cardboard_killer Posted July 18, 2020 Posted July 18, 2020 I was talking to a friend of mine yesterday and it came out that she had never read The French Lieutenant's Woman, simply a fantastic work of literature. I got so excited, I started re-reading it.
Chief_Mouser Posted July 18, 2020 Posted July 18, 2020 14 minutes ago, cardboard_killer said: I was talking to a friend of mine yesterday and it came out that she had never read The French Lieutenant's Woman, simply a fantastic work of literature. I got so excited, I started re-reading it. Tremendous book. Another of his that I really liked is 'Daniel Martin'. I didn't know this when I read it, but apparently the American critics loved it and the British ones hated it. Good job that I'm not, as a Brit, a critic. ?
lantern53 Posted July 19, 2020 Posted July 19, 2020 A newly published book, Race of Aces, tells the story of the race to be the top fighter ace in the Pacific theater, so it is about Richard Bong, Gerald Johnson, Neel Kearby, Tom Lynch. Accounts of their victories and their mistakes, which often cost them their lives. One thing I learned which I did not know was that on occasion some of these guys would go off and hunt Japanese planes, ON THEIR OWN! Sometimes they took a single wingman. They were so confident in their abilities they felt they could get away with it. Of course, we're not talking dogfights here, we are seeing how many of these victories were scored, which was a boom and zoom, high altitude to low altitude attack and get the hell out. Great book, though. 1
Heliopause Posted September 18, 2020 Posted September 18, 2020 Freshly delivered. Not exactly a novel though .... 2
Feathered_IV Posted September 18, 2020 Posted September 18, 2020 Cracking good read, written in 1943. The image of the RN cruisers charging out of the smoke screen to engage the Italian battlefleet will stay with you for life. 1
Diggun Posted September 18, 2020 Posted September 18, 2020 31 minutes ago, Feathered_IV said: Cracking good read Agreed. This is excellent. Really makes you feel 'there'. Would recommend reading Alistair MacLean's HMS Ulysses as a companion piece alongside this, MacLean's unremittingly grim tone is an interesting contrast to Forester's. 2
Uufflakke Posted September 20, 2020 Posted September 20, 2020 (edited) Water Margin: Outlaws of the Marsh As it is one of China's most popular books, it must have been read by tens of million of people in China and in Japan. If not hundreds of millions since it was written way back in the 14th century. A lot of fighting, looting, plundering and brigandry. Often compared to Robin Hood: stealing from the rich and giving it to the poor. But that is not that often the case in Water Margin: Outlaws of the Marsh. Her own fault. She should have listened to her husband. Edited September 20, 2020 by Uufflakke 1
cardboard_killer Posted October 13, 2020 Posted October 13, 2020 (edited) Waiting for shipment. Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in the Philippines, 1941-1942 Edited October 13, 2020 by cardboard_killer 1
Bremspropeller Posted October 13, 2020 Posted October 13, 2020 1 hour ago, cardboard_killer said: Waiting for shipment. Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in the Philippines, 1941-1942 On my shelf, too. Together with "Every Day a Nightmare". 1
unreasonable Posted October 14, 2020 Posted October 14, 2020 Okinawa - a well written account of the campaign, good mix of the personal experiences from both sides and the tactical picture, could have used one or two more maps, although the ones in there are OK. Mostly just lets the participants and facts speak for themselves, which is a refreshing change. Does argue that dropping the bomb was inevitable and justified, partly given what the Okinawa campaign had suggested an invasion would be like.
messsucher Posted October 14, 2020 Posted October 14, 2020 Nice book, though a bit like reference material about pilots in WW1, and something I was not looking for, but for what it is a nice book. 1
1PL-Husar-1Esk Posted October 14, 2020 Posted October 14, 2020 (edited) Just finished " Aces Falling: War Above The Trenches, 1918 " by Peter Hart , before that read "Bloody April: Slaughter in the Skies Over Arras, 1917" and "Somme Success: The Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of The Somme 1916" - all must read for ww1 enthusiast. What to read next .... Edited October 14, 2020 by 1PL-Husar-1Esk 1 1
CanadaOne Posted October 16, 2020 Author Posted October 16, 2020 On 10/14/2020 at 12:30 AM, vonGraf said: Never read it but heard a lot about it. I should get it and read it this winter. 1
Rjel Posted October 19, 2020 Posted October 19, 2020 I'm reading a book entitled DELAYED LEGACY. The book was written by the namesake son of a WWII P-51 pilot named Conrad Netting III. He flew with the 4thFG from April to June 1944 when he was lost a few days after D-Day. The book is well written and its story unique, the first half of it telling a lot of the story in the form of letters to and from a young couple separated by war. The second half of the book deals with the lost pilot's disposition after his death. Quite moving. As a disclaimer, it isn't as much about combat flying as it is about the effect WWII had on this young pilot and his even younger wife. Ultimately, it was a somewhat sadder story than I'd expected it to be. Those who continue to think the U.S. fighter pilot had little more to do than strap in, fly the missions and then go back home would do well to read this story. I'd recommend this book to any reader who likes the human aspect to any story. Those who revel in the details of combat flying will likely be disappointed. 1
cardboard_killer Posted November 18, 2020 Posted November 18, 2020 A quarter of the way though this. Okay so far. Really not too deep, but not dry either. One of the most interesting campaigns of the war, seeing off von Manstein, sacked by Hitler after losing this one. Retribution: The Soviet Reconquest of Central Ukraine, 1943 2
unreasonable Posted November 23, 2020 Posted November 23, 2020 Essential reading for anybody interested in the impact of new war technology. 1
ZachariasX Posted November 23, 2020 Posted November 23, 2020 The Big Show, this time all in order and less drama. COISNE was compiling three years of ORB records to match it against Clostermanns logbook, mission by mission. It is rather revealing in how exact Clostermann was, where he made his errors and how he came up with writing the The Big Show. 3
Mike2945 Posted November 24, 2020 Posted November 24, 2020 A superb account - I highly recommend this, especially when flying in BoM! I came across David Stahel as a result of watching a couple of his lectures on YouTube which were erudite and very revealing. His main contention is that the Germans weren't on the brink of winning the war in the East, and only just failed at the gates of Moscow, but rather......well, I'll leave you to watch the videos or read his books! Watch those and I guarantee you'll buy one of his books! Mike 1
cardboard_killer Posted November 26, 2020 Posted November 26, 2020 I was looking at amazon books and this one caught my eye. When I went for a closer look, the descritpion really dazzled me. 1
TheBlackPenguin Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 I have been listening to and following Philips P. O'Brian for awhile now and will read his book "How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II" https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/110871689X/ref=crt_ewc_img_huc_1?ie=UTF8&psc=1&smid=ATVPDKIKX0DER Here's his knowledge on Battle of The Bulge:
ZachariasX Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 2 hours ago, TheBlackPenguin said: Here's his knowledge on Battle of The Bulge: Does he have an axe to grind with someone specifically? That twitter thread is a rather unprofessional rant. 1
Bremspropeller Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 @ZachariasX how did the green Clostermann-book turn out to be? Just started reading 'Die Große Arena' again and am about to present a friend "The Big Show".
ZachariasX Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 2 hours ago, Bremspropeller said: Just started reading 'Die Große Arena' again and am about to present a friend "The Big Show". If you have interest in Clostermanns operational life, then Coisnes work is a very, very good addition. It details mission by mission every operational flight Clostermann entered in his logbook and matches that with squadrons records. It reveals how some mistakes found their way in the book "The Big Show", some for instance being caused by Clostermann by entering flights just before he did them and just entering flight times after coming back. Also there is a section that elaborates on when Clostermann actually came up with the idea of not just keeping notes for his parent, but actually writing it up with the intention it being a book eventually. Also he details the operational sorties of the "Alsace" Squadron at Biggin Hiil, detailing some background on Muchotte. In all it paints a pretty clear picture of what happened and it makes it obvious why that was difficult for everyone involved. If I just had that 20 years ago. And it costs nexts to nothing. After you read that, you can read the latest (and amended) edition of "Le Grand Cirque 2000". Best way to get back in French literature. 2
cardboard_killer Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 (edited) About a quarter through this one. Recommended. Not as detailed as Coddington's book on the campaign, which is the gold standard IMO, but more readable and keeping the important points front and center. Edited December 17, 2020 by cardboard_killer
Bremspropeller Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 (edited) 48 minutes ago, ZachariasX said: After you read that, you can read the latest (and amended) edition of "Le Grand Cirque 2000". Best way to get back in French literature. Thanks for the write-up! Unfortunately, my French is just enough to make people's ears bleed, when I'm talking. ? Nevermind, pulled the trigger on the green book and "Fire in the Sky". Edited December 17, 2020 by Bremspropeller
TheBlackPenguin Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 (edited) 8 hours ago, ZachariasX said: Does he have an axe to grind with someone specifically? That twitter thread is a rather unprofessional rant. Its obvious, those people who have Nazi fetishieses and how the Bulge has been poorly represented :). I think he is being straight and frank, it's not unprofessional at all. Edited December 17, 2020 by TheBlackPenguin
ZachariasX Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 35 minutes ago, TheBlackPenguin said: Its obvious, those people who have Nazi fetishieses and how the Bulge has been poorly represented :). What's your professional input into history? I think he is being straight and frank, it's not unprofessional at all. I understand that the twitter-tonality is a bit peculiar, but phrases like "everything is wrong" etc., makes one ask, what everything? Also his generalizations make assumptions he doesn't elaborate, saying "not of stratecig importance", well it was. It made the Russians conquer Berlin instead of the Americans. I think that is pretty important. It is not strategic in the sense that the Germans could, by capturing Antwerpen if everything went right for them and everything wrong for the Allies, could really alter the general course of the war. I understand if he got worked up by Neonazi war p*rn fantasies and that may have made him take a wholesale dump on a failed offensive. But this is venting and not helpful for any discussion. Or demonstration of knowledge. It is an offensive that was planned exectuted under he very noses of the Allies to the total surprise of the Allies. That in itself deserves some merit. And that is why I think if he knows what he talks about, he should be a bit more careful.
TheBlackPenguin Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 16 minutes ago, ZachariasX said: I understand that the twitter-tonality is a bit peculiar, but phrases like "everything is wrong" etc., makes one ask, what everything? Also his generalizations make assumptions he doesn't elaborate, saying "not of stratecig importance", well it was. It made the Russians conquer Berlin instead of the Americans. I think that is pretty important. It is not strategic in the sense that the Germans could, by capturing Antwerpen if everything went right for them and everything wrong for the Allies, could really alter the general course of the war. I understand if he got worked up by Neonazi war p*rn fantasies and that may have made him take a wholesale dump on a failed offensive. But this is venting and not helpful for any discussion. Or demonstration of knowledge. It is an offensive that was planned exectuted under he very noses of the Allies to the total surprise of the Allies. That in itself deserves some merit. And that is why I think if he knows what he talks about, he should be a bit more careful. Your entire first paragraph is wrong, factually and actuality. They did not come close, its a myth like say, the Battle of Britain being a close run thing. You're arguing with a *professor* of *strategic* level which I would safely is far higher than what you have, honestly if you want to argue with him go ahead as I have linked to it :). Second paragraph, sorry, but it's also latching onto how history of the Bulge and WW2 in general has been presented, he stated this clearly and concisely. Please, if you have anything real to add go an argue this with the O'Brian himself. Are you just upset that you notions may in fact be wrong? We have to be open that our preconceptions, or even what we learned from others may in fact be wrong. But, take it as it is, want to argue go on Twitter as I'd love to see your points directed to him :).
cardboard_killer Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 I think Twitter makes every argument sound reductive. And I can certainly understand throwing up one's arms in frustration over the fetishism of German militarism; I think it is a problem in my other hobby, board war gaming. So I would cut him some slack before calling him unprofessional over a tweet. OTOH, his own work seems to (haven't read it yet) diminish the Soviet contribution to the war. This review of his book would certainly indicate so: Quote From the United States Ralph Chang 1.0 out of 5 stars Vastly Misunderstands WW2 perhaps due to Anglo-American chauvinism Reviewed in the United States on August 22, 2017 Serious historians have always known that the Second World War was won by the Soviet Union in the Eastern Front. The historical fact is that the Red Army defeated the armies of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Finland and Romania and forced them to surrender. This happened between 1941 and 1943, by the middle of 1943 the war was obvious lost to Germany and it only continued due to the fact Hitler was unable to accept defeat. While, after being decisively defeated in 1940, the Anglo-Americans only managed to re-enter in mainland Europe in mid 1944, long after the outcome of the Russo-German war had been decided. Therefore, they played no decisive role in the outcome of the war. This becomes even more obvious if one looks at the casualty statistics: the number of German army soldiers killed in action in the Eastern front was 1,105,987 up to January 31, 1945, in the Western front, the number was 107,042, half of which in the Battle of France in 1940 and half in 1944-45, while in North Africa and Italy the total number was 50,481. Hence, after the Battle of France, approximately 90% of all German army soldiers killed in action were killed in the Eastern front. And during the decisive years of the war: 1941,1942 and 1943 the proportion of German army soldiers killed in action in the Eastern front was about 97%, with 3% lost in Italy and North Africa (source: OKW Casualty Figures). In terms of soldiers killed per semester, German KIA was roughly constant since the opening of the Eastern front hence even the opening of the Western front didn't change substantially the number of German battle casualties: 1941 1st half - 10,708 1941 2nd half - 280,700 1942 1st half - 220,500 1942 2nd half - 222,822 1943 1st half - 162,015 1943 2nd half - 287,081 1944 1st half - 214,700 1944 2nd half - 243,265 Well, one might say: it's true that the vast majority of the casualties was in the Eastern front because land battles are bloody while aerial and naval battles are not. True: German naval personnel losses were only 48,904 KIA, which included garrisons of harbors, while the Luftwaffe lost 138,596 men killed in action, but mostly as part of the Luftwaffe ground forces in the Eastern front. And while it's true that the Anglo-Americans were mainly responsible for defeating the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe, it's also true that these forces represented only a small minority of total German resources: in the 3rd quarter of 1943, monthly sales of aircraft to the Luftwaffe were 507 million RM, while sales of ships to the Kriegsmarine were 83 million RM (source: Tooze, No Room for Miracles), for comparison the average of German monthly total military expenditures in 1943 were 9,330 million RM (source: Harrison, The Economics of World War 2). Hence, expenditure on equipment for the German navy and airforce constituted only 6.3% of German military expenditures and that in 3rd quarter of 1943 when output of military aircraft was much higher than earlier. In terms of personnel, in 1944 the Wehrmacht had: 12,070,000 personnel of which: 810,000 in the Kriesgmarine (mostly in garrisons) 1,500,000 in the Luftwaffe (mostly manning AA batteries) 9,660,000 in the Army (Heer+WaffenSS+auxiliary troops) And a lot of Luftwaffe personnel was in the Luftwaffe ground forces (which were about 20 divisions which means 500,000 men) and hence should be considered part of the army. Therefore, including Luftwaffe ground forces, 85% of the German armed forces personnel was in the army. Given that expenditure on specialized equipment for the Navy and Airforce was only 6.3% of German military expenditures and the vast majority of personnel was in the army (or in ground elements of the Airforce and the Navy) it is easy to see that the vast majority of German resources were allocated for their ground forces, leaving a small fraction of resources for the actual airforce and the naval vessels. Why the author thinks naval and airpower was so important? It's because if we look at US or UK military expenditures, their expenditures on aircraft and naval vessels were much larger in proportion to government expenditures. In 1943, American expenditures on naval vessels and aircraft was 24.5 billion dollars (source: Wartime Production Achievements) while total war expenditures were 79.5 billion dollars (source: The Economics of World War 2), so 30.8% of total American military expenditures were direct purchases of ships and aircraft. Their navy and airforce also constituted a much larger share of manpower: in 1944, US military had 11.41 million personnel of which the army ground force had 5.7 million and the navy and air forces had the rest or 5.71 million, or about 50% - 50% army to navy+airforce, in Germany's case it was 85%-15%. This was a reflection of their vastly different geostrategic situations. Also, the most expensive aircraft were bombers like the Ju-88, cost 300,000 RM and were deployed in the Eastern front while fighters that were usually lost to the Anglo American airforces were fighters like the Me-109 which cost 85,000 RM. So while German aircraft losses were higher in the Western front the most expensive aircraft were lost in the Eastern front which were also the aircraft that consumed the most fuel: a single sortie of a Ju-88 consumed as much fuel as 5 sorties of a Me-109. Since most Luftwaffe sorties were done in the Eastern front (in 1943, about 430,000 sorties were done in the Eastern front) with the largest aircraft, hence, the vast majority of Luftwaffe fuel consumption was spent in the Eastern front. And for Germany, aircraft fuel was more scarce than aircraft given their deficiency in petroleum resources. Therefore, even though the majority of losses were against the Anglo-Americans, the majority of Luftwaffe resources were allocated against the Soviet Union and not against the Anglo-Americans. Additional points: the author appears to believe that Japan was an important strategic player in WW2. It was not. Japan was a small developing country that lacked the economic and industrial resources to be a great power, Japan was well aware of that and hoped that Germany would win the war which would allow Japan to expand their colonial sphere in Asia. When Germany lost the war, Japan lost the war. Focusing on the little naval exercises of US-Japan is plain irrelevant for understanding the outcome of WW2. Why the author focuses on Japan so much, to the point of making the absurd claim that Japan's industrial resources were comparable to the Soviet Union: in 1940, USSR produced 166 million tons of coal and 18.3 million tons of steel, Japan produced 57 million tons of coal and 5.4 million tons of steel, in total GDP the discrepancy is similar: in 1937, USSR's GDP was estimated at 398,017 million 1990 dollars, Japan's GDP was estimated at 134,807 million 1990 dollars, hence, Japan's industrial and economic resources were around 30% of the USSR's), is due to the author's ethnocentric point of view. Italy, by the way, was economically a much more developed country than Japan was, with about twice the per capita income (at about 56% of the UK's per capita income compared to 28% for Japan, in 1937) and much higher life expectancy (58 years compared to 48 years for Japan) in 1937. However, the author forgets Italy because Italy surrendered just after their armies were smashed by the Red Army. The idea that air-sea power was the fundamentally determinant to WW2 is based on the fact that after being decisively defeated in 1940, the Allies couldn't fight the German army anymore since they lost physical access to continental Europe. Hence, they invested the vast majority of their resources into the navy and airforces in order to regain access to continental Europe. However, after they managed to gain superiority in the sea and the air by mid 1944, and hence were able to perform an amphibious landing in continental Europe, the Red Army of the Soviet Union had already defeated the German army in the decisive battles of Stalingrad, Kursk and (just a couple of weeks before Normandy's breakthrough, Bagration), Italy had already surrendered for a quite some time: since September 1943 and the Red Army had already pushed the Wehrmacht over 1,200 kilometers away from Stalingrad by early 1944 while inflicting over 5 million casualties on the German army over the 3 years between the invasion of the Soviet Union up to the Anglo-American landings in Normandy. By the way, airpower is not a substitute for ground firepower: in a sample of 60 engagements in Italy in 1943-44, Dupuy (1978) estimated that on average 5.3% of Allied firepower was from the air and 94.7% was from the ground. Air superiority represents a complementary advantage to a ground forces and provides psychological support for the troops on the ground but it cannot substitute for those: ground based artillery represented 60% of all firepower and inflicted the vast majority of casualties. Even after the Germans lost air superiority and their air force was grounded, the level of casualties suffered by the allies did not decrease: monthly Soviet losses in the Eastern front continued to be around 600,000 losses per month in soldiers killed, missing and wounded even after the Red Army obtained complete aerial superiority after mid 1944. While in proportion to the number of divisions engaged Anglo-American losses in the Western front were the same level of WW1: in the Hundred days of Offensive of 1918, which actually lasted 115 days, Allied casualties were 1,070,000 or 9,000 casualties a day, in Operation Overlord, Allied casualties were 226,000 over 80 days or 2,800 casualties a day, but the Western front in 1944 had 60 German divisions, in 1918, it had 205 German divisions. In proportion to the number of divisions engaged losses in WW1 and WW2 were the same as well as the level of German qualitative superiority. The author also argues that allied airpower negated German qualitative superiority on the ground and made possible allied victory, one could just note, however, that the vast numerical superiority of the Allied ground forces (specially the Red Army with it's 540 divisions and 100,000 artillery tubes) already more than compensated for their qualitative inferiority. The Allies won WW1 against Germany and did so with the same level of qualitative inferiority on ground forces and when airpower was absolutely insignificant. In WW2 airpower became more important but was still 5% of Anglo-American firepower (and around 2-3% of German or Soviet firepower) and hence not decisive on it's own right. Also, the Soviet Union already obtained the strategic initiative after they encircled the German 6th army in Stalingrad which was about 18 months before the Allies obtained air superiority over Europe hence by the time air superiority was obtained in mid 1944 the Red Army had already advanced by more than 50% of the distance between Stalingrad and Berlin while the Wehrmacht was collapsing as they were unable to replace the losses of infantry divisions lost to the Red Army. Hence, it is obvious that gaining air-superiority played no decisive role in Germany's defeat in WW2. Of course, aerial and navel superiority was decisive for Japan's defeat because Japan was a small island nation without natural resources so without air and naval superiority they couldn't import food and would starve. Hence, like Tooze in Wages of Destruction (which I reviewed nearly 8 years ago), this author also focuses too much on the Anglo-Americans perspective and misses the overall geostrategic situation. I think that Anglo-American historians suffer from a certain bias from their perspective that leads for them to overfocus on the events directly related to their countries instead of trying to look at historical events from a global perspective. 5 people found this helpful
ZachariasX Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 37 minutes ago, TheBlackPenguin said: Your entire first paragraph is wrong, factually and actuality. They did not come close, its a myth like say, the Battle of Britain being a close run thing. You're arguing with a *professor* of *strategic* level which I would safely is far higher than what you have, honestly if you want to argue with him go ahead as I have linked to it :). That wasn't my point about "them getting close". But your insistence on that aspect illustrates what he was ranting about. It is a fair point, but still i consider it reductive. 40 minutes ago, TheBlackPenguin said: Second paragraph, sorry, but it's also latching onto how history of the Bulge and WW2 in general has been presented, he stated this clearly and concisely. Please, if you have anything real to add go an argue this with the O'Brian himself. Are you just upset that you notions may in fact be wrong? We have to be open that our preconceptions, or even what we learned from others may in fact be wrong. But, take it as it is, want to argue go on Twitter as I'd love to see your points directed to him :). Generally presented? You have the Nazi wet-dreamers and then mostly the ones that think the German command was a bunch of imbecils, usually it's "the other general" (if you asked one) or or Hitler and Goering. At least in the latter case, they at least usualy resort to material correctness. And no, I will not discuss that battle with him and not with you here. Regardless of how you interpreted my lines, I doubt we are too far apart on that on the whole anyway. And it is not the place for it. It did however read throgh his twitter feed to get a better idea of him. He indeed has interesting ideas. 52 minutes ago, cardboard_killer said: So I would cut him some slack before calling him unprofessional over a tweet. You both might be right about that. I am not really used to twitter-history, so theres a bit much hot sauce for me in that. Regarding the book How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, I think that reasoning is a bit reductionistic as well. That was the reason I took his rent a bit more at face value than necessary. It is a rather expensive book. It better be good. Great if it is.
1CGS LukeFF Posted December 17, 2020 1CGS Posted December 17, 2020 2 hours ago, ZachariasX said: You both might be right about that. I am not really used to twitter-history, so theres a bit much hot sauce for me in that. Regarding the book How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, I think that reasoning is a bit reductionistic as well. That was the reason I took his rent a bit more at face value than necessary. It is a rather expensive book. It better be good. Great if it is. O'Brien was on the We Have Ways of Making You Talk podcast with historian James Holland and Al Murray back in a two-part interview earlier this year, speaking about this book. The interviews were quite good and while I didn't agree with him on everything, most of what he presents I think is pretty well-supported. You can find the interviews here: Where the War was Won - Part 1 Where the War was Won - Part 2 1 1 1
II/JG17_HerrMurf Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 Currently about half way through Ian Toll's Pacific Crucible. It is rediculously good and delves into both the strategic and tactical sides of the conflict. I got to the first attacks on the Marshall's and couldn't put it down even though I had worked a double shift and was due for another the next day. Bring on BoMI and the Pacific Campaign 1
SCG_Tzigy Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 https://www.amazon.com/Low-Level-Hell-Scout-Pilot-ebook/dp/B001QAP3JQ/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=low+level+hell&qid=1608246630&sr=8-1 Absolutely insane. I can not believe these guys lived through all that and some. One of my patients flew scouts. Was able to return to normal life, retired recently after working as a judge. Crazy shite. 1
sevenless Posted December 17, 2020 Posted December 17, 2020 On 7/16/2020 at 12:35 PM, Irishratticus72 said: And you think you're having a bad day? Oof. Ugh! Who is telling that story? Krupinski? Thanks for the book tips. I guess I pull the trigger on them.
ZachariasX Posted December 18, 2020 Posted December 18, 2020 10 hours ago, LukeFF said: O'Brien was on the We Have Ways of Making You Talk podcast with historian James Holland and Al Murray back in a two-part interview earlier this year, speaking about this book. The interviews were quite good and while I didn't agree with him on everything, most of what he presents I think is pretty well-supported. You can find the interviews here: Where the War was Won - Part 1 Where the War was Won - Part 2 Thanks for those link Luke, a rather interesting talk. And thanks to you @TheBlackPenguin for bringing him up. I didn't really know him before. Although I would not always come to the same conclusions as he does, he makes some good arguments. 1 1
cardboard_killer Posted January 5, 2021 Posted January 5, 2021 (edited) Just got it in the mail today, The Battle for North Africa, 1940-1943, by W.G.E. Jackson, who also wrote the relevant books in the official history of the war for the British. I've been told it is the best single volume for the campaigns. I intend to put it to the front of the queue, stopping A Time For Courage: The Royal Air Force European War, 1939-1945 by John Terraine. I've gotten to the very beginning of the war, page 107, and it seems to be a well written history but very much from the British perspective. I'll try to get back to it some day, but maybe not as I don't see anything new and ground breaking (well it was written in the 1970s). Edited January 5, 2021 by cardboard_killer 2
Enceladus828 Posted January 5, 2021 Posted January 5, 2021 As early as next week this book should arrive in my mailbox/be delivered to me: https://www.amazon.ca/Golden-Thread-Mystery-Surrounding-Hammarskjöld-ebook/dp/B07J54VBV8 Can't wait to read it.
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