The Battle Of Kursk

[Thad]

Part 1: The Meaning of the Battle of Kursk. 

 

    Kursk is a highly controversial battle. Right after the battle, Marshal Vasilevsky wrote an after-action report that attempted to conceal the truth about 5 GTA’s losses, but Stalin soon found out and was enraged. Initially, Stalin wanted to have Rotmistrov tried and executed, but eventually Vasilevsky softened his response. Instead, Stalin put Politburo member Georgy M. Malenkov in charge of a commission to determine the reasons why the 5 GTA’s counter-attack had failed; Malenkov’s report was sealed, but it concluded that the 5 GTA’s attack was a model of an unsuccessful operation. Rotmistrov was allowed to remain in command of 5 GTA until mid-1944 but afterwards he was kicked upstairs into various high-level desk jobs.

 

    In the 1960s, Kursk was not well known in the West. Initially, popular memoirs by Guderian and Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin depicted Zitadelle as a decisive defeat, but this view was challenged by von Manstein’s memoirs that complained about Hitler ‘throwing away a victory’ in his decision to cancel Zitadelle. 

 

    Paul Carell echoed von Manstein’s claims in his well-known books written in 1964–70 and he helped to shape the early historiography of Kursk with his contention that von Manstein had indeed been on the cusp of a great victory when Hitler pulled the rug out from under his feet.

 

    Carell’s histories also helped to create a heroic mythology around the Waffen-SS troops involved in Zitadelle, which retains great credibility even today. The Soviet version of Kursk began appearing with the multi-volume History of the Great Patriotic War in 1958 and Rotmistrov’s inaccurate memoirs in the 1960s. This white-washed version of Kursk was designed to conceal the Red Army’s disproportionate losses in the battle and Nikita Khrushchev’s (by then First Secretary of the CPSU) role in the disastrous commitment of Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA. 

 

Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.

 

Part 2: The Meaning of the Battle Of Kursk

 

    Soviet accounts created a highly mythic account of Prokhorovka as ‘the greatest tank battle in history’ and Grigoryi A. Koltunov claimed that, ‘in one day the Germans lost more than 350 tanks and over 10,000 officers and men.’ Soviet historians regarded Kursk as determining the outcome of the war in the East, stating that, ‘the Germans had been bled white’ and had permanently lost the initiative. This version of the battle was melded with Carell’s and influenced popular as well as academic histories written about Kursk until the mid-1990s. Even seasoned authors such as Albert Seaton, John Erickson and David Glantz accepted embellished accounts of Kursk as historical fact. 

 

    In 1995, Glantz’s landmark one-volume account of the Eastern Front, When Titans Clashed, still claimed that the Germans lost 320 tanks and assault guns at Prokhorovka. At that point, two things happened which reduced most previous historiography on Kursk to pulp: the records of II.SS-Panzerkorps became available, and the Soviet-era archives were partly opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Books written based upon this new information by Zetterling, Nipe, Glantz and Zamulin have given a much more realistic interpretation of Kursk, but still suffer from biases. 

 

    Zetterling took a materialistic approach and provided a great statistical analysis of the battle based upon better – but not perfect – numbers. He used Totalausfalle numbers of tanks to show that the German armour was not crippled at Kursk and still retained the ability to advance, particularly if Hitler had allowed Nehring’s XXIV Panzerkorps to reinforce Hoth. However, Zetterling’s numbers are somewhat disingenuous, in that he suggests that tanks that were not completely destroyed were still useful to the Germans since they could be repaired, but in fact tanks which had been repeatedly hit by anti-tank fire and mines were increasingly ‘degraded’ to the point that they had only marginal combat value. He also fails to put the heavy German personnel losses in perspective: by 13 July von Manstein’s Panzer-Divisionen had lost a large number of tactical leaders, including three Panzer-Regiment commanders and multiple battalion and company commanders; the loss of these leaders negatively impacted unit morale and motivation. The Tiger tank units were particularly hard hit; for example, the s. Pz.Abt. had suffered about 40 per cent personnel casualties and the Waffen-SS separate Tiger tank companies had lost multiple commanders. 

 

    Personnel losses tend to hit armoured units particularly hard, since experienced leaders, gunners and drivers cannot be easily replaced by rear-echelon personnel or partly-trained replacements. What Zetterling missed was that while the Germans were able keep their Totalausfalle numbers low in relation to Soviet losses, the repaired tanks and remaining crews did not have anything near the same efficiency as the tanks and crews at the start of the offensive. 

 

    In 1996, amateur historian Georg Nipe wrote Decision in the Ukraine, which used some of the new numbers from German records, but fell into the trap of endorsing von Manstein’s claims about Zitadelle as a ‘lost victory.’ Without reference to any Soviet records, Nipe claimed that Rotmistrov lost 600–650 tanks at Prokhorovka on 12 July and that the Germans had actually gained numerical superiority in tanks in this sector and that the commitment of Nehring’s XXIV Panzerkorps may have been decisive.
 

Edited May 17, 2019 by Thad

[photog95661]

You caught me by surprise with this.  I have never claimed to be a historian, but your comments are totally beyond my understanding of this battle.  I know you well enough to question your input - this is a totally new perspective.  I will need a few days to digest this.  You have totally managed to blow my mind!  Once again, it seems that popular folklore is not totally consistent with the facts. I suspect this post will attract a lot of commentary.  I suspect the next few days will be interesting.

[Torrens]

Thanks for your input, I love reading things like this! There is also controversy about which was the actual  largest tank battle in history. Have a look at this video by a youtuber channel named TIK. He goes in depth about how another tank battle early into the war might have surpassed the Prohorovka engagement in numbers.

 

Edited May 17, 2019 by Torrens

[Thad]

Part 3: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk

 

    In 1999, David. M. Glantz wrote the best available single-volume history of the Battle of Kursk, based upon a good mix of Soviet and German records. However, Glantz failed to offer much insight into why major Soviet armoured counter-attacks on 8 and 12 July failed so badly, or why the II.SS-Panzerkorps was able to penetrate Vatutin’s defensive lines so quickly. 

 

    Nipe returned to the fray in 2011 with Blood, Steel and Myth, which focused even more narrowly on II.SS-Panzerkorps. Although he does not use Soviet records, Nipe added great detail on the operations of the Waffen-SS and concluded that the number of tanks involved in Prokhorovka was far fewer than previously stated, particularly on the German side. Indeed, it is now clear that no more than 210 German and 642 Soviet tanks participated in the fighting on 12 July 1943, which is quantitatively smaller than some of the tank battles around Smolensk in 1941 and Voronezh in 1942. 

 

    Distancing himself from earlier claims, Nipe also concluded that the capture of Prokhorovka would not have made any difference and the commitment of XXIV Panzerkorps would not have been decisive. 

 

    Finally, Valeriy Zamulin’s ground-breaking Demolishing the Myth (2011) has revealed a treasure-trove of Soviet records about the battle that provide a much more realistic interpretation. 

 

    While Hoth’s 4. Panzerarmee had inflicted grievous armour losses on Rotmistrov’s ill-timed 5 GTA counter-attack, the combination of mines, anti-tank guns, artillery and air attacks had in fact worn down the German combined arms team – just as the Stavka had intended. Hoth could still cobble together an armoured spearhead with his remaining tanks, but it was the loss of Panzergrenadiers and pioniers that made further advance problematic. By 15 July, von Manstein’s forces had suffered over 28,000 casualties, including 5,600 dead or missing.

 

    Altogether, the three Panzerkorps committed to Zitadelle by Heeresgruppe Süd still had 340 tanks (including 134 Pz IV and 33 Tigers) and 156 assault guns operational (about one-third of starting strength). According to Zetterling, Heeresgruppe Sud lost only 119 tanks and 10 assault guns during Zitadelle, but this means that over 800 AFVs were under repair. 

 

   Although Kursk was not a ‘death ride’ for the Panzerwaffe, a number of German Panzer units, such as all three Panzer-Divisionen in Breith’s III. Panzerkorps and the Panther brigade, were rendered combat-ineffective due to losses. Indeed, half of von Manstein’s remaining armoured combat power was concentrated in Hausser’s II.SS-Panzerkorps, with the other two Panzerkorps were no longer capable of attacking. 

 

   The suggestion that the II./SS-Panzerkorps could have made any significant advance northward after the action at Prokhorovka on 12 July is absurd on a number of levels, beginning with the reality that the factors that were still slowing the German armour – the mines, anti-tank guns and artillery, as well as the lack of infantry to cover the flanks – were still intact. Soviet airpower was also intact and causing frequent damage to Panzer units in the open. 

 

Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword. 

[JG1_Wittmann]

Nipe was I believe the first to use SS source material. primarily because it was not available earlier.  Glantz,  although having had a long  US Army career i believe,  was always  more of a Soviet fanboy  than  historian,  he just regurgitated all of their propaganda, in book form  in English for them.  A glaring error made by alot of historians was using the soviet account,  but mot people in the press sympathize with communism.  The Soviets hated the SS divisions most of all.  THe tried to weave a story that the SS suffered major losses at kursk in the south.

The losses claimed by them, were more  tanks than they would have had if 100% were operational.  That is where the lie exposed itself.  It was easier for the soviets to cover the 5th Guards Tank army losses because they were producing so many tanks, they just reconstituted it after the battle and lied about it being wiped out.  I  will have to look for the book, but a german was in a TIger,  t34's charged across a field with infantry on them  in masses. TIgers  then PzIV's opened up long range and destroyed them all, infantry bailed early when they took hits on some.

 

History  is not always true,  as written

[Thad]

Part 4: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk

 

    Operation Zitadelle was not the ‘death ride’ of the Panzerwaffe, as Soviet historians tried to depict for years. Far from it. Yet neither was Zitadelle a ‘lost victory’ as von Manstein claimed, since the Soviets were already at the point where they could replace losses far more rapidly than the Germans. 

 

    Rather, Zitadelle was the end of the road for the traditional German combined arms team, built upon the integration of mechanized manoeuvre forces and close air support. After Kursk, the Germans still had plenty of tanks and assault guns, but fewer and fewer supporting arms, air support or veteran leaders. It was the German infantry divisions that were disintegrating, which made it increasingly difficult for the panzers to hold or retake ground. Furthermore, the Germans learned the wrong lessons about tank warfare at Kursk – that it was a tank gunnery contest and that the side that outgunned the other won. The Tigers had done very well during Zitadelle, inflicting greatly disproportionate losses on the enemy and absorbing enormous punishment. Only 11 of 117 Tigers were destroyed during Zitadelle, although their operational readiness rate was very low so it was rare for more than a few Tigers to be involved in any given action.

 

    Increasingly, the Germans placed their faith in long 7.5cm and 8.8cm guns, at the expense of manoeuvreability. The Pz III had generally been kept in the background during Zitadelle and the Pz IV was now regarded as second-rate. Despite its shabby performance, Hitler and the OKH believed that the Panther would eventually counter-balance the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks. New heavy tanks, like the 68-ton King Tiger under development, were regarded as the answer to Soviet numbers, not trying to build a better medium tank. Effectively, after Kursk the Wehrmacht abandoned its interest in building more or better 30-ton tanks and settled on the fantasy that smaller numbers of super-heavy tanks would alter the trajectory of a lost war.

 

     Soviet losses at Kursk are more difficult to pin down, but the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts suffered approximately 148,000 casualties in stopping von Manstein’s offensive and lost between 600–900 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, the Steppe Front continued to pour fresh reserves into the battle even as Hitler called off the offensive and Vatutin’s armoured formations still had between 500-900 operational tanks and self-propelled guns.

 

    Painful losses suffered against Panther and Tiger tanks finally encouraged the GABTU to press for an upgraded main armament for the T-34 and a new heavy tank; these two initiatives would lead to the introduction of the T-34-85 and the IS-2 within six months. However, the Red Army still regarded the medium tank as its primary mobile combat system and heavy tanks were intended only to level the playing field when enemy heavy tanks appeared. In contrast to the Wehrmacht, the Battle of Kursk helped the Red Army to recognize that armoured warfare was not just about tanks and they learned to use their anti-tank and artillery capabilities to balance the tactical shortcomings of their tanks.

 

     Failures at Kursk taught the Red Army that launching hasty, ill-planned operations was counter-productive and as a result, the Red Army tried to fight in more methodical fashion. In time, Soviet improvements in combined arms warfare proved more decisive than German skill in tank gunnery. 

 

Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.   

[Thad]

Final Part: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk

 

    Another aspect of the Battle of Kursk which is rarely considered is its indecisiveness. Neither side achieved what it hoped to accomplish in this inordinate expenditure of resources. On the Soviet side, the Red Army wanted the German armour to literally ‘impale’ itself on mines and anti-tank gun barriers, but was risk-averse to allowing the Germans to achieve any kind of breakthrough. Every time German armour threatened to break through a Soviet defensive line, the Soviet commander committed most of his available armour to counter-attack it, resulting in head-in engagements with German assault groups. 

 

    However, in order for the Red Army to achieve any kind of decisive success at Kursk, Soviet tactical commanders needed to allow German spearheads to advance into the depth of the defence, creating vulnerable flanks. Given the forces available for Zitadelle, there was no way that the German pincers could have reached Kursk and held a viable front with the limited number of divisions available. Von Manstein would have required a dozen extra divisions to hold the flanks of a penetration stretching to Kursk. Yet lacking these divisions, deeper German penetrations meant longer, weaker flanks.

 

    If Stalin had granted Rokossovsky and Vatutin the flexibility to allow some loss of ground, Soviet armored counter-attacks against the extended German salient would have increased the possibility of surrounding and destroying some of the attacking Panzer-Divisions.

 

    On the German side, lack of operational flexibility robbed Zitadelle of any chance of achieving decisive results even before it started. The Germans knew very well that the Soviets had identified their likely attack sectors and were deploying strong forces to block them. Without surprise or a favourable correlation of forces, Zitadelle was limited to being a frontal assault.

 

    However, the Germans could have used the obvious tactic of a double pincer attack as a deception to fix large Soviet forces in place, while shifting the actual axis of attack to the face of the Kursk salient. If both Model and von Manstein had shifted part of their armour against the relatively weak 38th and 60th Armies, while mounting strong feints against the expected attack sectors, they likely would have achieved operational surprise and an overwhelming local superiority. 

 

    Soviet operational reserves were poorly deployed to respond quickly to a threat to the face of the salient, which would have delayed any response. Furthermore, the face of the Kursk salient was defended by far fewer mines and anti-tank guns, which would have increased the chance of a rapid breakthrough. By smashing in the face of the Kursk salient – which likely would have been far less costly than trying to reach Kursk through three lines of defence, von Manstein might have reduced the size of the Kursk salient and thereby shortened his front line. By ‘hitting them where they weren’t’ – a tactic favored by the Panzerwaffe in 1941–42 – the Germans might have achieved one or more nice tactical victories in the summer of 1943, as they had in the past.

 

However, inflexibility was the downfall of Zitadelle, since rather than using manoeuvre, the German commanders opted for brute force.

 

Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.   

[Porkins]

Really good posts. What I've read about Kursk follows what you're saying. I think a particularly salient point is that the German failure at Kursk was more the result of a lack of manpower, specifically trained panzer grenadiers and the officers and NCO's to lead them, than it was a lack of armored vehicles. The most serious shortage for Germany in the later half of the war (along with oil) was manpower. 

 

For this reason I quibble a bit with your assertion that it was an error for Germany to concentrate on larger heavy tanks as opposed to building, "a better medium tank." More PIV's, or an improved version of the PIV, was not a solution for Germany because they didn't have the trained manpower reserves to man enough medium tanks at anywhere near the numbers to counter Allied numbers. They were in desperate need of force multipliers, like a tank that enabled a 5 man crew to match the combat power of 5-10 allied tanks. This ultimately was not successful either, but I would argue that the idea was more sound than trying to outproduce the Allies, which was impossible for Germany to do. 

 

My last thought on Kursk is that it is not only overblown in terms of tank battles, it gets overblown in terms of overall importance. The reality is that even if Germany was successful, closing off the Kursk salient and destroying the armies w/in, the Soviets had more armies coming. Win or lose, Kursk wasn't a turning point either way for Germany. Their fate was sealed at Stalingrad, or even in front of the gates of Moscow. 

[MiloMorai]

A link for further reading, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545

[unreasonable]

@Thad Good discussion!

 

I agree with much of your conclusions, but it is hard to see how the Germans could have achieved anything decisive even if they had smashed into the centre of the salient. The problem for the Germans was that they had just enough divisions in good shape to either act as reserves, or to go for a strictly limited offensive like Citadel.

 

The Soviets were already planning to attack at Orel (Op. Kutuzov) and were able to do this in relative safety as all the German mobile units were being ground down elsewhere. By the end of the year the Germans were back at the Dnieper and having to think about building reserves to counter the invasion of France, which they knew was coming, as well as dealing with Italy.

 

If they had held back the mobile divisions they may have been able to have good results counter attacking the Soviet spearheads: once away from their fixed positions, minefields and artillery support the Soviet tank formations were very vulnerable. Longer run, it is hard to see the Germans not being defeated in the East once they had to start building up strength in the West as well. They were simply losing the production battle by a huge margin, and the Allies, East and West, had learned how to avoid stupid mistakes. Without Citadel, though, they might have held out a bit longer in the East.

 

I count Citadel as a definite win for the Soviets, whatever the loss count, but I agree with @Porkins - it did not decide anything, just accelerated the German collapse.  

 

 

 

 

[Finkeren]

Honestly, the more I read about Zitadelle, the less I understand the prominence it has gotten in popular history, especially compared to the intense drama of the Soviet offensives that followed (Seriously, we need more books, documentaries and blockbuster movies about the Lower Dniepr Offensive). A failed offensive that was fairly unambitious from the start, and aborted without having reached penetration to operational depths, soon negated by enemy counteroffensives, seems a strange candidate for a place in the public's mind as one of the greatest battles in history.

 

 

[LukeFF]

On 6/4/2019 at 4:50 AM, Finkeren said:

A failed offensive that was fairly unambitious from the start, and aborted without having reached penetration to operational depths, soon negated by enemy counteroffensives, seems a strange candidate for a place in the public's mind as one of the greatest battles in history.

 

Not really hard to understand - it was a large tank battle, and it was also the last time the Germans would launch one of their summer offensives. For those reasons alone it has gathered as much attention as it has.

 

On 6/4/2019 at 4:50 AM, Finkeren said:

blockbuster movies about the Lower Dnieper Offensive

 

C'mon, you know for very good reasons why are never going to see something like that in the West.  

[Finkeren]

1 hour ago, LukeFF said:

C'mon, you know for very good reasons why are never going to see something like that in the West.  

 

They tried with Stalingrad, and it made plenty good money, even if it was a mess of anti-commie propaganda and nonsensical storylines. And let's face it: The Soviet-German war is much, much better known by the general public, than it was 20 years ago, not least thanks to video games.

 

[DD_Arthur]

39 minutes ago, Finkeren said:

And let's face it: The Soviet-German war is much, much better known by the general public, than it was 20 years ago, 

 

Hmmm......not convinced about that.

 

Back on topic though;  what was the strategic objective of Zitadelle?  It's difficult to understand what exactly they were trying to achieve. 

In '41 they tried to destroy the Red Army.  In '42 they tried to cut the Soviet Union in half. In '43 they tried to.....straighten the line?

[Finkeren]

12 minutes ago, DD_Arthur said:

 

Hmmm......not convinced about that.

 

Back on topic though;  what was the strategic objective of Zitadelle?  It's difficult to understand what exactly they were trying to achieve. 

In '41 they tried to destroy the Red Army.  In '42 they tried to cut the Soviet Union in half. In '43 they tried to.....straighten the line?

 

By 1943 there was no strategy left. People like Robert Citino have searched far and wide for any rhyme or reason on the strategic level of the German war effort in 1943, and have come up short. After the Stalingrad debacle and the loss of most of the important gains in the Caucasus, any strategic analysis of the German situation could only yield one result: Bring the war to an end as quickly as possible to minimize the losses. Since capitulation was politically impossible, and both sides were determined to see it through to the bitter end, it was much easier for German officers on all levels to just keep on doing, what they were doing and try to tackle the immediate problems at hand rather than think about the long term issues and get depressed about it. That way they doomed many, many millions of people to death and suffering. 

 

Ironically, there was more grand strategic purpose to the last desperate gasp of the Wehrmacht with the Ardennes Offensive in late '44. It was a hopeless attempt at causing the entire western front to collapse for the Western Allies and force a separate peace aimed at holding back Soviet advance into central Europe - Something that was never gonna happen, even if the offensive had somehow succeeded. But at least the Wehrmacht was trying to do something.

[Squaluswobbiebait]

An affordable tome surveying the battle of Kursk that any Ostfront armor lover should have. (An abridged version of his 1662 page beast!) 

 

https://www.amazon.com/Battle-Prokhorovka-Kursk-Largest-History/dp/0811738078/ref=pd_rhf_ee_p_img_10?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=CPYDEMDCRF91G04JBWZY

[SCG_Slater]

History is written by the winners, that's why history is not history per say, it's more a one sided view from the victorious side, that can be said about all history.

[Finkeren]

26 minutes ago, Slater said:

History is written by the winners, that's why history is not history per say, it's more a one sided view from the victorious side, that can be said about all history.

 

In the case of the war on the Eastern Front, that is demonstrably false. For the first few decades (in the West) that history was to a very large degree written by the losers. War memoirs of German generals and other German sources were given far too much weight, and historians are still working to clean up the mess of myths, distortions and mistakes that was the result.

[Cybermat47]

15 minutes ago, Finkeren said:

 

In the case of the war on the Eastern Front, that is demonstrably false. For the first few decades (in the West) that history was to a very large degree written by the losers. War memoirs of German generals and other German sources were given far too much weight, and historians are still working to clean up the mess of myths, distortions and mistakes that was the result.

 

Yep, that’s what led to the “clean Wehrmacht myth” - the idea that there were no Nazis in the Wehrmacht, and that nobody in the Wehrmacht ever committed a warcrime that was worse than the norm.

 

Of course, this is false. Hans-Ulrich Rudel was a fervent Nazi until his death, and a friend of Josef Mengele. Field Marshall Walther von Reichenau said "The soldier in the eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations. Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews...". 

[Retnek]

2 hours ago, Slater said:

History is written by the winners, that's why history is not history per say, it's more a one sided view from the victorious side, that can be said about all history.

Wrong. If you (are able to) use the sources available to the public. One might stay at the level of penny press or "documentaries" on certain TV-channels. But who would call that waste of time a proper education?

 

Most of the more serious historians and other sensible people enjoy a common concept:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historian#Professionalization_in_Germany

 

" Sources had to be hard, not speculations and rationalizations. His credo was to write history the way it was. He insisted on primary sources with proven authenticity."

 

That concept has been used successfully for the historical sciences. Sadly the impact on everyday's life by the insights of modern historical research was (especially in Germany until 1945) very low. But that's a problem a lot of scientific insights share - wtfc?

Anyhow, there are academic standards for historical research and even in the worst time of Cold War historians from both sides of the Iron Curtain usually were able to find a common understanding about the facts itself. "What" happened never that much was in question. A practised Soviet historian seriously denying the Soviet responsibility for the Katyn Massacre even in 1965 was rated an idiot by his own colleagues, too.

Beyond that academic consensus there are "historians" presenting "alternative truth" endlessly. Dead horses are a perfect ride for propaganda.

Edited June 24, 2019 by Retnek

[Aap]

Even if there are many distortions and myths about Eastern Front, taken from the memoirs of German generals, you can hardly say that the history of Eastern Front was written by losers. General perception of what happened in the east is still based a lot on what the victors have said. I would say that actually more so than in the west, where historians have had better access to actual facts and archives etc. 

[Aap]

4 hours ago, Retnek said:

A practised Soviet historian seriously denying the Soviet responsibility for the Katyn Massacre even in 1965 was rated an idiot by his own colleagues, too.

 

Katyn is actually a prime example of "writing history". If some Soviet historian had figured out the truth about Katyn in 1965, he certainly kept his mouth shut. It took almost 50 years in Soviet Union to admit what had happened and even in West, when investigations clearly indicated that Soviet Union had carried out the massacre, and despite Cold War, it remained kind of hush-hush topic in public.

[SCG_Slater]

5 hours ago, Retnek said:

Wrong. If you (are able to) use the sources available to the public. One might stay at the level of penny press or "documentaries" on certain TV-channels. But who would call that waste of time a proper education?

 

Most of the more serious historians and other sensible people enjoy a common concept:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historian#Professionalization_in_Germany

 

" Sources had to be hard, not speculations and rationalizations. His credo was to write history the way it was. He insisted on primary sources with proven authenticity."

 

That concept has been used successfully for the historical sciences. Sadly the impact on everyday's life by the insights of modern historical research was (especially in Germany until 1945) very low. But that's a problem a lot of scientific insights share - wtfc?

Anyhow, there are academic standards for historical research and even in the worst time of Cold War historians from both sides of the Iron Curtain usually were able to find a common understanding about the facts itself. "What" happened never that much was in question. A practised Soviet historian seriously denying the Soviet responsibility for the Katyn Massacre even in 1965 was rated an idiot by his own colleagues, too.

Beyond that academic consensus there are "historians" presenting "alternative truth" endlessly. Dead horses are a perfect ride for propaganda.

didn't the soviet union write the history? what the west wrote was what was in their interest not if it was true or not. History books written in the soviet union and in the west was different, but none of them correct.

[Retnek]

1 hour ago, Slater said:

didn't the soviet union write the history? what the west wrote was what was in their interest not if it was true or not. History books written in the soviet union and in the west was different, but none of them correct.

Difficult to discuss science with someone not willing to understand the method. History isn't static. Our understanding of the world isn't, too. There's no "final truth", one (gladly) leave that setup to the religious and the present mainstream of economic "sciences" .

Well done science is a trustworthy process to find a promising direction, an increasingly sharper image of what is or what has been. Adding pieces, find new aspects, sometimes just by changing the point of view, bit by bit. Going that way there's no chance for winner or looser to finalize "The History".

[DD_Arthur]

10 hours ago, [Pb]Cybermat47 said:

Yep, that’s what led to the “clean Wehrmacht myth” - the idea that there were no Nazis in the Wehrmacht, and that nobody in the Wehrmacht ever committed a warcrime that was worse than the norm.

 

I've never heard of this 'clean wehrmacht myth".  Care to elaborate?

[Cybermat47]

1 hour ago, DD_Arthur said:

 

I've never heard of this 'clean wehrmacht myth".  Care to elaborate?

 

In the years since WWII, the idea has sprung up that the Wehrmacht was an apolitical organisation, one that conducted itself in the same manner as the militaries of the western allies, while the Nazi party was the only organisation in Germany that was pursuing the goals of Nazi ideology.

 

The myth is most prevalent in the West, due to the fact that the majority of ideologically-fuelled German warcrimes were committed on the eastern front. More importantly, the West had to rebuild the German military in order to contend with the Red Army in the Cold War. To do that, they needed recruits, which would be difficult if the military was seen as part of a shameful past. As a result, the Himmerod Memorandum began a rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht as a whole in both Germany and the western nations.

 

In reality, though, the Wehrmacht had committed many warcrimes in service to Nazi ideology. Field Marshall Walther Reichenau, commander of the 6th Army and a committed Nazi (as you can see in my previous post), ordered his troops to take part in the Bila Tserkva massacre. After aiding the SS in killing all the adult Jews in the town, the children were left abandoned for several days. Oberst Helmut Groscurth wrote: "The rooms were filled with about 90 children. There was an indescribable amount of filth; Rags, diapers, refuse lay everywhere. Countless flies cover the children, some of whom were naked. Almost all of the children were crying or whimpering. The stench was unbearable. In the above mentioned case, measures were taken against women and children which were no different from atrocities committed by the enemy."

 

After Groscurth and some chaplains attempted to save the children (the only recorded case of such an effort ever happening - and note that they did nothing to try and save the adults), the order to execute them was issued anyway. An SS observer said: “I went to the woods alone. The Wehrmacht had already dug a grave. The children were brought along in a tractor. I had nothing to do with this technical procedure. The Ukrainians were standing around trembling. The children were taken down from the tractor. They were lined up along the top of the grave and shot so that they fell into it. The Ukrainians did not aim at any particular part of the body. They fell into the grave. The wailing was indescribable. I shall never forget the scene throughout my life. I find it very hard to bear. I particulary [sic] remember a small fair-haired girl who took me by the hand. She too was shot later ... The grave was near some woods. It was not near the rifle-range. The execution must have taken place in the afternoon at about 3:30 or 4:00. It took place the day after the discussions at the Feldkommandanten ... Many children were hit four or five times before they died.”

 

Many in the Wehrmacht were fully committed to the Nazi war of extermination. One soldier wrote: “The pitiful hordes on the other side are nothing but felons who are driven by alcohol and the threat of pistols at their heads ... They are nothing but a bunch of assholes! ... Having encountered these Bolshevik hordes and having seen how they live has made a lasting impression on me. Everyone, even the last doubter, knows today that the battle against these sub-humans, who've been whipped into a frenzy by the Jews, was not only necessary but came in the nick of time. Our Führer has saved Europe from certain chaos.”

 

Of course, this isn’t to say that every individual in the Wehrmacht was a Nazi. For example, Hauptmann Wilm Hosenfeld actively saved Jews in Poland. Hans Scholl, Willi Graf, and other young German soldiers and students were executed for forming the anti-Nazi White Rose movement. But the Wehrmacht itself was not an apolitical organisation, and it had many war criminals within its ranks.

 

Edited June 24, 2019 by [Pb]Cybermat47

[Finkeren]

The "clean Wehrmacht" myth is far from the only misconception that stems from the overreliance on German scources. The entire perspective is screwed. The very fact, that we routinely refer to the war between the Soviet Union and the Axis as "The Eastern Front" and not the "Soviet-German War" or the "GPW" shows the perspective. 

 

The impact is felt at all levels of history writing. From the fact that certain things just doesn't get written about, if there isn't an interesting German perspective, to military historians repeatedly putting Soviet units at places and times where they weren't, simply because some German general thought they were there and wrote it down in his memoirs. 

 

The most annoying thing about this for any amateur student of WW2 is, that it leaves huge gaps in the litterature. Why is it, that just about any book about the Battle Of Moscow is 80% build-up with descriptions of Barbarossa and detailed descriptions of Taifun, but as soon as the Soviet counteroffensive starts, the story either just stops or quickly runs through the broad strokes and then trails off into some debate about Hitler's order to stand fast? How many books are available in English about the relatively inconsequencial Kursk campaign (the Zitadelle part) compared to huge, engaging battles with massive consequences like Operation Bagration or the Lower Dniepr Offensive? After the summer of 1943, the "Eastern Front" pretty much disappears from popular history only to pop up again in late 1944, as the Red Army was really starting to break into what is now Germany, so we can get the perspective of the German civilians who suffered during the invasion and obsess over the tiniest little details of Hitler's last days in the Führerbunker. Meanwhile we can read about the summer-44 destruction of an entire German army group sorta mentioned in passing in books about the Allied landings in Normandy. 

 

I really think, this is why Kursk is featured so prominently in popular history. Not just because it was the last hurrah for the Wehrmacht, it is also the last thing Western historians get to write about that war before the endgame. 

[Cybermat47]

7 minutes ago, Finkeren said:

The very fact, that we routinely refer to the war between the Soviet Union and the Axis as "The Eastern Front" and not the "Soviet-German War" or the "GPW" shows the perspective. 

 

I agree that the Soviet Union’s war effort isn’t covered as much as it should be, but the struggle between the Axis and the USSR was just another front in WWII. 

 

It doesn’t make sense to say that the western front and the eastern front were seperate wars, when the western allies and the Soviets cooperated very closely, with western forces seeing combat on the eastern front, operations in the west being planned in order to relieve pressure on the Soviet military, the west supplying the Soviets with equipment, Stalin meeting with western leaders to coordinate their strategy, and both conflicts being ended at the same time by the same treaty. 

Edited June 25, 2019 by [Pb]Cybermat47

[Finkeren]

6 minutes ago, [Pb]Cybermat47 said:

 

I agree that the Soviet Union’s war effort isn’t covered as much as it should be, but the struggle between the Axis and the USSR was just another front in WWII. 

 

It doesn’t make sense to say that the western front and the eastern front were seperate wars, when the western allies and the Soviets cooperated very closely, with western forces seeing combat on the eastern front, operations in the west being planned in order to relieve pressure on the Soviet military, the west supplying the Soviets with equipment, Stalin meeting with western leaders to coordinate their strategy, and both conflicts being ended at the same time by the same treaty. 

 

Oh trust me, I'm not seeing the "Eastern Front" as a wholly separate war - far from it. I'm simply pointing out, that modern historians completely adopting the German terminology shows their perspective (the Allies at the time certainly didn't generally refer to the fighting in Eastern Europe as "The Eastern Front") 

[SCG_Slater]

13 hours ago, Retnek said:

Difficult to discuss science with someone not willing to understand the method. History isn't static. Our understanding of the world isn't, too. There's no "final truth", one (gladly) leave that setup to the religious and the present mainstream of economic "sciences" .

Well done science is a trustworthy process to find a promising direction, an increasingly sharper image of what is or what has been. Adding pieces, find new aspects, sometimes just by changing the point of view, bit by bit. Going that way there's no chance for winner or looser to finalize "The History".

 I'm not taking anyone's side here, especially not the Nazies, however you must be very blind if you believe that "history" is just a fact gathering process where the outcome is adjusted as more evidence  comes forward.  History is tainted with politics, and it's not just the "facts" sometimes data is manipulated to make a certain opinion or group look better or worse.

Those who question the official story is always  depicted as A) Crazy B) the local town idiot or C) conspiracy nut cases.  Some historians are not biased, however they are not common and 

the work they do is very rarely exposed through the official channels.

 

But I digress, not here to buy an argument, so carry on.... 

[unreasonable]

13 minutes ago, Finkeren said:

 

Oh trust me, I'm not seeing the "Eastern Front" as a wholly separate war - far from it. I'm simply pointing out, that modern historians completely adopting the German terminology shows their perspective (the Allies at the time certainly didn't generally refer to the fighting in Eastern Europe as "The Eastern Front") 

 

This is not so much about western bias as about sources - for most of the post war period there was no way for western historians to get direct access to primary sources in the SU. The accounts produced by the SU were blatant propaganda. It was only after the Berlin Wall came down that there was a period when it was possible for western historians to read Soviet archives.

 

The paucity of Russian speakers in the west probably did not help - those that could read the language were mostly doing more important jobs!

 

I remember reading accounts of Bagration in the 1970s - the idea that there was no western coverage of the later battles is simply false. If the coverage of Soviet movements was incomplete or inaccurate you can hardly blame historians who are denied access to the sources.

[Finkeren]

I'm not blaming anyone or accusing anyone of particularly outrageous bias. I'm simply lamenting the current state of popular history. 

 

Of course historians were (and are) limited to the perspective their sources offer, that's why I'm talking about perspective, not bias. 

 

The thing is: The cold war ended decades ago, and even though acces to Soviet archives is still limited, we now at least have a chance to broaden that perspective, and fortunately a few western historians have worked hard to do just that. But popular history is lagging seriously behind. If I want a nuanced perspective on the GPW I have to read Glanz and the like, which is great but also very heavy stuff to digest. 

 

I long for some popular books to tell not just the story about, how Germany lost WW2, but how the USSR won it.

[unreasonable]

Have you read Antony Beevor's books, "Stalingrad" and "Berlin"? I find them to be well balanced, written since more sources became available and aimed at the general reader.  

 

 

[Finkeren]

I have read both, even though I really don't like Beevor that much. To me he has always seemed to be deliberately seeking to paint the USSR, and really anything remotely associated with the left wing, in as negative a light as possible, exemplified by his micharacterizations of Order no. 227 and the use of blocking detatchments and penal battalions by the Red Army. 

 

Still, he is a pretty good writer overall, but his writing is most definitely biased. Of the books by him, that I have read so far, my favorite is probably the one about the SCW. 

 

EDIT: Also, more to the point, both of Beevor's books on the Eastern Front cover events that have already been done to death. If you do Stalingrad or Berlin, you're not exactly breaking new ground, which was my principal complaint. 

Edited June 25, 2019 by Finkeren

[Aap]

3 hours ago, Finkeren said:

The "clean Wehrmacht" myth is far from the only misconception that stems from the overreliance on German scources. The entire perspective is screwed. The very fact, that we routinely refer to the war between the Soviet Union and the Axis as "The Eastern Front" and not the "Soviet-German War" or the "GPW" shows the perspective.

 

And the perspective is that "Eastern Front" is as neutral term as it gets for eastern front. It was called eastern front during WWI, too, even in Russian (Vostochnıy front). You really think that we should talk about "GPW" - "Great Patriotic War" instead? The name itself has propaganda written into it, not to mention that for a ... let's say Mexican guy .. there was nothing "patriotic" about this war. "Soviet-German War" at least sounds more neutral, but still makes an implication of a separate war between USSR and Germany, outside of WWII, in which the USSR (single-handed) was victorious. 

[SCG_Neun]

Reading an excellent book now that brings a lot of insight into this very topic.  I highly recommend it.  "The First Soldier" by Stephen Fritz.....

 

After Germany’s humiliating World War II defeat, numerous German generals published memoirs claiming that their country’s brilliant military leadership had been undermined by the Führer’s erratic decision making. The author of three highly acclaimed books on the era, Stephen Fritz upends this characterization of Hitler as an ill-informed fantasist and demonstrates the ways in which his strategy was coherent and even competent.
 
That Hitler saw World War II as the only way to retrieve Germany’s fortunes and build an expansionist Thousand-Year Reich is uncontroversial. But while his generals did sometimes object to Hitler’s tactics and operational direction, they often made the same errors in judgment and were in agreement regarding larger strategic and political goals. A necessary volume for understanding the influence of World War I on Hitler’s thinking, this work is also an eye-opening reappraisal of major events like the invasion of Russia and the battle for Normandy.

 

I

[Finkeren]

23 minutes ago, II./JG77_Kemp said:

 

And the perspective is that "Eastern Front" is as neutral term as it gets for eastern front. It was called eastern front during WWI, too, even in Russian (Vostochnıy front). You really think that we should talk about "GPW" - "Great Patriotic War" instead? The name itself has propaganda written into it, not to mention that for a ... let's say Mexican guy .. there was nothing "patriotic" about this war. "Soviet-German War" at least sounds more neutral, but still makes an implication of a separate war between USSR and Germany, outside of WWII, in which the USSR (single-handed) was victorious. 

 

Even though I personally sometimes use the term GPW provocatively, I am of course not advocating, that we start using it as the generic historical term. "Soviet-German War" might be a better, more neutral, term, but I'm not even really advocating, that we change anything. The "Eastern Front" has been used by so many people for so long, that there's really no point in trying to change it. 

 

I was simply using it as an example of how much historians have adopted the German perspective of the war. The term itself is just a small symptom of the larger issue, and not something I think warrants a change. 

[Aap]

31 minutes ago, Finkeren said:

I was simply using it as an example of how much historians have adopted the German perspective of the war. The term itself is just a small symptom of the larger issue, and not something I think warrants a change.

 

And I was pointing out that that the term "Eastern Front" is just a neutral term for eastern front, not some attempt to write history from German perspective. Like I said, even Russians called the same theater of war "Eastern Front" during Wold War One. Or thinking of English language, how about a newspaper heading from 1916: "Huns Are Trapped By Own Poison Gas On Eastern Front"? Does it sound like promoting German perspective of WWII?

[DD_Arthur]

23 hours ago, [Pb]Cybermat47 said:

 

In the years since WWII, the idea has sprung up that the Wehrmacht was an apolitical organisation, one that conducted itself in the same manner as the militaries of the western allies, while the Nazi party was the only organisation in Germany that was pursuing the goals of Nazi ideology.

 

The myth is most prevalent in the West, due to the fact that the majority of ideologically-fuelled German warcrimes were committed on the eastern front. More importantly, the West had to rebuild the German military in order to contend with the Red Army in the Cold War. To do that, they needed recruits, which would be difficult if the military was seen as part of a shameful past. As a result, the Himmerod Memorandum began a rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht as a whole in both Germany and the western nations.

 

Cybermat who exactly is the author of this bit of copy/pasting?  I'm curious.

[Cybermat47]

30 minutes ago, DD_Arthur said:

 

Cybermat who exactly is the author of this bit of copy/pasting?  I'm curious.

 

I wrote that myself. I’ve been studying the clean Wehrmacht myth for a few months now.

Edited June 25, 2019 by [Pb]Cybermat47