Me-110 during BoB: A failure?

[SE.VH_Boemundo]

Many argue that Me-110 was outclassed by hurricanes and spitfires but some sources claim it had a better kill ratio than even Bf-109. His K/L was equal to english fighters even they was fighting, during period, mainly enemy fighters, while many english victories was made against bombers. Where is the truth?

 

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/me-110-underrated.45345/

 

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/bf110-exchange-ratio.26265/page-12

 

 

 

 

[AndyJWest]

A failure? Possibly not. I don't think there can be much doubt though that if the resources allocated to it had instead been put into equipping the Luftwaffe with more Bf 109s, and with ensuring that they had the capability to engage with the RAF for longer (i.e. drop tanks, and better tactics) things would have gone worse for the British.

 

As for K/L ratios, and the 'truth', discussions need to be based around more better sources than forum posts. We already know that both sides defeated the other resoundingly during the Battle of Britain, and don't need to read another explanation why... ?

[cardboard_killer]

42 minutes ago, AndyJWest said:

I don't think there can be much doubt though that if the resources allocated to it had instead been put into equipping the Luftwaffe with more Bf 109s, and with ensuring that they had the capability to engage with the RAF for longer (i.e. drop tanks, and better tactics) things would have gone worse for the British.

 

Actually, aside from dive bombing the chain stations, I think the Germans had the best success with low-altitude high-speed Bf-110 strikes against airfields. The problem was, they had crappy intel and so often attacked secondary or even abandoned fields, and, when they were unlucky enough to appear over the target when British fighters were nearby, airborne and had altitude advantage, the Bf-110s had very heavy loses.

 

In any case, the central goal of the air offensive was beyond LW capabilities at any time in the war; the British could have simply abandoned southern England to the LW and only come out to contest an actual invasion. Which would have been slaughtered almost certainly.

[SE.VH_Boemundo]

Some argue that radar allowed British to make good use of their resources, so he could deliver the right amount of fighters, optimal altitude etc at a determined place. Some argue that the high command of luftwaffe ask to 110 to act as close as possible to bombers, negating possible advantages... I guess Goering made false conclusions about the use of radars and ignored the problem.

 

Edited March 11, 2020 by =BLW=Tales

[AndyJWest]

If you want to analyse Luftwaffe strategy and tactics during the BoB, and during much of WW2 in general, the first thing you need to understand is that Goering was an idiot. He got his job because he was one of Hitler's cronies, who'd been with him almost from the beginning, and because having a decorated WW1 fighter pilot in the job looked better than having someone who actually understood contemporary military aviation. Hitler wanted people who would tell him what he wanted to hear, and Goering was good at that. The only real mystery as far as this is concerned is why Hitler didn't do to Goering what he did to so many other of his yes-men who failed to deliver on their rash promises, and ditch him. It actually took outright treason on Goering's part (as Hitler saw it) for Hitler to finally turn against him, in his last few days.

[cardboard_killer]

11 hours ago, =BLW=Tales said:

I guess Goering made false conclusions about the use of radars and ignored the problem.

 

I think Kesserling and Sperle have to share most of the blame for operations, but the lack of intel is amazing to me considering the nature of British society (i.e. a liberal democracy).

[Bremspropeller]

12 hours ago, AndyJWest said:

If you want to analyse Luftwaffe strategy and tactics during the BoB, and during much of WW2 in general, the first thing you need to understand is that Goering was an idiot

 

I just finished a book about Günther Lützow (in German) and it's evident, that Goering not only was an idiot per sé, but he was very intelligent at playing people in his favor. He also surrounded himself with people that allowed him to look smart. He's the prototype of the modern management failure. With a party-membership.

 

My company has people in charge with very similar character-traits.

Those people are all around us and they're doing their own damage on companies, the economy and societey on a daily basis.

 

[Reggie_Mental]

On 3/11/2020 at 10:03 PM, =BLW=DarthFlieger said:

Some argue that radar allowed British to make good use of their resources, so he could deliver the right amount of fighters, optimal altitude etc at a determined place. Some argue that the high command of luftwaffe ask to 110 to act as close as possible to bombers, negating possible advantages... I guess Goering made false conclusions about the use of radars and ignored the problem.

 

Or rather, his intel subordinate, Generalleutnant Joseph Beppo Schmid did. A close personal friend of Goering and appointed through nepotism rather than ability.

 

Schmid and his branch Abteilung 5, wrongly concluded that the radar masts were a blind navigation system for RAF aircraft and not for long range detection of approaching aircraft. As if the fact that the masts were pointing out to sea all over the South and East coast of England wasn't a clue to their actual purpose!

 

Beppo went on to other mediocre and frankly piss-poor commands, surviving the war and dying in 1956, largely forgotten in LW and Nazi WW2 history.

 

Goering commanded Jasta 1 after Manfred Von Richtofen's death, and many surviving accounts seem to credit him with effective leadership and bringing together a rather shattered group of fliers in 1918. But other accounts have emerged buried under the post world war 1 Nazi snowjob that in actual fact, he was a disaster and the unit morale and effectiveness collapsed under his leadership. There were many in the unit with 40+ kills that resented his command, as he had only racked up 22 (or 17, as post war analysis concluded) However it should be borne in mind that by April 1918 the Imperial German air arm was collapsing due to a lack of resources, pilots and fuel.

Edited April 22, 2020 by Reggie_Mental

[Lusekofte]

I have this understanding that 110 crew had a kind of “elite status”

Reading some litterature about them I find them interesting. 
My understanding is the loss rate was better than 109 in % and they did a really good job during bob. 
The impression of them being bad is made from documentaries , where just about all of them claim they where easy prey for the spits. 
I read About a Norwegian pilot getting attacked by a 110 in his Gladiator, he evaded and just turned 360 degrees and could get some hits on it before it got too far ahead. After next attack he managed to shoot it down that way. 
There where a masacre when a squadron of 110 came from Denmark or Norway covering HE 111 they where equipped with plywood external tanks that could not be jettisoned. Like the night fighter version this made it sluggish to maneuver and where sitting ducks with high explosive fumes in their bellytank. They where desimated. 
another fighter bomber mission from France that went south made this reputation

[MiloMorai]

12 hours ago, 216th_LuseKofte said:

I have this understanding that 110 crew had a kind of “elite status”

Yes have read that many times.

[LLv34_Flanker]

S!

 

 Have a few memoirs of Bf110 pilots. They do not call it a bad plane. Was easy to fly with good handling qualities. Speed was not that horrible either and it could dive away to an extent. Spitifre pilot Robert Wellum wrote he had a 110 giving a run for the money even he was in the Spitfire. The 110 used it´s speed and did not try to turn inside the more nimble fighter. 110 was more or less a victim of too high expectations, wrong deployment of it and quick development of single seat fighters. But as a nightfighter it did a very good job and as a jabo in Eastern Front.

[Lusekofte]

2 hours ago, LLv34_Flanker said:

S!

 

 Have a few memoirs of Bf110 pilots. They do not call it a bad plane. Was easy to fly with good handling qualities. Speed was not that horrible either and it could dive away to an extent. Spitifre pilot Robert Wellum wrote he had a 110 giving a run for the money even he was in the Spitfire. The 110 used it´s speed and did not try to turn inside the more nimble fighter. 110 was more or less a victim of too high expectations, wrong deployment of it and quick development of single seat fighters. But as a nightfighter it did a very good job and as a jabo in Eastern Front.

Eric Brown test flew 110 and said in a interview I found on ytube. That it had better dayfighter quality than Beufighter and Beufighter was a better night fighter. 
I read the antennas on the 110 interfered with aerodynamics. It did not respond well. 
A corkscrewing Lancaster would leave the 110 flying straight past it without possibility to follow 

[LLv34_Flanker]

S! 

 

@216th_LuseKofte Beaufighter was designed to have an internal radar. The antennas affecting 110 did not matter so much at night, bombers were slow flying targets anyway.

 

Really a shame that Schnaufer did not have any written memoirs, he was the most efficient nightfighter in the 110 with 121 kills. Quite a feat. 

[ZachariasX]

On 4/22/2020 at 4:47 AM, Reggie_Mental said:

But other accounts have emerged buried under the post world war 1 Nazi snowjob that in actual fact, he was a disaster

Actually, you can read Udets opinion in his memoir published IIRC before WW2 and without losing too many words it was clear that any self respecting Jasta was led by example by the most talented pilot. Goering is the antithesis to that.

 

MvR was shot down and Goering took over during Udets leave. When he returned, Udet was shocked to hear the Goering hadly ever flew and maybe scored just one which tells you everything. Goering was appointed as a bureaucrat descision partly due to him being one of the older (most senior) men in the unit. Goering was 25, Udet 22.