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Lend-lease


Ojisan_Mjoelner
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It was not free, but selled for gold. It was a Hurricanes, phased out already (most of them were a veterans of BoB). 

 

And finally, British lend lease was for free, and the Hurricane is a British aircraft. The only lend lease paid for with gold was US pre-lend lease of 1941, before the US entered the war. If you disagree with that, please show a source.

 

Panzerbar is correct.  British supplies were not free but had to be paid for in gold.  HMS Edinburgh was torpedoed returning from Murmansk with convoy QP11 at the end of April 1942.  She went to the bottom carrying gold bullion worth around 80 million Euro's at todays prices.

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J2_Trupobaw

 

 

When you think of the whole plan strategically - let's gather every last grain of our tiny army, invite some half-hearted allies and invade a gigantic country with a strong military and industrial complex for the sake of extermination and slavery - one can only wonder how stupid or delusional were every single general involved in the planning.

 

They were convinced that Soviets are about to attack themselves and their attack is a preemptive strike. The claims of Germany protecting the Europe, Western Allies included, from Soviet aggressor have been ridiculed as Nazi propaganda for last 70 years, but 1) Germans themselves believed in that and acted on that belief and 2) we never learned if Germans were right or not, because they if Stalin had such plans, nuclear deterrent threw them out of the window after the war. And look how sout hings still went with nuclear detterent... Germans surely did destroy lots of materiel that had to be replaced with lent-leased new ones (incluging all these new fighter types) because it was gathered on western borders of Soviet Union, and not in defensive deployment given how they got overrun. By Rudels memoirs, German soldiers were impressed by sheer volume of trucks, tanks and planes they destroyed in early months of war, and horrified of what would have happen if Soviets went to offensive first with all that stuff. 

 

Again, we don't know and it does not matter if German belief was right; the fact is, this was their asessment of situation. Hitler went down believing that Western democracies have doomed themselves and will be conquered by Soviets within generation. 

Edited by Trupobaw
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216th_Lucas_From_Hell

Not to derail but Hitler had penned his intention of invading the Soviet Union back in the 1920s, and then in 1939 reinforced his belief on that. Army commanders were also enthusiastically dancing to his tune and disseminating that into the ranks. Rudel and friends can say whatever they want - they were hearing exactly what Berlin wanted them to hear, and seeing things through the very perspective they wanted them to see.

 

While people are obsessed with quoting Vladimir Rezun (i.e. 'Viktor Suvorov') - a single historian who fled the Soviet Union in the 1980s and like most dissidents came up with some pretty bombastic claims that were obviously adopted with love by the West at the time - most if not all nuanced historians who aren't following an agenda agree that there was no such thing. Geoffrey Roberts' book for example makes extensive use of both Western and Soviet sources, and proves not by prose but with factuality that there was no such thing. As it were during the war, the Soviet Union was keen on the active defence concept which meant counter-attacking again and again. The plan was to hold back the initial attack, then drive the German army out through a swift counter-attack. Operation Uranus, Operation Kutuzov, and the Yel'nya and Vyazma counter-attacks in 1941 are good examples of that doctrine.

 

Hitler wanted land, workforce and resources, and the belief was shared across the higher ranks of the Wermacht and passed down to the lowest ones as well. But anyway, that's OT :)

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Lend Lease program to Russia started and continued for political reasons in the lack of support in other fronts for the hard pressed Red Army since 1941. Many of the planes delivered was put very good in use. The P 39 was extremely successful compared to other allied usage, mostly because of the altitude they fought in. Another very popular plane was the A 20 Boston or Havoc. 

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Panzerbar is correct.  British supplies were not free but had to be paid for in gold.  HMS Edinburgh was torpedoed returning from Murmansk with convoy QP11 at the end of April 1942.  She went to the bottom carrying gold bullion worth around 80 million Euro's at todays prices.

Excuse me, that gold was not for Hurricanes. The British transported gold for the US which I said were paid in gold for early lend lease and maybe possibly for humanitarian goods, which opposed to war machinery, were not free but sold at a discount. Panzerbar is not correct and neither are you. Edited by JtD
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Whenever faced with sizeable opposition, the bombers would drop their bombs earlier and make a move home.

 

An impossible statement without knowing any specifics from both sides.  The Germans had radio's, just like the western allies and could recall missions.  Tactical support missions are fluid based on the situation on the ground.

 

 

 

''Before entering German controlled airspace, the force was recalled,'' Mr. Munday said. ''According to standing orders, the bombs were jettisoned in designated areas before landing.''

 

http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/31/arts/raf-bombs-may-have-downed-glenn-miller-plane.html

 

Large aircraft have weight limits for landing.  Not only is landing with a live bomb dangerous, but the weight can damage the landing gear.  It was standard practice to jettison the load.  Many aircraft today have the ability to jettison fuel to reduce the weight to safe landing limits.

 

 

 

BTW: same picture in the West - far less then a half of Jagdwaffe "victories" mached with actual Allied losses, so could be stated as "confirmed".

 

Incidents of overclaiming occurred on all sides.  The German system was actually one of the more rigorous claims investigation as it required 2 witnesses, an independent investigation with collaborating evidence before a claim was awarded.  It often took a year to have "claim" awarded as confirmed and as such there are almost no Luftwaffe claims confirmed after early 1944.

 

Many of these amatuer "claims" investigation draw upon airframes written off as destroyed or did not return.  Units in combat often make multiple status reports and those numbers do change.  The actual investigations drew upon ground eyewitnesses, physical evidence, and Military Intelligence resources.   In the heat of combat, a damaged aircraft evading attack while spewing oil, fuel. or radiator fluid could easily be mistaken as destroyed.  Your games have very artificially easy aircraft spotting.  In reality, it is pretty hard to spot another aircraft from any distance.  Once the "victor" loses sight, then all he is left with is the fact he saw the enemy aircraft disengage while damaged plummeting toward the earth.

 

Even if a damaged aircraft lands off field, it is possible to repair it, ferry home, and have it operational the next day or even that evening depending on the damage. In other words, Unit status reports are dynamic and could change in a few hours.  They only represent a snapshot in time.

 

An aircraft forced down or forced to withdraw from a fight can easily be counted as a victory even under the most rigorous wartime claim system despite the pilot surviving and the aircraft being operational within a few hours.

 

 

 

 

Did some basic comparing some days ago to press an unimportant argument. Both Prien and Foreman are detailed enough to offer day to day claims and losses, here are monthly figures and totals.

According to Jochen Prien the gross numbers are as followed:

For JG 2 and 26 between June 22 and December 31, 1941

100 killed
48 wounded
1 prisoner of war
-----------------
149 lost pilots

110 fighters lost due to air combat
168 total fighters lost

June 22 there were 166 fighter pilots available to JG 2 and 26 combined, which roughly means a 90% attrition at the end of the year. Against this the Jagdwaffe claimed 838 against the RAF.


Fighter Command figures (based on Foreman)

=================================
July
=================================
claims
221:75:105 (+4:2:2 ground)

missing/Destroyed
119 Spitfires
8 Hurricanes
1 Beaufighter

96 pilots missing
5 pilots killed
22 pilots wounded (+1 air gunner)

=================================
August
=================================
claims
160:73:96 (+14:1:13 ground)

missing/destroyed
110 Spitfires
20 Hurricanes
2 Havocs
2 Beaufighters

108 pilots and 6 aircrew missing
6 pilots killed
18 pilots wounded (1 died later)

=================================
September
=================================
claims
206:97:110 (+3:0:3 ground)

missing/destroyed
118 Spitfires
19 Hurricanes
3 Whirlwinds
1 Havoc

110 pilots and 2 aircrew missing
3 pilots killed
2 pilots wounded

=================================
October (Enter the Fw 190)
=================================
claims
101:32:46 (+6:1:2 ground)

missing/destroyed
52 Spitfires
11 Hurricanes
2 Beaufighters
2 Whirlwinds
1 Defiant
1 Havoc

53 pilots and 2 aircrew missing
7 pilots killed and 3 aircrew
7 pilots and 1 aircrew wounded

=================================
November
=================================
claims
22:13:38 (+2:1:4 ground)

missing/destroyed
44 Spitfires
15 Hurricanes
2 Beaufighters
1 Whirlwind
1 Defiant
1 Havoc
1 Tomahawk

51 pilots and 3 aircrew missing
5 pilots killed
5 pilots wounded

=================================
December
=================================
claims
31:6:15 (+2:0:1 ground)

missing/destroyed
25 Spitfires
10 Hurricanes
4 Beaufighters
2 Defiants
2 Tomahawks

25 pilots and 3 aircrew missing
5 pilots killed and 1 aircrew
6 pilots and 1 aircrew wounded

=================================
July-December
=================================
claims
741:296:410 (+31:5:25 ground) 

missing/destroyed
468 Spitfires 
83 Hurricanes 
11 Beaufighters 
6 Whirlwinds 
5 Havocs 
4 Defiants 
3 Tomahawks

443 pilots and 16 aircrew missing
32 pilots and 4 aircrew killed
60 pilots and 3 aircrew wounded

add

Bomber Command Figures (based on Martin Middlebrook & Chris Everitt)

=================================
July-December daylight ops
=================================

7/8 July to 10 November (given period)

112 aircraft lost

rest of days 1-6 July and 11 November to 31 December gave rough a count of 25+

for sake of argument it makes for 140 bombers lost on daylight ops (majority Blenheims).

================================================== =========

Now make up your own mind what to think of these numbers.

IMHO it does not make for a strong case for the debunkers.

Ruy Horta

 

http://www.lwag.org/forums/showthread.php?t=2385

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They got where they got in 1941 because they launched a powerful surprise attack using everything they had while the Soviet Union was still in the process of redeveloping its military.

If that was a surprise attack it gives a new meaning to surprise. Fact is the Soviets were ignorant of a load of information and incapable of mounting a reasonable defence against a numerically inferior attacker. If anything, it was the largest military blunder of the 20th century and it cost millions their lives.

I'm pretty sure that by the standards of this board, if the Germans had lost a few thousand aircraft in a couple of days, it would have been their fault. But since it's the Soviets, it's understandable and excusable. It doesn't say anything about their strategic or tactical abilities. What in fact is much more puzzling, is that any Soviet aircraft got destroyed, given that German bombers generally dropped their bombs right after getting airborne, just to be sure to preserve their presence for strategic purposes. As has been established in this topic and proven beyond doubt by a selected one or two anecdotes, Germans didn't attack high risk targets. And enemy airfields certainly are.

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ZachariasX

If you look at the memoirs of any Soviet fighter pilot, of any era, the scenario described by Panzerbar is a very common one that repeated itself all the way from 1941 to 1945. Whenever faced with sizeable opposition, the bombers would drop their bombs earlier and make a move home.

 

 

That is really news to me. B-17 crews for sure found the Germany way of "retreating when facing a seizable opposition" very entertaining. Many of the first hand accounts published shorty after the war were written with "correct morale" and should be taken with a grain of salt, no matter how entertaining they are.

 

I do however posses comparably little literature reflecting the soviet side, as my Russian is rather rusty. But if you are aware of good sources that have been translated in some other language, I'd be happy to look them up.

 

 

Excuse me, that gold was not for Hurricanes. The British transported gold for the US which I said were paid in gold for early lend lease and maybe possibly for humanitarian goods, which opposed to war machinery, were not free but sold at a discount. [..snipp...]

 

 

Correct.

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ZachariasX

 

 

[...snipp...] Germans didn't attack high risk targets [...snipp...]

 

They for sure did that. But there is a difference in attacking risky targets or acting in a generally risky way, such as the Flying Corps during Bloody April. The VVS certainly didn't mind to expend pilots and planes in a way Trechard was expending his in 1917. The Germans wouldn't do that, but they would assemble their forces such that tey could hit hard whatever they felt like was within their possibilities to hit. Apart from doomed tarnsport assignements, I can only think of Operation Stienbock where they just sent entire outfits to their demise.

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Claimed, not destroyed. Jagdwaffe claimed ~45 000 victories in the East. ~15-20 000 of them could be classified as confirmed, leaving from 20 to 30 000 as overclaim.

 

Soviet Air Forces fighters claimed ~43 000 victories during 1941 - 45. Same ~15 000 of them also could be classified as confirmed.

 

But it does not matter. What does? Soviet tank steamrolling Luftwaffe airfield. Soviet Soldier, infantry Private Ivan in Berlin in may 1945. That mean, that Soviet Fighters did their job better then Luftwaffe fighters. Thats all.

 

The problem with your figures is that while the Soviets lost 15- 20000 aircraft in air combat (total operational losses being some 46000), the ca. 15000  Luftwaffe losses were total operational losses  thus the Luftwaffe losses in air combat are significantly less than those of the Soviet Air forces, Click on the 2nd link MiloMorai provided in post #16.

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...Apart from doomed tarnsport assignements, I can only think of Operation Stienbock where they just sent entire outfits to their demise.

If I'm reading this correctly, the losses of the involved bomber squads amounted to about 120% their initial operational strength. This makes the losses/turnover about half of that of the typical Luftwaffe daytime fighter unit during the same period.
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ZachariasX

If I'm reading this correctly, the losses of the involved bomber squads amounted to about 120% their initial operational strength. This makes the losses/turnover about half of that of the typical Luftwaffe daytime fighter unit during the same period.

 

I read this in the same way. But fighters were produced in huge numbers, bombers were not produced anymore at a pace to replenish losses. So, the 120% losses meant they were gone for good. 200% losses for fighters meant deliver 600 fighter planes to the field (and they did so).

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But I think it pretty clearly shows that the Luftwaffe took risks in the average sortie and certainly did expend men and material. Not that this, in my world, is any measure for quality, quite the opposite. Just trying to make a point about them not flying around for sports, dodging anything that looked like a threat. I also think it didn't matter to the pilots if their unit was disbanded or replenish after their death.

 

You're also free to check Luftwaffe torpedo bomber groups, any, I'd guess. Just as an example III./KG26 first year of operations with their new Ju88LT's: average strength: just under 20 ac. average losses per month: just over 5.5ac. A turnover of ~350%, in a typical mid war year, and including time away from the front to rebuild.

 

If this topic is right, they crashed because the pilots got bored of avoiding combat. The Allied seamen in turn just exaggerated the Luftwaffe threat, while being good sports and scuttling hundreds of ships in order to make their stories appear true. Or the Luftwaffe went where it could, even at high cost, for as long as it cost the enemy more.

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216th_Lucas_From_Hell

JtD, there is no anti-German oppression in these boards, no need to exaggerate.

 

ZachariasX, you can find numerous reports of that in the memoirs of Pokryshkin (1941-1945, 55 IAP/16 GIAP, and commanding 9 GIAD), Rechkalov (1941-1945, 55 IAP/16 GIAP), Mariinskiy (1943-1945, 129 GIAP), Kaberov (1941-1943, 3 GIAP-KBF). Of those, Pokryshkin's are available for free in Spanish online, while Mariinskiy and Kaberov published them in English. I can send you Mariinskiy's via PM if you'd like, it's very interesting.

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No oppression, but imho a whole lot of ignorance and/or misinterpretation. It borders history revisionism and is getting on my nerves. The Germans were fighting a war, aggressively, and the Luftwaffe was an essential part of it. From the start, to the end. And because they didn't stupidly/cluelessly/carelessly fly into their demise as often as others did, they now were shy of combat. Sorry, guys, that's just plain wrong. No matter which words you use or which spin you want to give it, it stays plain wrong.

 

It's pretty obvious that with 1000 aircraft you can't achieve the same results or use the same tactics and strategies as with 10000 aircraft, but that has nothing to do with ignoring mission goals, accepting only low risk missions or individual preference for avoiding combat. Flying on the side with the 10:1 superiority is certainly a lot less risky than being outnumbered 1:10. Even AAA is a lot more dangerous if everyone's shooting at you, instead of at you or one of your nine buddies.

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Excuse me, that gold was not for Hurricanes. The British transported gold for the US which I said were paid in gold for early lend lease and maybe possibly for humanitarian goods, which opposed to war machinery, were not free but sold at a discount. Panzerbar is not correct and neither are you.

 

Yep, you're right JtD.  I knew initial US aid to the Soviets was paid in gold, silver and sometimes platinum.  I'd assumed the same for early British deliveries before lend lease to the Soviets got underway as a formal programme.

 

Never heard of the Germans being reluctant to fight before either, lol. 

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ZachariasX

No oppression, but imho a whole lot of ignorance and/or misinterpretation. It borders history revisionism and is getting on my nerves. The Germans were fighting a war, aggressively, and the Luftwaffe was an essential part of it. From the start, to the end. And because they didn't stupidly/cluelessly/carelessly fly into their demise as often as others did, they now were shy of combat. Sorry, guys, that's just plain wrong. No matter which words you use or which spin you want to give it, it stays plain wrong.

 

It's pretty obvious that with 1000 aircraft you can't achieve the same results or use the same tactics and strategies as with 10000 aircraft, but that has nothing to do with ignoring mission goals, accepting only low risk missions or individual preference for avoiding combat. Flying on the side with the 10:1 superiority is certainly a lot less risky than being outnumbered 1:10. Even AAA is a lot more dangerous if everyone's shooting at you, instead of at you or one of your nine buddies.

 

You can accuse the Nazis for almost everything, but being shy of combat is indeed a ridiculous one. The only difference I really see when comparing to the RAF is that when worn down to the braking point in summer of 1940, the RAF command structure remained very much intact. It didn't fall apart in a way like Goering and the staff around him, where basically everyone was left to his own initiative.

 

This affected sourcing a great way. It is a tribute to Erhard Milch, the hated Saxon bureaucrat, to keep the shops up and running. With the main leadership impaired, all units had less resources and could plan in a much narrower way. The Kampfgeschwader flew the kind of missions they always did, but with risk increasing daily and the handful of remaining proficient fighter pilots had to pick the fights that gave them most chances. It is a logical behavior.

 

There is the occasion where Galland and Steinhoff went aloft to observe the situation in the west (in late 1944, flying 190's AFAIR). They soon saw a huge bomber stream with all the escorts. They took one look and turned away. It would have been moronic to attack 500 Mustangs. Those did however go after them and the two could shake them of only with great difficulties. They were not cowards. Even if Goering said so. No one would have lasted through such an attack, even if they shot 20 Mustangs.

 

Being careful doesn't make you a coward...

 

Z

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