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Water Methanol Injection Explained In Detail


II./JG27_Rich
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I'm amused by the notion of a ww2 pilot whose primary concern would be breaking civilian aviation law whilst someone was shooting at him. Hilarious!

 

 

Maybe you will find this amusing????

 

 

sx9o.jpg

 

 

 

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Bongodriver sarcastically says:

 

Was actively operating these aircraft in a combat environment part of the operating limitations?.......I'm pretty sure getting shot up never really had a section in the POH.

 

 

I think it was similar to the operating instructions on the Machine Guns, weapons, and equipment I used in combat.  If you did not operate them accordingly, they broke when needed greatly increasing your chance of dying in combat.

 

The limits are set IAW the narrow margins the physics allows in order to fly with airplanes so it is even more important to observe the limitations. 

 

That is why in aviation convention, the operating limitations carry the weight of law.....even in state owned aircraft!!

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Scroll through to 22:40 after which an experience pilot says

 

 

"A pilot is very rule bound and rule based and will follow all the protocols and standard operating procedures as far as he possibly can but there comes a time when it doesn't matter what rules you have, you have to break those rules in order to achieve the aim, which is, of course getting the aeroplane safely on the ground..."

 

 

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Scroll through to 22:40 after which an experience pilot says

 

 

This has already been covered.....

 

You can deviate from any regulation in an emergency but you will have to explain it in writing to the aviation authority when you are on the ground.  If the outcome is good, then nobody will really care but if you bend sheet metal and bleed you can bet violating operating limitations will not be looked upon favorably.   The statistic say 85% of the time, violating the operating limitations will be a factor in the accident.  So you do the math and determine if the you are part of that very luck 15% of the time it works out!!

 

 

The question is how do you make the "game" adhere to the limitations of reality.  We know the behavior of gamers:

 

 

Not only does it represent a huge strain on the engine to the absolute limits of the engineering technology but at high density altitude you end up with more propeller slip than power transfer and the aircraft will slow down when over boost is applied.....................................

 

 

Gamers tend to put up a performance curve that in reality represents the aircraft for 3-5 minutes at a time.  Because of the nature of the speed stable portion of the power required curve, it takes most airplanes 2-3 minutes to reach Vmax in level flight.   That means any point on that entire performance curve is only attainable for 2-3 minutes at most.

 

 

So when these huge performance debates erupt, you can laugh at the fact they are discussing 2-3 minutes of the airplanes performance envelope like it is meaningful.

 

Gamers hit the over boost condition every flight and every combat.  It is not quite the outstanding event it was in reality.

 

It would be nice if IL2 BOS treated these systems more realistically IMHO.

 

 

 

The way to do that realistically is to impose the operating limitations found in the aircraft Flight Handbooks upon the players.  If some variation can be allowed so be it.  It should start just before the operating allowance in the POH and dramatically increase as that time is surpassed.

 

That operating limitation found in the Flight Handbooks is set by the physics.  It is the point a "reasonable expectation" of safety at best possible performance can be found as determined by the engineers, operators, and pilots.  It is not a "guarantee" of safety or reliability.

 

It should not be a "guarantee of safety" in  the game nor should players wish to exceed it on a routine basis. 

 

In addition, the physical limitations of power transfer in a propeller should be observed.  That means the environmental conditions in which these over boosted operating limits are useful is reduced.

Edited by Crump
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this is unbelievable, can we stop this altogether? It's obvious that Crump has no intention of listening to the points that other people make, because he's just trolling.

 

He lives by the manual and doesn't understand that in WW2 manuals were not always followed, even less so in the prohibitive conditions of the Russian front. The work done by mechanics was a maintenance one that had to work in parallel with pilot reports, but pilots often pushed the aircraft and engines' envelope because THEY HAD TO. It's no rocket science, and nothing will change that, it's written in the history books, so get over it. This is the reason why there were so many engine failures and malfunctions during the war: a prolonged combination of manhandling, inadequate maintenance (caused by the unavailability of spares) and wear. 

 

Manuals were indicative, not empirical, and the "must" and "should" were used only with the intention of preserving the engine life as much as possible, but rest assured that nothing would automatically fail if the engine wasn't taken down after 5 hours of WEP. Factors like the total engine hours and maintenance done up until then had a radical impact on the resistance of the engines, and this is nothing you will find in a manual, and you will not understand if you never got your hands dirty in an aircraft/car/boat engine..

 

Can we go back to the original topic now please? 

Edited by Sternjaeger
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this is unbelievable, can we stop this altogether? It's obvious that Crump has no intention of listening to the points that other people make, because he's just trolling.

 

He lives by the manual and doesn't understand that in WW2 manuals were not always followed, even less so in the prohibitive conditions of the Russian front. The work done by mechanics was a maintenance one that had to work in parallel with pilot reports, but pilots often pushed the aircraft and engines' envelope because THEY HAD TO. It's no rocket science, and nothing will change that, it's written in the history books, so get over it. This is the reason why there were so many engine failures and malfunctions during the war: a prolonged combination of manhandling, inadequate maintenance (caused by the unavailability of spares) and wear. 

 

Manuals were indicative, not empirical, and the "must" and "should" were used only with the intention of preserving the engine life as much as possible, but rest assured that nothing would automatically fail if the engine wasn't taken down after 5 hours of WEP. Factors like the total engine hours and maintenance done up until then had a radical impact on the resistance of the engines, and this is nothing you will find in a manual, and you will not understand if you never got your hands dirty in an aircraft/car/boat engine..

 

Can we go back to the original topic now please? 

 

 

+1 :salute:

 

I hope and am pretty sure we will not wind up with a DCS situation where we get a study sim instead of a good representation of flying over Stalingrad in the allocated timeframe I've learned a lot about WEP from everyone in this thread tho it has been painfull.

 

 

I love the information crump has shared here ! I hate that he will not admit when he is wrong. Makes him look poorly here when he has so much info to share. A real shame...

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Manuals were indicative, not empirical, and the "must" and "should" were used only with the intention of preserving the engine life as much as possible,

 

 

What??

 

Ok, first of all this is not "Crump's interpretation".  The manuals say what they say and aviation convention is the way it is for a reason.  Nothing to do with me or "my interpretation". 

 

What we have here is a group of folks who want to dispute "must" and "mandatory" changing them to "maybe", "should" or something ambiguous instead of the explicit instructions they represent. 

 

 

The wording is precise in the manuals for a very good practical reason......

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DD_bongodriver

No, we have a group of people that realise words like 'must' and 'mandatory' are inevitable in a published set of limitations but also realise that in the adversity of wartime, on many occasions, either through necessity or sometimes by desperation the manuals were overlooked in favour of performance gains that may have given a much needed 'edge'

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No, we have a group of people that realise words like 'must' and 'mandatory' are inevitable in a published set of limitations but also realise that in the adversity of wartime, on many occasions, either through necessity or sometimes by desperation the manuals were overlooked in favour of performance gains that may have given a much needed 'edge'

 

We also have some actual pilot histories where they (some) did exactly what a certain person here says they did not do. So we have to believe the actual pilots themselves !

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No, we have a group of people that realise words like 'must' and 'mandatory' are inevitable in a published set of limitations but also realise that in the adversity of wartime, on many occasions, either through necessity or sometimes by desperation the manuals were overlooked in favour of performance gains that may have given a much needed 'edge'

 

 

 

So that 15% of the time should be the normal outcome in the game?  Is that what you are saying??

 

That is what is sounds like to me.

 

You are arguing that the highly unlikely event you will exceed the operating limitations and have it work out favorably becomes the normal outcome for the game.

 

I agree, it should included under the arcade settings.

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DD_bongodriver

So we have to believe the actual pilots themselves !

By normal convention it is a reasonable source of reliable accounts, but for 'some' people the accounts of pilots are considered unreliable....apparently they are all subject to wild fantasy based delusions, this is heavily influenced by which nation those pilots are from too.

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If Crump flew his 150 octane fueled P-51 over Germany 'by the book', he would be either a POW or dead because he wouldn't push the engine passed the limits to escape from the Bf109/Fw190 on his 6.

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We also have some actual pilot histories where they (some) did exactly what a certain person here says they did not do. So we have to believe the actual pilots themselves

 

 

You mean like this guy?  His outcome is typical according to the all the data compiled under that mandatory reporting system now inplace..........

 

 

Dave Hastie talks about his Spitfire and the boost

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DoAgIlNLcM8

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DD_bongodriver

So that 15% of the time should be the normal outcome in the game?  Is that what you are saying??

 

That is what is sounds like to me.

 

You are arguing that the highly unlikely event you will exceed the operating limitations and have it work out favorably becomes the normal outcome for the game.

 

I agree, it should included under the arcade settings.

No....I said this...

 

 

No, we have a group of people that realise words like 'must' and 'mandatory' are inevitable in a published set of limitations but also realise that in the adversity of wartime, on many occasions, either through necessity or sometimes by desperation the manuals were overlooked in favour of performance gains that may have given a much needed 'edge'

 

 

Not sure where 15% was ever mentioned or any of the other stuff you mention

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DD_bongodriver

You mean like this guy?  His outcome is typical according to the all the data compiled under that mandatory reporting system now inplace..........

No, his outcome does not sound typical at all, he seemed fairly surprised the engine blew up but also seemed quite comfortable with the concept of putting the throttle through the 'gate', this really gives the impression that it was regularly done and often beyond stated limits.

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Crump, we're saying that whilst a pilot might (or should) be sticking to a manual, an engine most likely won't. They gave deliberately redundant operational instructions to preserve the life of the engines a much as possible, because they cost a pretty penny.

 

I've seen more than one Merlin opened for his 500hr inspection, and often they need nothing more than a change of oil, but redundant checks are one of the things we need to put up with for the sake of safety. The 500hr TBO on the Merlin is a wartime heritage which we could well do without today, but go say that to the aviation authorities, who, like yourself, believe only in what they see in manuals..

Edited by Sternjaeger
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Crump, we are saying that you can't think of an aircraft engine tolerance as in being in a vacuum, like you're doing.

 

 

It's simpler than that.

 

We have historical evidence that pilots did exactly what he says they didn't do and got away with doing it. And he can't deny it, and dodges that fact. Will he admit it, probably not...

Edited by thx1138
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Not sure where 15% was ever mentioned or any of the other stuff you mention

 

 

It has been mentioned several times if you would read the replies.  It is actually 88% of the time and not 85% so I was wrong on that count.  It is only 12% of the time it will be successful!

 

The NTSB maintains an extensive accident database.  That is why deviation reporting is mandatory for working pilots.  If you deviate and are successful, it goes in the database, if you deviate and are not successful, that too is recorded.

 

So it gives a great measured outcome regarding the consequences of not following the operating limitations.

 

So we find out is the most common cause of an aviation accident is power plant failure.  If something is going to fail and cause a crash, it is the engine.

 

 

post-1354-0-44019900-1384275110_thumb.jpg

 

The most common contributing factor to that cause is improper use/procedures:

 

 

post-1354-0-68149500-1384274869_thumb.jpg

 

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They gave deliberately redundant operational instructions to preserve the life of the engines a much as possible, because they cost a pretty penny.

 

 

No they did not issue operational instructions to preserve the life of an engine.  The instructions were issued to allow the pilot to gain maximum performance with a reasonable chance of making it home.

 

Read the Allison engineers reply to the one squadron who modified a few of their airplanes unofficially. 

 

It does not say a thing about preserving the longevity of the engine. It talks about maximum performance and not having the engine fail, killing the pilot and losing an airplane.

 

post-1354-0-12765200-1384276915_thumb.jpg

 

Also, you do not seem to understand that the average maintenance stock for aircraft engines is ~75% is almost all the air forces.  That meant there were 3 engines for every aircraft in service.  That is why when a friend of mine's father bought a P51 Mustang in the 1950's, it came with two overhauled Merlin engines as well as drop tanks.

 

Engines are cheap compared to training pilots and replacing aircraft.

 

 

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DD_bongodriver
So we find out is the most common cause of an aviation accident is power plant failure. If something is going to fail and cause a crash, it is the engine.

 

 

Even if we were to actually take notice of contemporary statistics recorded in peace time, you do realise the figures you have just provided clearly state that only 12% of engine related failures were caused by improper handling, read your underlined text in the second picture again very carefully.......'it was a cause 12 per cent of the time and a factor 79.7 percent of the time'........79.7% of the time the engineering coped with the abuse until another factor took effect.....interesting.

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Bob Gobel (WWII Ace). He had this to say about WEP in the P-47:

""On one occasion over Vienna I got into a fight, shot down one Me-109 and was turning with another when I was jumped by two FW-190's. I let the nose fall through the horizon and went into a vertical dive but spiraling so as not to give them a shot as I accelerated.

I was in War Emergency Power (throttle through the gate - 67 in. of Hg) when I hit the deck and had opened the distance slightly so that the 190's were out of range. The race seemed to last a very long time before they gave up the chase but was actually closer to 10-12 minutes. The book limited the operation at that setting to 5 minutes but of course I wasn't about to pull the throttle back, even if the engine blew. When I got back to base and landed, I discovered that I had burned or blown off several exhaust stacks but the engine ran fine. I think all engineering did was compression check the engine, check the screens for metal particles and mark the aircraft back in commission."

and this comment I found once from a P-38 pilot about WEP:

"When I was overseas in 44 and 45, flying the J winter thru summer,
the policy was to drop tanks and push up MP to 45 inches when German fighters were spotted in a position where an engagement was likely. When you actually went for them, throttle up to WEP, 60 inches or so, rpm all the way up too, up past 3000 rpm. And there it would stay until the engagement was over and you remembered to throttle back. You could easily be at WEP for 20 minutes or more."

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DD_bongodriver
Read the Allison engineers reply to the one squadron who modified a few of their airplanes unofficially. 

 

 

Wow....thanks for that, very interesting reading, I never though you'd be the one to provide the actual proof that Squadrons did indeed 'unofficially' modify the aircraft and even provide the proof of an 'angry letter' from the manufacturers.

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.......'it was a cause 12 per cent of the time and a factor 79.7 percent of the time'........

 

 

88.7% of the direct underlying events.....read the report!! ;)

 

12% of the time, it was the direct cause of that accident.....the pilot set the engine out of limits and it failed right then and there.

 

79.7 % of the time, the engine failed at a later date under normal operations because it had been operated outside the limitations earlier! 

 

That is what Allison says will happen too!! :mellow:

You do understand I am not only a pilot but a mechanic too, bongo?

 

It is not hard to tell when an engine has been abused.  The most common cause of cylinder cracking is guess what.......

 

Operating outside the limitations.....

 

Kind of a pattern.....just saying.

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Does the NTSB have records for WW2 military a/c from WW2?

 

What is your implication here?

 

That we did not have a problem operating aircraft engines outside the limitations until we discovered they might not be reliable if we did?

 

So before that discovery, we could use what ever we wanted without consequences.

 

Or is it that WWII engines were so much more reliable than todays engines as to be immune from abuse damage?

 

Can you clarify your point, please.

Edited by Crump
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DD_bongodriver
You do understand I am not only a pilot but a mechanic too, bongo?

 

 

It is very clear that you are a very very rigid person who does not have a capacity to admit error..........most compelling evidence of being a mechanic I saw yet :lol:

 

I have no issue with believing you are a pilot, I have taught many people to fly over the years and it has all sorts, some have been much stranger than you.

 

12% of the time, it was the direct cause of that accident.....the pilot set the engine out of limits and it failed right then and there

 

 

There is no information suggesting the failures were instant, in fact there is no information that denies the possibility the failures were caused by chronic engine mishandling.

Edited by DD_bongodriver
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There is no information suggesting the failures were instant

 

 

Direct cause of the engine no longer functioning and able to keep the airplane aloft such that it causes the crash........

 

That is pretty suggestive of an instant failure, Bongo.

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chronic engine mishandling.

 

 

No there is nothing said about "chronic" engine mishandling.  It does not have to be chronic at all.  Allison relates this to the pilots of WWII.  Operate just once outside of the limitations can weaken the engine such that it fails.  The data suggest's it could fail right in the moment or be sufficiently weakened as to fail in the near future under normal operating conditions.

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No there is nothing said about "chronic" engine mishandling.  It does not have to be chronic at all.  Allison relates this to the pilots of WWII.  Operate just once outside of the limitations can weaken the engine such that it fails.  The data suggest's it could fail right in the moment or be sufficiently weakened as to fail in the near future under normal operating conditions.

 

 

But as already showed here, historical evidence shows that some pilots did exactly that. Do you deny this fact ?

 

Yes or No please.

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How many thousands of hours of operations were flown during WWII ? and we are relying on a few "gung ho" anecdotes from a couple of sources, I would suggest that the reason for the good condition of the Merlin engine mentioned at overhaul time was because it had been operated within its limits "by the book"

 

If you talk to a lot of military pilots about operating outside of recommended limits you will get a quite different perspective. If Crump regularly flew his P-51 over Germany like people do in flight sims he would be a POW or dead from engine failure :)

 

Cheers Dakpilot

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Anecdotal evidence is fine when it supports your argument, but invalid when it doesn't...

 

 

 

Come on guy!

 

You are setting an impossible standard. 

 

I have presented the very words in the form of lawful orders to the service members of the United States Army Air Force as well as the best statistical data in the world on aviation accidents/causes as to why those orders are so specific.  None of that is good enough for you.  As if the USAAF did not want to win WWII.......

 

So maybe listening to a guy who was there might help.  ;)

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DD_bongodriver

Direct cause of the engine no longer functioning and able to keep the airplane aloft such that it causes the crash........

 

That is pretty suggestive of an instant failure, Bongo.

 

 

It is 'your' suggestion yes, but it is not evidenced from the extracts you have provided, if a man is shot and dies 2 weeks later from that gunshot, it is still the cause of death but not immediate.

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Come on guy!

 

You are setting an impossible standard. 

 

I have presented the very words in the form of lawful orders to the service members of the United States Army Air Force as well as the best statistical data in the world on aviation accidents/causes as to why those orders are so specific.  None of that is good enough for you.  As if the USAAF did not want to win WWII.......

 

So maybe listening to a guy who was there might help.  ;)

 

Nope, I'm asking that you set a consistent standard.

 

And I'll listen to guys who were there, certainly. You weren't.

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if a man is shot and dies 2 weeks later from that gunshot, it is still the cause of death but not immediate

 

 

No, the cause is the immediate result in accident reporting.  The factors bring about that cause, in otherwords, they form a chain of events that anywhere along that chain, the accident cycle could have been prevented.

 

Nope, I'm asking that you set a consistent standard.

 

 

Go read the thread all the evidence is posted in black and white.  Not my words, the USAAF's and the NTSB's.....

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