Question: BoB1940: from when the German Pilots got informations by the Freya Radars at the Channel Coast?

[kraut1]

Hi All,

I know that some radars were installed in ca. june / july 1940 at the Channel coast near Cap Griz Net.

And I know that they were used in first line for detecting maritime targets and that the cooperation with the Luftwaffe was poor.

But I suppose that at least during the late Battle of Britain / The Blitz in autumn 1940 they provided maybe some informations for the Luftwaffe pilots about enemy planes. 

So it would be interesting for me for my late October / November / December 1940 missions of my Luftwaffe 40-45 campaign.

https://forum.il2sturmovik.com/topic/92369-luftwaffe-ww2-career-1940-45-part02-bob-updated-optional-bf109e4-missions-for-odessa-owners/

-which radar types were installed where? Freya or Wuerzburg? (only for area Boulogne-Calais-Dünkirchen)

-from which approx. date they transmitted reports about british planes during the flight?

(I don't mean accurate radar guidance, just from time to time reports related to grid coordinates / or town names...)

Many thanks in advance!

Edited November 2 by kraut1

[AndyJWest]

See Kammhuber Line. Freya was used (not very effectively) to detect incoming RAF bomber raids. I think that was about the extent of what the Luftwaffe did with them during the period. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[kraut1]

2 hours ago, AndyJWest said:

See Kammhuber Line. Freya was used (not very effectively) to detect incoming RAF bomber raids. I think that was about the extent of what the Luftwaffe did with them during the period. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thank you very much for your answer!

The intention of my question was more in respect of the late Battle of Britain offensive German Missions.

Although the Battle of Britain was lost in September in respect of the air supremacy the Germans were still flying offensive  missions until end of 1940.

And I would like to know, if maybe during such offensive missions they were informed by the ground control about RAF planes from time to time.

The Freya at Cap Griz Nez had a range of more than 100km as far as I know and so it could have been possible to detect RAF planes in the area of e.g: Manston, Hawkinge, Lympne.

But of course it is possible that in this time period the german Radar was not used for this purpose...

 

If I would get a positive confirmation about this I could adapt a group for mission generation, with audio ground control messages in intervals of ca. 5 minutes about the approx. location of RAF flights (resolution: 10kmx10km default grids of the maps)

https://forum.il2sturmovik.com/topic/91428-ground-observer-radar-enemy-planes-grid-russiangerman-audio-reports-v1-03062025/

 

 

Edited November 2 by kraut1

[AndyJWest]

I've not seen anything indicating that Freya was used in the manner you describe. Fortunately, the Luftwaffe seems not to have understood what their own systems would have been capable of, had they used them more effectively. 

 

 

[kraut1]

On 11/2/2025 at 6:27 PM, AndyJWest said:

I've not seen anything indicating that Freya was used in the manner you describe. Fortunately, the Luftwaffe seems not to have understood what their own systems would have been capable of, had they used them more effectively. 

 

 

Yes, I agree.

Today I bought JG26 by Caldwell for Kindle and according to this book the German Radar defensive system seems to be installed during the first 6 months of 1941.

[AndyJWest]

Yup. It took the Luftwaffe a hell of a long time to understand even the basics of organised 'air defense' (or as the RAF would have insisted 'air defence'😉). Eventually, they got it, but it was very much a lost opportunity during the time when RAF bomber raids were small and poorly organised: had the Luftwaffe been able to organise faster, they could have done a lot more damage, and maybe deter the RAF from scaling things up at the rate they did.

 

Anyone who's been watching Al Murray and James Holland's YouTube videos on the Battle of Britain (link) will be familiar with a recurring theme of theirs: the shear incompetence of the German leadership. This failure to understand the capabilities own technology was maybe not on that scale, but it was symptomatic of the broader problem. They'd expected the RAF to be defeated in a few days. They didn't expect the RAF to have the capacity to be actively engaging in bombing while simultaneously defending Britain. And, until they'd found out how wrong they were, they had no reason to even think seriously about defence.