Thoughts on the K-4 Manouverability

[ZachariasX]

11 minutes ago, VO101Kurfurst said:

The Germans agreed and sent them the worst G-6s they could possibly find. ?

Actually, it was more likely open sabotage by factory workers. It wasn't really the Germans who wanted to deliver a lemon, but they surely had an eye for that part of the productuion that was good for the bin and took that dirty dozen from that. This kind of sabotage usually consisted in overtightening of screws or damaging springs (or not putting them in at all). In either way, they were unusable after three years and were disposed.

 

And the were not traded, the fact that Switzerland bowed to Nazi pressure just facilitated a sale. You might be interested in what went on and why this happened. I keep it in here as it is a "Messerschmitt performance" through and through:

 

 

 

The Swiss were painfully aware that they used outdated material and were looking for more recent things. But that proved to be very difficult.

 

First, they thought of just building some more Me-109E (the Swiss never used the "Bf" prefix). Although that was seen as a sort of a copyright infringement, Georg Bührle, Owner of Oerlikon and 50% owner of Pilatus in Stans (Switzerland's permier weapon trader) thought it was no problem to build some of those aircraft. But the government was evasdroping on his negotiations and phone calls and promptly terminated any of such venture. One has to keep in mind that the Swiss needed a constant supply of coal from Germany, a trainload a day was direly needed and you should know when you can p*ss in the wind (sould absolutely want to) and when it is really not the time for it. The situation was bad enough if in the first two years of the war when the Swiss AF shot it out with some Nazi intruders and that drew some blood on both sides. It took way more effort to rectify that behind the scenes than going up and shooting things.

 

Second, Switzerland failed to procure aircraft from the US, as the Japanese chose an inconvenient timing attacking Pearl Harbor, in effect negating the envisioned import of crated aircraft via Genova.

 

From there it went further downhill. The Italians made an offer in 1942 for 30 Macchi C 202 for CHF 400'000.- each. The price was thought to be excessive but they ordered 2 planes for 370'000.-. That was deemed ok, but then the Italians insisted on forther 8'500 litres aviation gasoline that was as scarce in Switzerland as in our neighboring countries. hence, no deal.

 

In 1943, the chief of the Swiss Air Force, Bans Bandi tried to talk Göring into selling some 109 and 110. Göring however had other worries and declined. Hans Bandi got promptly fired for talking to Goering like that by General Guisan who replaced him with someone Guisan felt he could trust.

 

The British also valued their numbers in aircraft higher than making money, even in 1944. At least they donated (very involuntarily so) a Mosquito not much later on, a favorite among the crews here for many years.

 

It was in this context that the federal council finally took the opportunity that presented itself by complying to Nazi pressure (instead of them sending agents murdering the pilots or bombing Dübendorf) to buy a dozen overpriced aircraft and still thought it was a good deal.  The 12 Bf-109G6 were  not traded for the destruction (blown up on the apron of LSMD with Nazi presence), they were actually sold by Messerschmitt to Switzerland for the then price of CHF 500'000.- each to be paid in two installments of 3 million CHF. There were two checks issued that enabled the Swiss negotiator to "withdraw" 800 kg of gold at the Swiss National Bank and sell that on the free market for the cash to pay the two installments. Taking the opportunity, the federal council autorized the procurement of the new aircraft two days after the said Bf-110 was blown up. And only then the deal could move forward.

 

Even though it was said that this Bf-110 C9+EN was blown to smithereens by the explosives brough along by SS Major Hans Willhelm Eggenand his Liaison officer Hans Brandt, that is not really true. Albert Wiesendanger, then head of the Stadtpolizei (city police) Zurich, picked up a part of the rudder stab.

 

This artefact shows the score of Willhelm Johnen and his crew without of course the last two that were made the night of the landing. This piece is now located that the Militär- und Festungsmuseum Full-Reuenthal.

 

Whether any of that gold was ever withdrawn is not known. But as it appears, about one installment of three millions was paid and the 12 Bf-109G6 were promptly delivered by German pilots in civilian clothing. The aircraft made it barely to Switzeland but then had to be grounded due to constant engine failures. The aircraft were so miserable it became apparent on day one that they were not just useless but dangerous to the crews.

 

The whole diplomatic brouhaha was not about the aircraft being essentially trash, but the fact that Switzerland only paid for it 3 million CHF, but Willy deemed it preposterous that they didn't pay the full 6 million and kept pestering for the remaining balance. And this was in essence an affair between Messerschmitt AG (that happily survived the war) and the Switzerland. It was the relations Switzerland built on by lending Germany a firm hand after the war, and it seems some were more grateful for that than others. In the end, it was German politics that at some point got irritated as well and that put a quick end to the affair.

 

***

 

These were many words to say that things are not so simple and no nation would "just give" some aircraft when it is not to vital interest of a nations own survival. And trades between crooks are always special.

[Holtzauge]

I see page 199 and 201 above but to understand how the story on these pages connect it would be good to see page 200 as well.

Edited June 7, 2021 by Holtzauge

[LukeFF]

17 hours ago, CUJO_1970 said:

I'm quite familiar with the 109s sent to Switzerland, and the fallout that ensued. Why do you think those aircraft ended up being given to the Swiss?

 

Do you think these are indicative of serial produced 109s as accepted for service in the Luftwaffe?  Yes? Then you think that all 109 were "built like crap"?

No? Then what is the point of bringing it up?

 

Apparently, they thought the Swiss wouldn't care about the quality of the planes they were being given. Yeah, not a great idea, and even more so when you're dealing with the Swiss. ? 

 

Do I think those planes are representative of what the Luftwaffe was flying? I certainly do - it points to at least some of the planes being put out at the factories at that time by_slave_labor obviously were not that great of quality. Even the vaunted Oleg Maddox once said he didn't use FM data from G-10s and G-14s produced in Germany, because the quality of those planes was so bad - but instead he used data from Hungarian-built planes. You can't really expect high-quality production from people who've been dragged away from their homeland and then forced to work under threat of violence.

 

17 hours ago, CUJO_1970 said:

Wow look at II/JG 3. 23 of 29 machines ready to go. Nice work by those guys.

Looks like with the proper mechanics and experienced pilots the 109 could achieve a very high serviceability rate even under the worst conditions.

 

Thanks for pointing that out. I'm impressed even more now.

 

?

 

You should have a look at JG 26's serviceability records from this time - a unit that certain "experts" like to hold up as an elite unit. If they were at 50% readiness on any given day - before, during, and after the Normandy invasion - it was a miracle.

[41Sqn_Skipper]

Serviceability of RAF fighters:

Maintenance. Air Publication 3397, Air Ministry 1954

 

Edited June 7, 2021 by 41Sqn_Skipper

[MiloMorai]

Skipper, are those numbers for a/c on hand or a percentage of Establishment Strength?

[gimpy117]

18 hours ago, VO101Kurfurst said:

Lead deposits from increased TEL content of 150 grade eventually fouled and clogged up spark plugs, eventually leading to spark plug malfunction at low speeds (where temps were too low to burn away lead deposits) and various corrosive additives ate away valve clearance. Spark plugs on 150 grade Mustangs had to be changed in every 7 hours, meaning after every escort sortie. 

so yeah, in game out 30 Min flights almost flat out we should be fine. and here's that valve clearance quote again, it ate at the seats (allegedly), that lowers compression after a while sure, but good maintenance should catch that. If the seat is so bad that it allows the valve to travel up and reduce the clearance between the rocker and valve, like I said before it's the least of your worries. and from an A&P standpoint I think it's just screwball wrench turning not bad fuel. 

 

I do 12 leak down checks on every plane that comes in the door, it's basic stuff that doesn't take that long. changing 12 plugs every 7 hours is a drag sure, but that's like basic stuff two. honestly in a wartime situation unless plugs are scarce you can just put new ones in, you don't even have to clean them.  

7 hours ago, LukeFF said:

Do I think those planes are representative of what the Luftwaffe was flying? I certainly do - it points to at least some of the planes being put out at the factories at that time by_slave_labor obviously were not that great of quality. Even the vaunted Oleg Maddox once said he didn't use FM data from G-10s and G-14s produced in Germany, because the quality of those planes was so bad - but instead he used data from Hungarian-built planes. You can't really expect high-quality production from people who've been dragged away from their homeland and then forced to work under threat of violence.

I agree with this statement. the fact that they could produce 109's even at all given the material, facility, and skilled labor shortages and sabotage is a miracle. putting together an aircraft isn't like assembling a widget. every single one is a little bit different. its not easy to just whomp an airframe together...especially in a cave when you're being bombed. 

 

that's also interesting that the Devs gave the 109 a free pass and let it be a higher quality version from outside builds...seems....generous. if anything they should just have a modification for these aircraft to be "Hungarian spec". I get quality varies from factory to factory even from USA built aircraft, but that's a big handout when you're trying to simulate GERMAN aircraft late war. 

 

makes me wanna argue even more about "bad soviet fuel" nerf to the P40.     

Edited June 8, 2021 by gimpy117

[Dakpilot]

2 hours ago, gimpy117 said:

makes me wanna argue even more about "bad soviet fuel" nerf to the P40.   

 

What exactly do you expect out of the 1941 export P-40E-1, it would be nice to have later versions but what we have is the one that flew in latter part of Moscow campaign and early stages of Stalingrad

 

Cheers, Dakpilot 

[gimpy117]

16 hours ago, Dakpilot said:

 

What exactly do you expect out of the 1941 export P-40E-1, it would be nice to have later versions but what we have is the one that flew in latter part of Moscow campaign and early stages of Stalingrad

 

Cheers, Dakpilot 

yeah but that exact same engine was running at 70"HG in the desert with only occasional wear issues. alison even said they were "delighted" that their engines were so tough. 

Edited June 8, 2021 by gimpy117

[Dakpilot]

I think you will find that it is  not the exact same engine 

 

Cheers, Dakpilot 

[JtD]

Of course, it can't be the "exact same" engine unless the Allies invented a way to have the same object in two places at the same time. Which would be an interesting way to explain Allied numerical superiortiy.

 

By all reasonable means of "same", it were the same engines cleared for and to be run at the same boosts and rpm.

[MiloMorai]

A little history.

 

Bad Wörishofen (GER) (48 00 50 N – 10 36 50 E) General: operational airfield (Einsatzhafen) in Bavaria 45 km SSW of Augsburg and 29 km NW of Schongau; airfield located 2 km NE of Bad Wörishofen.

History: listed as an emergency landing ground (Notlandeplatz) in 1927 and then developed into an operational airfield in the mid1930’s. Used throughout the war as a practice field for single-engine trainers. In mid-1943 it also became an operational fighter station and remained so to the end of the war. Dimensions: approx. 915 x 1000 meters (1000 x 1100 yards) with a square shape.

Surface and Runways: grass surface. No paved runway. A perimeter track encircles the landing area. Equipped with perimeter lighting. Fuel and Ammunition: fuel storage was off the SE corner. Infrastructure: there were 5 medium hangars in a row that curved around the SE corner and 3 of them had paved hangar aprons. Several barrack buildings were near the edge of the woods off the SE corner. A special branch rail line served the N, S and W sides of the airfield.

Dispersal: 20 parking hardstands were located on the edge of the woods along the NE corner. Defenses: 2 light Flak positions and 4 machine gun positions existed in Jan 44. Remarks: none.

Operational Units: III./JG 3 (Aug 43 – Feb 44, Apr-May 44); I./JG 4 (Nov-Dec 43); 3./JG 301 (Nov-Dec 43); 3./TGr. 30 (May-Jun 44); Stab, I./JG 300 (Jul-Aug 44); elements of 2./Versuchsverband OKL (May 45).

School Units: Arbeitsplatz for LKS Fürstenfeldbruck/LKS 4 (1937-45); Arbeitsplatz for Schule/FAR 23, FFS A/B 23 then FFS A 23 (Kaufbeuren) (1939-45); Stab/JG 101 (Jun 44 – 1944); Verbandsführerschule des General der Jagdflieger (Jan – Apr 45).

Station Commands: Fl.H.Kdtr. (E) Wörishofen (1939-40); Fl.H.Kdtr. E 5/VII (1940); Flugplatzkdo. of Fl.H.Kdtr. A(o) 14/VII Kaufbeuren (1944-45).

Station Units (on various dates – not complete): Werft-Abt. (v) 122/XII (1944-45). [Sources: AFHRA A5258 pp.421-22 (29 Feb 44); chronologies; BAMA; NARA; PRO/NA; web site ww2.dk]

[MiloMorai]

An excerpt from I book I fully recommend: 

That the Bf 109 production suffered as a result of the employment of PoWs, foreign workers and concentration camp inmates, is evident from a report at the beginning of September 1944 in which it was stated that Erprobungstelle  Tarnewitz, the weapon-testing centre, received one of the few K-2s - W.Nr. 600056. On flying the aircraft over from Obertraubling, the ferry pilot established that the elevator bolts had not been secured, and on the second take-off, an elevator blockage occured. In K-4 W.Nr. 330112 handed over to Tarnewitz from the Industrial airfield at Suchholf, the rudder controls and pedals chafed and jammed. The wing leading edge slats were markedly deformed and jammed on extension and retraction, and a 2mm gap existed at the separation point between the mass-balance and the wooden skin on the elevator, and on top of that, the brakes did not function properly. On the subsequent ferry flight from the plant to E-Stelle, an emergency landing had to be made due to loss of coolant. In 1944 alone, a total of 82 Bf 109 on ferry flights from Regengsburg to front line units either crashed or made emergency landings. In Bf 109 K-4, W.Nr 330112, at Tarnewitz for weapon trials, an MG 151 was installed instead of MK 108, whilst the other K-4 had an MK 108 in each wing. 

Even the front line units had problems with aircraft that arrived, since for Bf 109 flight trials, only sufficient fuel was available for a 15 minute test-flight from mid 1944, and it was naturally not possible to conduct a comprehensive test-flight within 15 minutes. In a report of experiences dated 18 March 1945, the Technical Officer of JG6 had to say this about the Bf 109:

 

"Newly-delivered aircraft were very prone to faults in the first 5 to 10 flying hours. Almost the same complaints repeat themselves which burden the unit technically and which reduce the operational readiness. The following faults were almost continually met: elevator free-play in the position lever, loose distance-pieces on the elevator control cables, too-long anchoring bolts on the suspension lever of the sprung undercarriage legs; missing range-of-travel markings on the wheel; leaky or blocked conduits in the MW-50 system, faults in the electrical system; bad coolant mixture; almost always too-little frost protection fluid and almost no Korrosionschutzol (corrosion-protection of oil) 39 mixed with it; chafing lubrication-return conduits on the starboard valve sump; oiling of the engine through leaky flange couplings; weapons badly centred, and the aircraft are not free of W/T problems, especially in the installation set. With some of the Bf 109 Ks, the ammunition belt-feed guides in the airframe were displaced  by 3 to 5mm vis-a-vis the weapons, so that the ammunition belt could not be correctly retracted and belt-jamming was preprogrammed. After only a few rounds had been fired, the MK 108 regularly failed due to an unsuitable volume of insulation for the projectile fuse. In the procurement of replacement parts, difficulties were continually encountered in receiving the Fl 8/2926 E-5 AD component for the high tailwheel"

 

Its safe to assume that sabotage was deliberately practised during production by the PoWs, foreign workers and concentration camp workers engaged in manufacture, in the form of loose screw anchorings of all kinds, incorrect electrical connections, non-adherence to correct coolant mixture ratios, improperly screwed spark plugs etc. The frost-protection fluid that was on hand was often spirited  away by the Russian PoWs and drunk as alcohol substitute, and numerous death of PoWs dying of alcohol poisoning are documented in lists of losses.

 

"Nest of Eagles: Messerschmitt Production and Flight-testing at Regensburg 1936-1945" -by Peter Schmoll-

[Dakpilot]

2 hours ago, JtD said:

Of course, it can't be the "exact same" engine unless the Allies invented a way to have the same object in two places at the same time. Which would be an interesting way to explain Allied numerical superiortiy.

 

By all reasonable means of "same", it were the same engines cleared for and to be run at the same boosts and rpm.

 

A bit captain obvious, but gimpy used the same phase about 70" engines in the Desert. 

 

The whole 70" in the Desert was a full year later than the P-40 E-1 and spares package that was delivered to Russia in 1941 (note that they were keeping some of  their P-40's flying due to lack of engines by fitting Klimovs and the P-40's at Stalingrad were withdrawn after two week of action due to lack of spares it seems logical to assume the E-1's did not get updates) 

 

I was obviously referring to engine model/spec not exact engine... 

 

Although still a V-1710-39, later engines had undergone many improvements (a year is a long time in engine development in wartime) better crankshafts (I think 3 iterations) new and stronger crankcase/block casting, changes to inlet manifold to reduce detonation, MAP limiter, MP guage that read over 50" and multiple other improvements. 

 

Anyway this is not the thread to discuss this and it has all been covered before. 

 

As I have said many times it would be great to have later models of P-40,

 

but 1941 70" 1500hp Allison's with any form of reliability in Russia was not a thing

 

Cheers, Dakpilot 

[41Sqn_Skipper]

Why not read the whole statement: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/V-1710_Service_Use_of_High_Power_Outputs.pdf

 

 

[Aurora_Stealth]

Think this thread has gone beyond its economical use here @Richomer, and drifting off topic in different directions. May be worth closing it.

 

Regarding some of the comments regarding K-4, not sure what's trying to be proved really... apart from the obvious fact that the losing side did in fact have increasingly poor quality in its manufacturing and assembly (as it would for most of its manufactured products) at the end of the war. I'm not sure what else would be expected from factories being bombed, lack of skilled labour being available, material shortages, sabotage and of course the morally bankrupt use of slave labour etc.

 

Not sure why this would be a surprise to anyone, it doesn't reflect on the K-4 itself being a bad design - these are strategic and to a degree, ideological problems that eventually affected the operational and then tactical level... any sensible leader would not have carried on a clearly lost war to such a desperate end. You do have to also ask why start the war in the first place but that's a separate discussion for another thread.

 

As usual, the Germans tried to improvise as best they could (they are recognised as being fairly good at this as per some of the points made earlier) and getting even the operational numbers they had was quite surprising considering circumstances in 1944 and 1945. There was always going to be low serviceability compared to the Allies - the Germans were on the losing side and it was now their country that was being destroyed.

 

Yet they were still able to get aircraft operational and in the air (who wanted to? - the war was lost and they were bitterly outnumbered), and yes 150 octane definitely did contribute to engine failure - just look at what happened to the Spitfire Mk XIV when it entered service using it - its extremely volatile fuel and can cause numerous issues that affect reliability including issues with spark plugs, detonation etc as mentioned. The way to play it smart is to use these types of fuel only when the benefit exceeds the risks, i.e. you're up against very determined resistance, flying short distances close to home, or you can ensure rigorous maintenance to compensate and can rely on lots of spares support for increased failure rates which almost certainly will accompany usage.

 

I don't think its unfair to say that the Allies (to a much, much lesser extent perhaps) were also suffering mild issues in their engine reliability when running at extremely high boost and straining their engines, but most of the time this was seen as a trade-off to ensure they could defeat whatever stiff resistance they might encounter including jet fighters, or highly contested areas. Not sure that comes as a huge shock either really, the Allies could afford to have an above average failure rate for higher engine performance - they were operating with a great many advantages including numerical superiority.

Edited June 10, 2021 by Aurora_Stealth

[JtD]

6 hours ago, Dakpilot said:

The whole 70" in the Desert was a full year later than the P-40 E-1 and spares package that was delivered to Russia in 1941

 

No P-40E-1's were delivered to the Soviet Union in 1941 (just a dozen E's). By the end of 1942, the P-40E(-1)'s of the desert air force had been using excessive boosts for quite some time. Therefore it cannot have been a full year and several engine iterations later - it actually was as contemporary as it possibly gets - summer to autumn 1942.

Yes, the devs picked the wrong P-40 to include with BoM, but making another mistake by modelling the engine as fragile as it is, doesn't make it right, it makes it double wrong.

 

6 hours ago, Dakpilot said:

Anyway this is not the thread to discuss this

 

Agree with that.

Edited June 9, 2021 by JtD

[41Sqn_Skipper]

On 6/8/2021 at 12:44 AM, MiloMorai said:

Skipper, are those numbers for a/c on hand or a percentage of Establishment Strength?

 

The book also gives the pre-war figures where squadron should be at full strength. So I assume it's for a/c on hands. 

[Dakpilot]

2 hours ago, JtD said:

 

No P-40E-1's were delivered to the Soviet Union in 1941 (just a dozen E's). By the end of 1942, the P-40E(-1)'s of the desert air force had been using excessive boosts for quite some time. Therefore it cannot have been a full year and several engine iterations later - it actually was as contemporary as it possibly gets - summer to autumn 1942.

Yes, the devs picked the wrong P-40 to include with BoM, but making another mistake by modelling the engine as fragile as it is, doesn't make it right, it makes it double wrong.

 

 

Agree with that.

 

The difference between the P-40 E and P-40 E-1 was the designator (1) to differentiate aircraft sold to Soviets and those which were lend lease otherwise they were the same aircraft. Don't see what your point is

 

By late 42 most desert airforce P-40's would have been K models, introduced in Aug. 

 

Any P-40E still around at end/late 42 would likely not be using their original engines, or being used as a fighter 

 

Would love to see some links showing which units were doing the 70" overboost in the desert and which P-40's they were using and when. 

 

Cheers, Dakpilot 

[MiloMorai]

P-40 Warhawk - In the Desert

 

Becoming the primary fighter of the RAF's Desert Air Force in North Africa, the P-40 began to thrive as the bulk of aerial combat in the region took place below 15,000 feet. Flying against Italian and German aircraft, British and Commonwealth pilots exacted a heavy toll on enemy bombers and eventually forced the replacement of the Bf 109E with the more advanced Bf 109F. In early 1942, DAF's Tomahawks were slowly withdrawn in favor of the more heavily armed P-40D which was known as the Kittyhawk. These new fighters allowed the Allies to maintain air superiority until being replaced by Spitfires that were altered for desert use. Beginning in May 1942, the majority of DAF's Kittyhawks transitioned to a fighter-bomber role. This change led to a higher attrition rate to enemy fighters. The P-40 remained in use during the Second Battle of El Alamein that fall and until the end of the North Africa campaign in May 1943.

 

P-40 Warhawk - Mediterranean

While the P-40 saw extensive service with the DAF, it also served as the primary fighter for the US Army Air Forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean in late 1942 and early 1943. Coming ashore with American forces during Operation Torch, the aircraft achieved similar results in American hands as pilots inflicted heavy losses on Axis bombers and transports. In addition to supporting the campaign in North Africa, P-40s also provided air cover for the invasion of Sicily and Italy in 1943. Among the units to use the aircraft in the Mediterranean was the 99th Fighter Squadron also known as the Tuskegee Airmen. The first African American fighter squadron, the 99th flew the P-40 until February 1944 when it transitioned to the Bell P-39 Airacobra.

[354thFG_Rails]

LOL these last few pages of this thread have nothing to do with the K4 maneuverability. This thread is off the rails, how has it not been locked and unlocked at least 5 times. ?

[357th_KW]

36 minutes ago, QB.Rails said:

LOL these last few pages of this thread have nothing to do with the K4 maneuverability. This thread is off the rails, how has it not been locked and unlocked at least 5 times. ?

 

I'm pretty sure I know of a few key phrases that could bring that about.

[41Sqn_Skipper]

1 hour ago, QB.Rails said:

LOL these last few pages of this thread have nothing to do with the K4 maneuverability. This thread is off the rails, how has it not been locked and unlocked at least 5 times. ?

 

Isn't there a forum rule that any 109 thread needs to turn in a 100 or 150 octane discussion after 7 pages?

[Kurfurst]

On 6/7/2021 at 10:22 PM, LukeFF said:

Do I think those planes are representative of what the Luftwaffe was flying? I certainly do - it points to at least some of the planes being put out at the factories at that time by_slave_labor obviously were not that great of quality. Even the vaunted Oleg Maddox once said he didn't use FM data from G-10s and G-14s produced in Germany, because the quality of those planes was so bad - but instead he used data from Hungarian-built planes. You can't really expect high-quality production from people who've been dragged away from their homeland and then forced to work under threat of violence.

 

Aircraft Division Industry Report

Second Edition January 1947

Table of Contents

Preface
Chapter I	Summary and Conclusions
Chapter II	The German Aircraft Industry
Chapter III	Government Controls and Programs
Chapter IV	Target Selection for Strategic Bombing
Chapter V	Attacks on the Aircraft Industry
Chapter VI	Effects of Bombing on Aircraft Production
Chapter VII	Aero-Engine Production
Chapter VIII	Materials and Aircraft Components
Chapter IX	Report on V-Weapon Production
Exhibits

Preface

1. In September 1944 the US Strategic Bombing Survey was organized under Presidential directive to conduct a survey of the effects of strategic bombing in hastening the German defeat. The American public is well aware that no small part of the cost of the European war can be charged to the Allied aerial offensive against strategic industrial installations. To them an accounting must be given.

2. Strategic bombing is a highly scientific process. It is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources which will most weaken the enemy by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to prosecute the war. Targets are selected only after a careful balancing of their significance to the enemy economy against the capabilities of the attacking force. To be successful, any strategic attack must cost the enemy many more man-hours lost than are expended in the attack.

3. During the war it was impossible to asses the real significance of this type of warfare. A limited amount of information on physical damage to industrial plants could be obtained from aerial photographs. Ground intelligence from agents inside Germany made an important contribution and some German prisoners of war also told what they knew. It was impossible, however, to know with certainty whether or not the effects of air activity against the Reich justified the effort expended. The final accounting could only be made only after a careful on-the-spot investigation of the targets that had borne the brunt of the attack.

4. This report deals with the specialized but highly important part of the total strategic bombing effort - the attacks on the German aircraft and V-weapons industries. The destruction of this group of industries was considered of vital importance in support of the Allied air effort against Festung Europa. A number of key points in the industrial pattern were selected as objects of attacks. In this report an attempt is made to assess objectively the merits of the choice. It analyzes the German aircraft industry as it was before bombing and as it reacted to our attacks. Chapter One presents the summary and conclusions of the entire investigations. One of the most important effects of strategic bombing, plant dispersal, has been given special treatment in Chapter Two. Throughout the report, wherever the available data have permitted, comparisons are drawn between American and German production methods.

5. The report is based on field team investigation of a selected list of key targets in Germany, on interrogations of important German aircraft officials taken into custody after the collapse, and on analysis of government records of aircraft programs and production found hidden in caves, cellars and attics throughout Germany.

6. Reference should be made to Exhibit VII for detailed information on the history of the Aircraft Division, the persons who engaged in this study and the documents available to supplement this report.

7. The report was prepared under the editorial leadership of Colonel Carl H. Norcross, formerly managing editor of Aviation Magazine. The group responsible for the perparation and the analysis of the German aircraft industry included: W. G. Friedrich, head of the Aeronautical Engineering Dept., North Carolina State College; N.W. Gilbert, Professor of Business Economics, California Institute of Technology; Jerome Lederer, Chief Engineer and Assistant Manager, Aero Insurance Underwriters; C.W. Miller, formerly Director, Planning and Airframe Supply, British Air Commission, Washington, D.C.; Myron A. Tracy, Acting Director, Aircraft Resources Control Office, Aircraft Production Board, Washington, D.C.; and Stephen Zand, Director, Vese Memorial Aero Lab., Sperry Gyroscope Company.

 

[....]

 

 

11. Operating Difficulties Caused by War

a. Dispersed operations reduce the opportunities for the attainment of maximum efficiency. The German industry established before the war was broken up into separate buildings as a precaution against bombing. Dr. Frydag estimated that in 1936 that such plants reduced efficiency by 20-25 percent below that which would be possible in large building.

b. The emergency dispersal of aircraft production operations during the war resulted in further reduction in efficiency. Dr. Frydag estimated that indirect workers rose from a little over 40 percent to something over 50 percent of the working force.

c. The airframe industry failed to design and develop high production, special purpose tools. Milch expressed himself bitterly on this point and blamed the head of the Main Committee for Machine Tools, Otto Lange, for obstructing such a program.

d. The quality of the working force declined. Germany's best workers went into the military services. Their places were taken by women and older men, foreigners, prisoners of war and part-time workers. The proportion of these several groups for each company as of October 1944 are shown in

 

Exhibit IV. The proportions for the total working force were as follows:

(a) German Men and Women	52%
(b) Prisoners of War and Jews	12%
(c) Foreign	36%
Women	23%

e. Not all of the foreigners were "slave" workers. A large number came voluntarily to Germany to take an active part in Hitler's New Order. As a general matter, however, they were considered less efficient than the Germans. Many foreigners were coerced by devious means into coming to Germany; these were the "slave" workers. They were less efficient than the voluntary group. The Dutch were the least cooperative, the Belgians and French were somewhat better, and Russians, especially Ukrainian women, reasonably well regarded.

f. It must be noted that the German aircraft industry never made as extensive use of women as did the American. The propaganda put forth by Goebbels and by Sauckel, Minister of Labor, was that foreigners should be used. A good many foreign women were employed as house servants prior to 1944 to make the lives of German housewives easier.

g. Air raids caused a loss of less than 5 percent in worker time.

h. Air raid precautions, such as the erection of blast walls and shelters was not a significant factor in reducing efficiency.

i. Repair of air raid damage was not charged to the industry and accordingly not reflected in the efficiency of the industry. The Todt Organization and the Speer Ministry attended to major repairs.

j. The frequency of the program changes was referred to repeatedly by Germans under interrogation as a principal difficulty of their industry. A study of these program changes does not reveal a situation substantially different from American program changes.

k. The frequency of engineering changes also has been pointed to by Germans in explanation of the difficulties under which they worked. A study of these changes does not support this complaint although chopped up operations because of dispersal complicated the matter. The same attitude has been expressed by American production men. Frequent engineering changes, especially in wartime, are inherent in aircraft. German production tooling, furthermore, was better suited than most American to the introduction of engineering changes.

l. Speer commented on the quality of management of German aircraft firms: "Due to the rapid growth of the airplane industry, we did not have first class men. In addition, we suffered in the airplane industry because aircraft designers were also general managers. We have Messerschmitt, Heinkel, Tank. A man like Messerschmitt is an artist. One should never put an artist at the head of such a large firm. We remedied that only very late and then only partially."

m. The fact that the output per German worker was only about half that of American workers might indicate that the German aircraft industry can only be compared unfavorably with the American industry. This is not the case. The German industry enjoyed at least two important advantages:

(1) The supply of competent mechanics in the German labor market was much greater than that available to American aircraft manufacturers.

(2) The bulk of German aircraft production was concentrated on a small number of models, so that a tremendous background of production experience was accumulated in each. It is true that in 1943 and 1944 the actual operations were broken up considerably and scattered geographically, but the manufacturing experience in tooling and production engineering was continuous. Points were reached further along the learning curve than were reached by any American models.

 

12. Effects of Strategic Bombing on Quality of German Aircraft

a. If strategic bombing caused a reduction in the quality of German airplanes, the effect was as injurious as if aircraft plants had been damaged or destroyed. Airplane performance depends upon excellence of design and of production. The present section considers the effect of bombing on the quality of German airplanes.

b. The design and development offices of the German aircraft companies were not selected as bombing targets, although several were hit in raids on plants. The case of the successful attack on the Peenemunde group engaged in V-weapon research was an exception, but it was not engaged in aircraft work. In general, however, bombing did not interfere seriously with the engineering work that was being done on new airplanes.

c. The improvement of existing aircraft and engines was affected in a few instances by bombing. The work of engineers engaged in the making of design improvements was made more difficult, and in several cases the work on test installations was interrupted or destroyed. The dispersal of operations to avoid bombing made it very difficult to introduce engineering changes into line production. The introduction of the latest design DB 603-type engine was delayed by bomb damage to the high altitude test stands. The replacement of the Jumo 211 with the higher performance Jumo 213 was delayed by difficult conditions caused by bombings. The Me 262 was put into production in dispersed and underground locations. If it could have been set up for production in an established Messerschmitt plant with a production organization accustomed to working together, time could have been saved and design problems could have been worked out more easily.

 

13. Effects of Bombing on Quality of Production

a. The manner in which an airplane design is carried out in the factory determines by at least a small margin the quality of its performance. Strategic bombing, by multiplying production difficulties, undoubtedly tended to lower the quality of German airplanes. In spite of this fact, however, there is no conclusive evidence that there was a more than 5 to 10 percent reduction in performance because of factors attributed to production. Even this, however, is an important amount. At the end of the war, an American commander indicated his respect for German models by stating that except for the limited range of German fighters, he would have been willing to trade airplanes for individual combat.

b. Some of the ways in which the quality of the production job was affected directly and directly by bombing are as follows:

(1) Especially in the case of high performance aircraft the tolerance of the airfoil must be kept very close. German practice with production tools was excellent for this purpose, but it depended upon the circulation of master tools and checking fixtures. This circulation was interrupted and eventually stopped when transportation broke down.

(2) Dispersal was not accomplished smoothly as to complete items of manufacturing equipment, and frequently operations had to be resumed in the dispersed locations with inadquate, or unproven, tools and equipment. In the case of such facilities as heat-treating equipment, the proper physical qualities of structural aluminium parts sometimes were not attained.

(3) During the summer of 1944 the shortage of fuel caused a reduction from two hours to one-half hour in the final run-in time on engines. The shortage of ammunition caused the discontinuance of test firing of guns. Pilots were warned by a tag to be careful when making the first shots.

(4) Workmanship became inferior for many reasons, one of which was bombing. In the case of the finish of the skin, which affected the drag, gaps were often found where sheets came together. The Main Committee for Aircraft arranged to have wing panels of American planes sent around to German factories to show the relative superiority of American workmanship in this regard, and serve as an incentive to do as well.

(5) The maintenance of manufacturers' inspection became very difficult with dispersal. There were not enough competent inspectors to place in each location, and the administrative problem of coordinating and enforcing inspection standards was greatly increased.

(6) In so far as bombing interrupted the flow of materials and components, emergency substitutions sometimes were necessary. Such substitutions, though approved by qualified engineers, gave support to the comment by German pilots toward the end of the war that the airplanes they flew were "backyard" airplanes. This comment could have been an alibi to cover up inadquate pilot training and competency.

 

14. Air Ministry Inspection

a. The responsibility for acceptance of aircraft and their principal components lay with the Inspection Office (Bau Aufsichts Leitung). This office was part of the Technical Office of the Air Ministry, and coordinated with the Production Division of the Ministry. The head of the Technical Office was responsible for the accomplishment of engineering, production and inspection functions. the head of the Inspection Office was under no pressure to lower his standards to permit the Production Division to make a better showing, unless directed by the head of the Technical Office. There is no indication that any such instructions were given, even when bombing was causing (directly or indirectly) rejections and consequent loss of airplane production.

b. The Inspection Office had representatives in each of the main aircraft, engine and accessories plants. The inspector in charge supervised the inspection of products made in the main and branch plants of the company. The professional standards of this organization were high. Throughout the war the Inspection Office stamp of acceptance was held in high respect. Dispersal, however, presented a serious problem. During the winter of 1943-1944, along with serious inroads caused by the drafting of men into the army, it became necessary to provide inspectors for several times the number of plants. It was an impossible assignment. An arrangement was made whereby the Inspection Office deputized the company inspectors to make detailed acceptance. This worked satisfactorily. Production managers complained that standards were higher on this basis than when the Inspection Office representative inspected. When Saur became chief of the Fighter Staff in March 1944 he insisted that the Inspection Office discontinue the deputizing of company inspectors. Officially this was done, but the same arrangement continued, because the Inspection Office did not have a sufficient staff to do the whole job. It is not surprising under such circumstances, if the number of rejections and spoiled parts increased.

c. Goering stated that under dispersal, quality suffered considerably. Fittings sometimes did not meet tolerances. Because there was more than one source for each component and subassembly, there was not satisfactory interchangeability. Goering gave as an illustration that landing gear wheels did not always match. It was this situation that contributed in part to the decision to concentrate production in single underground plants.

d. The inspection of purchased parts, such as rivets and bolts, was carried on by the Aircraft Manufacturers' Association. This non-governmental organization had established standards for such items, and employed inspectors who covered all producers of those items. In addition to the high professional code of these inspectors, civilians who passed faulty parts or materials were subject to special courts-martial as saboteurs.

 

15. Effect of Declining Quality on Operational Losses

 

a. The greatly increased production of fighter airplanes in 1943-1944 was not reflected in a conspicuous increase in the operational strength of the Luftwaffe. This general problem is considered in the report of the Operations Division of the Survey. Leading officials of the Speer Ministry Armament Staff and of German aircraft companies stated that they could not understand the discrepancy. Dr. Frydag said that he had raised the question repeatedly as to why the aircraft industry should make such strenuous efforts to produce airplanes when the number in operation appeared to remain the same. The present analysis is concerned only with design and production considerations which might throw light on the puzzle.

b. Fighter and destroyer types, which included the Me 109, 110, FW 190 and Ju 88, did not decline in quality. The only plausible factor relating to production which might explain a high operational loss rate, has to do with spares. It is known that in 1944 Saur minimized the diversion of parts and subassemblies as spares in order to maximize the score of his production record of new airplanes.

c. The case of the Me 262 jet fighter is a particular one. Its great speed consitituted a great threat to the Combined Bomber Offensive and a great hope for the German Air Force. From the production point of view, however, several design difficulties that were encountered must be noted:

(1) The Me 262 was forced through its developmental stages at such a speed that many design problems were not adquately solved.

(2) The engine for the Me 262 was not ready for line production until June 1944 and even then the engine starter and fuel regulating mechanism were not fool-proof. Pilots were continually opening the throttle too quickly with the result that the engine stopped or burned up.

(3) Goering stated that the landing gear and brakes were poorly designed and, unless operated carefully, caused ground loops.

(4) Repair parts, especially turbine blades, were not in good supply. Saur insisted that the line requirements have first claim. (The life of turbine blades ranged between 25 and 36 hours.)

 

16. Conclusions Regarding Production Quality

 

a. Design and inspection standards were not substantially lowered.

b. The inspection organizations of the manufacturers and of the Air Ministry had a difficult time coping with production and operations under dispersal conditions, and administrative control of the situation was lost. There is no evidence, however, that manufacturers took advantage of the situation.

c. Production under dispersal conditions created serious problems as to interchangeability of parts.

d. The continuous effort that was expended on the improvement of design resulted in better performance of a magnitude at least equal to the loss caused by reduced quality of production.

e. Tentative conclusions from actual tests of the performance of German aircraft conducted in England in 1945, indicated that quality was maintained up to the last. Wood was used in the empennage assembly of the Me 109, in the flaps of the FW 190 and in several places on the Me 262. This substitution apparently did not affect performance.

 

 

[Bremspropeller]

2 hours ago, VO101Kurfurst said:

13. Effects of Bombing on Quality of Production

a. The manner in which an airplane design is carried out in the factory determines by at least a small margin the quality of its performance. Strategic bombing, by multiplying production difficulties, undoubtedly tended to lower the quality of German airplanes. In spite of this fact, however, there is no conclusive evidence that there was a more than 5 to 10 percent reduction in performance because of factors attributed to production. Even this, however, is an important amount. At the end of the war, an American commander indicated his respect for German models by stating that except for the limited range of German fighters, he would have been willing to trade airplanes for individual combat.

 

So, there is no conclusive evidence that there was a more than 5-10% reduction in performance.

So there is no evidence that on a 400mph airplane, the performance-loss was more than 20-40mph...

 

Killing with kindness I'd say.

 

 

The report is interesting, yet either the quoted sections don't go too deep into the more interesting part (since it's date 1947, I'm not surprised by that), or it's not supposed to ask the deeper questions.

 

How was the production-quality affected by dislocation over time? Did defects of worksmanship slowly creep in or did they develop right away?

How were different batches of products affected by different workers?

 

 

There are multiple reports of quality-defects by pilots and mechanics alike. And that's concerning airframes, engines and components and wiring.

Also, there seems to be a rend concerning which production-contractors seemed to put out higher quality-levels than others.

With 109s, the Erla-birds seemed to be a little better. With the Doras, the Sorau-birds apparently were sticking out in terms of quality and finish...

 

[MiloMorai]

16 and 17 October: Uneventful days for III./JG 54. Flight operations were limited by the passage of a bad weather front. The Gruppe did, however, receive at least five new "Doras" on this day. The bad weather conditions continued over the north of Germany on 18 October, once again bringing training to a halt. Only a few ferry flights were carried out. Several experienced pilots flew aircraft to Hesepe, where they were badly needed after the losses of 15 October,' As a rule, inexperienced new arrivals were not used for these ferry flights on account of the constant threat of bad weather or enemy fighters. After landing at Hesepe, the pilots returned by train from Bramsche to Oldenburg. Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. WeiB received the bad news from the weather service early in the morning: "bad weather situation constant today and tomorrow." 

The interruption of training activities would have to continue. For Hptm. WeiB this was cause for concern, for the pilots of his 10. and 11. Staffeln urgently needed more training missions. Tied to the ground, the choice of alternative activities for the young men was limited. Morale suffered, especially among the younger pilots, if the routine was boring. The commanding officer knew this but there was nothing he could do about it. For the ground personnel the situation was different. There was finally time to strip down the newly-arrived machines in order to carry out the safety checks that had by now become standard procedure. Problems with aircraft coming from the factory had increased since thousands of forced labourers had been put to work in the production of aircraft. More than once the technicians of III./JG 54 found things during their checks that suggested sabotage. Metal shavings in the engine cylinders, improperly-installed relays, and loose screws in vital spots could not be a coincidence. Each find of this type by a frontline maintenance facility resulted in an immediate report and a subsequent investigation at the production site by the Gestapo. As a result of this experience the maintenance personnel of III./JG 54 checked every aircraft extremely thoroughly, for they did not want "their pilots" to become victims of sabotage. 

Green Hearts First in combat with the Dora 9

Page 59, Chapter 4. Training Missions of 10. and 11./JG 54
Oldenburg and Varrelbusch Airfields 13 October - 26 Eecember 1944

[Aurora_Stealth]

On 6/10/2021 at 12:23 PM, Bremspropeller said:

 

So, there is no conclusive evidence that there was a more than 5-10% reduction in performance.

So there is no evidence that on a 400mph airplane, the performance-loss was more than 20-40mph...

 

Killing with kindness I'd say.

 

 

The report is interesting, yet either the quoted sections don't go too deep into the more interesting part (since it's date 1947, I'm not surprised by that), or it's not supposed to ask the deeper questions.

 

How was the production-quality affected by dislocation over time? Did defects of worksmanship slowly creep in or did they develop right away?

How were different batches of products affected by different workers?

 

 

There are multiple reports of quality-defects by pilots and mechanics alike. And that's concerning airframes, engines and components and wiring.

Also, there seems to be a rend concerning which production-contractors seemed to put out higher quality-levels than others.

With 109s, the Erla-birds seemed to be a little better. With the Doras, the Sorau-birds apparently were sticking out in terms of quality and finish...

 

 

I don't think the report was that surprising, they're saying that performance losses seen from aircraft actually flown in combat were not that obvious (its hardly going to be 40 mph on average is it - that's quite obvious) or displaying clear signs of mechanical failure. As the war goes into its final stages - you are going to see and expect a higher volume of these issues from production, that doesn't mean those airframes are going to always be used in combat as is - hence the low serviceability.

 

It would be pretty pointless to send up even inexperienced pilots in combat, in an aircraft that you have no confidence of approximating its own performance or has a likely chance of premature mechanical failure. While they may have had very rough and tough circumstances as the war goes on, they are still going to do some sort of checks at the squadron level including overnight when not flying, some short run of the engine and aircraft would be expected ... maybe even using newly repaired and refurbished aircraft for training - especially if they are concerned about manufacturing defects and poor parts / assembly / quality and don't want to risk that occurring in combat.

 

10% sounds like a worst case i.e. no evidence was found showing it exceeded this.

 

2 hours ago, MiloMorai said:

16 and 17 October: Uneventful days for III./JG 54. Flight operations were limited by the passage of a bad weather front. The Gruppe did, however, receive at least five new "Doras" on this day. The bad weather conditions continued over the north of Germany on 18 October, once again bringing training to a halt. Only a few ferry flights were carried out. Several experienced pilots flew aircraft to Hesepe, where they were badly needed after the losses of 15 October,' As a rule, inexperienced new arrivals were not used for these ferry flights on account of the constant threat of bad weather or enemy fighters. After landing at Hesepe, the pilots returned by train from Bramsche to Oldenburg. Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. WeiB received the bad news from the weather service early in the morning: "bad weather situation constant today and tomorrow." 

The interruption of training activities would have to continue. For Hptm. WeiB this was cause for concern, for the pilots of his 10. and 11. Staffeln urgently needed more training missions. Tied to the ground, the choice of alternative activities for the young men was limited. Morale suffered, especially among the younger pilots, if the routine was boring. The commanding officer knew this but there was nothing he could do about it. For the ground personnel the situation was different. There was finally time to strip down the newly-arrived machines in order to carry out the safety checks that had by now become standard procedure. Problems with aircraft coming from the factory had increased since thousands of forced labourers had been put to work in the production of aircraft. More than once the technicians of III./JG 54 found things during their checks that suggested sabotage. Metal shavings in the engine cylinders, improperly-installed relays, and loose screws in vital spots could not be a coincidence. Each find of this type by a frontline maintenance facility resulted in an immediate report and a subsequent investigation at the production site by the Gestapo. As a result of this experience the maintenance personnel of III./JG 54 checked every aircraft extremely thoroughly, for they did not want "their pilots" to become victims of sabotage. 

Green Hearts First in combat with the Dora 9

Page 59, Chapter 4. Training Missions of 10. and 11./JG 54
Oldenburg and Varrelbusch Airfields 13 October - 26 Eecember 1944

 

Which makes perfect sense doesn't it - you know the standard of factories manufacturing and quality control is increasingly being affected... so the squadrons and maintenance teams themselves i.e. ground crew, mechanics, test flights, ferry flights, training flights end up becoming the quality control.

 

Again, its a pretty poor situation to be in and not great... but they had a flow of new airframes coming through to scavenge for spares and they could mix and match to ensure a pool of serviceable aircraft.

 

Once you're suffering mechanical failures at an increasing rate from newly manufactured aircraft, you know you're going to have to check them. You're not just going to let the whole squadron fall out of the sky, you would have to be pretty crass to ignore that - even in late 1944/early 1945.

Edited June 15, 2021 by Aurora_Stealth

[gimpy117]

11 hours ago, Aurora_Stealth said:

 

I don't think the report was that surprising, they're saying that performance losses seen from aircraft actually flown in combat were not that obvious (its hardly going to be 40 mph on average is it - that's quite obvious) or displaying clear signs of mechanical failure. As the war goes into its final stages - you are going to see and expect a higher volume of these issues from production, that doesn't mean those airframes are going to always be used in combat as is - hence the low serviceability.

 

I don't buy that. a desperate nation is gonna use anything they can get their hands on. I think the low numbers are due to aircraft that could literally not fly. hell the Nazis were trying everything under the sun to get a plane up to intercept bombers. dangerous experiments included.  if it could fly and provide cover for the cities I'm sure they would use it 

[JtD]

The Germans had hundreds of aircraft standing around waiting for fuel or pilots to fly them. There was no need to use aircraft in combat that were excessively poorly manufactured.

[the_emperor]

Additionally the germans suffered from very poor quality of the fuselage/surface which very eating up any gain in increased engine power output.

Edited June 16, 2021 by the_emperor

[Bremspropeller]

Loosely translated, the most important sentences:

 

"DB mentioned that there's no sense to ever-increasing power-output when speed-gains are eaten up by production-inaccuracies."

"...a direct coparison between a Mustang and a 109 [to show production quality differences] was arranged for Mr. Sauer, however he has not shown up..."

"The side-by-side comparison of those two aircraft, in terms of 109 prouction quality, apparently is downright devastating/ crushing".

 

 

Edited June 16, 2021 by Bremspropeller

[Aurora_Stealth]

37 minutes ago, Bremspropeller said:

Loosely translated, the most important sentences:

 

"DB mentioned that there's no sense to ever-increasing power-output when speed-gains are eaten up by production-inaccuracies."

"...a direct comparison between a Mustang and a 109 [to show production quality differences] was arranged for Mr. Sauer, however he has not shown up..."

"The side-by-side comparison of those two aircraft, in terms of 109 production quality, apparently is downright devastating/ crushing".

 

Really interesting, sounds quite serious - at least in this instance, although I can imagine individual factories and production lines varied a lot depending on conditions and must have been getting worse as the end came in sight. Still, I don't know that you can summarise all Bf 109 production and more importantly the actual quality of serviceable aircraft used in combat from this one statement.

 

Can anyone confirm who Sauer is (would help with the context), I can imagine someone closely involved with production and planning; but cannot comment more than that.

Edited June 16, 2021 by Aurora_Stealth

[357th_KW]

Impossible to say for sure without more detail, but I would assume Karl Sauer, a Nazi official who worked alongside Speer and Milch as part of the jagerstab trying to maximize fighter production.

[the_emperor]

1 hour ago, Aurora_Stealth said:

Still, I don't know that you can summarise all Bf 109 production

From the tone this probleme seems to be a universal one for fighter production, not for the specific fighter in questions for the demonstration.

and it does makes sense. Fusalage quality cant be the same in 1945 as it was 1940.

[RedKestrel]

8 hours ago, JtD said:

The Germans had hundreds of aircraft standing around waiting for fuel or pilots to fly them. There was no need to use aircraft in combat that were excessively poorly manufactured.

But if nearly all of those hundreds of aircraft had poor manufacturing, then you could only select the best of a bad bunch.

 

2 hours ago, Aurora_Stealth said:

 

Really interesting, sounds quite serious - at least in this instance, although I can imagine individual factories and production lines varied a lot depending on conditions and must have been getting worse as the end came in sight. Still, I don't know that you can summarise all Bf 109 production and more importantly the actual quality of serviceable aircraft used in combat from this one statement.

 

Can anyone confirm who Sauer is (would help with the context), I can imagine someone closely involved with production and planning; but cannot comment more than that.

I suppose you can't summarize everything, but surely the aircraft manufacturers, when called to hand over a 109 to compare the production quality to the enemy's plane, would show the best they could supply. 

 

[the_emperor]

in that case, yeah you can summarzise: fuselage/surface quality of 1945 production aircraft (at least 109s) was abysmal.

We are lucky (or for the allies unlucky) that it is not reflected in the game to keep the fun up when flying late war axis aircrafts.

Cheers

Edited June 16, 2021 by the_emperor

[357th_KW]

Another example of production difficulties was problems with the wooden tail.

 

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pQaNxzKZu4sju89DKSzEblkB0il4qjaV/view?usp=sharing
 

https://drive.google.com/file/d/13sWnt3MLhOSmyJr-M7c-xB6UgMFclPKk/view?usp=sharing
 

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1i83wiB9mQwrnhIO17uoLgVVoEjvZAUst/view?usp=sharing

 

Roughly a quarter of JG26/27 109s were found to have faulty tails with flutter issues, caused by wet weather!  Obviously a snowy winter in Western Europe can’t have done them any favors given the airfield conditions of the Luftwaffe at the time.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/jg53-109g14.jpg

 

[oc2209]

On 6/7/2021 at 8:29 PM, gimpy117 said:

that's also interesting that the Devs gave the 109 a free pass and let it be a higher quality version from outside builds...seems....generous. if anything they should just have a modification for these aircraft to be "Hungarian spec". I get quality varies from factory to factory even from USA built aircraft, but that's a big handout when you're trying to simulate GERMAN aircraft late war.   

 

A sim is designed to fly planes as they're meant to be flown under ideal conditions. Not with missing parts, sabotage, poor maintenance from inexperienced mechanics or a chronic supply shortage.

 

If we're going to argue that many German planes from '44 on should fly like junk heaps, then the same argument should be made for many Russian planes probably up to '44 at least.

 

Would the simulation be more accurate if the Yak's wing would randomly delaminate in mid-flight? I don't want low quality early-war Russian planes, and I don't want low quality late-war German planes. I'm pretty sure no one else does, either.

 

By the same token, if we ever get Japanese planes, do you also want to simulate flying them with Japan's diluted fuel, that would probably lower top listed speeds of most planes by at least 20 MPH? Would that be an enjoyable experience? Once you go down that hyper-realism rabbit hole, where does it end? Have shortages of everything for the Axis countries after 1943, such that a career would be a horrible slog that no one would consider entertaining?

 

This product is a sim and a game. It's not one or the other. An actual simulation of WWII is not only impossible, but totally undesirable. All we want to do, is fly the airplanes as they were meant to be flown by the engineers who designed them; and not in the sorry conditions that poor sods were forced to fly them in reality.

 

To briefly mention the OP:

 

I don't have a problem with the K-4's handling. It was well established that the F series was the pinnacle of the 109's handling, with probably the E as a close second. No one enjoyed flying the G and K series. With or without the extra wing guns bolted on.

 

Extra weight was continually added to the G and K, primarily in the forms of heavier engines which in turn demanded structural reinforcement. Weight degrades handling. This is doubly true in an airframe like the 109's with small wings and high wing loading. The Spitfire suffered less from its weight bloat, as it had plenty of wing to play with.

 

If other sims have the K handling like the F, but with an extra ~1000 HP, I'd question the validity of those flight models. I'm not being a blind Sturmovik fanboy. Weight kills. In this sim, there's a clear feel of degradation in handling as the 109 series progresses; which mirrors both pilot accounts and common sense.

[gimpy117]

5 hours ago, oc2209 said:

 

A sim is designed to fly planes as they're meant to be flown under ideal conditions. Not with missing parts, sabotage, poor maintenance from inexperienced mechanics or a chronic supply shortage.

 

If we're going to argue that many German planes from '44 on should fly like junk heaps, then the same argument should be made for many Russian planes probably up to '44 at least.

 

Would the simulation be more accurate if the Yak's wing would randomly delaminate in mid-flight? I don't want low quality early-war Russian planes, and I don't want low quality late-war German planes. I'm pretty sure no one else does, either.

 

By the same token, if we ever get Japanese planes, do you also want to simulate flying them with Japan's diluted fuel, that would probably lower top listed speeds of most planes by at least 20 MPH?

 

I suppose I would put this question out there: is it an exception or the rule?

if the large majority of aircraft produced could not meet design specs then is it logical to use the numbers of a perfect example? sure, they must have had a perfect example to test the type to set the official numbers, but, if they pulled random produced versions out and tested them and showed they were on average 20KMH slower...well maybe that's a pretty good representation of the actual performance of the aircraft. It's like if 1,000 years from now people studying history only see Phelps and think all Americans were giant ripped speedboats of a person, when in reality a lot of us are in danger of downing in a deep enough pool, myself included. 

 

as to the catastrophic failure issue- I don't think that has a place in the game. at least not multiplayer. having a flight ending or pilot loss from a random mechanical issue isn't fair. It would be interesting to see it implemented into a career. failures were a real thing pilots had to deal with. A caveat to this is, if it could be shown that actual combat aircraft on average had a lower G tolerance (for instance) than design and it wasn't just a fluke or a rare "bad aircraft" than it would be fair to reflect that.

 

as to fuel...well...hate to break it to you but the devs already justified the harsh engine limits of the P-40 to "bad" soviet gas. the Soviets had American aviation fuel given to them. I guess it was typically mixed with lower quality fuels to make a so-so product but, if we're gonna have every late war 109 flying around as a "perfect" example then why is it a stretch to not give the P-40 full engine limits?      

 

  

[Dakpilot]

1 hour ago, gimpy117 said:

as to fuel...well...hate to break it to you but the devs already justified the harsh engine limits of the P-40 to "bad" soviet gas. the Soviets had American aviation fuel given to them. I guess it was typically mixed with lower quality fuels to make a so-so product but, if we're gonna have every late war 109 flying around as a "perfect" example then why is it a stretch to not give the P-40 full engine limits?   

 

Can you show where Devs said this, I don't recall

 

Cheers, Dakpilot

 

 

[oc2209]

2 hours ago, gimpy117 said:

I suppose I would put this question out there: is it an exception or the rule?

if the large majority of aircraft produced could not meet design specs then is it logical to use the numbers of a perfect example? sure, they must have had a perfect example to test the type to set the official numbers, but, if they pulled random produced versions out and tested them and showed they were on average 20KMH slower...well maybe that's a pretty good representation of the actual performance of the aircraft. It's like if 1,000 years from now people studying history only see Phelps and think all Americans were giant ripped speedboats of a person, when in reality a lot of us are in danger of downing in a deep enough pool, myself included. 

 

as to the catastrophic failure issue- I don't think that has a place in the game. at least not multiplayer. having a flight ending or pilot loss from a random mechanical issue isn't fair. It would be interesting to see it implemented into a career. failures were a real thing pilots had to deal with. A caveat to this is, if it could be shown that actual combat aircraft on average had a lower G tolerance (for instance) than design and it wasn't just a fluke or a rare "bad aircraft" than it would be fair to reflect that.

 

as to fuel...well...hate to break it to you but the devs already justified the harsh engine limits of the P-40 to "bad" soviet gas. the Soviets had American aviation fuel given to them. I guess it was typically mixed with lower quality fuels to make a so-so product but, if we're gonna have every late war 109 flying around as a "perfect" example then why is it a stretch to not give the P-40 full engine limits?     

 

The human to plane analogy doesn't hold, because humans aren't built with blueprints. There's much more random variation in biological reproduction as opposed to mechanical reproduction. A plane's performance can be estimated based on its weights and dimensions and propulsion and aeronautics and the laws of physics. A human's performance can't be estimated by reading gene sequences. Not yet, anyway.

 

Can you imagine how needlessly complex it would make the dev's job to guess how much worse the performance of a badly-manufactured airplane would be? Who would make the arbitrary decision as to how flawed, how impaired, the 'average' plane would be? At what date would this inferior performance kick in? Would it occur gradually, or would you simply go from flying a 109G-6 with a 21 second turn time on one day, and on the next day it would be 25 seconds? Are we to believe that every single plane made after or before a certain date will always fly like junk?

 

Can you imagine how much people would complain once they realized their planes were being manipulated in this fashion? When you have a 109 that can't turn with a P-47 on the deck, because a flight simulator game is also simulating the crumbling industry of a dying nation; or a Yak that has opaque plexiglas you can barely see through; all to simulate that the German slave laborer or 17 year old Russian girl who assembled your aircraft was half-starved and in a particularly bad mood that day?

 

Do you have comprehensive data on how the bad production values translate into actual performance changes? Can you accurately simulate how an ill-fitted rudder pedal would affect our planes?

 

You want 'on average' data to show how inferior these planes were? It doesn't exist. Blueprints and specifications on how a reasonably well constructed plane should handle and perform--those do exist.

 

The P-40 issue is not a matter of arbitrarily crippling the plane. It's an issue of following the factory recommendations. Perhaps too stringently, but that's beside the point. The P-40 performs as it should, on paper.