Pacific War

[Gambit21]

You can be in the defensive and still marshal resources and launch an attack.

 

It’s not all about the Navies.

From a real estate standpoint, Japan had been and still was on the defensive.

 

You’re confused about the difference between a battle and and the overal situation.

[Pikestance]

I am not at all confused about anything. The IJN initiated the attack, not the USN. The USN was supporting the Landing. They were in the defensive posture, not the IJN. Using your definition, the Battle of the Marne is a defensive battle by the French. 

 

In Combat, the initiator of the combat is the attacker and the side defending their position is the defender. The USN was defending the landing site. They were not the attacker. 

[cardboard_killer]

8 hours ago, Gambit21 said:

Guadalcanal effectively ended any Japanese advances/taking of territory from that point onward.

 

Actually, the Japanese made major advances in China and invaded India (well, Manipur State) in 1944 as well. The China operations prevented the US from basing B-29s there, basically checkmating the entire Allied China strategy of the past two years. The invasion of India went spectacularly badly, although it is a case where a large army was supplied only by air at Imphal. I wish the Japanese had enough of an air force left to simulate that campaign, but for the most part the allies maintained air supremacy over the battlefield with squadrons drained from Italy.

 

Concerning the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the IJN had almost no planes left that could operate off carriers, so the carriers were used as bait for the vast armada of US planes. However, it was the first battle where kamikazes were used by the IJA. The land battle on Leyte involved some kind of air parity for awhile, as the US landed and built airfields on ground unsuited for ops, so were hamstrung at the beginning of the battles for the island(s).

4 hours ago, PikeStance said:

The USN was defending the landing site. They were not the attacker. 

 

Someone should have explained that to Admiral Halsey.

 

RR The World Wonders RR

[Cybermat47]

4 hours ago, PikeStance said:

In Combat, the initiator of the combat is the attacker and the side defending their position is the defender. The USN was defending the landing site. They were not the attacker. 

The US initiated the combat by attacking the Japanese-occupied Phillipines. In response to the US landings, the Japanese counterattacked - i.e. defending by attacking the enemy’s attack.

 

4 hours ago, PikeStance said:

Using your definition, the Battle of the Marne is a defensive battle by the French.  

It was. It was a counteroffensive against the German offensive.

[Pikestance]

2 hours ago, [Pb]Cybermat47 said:

The US initiated the combat by attacking the Japanese-occupied Phillipines. In response to the US landings, the Japanese counterattacked - i.e. defending by attacking the enemy’s attack.

 

It was. It was a counteroffensive against the German offensive.

 

A counter offensive is an offensive. When you make a counter offensive you are taking the initiative. You are attempting to move the enemy from their position. The enemy is then defending their position. 

[II/JG17_HerrMurf]

9 minutes ago, PikeStance said:

 

A counter offensive is an offensive. When you make a counter offensive you are taking the initiative. You are attempting to move the enemy from their position. The enemy is then defending their position. 

 

Counter offensives ATTEMPT to take the initiative. They tend to fail more often than they succeed. They are pre-disposed to failure as they are usually limited in scope and typically draw from the same resources as the troops defending the primary positions. There are, of course, some specatular successes but they are generally the exception.

Edited October 23, 2019 by II/JG17_HerrMurf
clarity

[Pikestance]

32 minutes ago, II/JG17_HerrMurf said:

 

Counter offensives ATTEMPT to take the initiative. They tend to fail more often than they succeed. They are pre-disposed to failure as they are usually limited in scope and typically draw from the same resources as the troops defending the primary positions. There are, of course, some specatular successes but they are generally the exception.

Ok, this is becoming tedious. A counter offensive is an initiative. If you do not have the initiative then you are on the defensive. 

[II/JG17_HerrMurf]

2 hours ago, PikeStance said:

Ok, this is becoming tedious. A counter offensive is an initiative. If you do not have the initiative then you are on the defensive. 

 

Attempt and Locally, yes. Tactically, maybe. Strategically, not often. And the initiative, if gained at all, is often so brief as to be of negligible importance.

Edited October 23, 2019 by II/JG17_HerrMurf

[Vig]

Lol there are a lot of lawyers on here.  Fact is that the Japanese were, after Guadalcanal, placed on the *strategic* defensive.  With regard to the air war in the Pacific theater, their premier asset, their elite carrier squadrons, were beaten and broken.  Japanese pilot quality decreased as half-trained pilots were rushed into service, partially the result of the profligate waste of air assets over Guadalcanal, e.g., Val dive-bombers sent on one-way trips, launched even though they lacked the range to return. 

 

The Japanese fought fiercely and desperately for the Solomons, taking huge risks without regard to loss.  Although their naval forces could often make these risks pay off, the land forces performed miserably, launching attacks through difficult terrain based upon faulty intelligence as to USMC numbers and fighting quality, then starving and dying on long retreats because, in their hubris, they believed defeat to be impossible and supplied their troops with only enough rations to get to Henderson.

 

This win-or-die mentality did not serve the Japanese well when they still had parity of forces with the US.  As their losses mounted and the strength of the American forces increased exponentially, the Japanese were doomed in the Pacific theater.  Overwhelmingly powerful surface squadrons could still make contact with CVEs at Samar, but it didn't matter.  Its counterpart force was destroyed in Surigao Strait, and the Japanese carrier offensive at Leyte Gulf was conducted by toothless carriers with empty hanger decks.  The Japanese surface forces were counterattacks against very long odds, but the Leyte Gulf carriers were simply a diversion.

 

This does not consider the immense increase in size, strength, and combat efficiency of the American fleet since the commencement of hostilities; the Japanese inability to replace their naval losses; the wholesale destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet by US submarines and aircraft; the resulting fuel shortage that would have kept the Japanese from using their remaining warships or adequately training aviation pilots; US strategic bombing resources freed for use by the defeat of Nazi Germany, or the American development of the atomic bomb.

 

The Japanese had lost the war by the end of the Solomons campaign.  They were subsequently still capable of limited tactical offensive/counteroffensive action to a decreasing extent -  just as the Japanese surrender delegation could have engaged in a fistfight with MacArthur on the deck of the Missouri - but it simply did not matter because it could not have changed the result.

 

 

Late war Japan would still be fun if I could shoot at B-29s with this thing:

Edited October 23, 2019 by Vig

[cardboard_killer]

2 hours ago, Vig said:

Fact is that the Japanese were, after Guadalcanal, placed on the *strategic* defensive.

 

Well, to be accurate, the New Guinea overland campaign was their last SW Pacific strategic offensive operation; Guadalcanal was part of the strategy to isolate Australia and (maybe) invade some parts as well eventually. However, both the India and China operations were strategic offensives in 1944, the latter successful and the former a loss.

[Vig]

It was all part of Operation Mo to secure Port Moresby, with Tulagi and Guadalcanal being taken to serve as flank guards.  But you're right, the main offensive was right down the Kokoda Trail, and the battle was the Australians to win or lose.     

 

India and China were separate theaters.  I find the India-Burma campaign to be absolutely fascinating, but the political complications in China took precedence over the actual fighting.  Not much wargame material there imho.

[Pikestance]

5 hours ago, Vig said:

Lol there are a lot of lawyers on here.  Fact is that the Japanese were, after Guadalcanal, placed on the *strategic* defensive. 

 

 

7 hours ago, II/JG17_HerrMurf said:

 

Attempt and Locally, yes. Tactically, maybe. Strategically, not often. And the initiative, if gained at all, is often so brief as to be of negligible importance.

 

Instead of trying to find a strange technicality to argue against convention, accept that if you have the initiative and you are launching the "attack" then you are in fact, on the offensive. If you want another example, The Battle of Chickamauga. The union was on the offensive, but Bragg gathered his forces and "attack" (taking the initiative) and defeated the Union army. It was a Confederate defensive engagement, but an offensive. 

[Vig]

Ok then.  Fun talking to you.

[Gambit21]

2 hours ago, PikeStance said:

 

 

Instead of trying to find a strange technicality to argue against convention, accept that if you have the initiative and you are launching the "attack" then you are in fact, on the offensive. If you want another example, The Battle of Chickamauga. The union was on the offensive, but Bragg gathered his forces and "attack" (taking the initiative) and defeated the Union army. It w

 

 

You fail to understand the difference between a local, tactical situation and a strategic situation. That you use this example is further proof of this and doesn’t relate to post Guadalcanal Japan AT ALL.

 

It would be like using a localized Indian/Native American attack/victory against a Cavalry detachment in the late 1800’s to make the case that they were not on the defensive. 

 

...and yes this is tedious.

[Pikestance]

16 minutes ago, Gambit21 said:

 

You fail to understand the difference between a local, tactical situation and a strategic situation. That you use this example is further proof of this and doesn’t relate to post Guadalcanal Japan AT ALL.

 

It would be like using a localized Indian/Native American attack/victory against a Cavalry detachment in the late 1800’s to make the case that they were not on the defensive. 

 

...and yes this is tedious.

The discussion the battle of Leyte Gulf, not Guadalcanal. I have not made ONE post relating to Guadalcanal. My original response and all subsequent responses related to Leyte Gulf ONLY. 

 

I also have not used any such examples. I used the Battle of the Marne, which I believe is the First World War and to my knowledge the use of 19th century warfare was not used, nor any native Americans (that I am aware of) participated in the offensive. Now, later, I did use the Battle of Chickamauga to illustrate that even a combatant that was in a defensive pasture can still choose to take the initiative to launch an offensive. 

 

is this the end.... because really I feel like you are purposely flaming me when you purposely make references to things I did not remotely stated or claimed. 

[Gambit21]

16 minutes ago, PikeStance said:

 

is this the end.... because really I feel like you are purposely flaming me when you purposely make references to things I did not remotely stated or claimed. 

 

I think you should feel like you lost track of the entire point of the conversation instead of feeling like you’re being “flamed” as it were.

 

But easier to move goal posts I guess.

 

[Cybermat47]

20 minutes ago, PikeStance said:

The discussion the battle of Leyte Gulf, not Guadalcanal. I have not made ONE post relating to Guadalcanal. My original response and all subsequent responses related to Leyte Gulf ONLY.

And Leyte Gulf was post-Guadalcanal.

 

21 minutes ago, PikeStance said:

I also have not used any such examples.

You have, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, where the Japanese attempted to defend their captured territory by counterattacking the US landing grounds.

 

22 minutes ago, PikeStance said:

because really I feel like you are purposely flaming me when you purposely make references to things I did not remotely stated or claimed. 

Everything Gambit has mentioned is as relevant to this conversation as the Battle of the Marne.

[Pikestance]

3 minutes ago, [Pb]Cybermat47 said:

And Leyte Gulf was post-Guadalcanal.

 

You have, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, where the Japanese attempted to defend their captured territory by counterattacking the US landing grounds.

 

Everything Gambit has mentioned is as relevant to this conversation as the Battle of the Marne.

You wrote counterattacking,... sigh. Thanks for admitting it was the IJN offensive. LOL 

 

4 minutes ago, Gambit21 said:

 

I think you should feel like you lost track of the entire point of the conversation instead of feeling like you’re being “flamed” as it were.

 

But easier to move goal posts I guess.

 

Stop looking in the mirror.

 

[Danziger]

You guys just don't get it. Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. America was on the defensive for the rest of the war all the way to the Japanese surrender.

[cardboard_killer]

The interesting thing is that Japan's strategic goal in 1941 was to destroy the US fleet and establish a defensive zone that would be too costly to the US to sustain an attack based on US political aversion to high losses for a war far from US shores. Along with the Soviet non-aggression pact they had in place, Japan would then have a free hand to seize European colonial states, and then finish off China without European/US interference.

 

So, the strategic defense against the USA was part of the grand offensive strategy. Leyte and Guadalcanal were battles lost within that strategy.

[Pikestance]

 

The plan that altered due to two factors;

• The carrier force was not destroyed
• The shipyard was not destroyed. 

 

The IJN would launch another offensive in which the target was Midway. It was part of an elaborate scheme to force the USN to split their forces while the IJN concentrated on Midway with he idea of destroying the US carrier force. The probably would had worked if the US had not broken the code and ambushed the IJN. 

 

The goal of Japan was to acquire the precious resources and to subdue China creating a number of puppet states in which they could draw resources from.

 

 

[cardboard_killer]

3 hours ago, PikeStance said:

The plan that altered due to two factors;

 

Pearl Harbor was not a major shipyard; major repairs of most ships and refurbs went to the west coast of the USA (San Diego, San Fran, Portland). Pearl Harbor wasn't even the main base for the US Pacific Fleet until mid-1940, when the fleet was moved there to try to scare the Japanese out of any offensive action (a political decision as the Navy was against it). The Japanese also did not worry much about the carriers until after the 1942 carrier raids. They spent little time countering them with the fleet until the raids and Coral Sea. The IJN was as swamped with battleship admirals as the USN.

 

The Midway battle was a result of those raids and IJN/IJA politics.

Edited October 24, 2019 by cardboard_killer

[Voyager]

Back to the original subject, if they do a Pacific Theater expansion, I'm buying it, but I suspect the next one will be somewhere in Europe first, mostly because it will give them time and scope to get the US aircraft model work to the point the German and Russian fighters are, and expand the base feature set some more in preparation.

 

The IJN aircraft are going to be hard, as are carrier operations, and long range operations. 

 

My guess is we'll see something that lets them do drop tanks and longer range tactical missions in the ETO, possibility the Mediterranean, then we'll see a PTO campaign that focuses on something that requires Japanese aircraft, but does not focus heavily on carrier operations. Perhaps something late war that was heavily the Marines and Army? Would the Solomons campaign work for that? 

 

Then I think we'll see things like the Battle of Midway start showing up. 

Edited October 24, 2019 by Voyager

[Gambit21]

8 minutes ago, Voyager said:

, mostly because it will give them time and scope to get the US aircraft model work to the point the German and Russian fighters are...

 

?

[Voyager]

40 minutes ago, Gambit21 said:

 

?

They've just released the US fighter line, so I don't expect they've got the workflow down to the point that they do with the German or Russian fighters. I seem to recall they've started before that, because of the number of 109's they've done, it is much easier to do additional varients; they've got a lot of experience modeling and tweaking DB601, M105's and the various versions of German and Russian kit. 

 

The P-47 is the first R-2800 engined aircraft in the sim, and I don't believe we have anything with either the Twin Wasp or the Wright Cyclone in it yet.

 

Not saying that it is essential, more that building up the catalogue of US aircraft variations makes it easier to do more of them, and making it easier to do one half of the plane set allows more risk reduction to be allocated to the other plane set. 

[Pikestance]

 

9 hours ago, cardboard_killer said:

 

Pearl Harbor was not a major shipyard; major repairs of most ships and refurbs went to the west coast of the USA (San Diego, San Fran, Portland). Pearl Harbor wasn't even the main base for the US Pacific Fleet until mid-1940, when the fleet was moved there to try to scare the Japanese out of any offensive action (a political decision as the Navy was against it). The Japanese also did not worry much about the carriers until after the 1942 carrier raids. They spent little time countering them with the fleet until the raids and Coral Sea. The IJN was as swamped with battleship admirals as the USN.

 

The Midway battle was a result of those raids and IJN/IJA politics.

 

I never stated it was a major shipyard. Destroying the shipyard was an objective of the attack. They chose not to launch a third stroke because the carriers were not there ad they did not know where they were. Having the shipyards intact allowed the USN to repair damaged ships which allowed the USN to react to Japanese offensive after PH. Moreover, I wouldn't say that PH was not a major concern giving they consider that moving the fleet to PH was considered to be a provocative move by the US. Having PH has a base of  operations was a huge plus for the USN over having it along the US west coast. Having a operational shipyard in PH was major advantage as opposed to "steaming back" to the West coast which is what I was implying i my first response. 

 

You seem to be looking for an argument here. I didn't take any issue with what you wrote except that Midway was an offensive after PH, so IJN was not in a reactive  or defensive state.