Kurfurst Posted February 28, 2014 Author Posted February 28, 2014 (edited) That is an interesting document showing that the RAF were interested in gaining accurate performance figures and power curves from captured Luftwaffe aircraft; so refreshing to see that fact being acknowledged. Instead of the red herring, how about commenting on the part that the RAFs Air Intel acknowledged that Bf 109Gs were actively using the 1.42ata Start u. Notleistung as of Q4 1942 /Q1 1943? So i think 777 should make both version 1.3 Ata and 1.42 Ata and version with full rating 1.42 Ata should have freqently random failures when used full rating or if decide to make only 1.42 Ata version they should account random engine failures in game. I agree... the G would be a bonus aircraft anyway, wouldn't it? In theory I also agree about the random failures with both you and Crumpp about WEP overloads, however in practical sense I do not know this could be practically implemented. Those failures, even in case of "problematic" engines, weren't all that common to be noticeable... say whats the point about modelling a random engine failure on every 50th or 100th or 500th take-off..? Edited February 28, 2014 by Rama
NZTyphoon Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 (edited) Instead of the red herring, how about commenting on the part that the RAFs Air Intel acknowledged that Bf 109Gs were actively using the 1.42ata Start u. Notleistung as of Q4 1942 /Q1 1943? Well Barbi, as I have already stated it must have been a confusing time for the Luftwaffe's mechanics and aircrew, what with being told one minute that they can use 1.42 ata, then the next discovering it could not be used because the DB 605s were still too fragile. Or do I take it right Sir, that you are still in the state of denial? My "state of denial" is not in the same league as Barbi's complete and blinded state of total rejection of the fact that all frontline RAF fighters were using 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain - at least I'm open minded about 1.42 ata use in late '42-early '43, whereas Barbi just cannot bring himself to admit that he's wrong about 100 octane fuel. Edited February 28, 2014 by NZTyphoon
Crump Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 My "state of denial" is not in the same league as Barbi's complete and blinded state of total rejection of the fact that all frontline RAF fighters were using 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain If you produced a single Operating Handbook listing it as the specified fuel during the Battle of Britain, I would complete agree. Instead you built an entire argument for "all frontline fighters" based off logistical studies and non-operational documentation. It is not until 1942 that we see 100 Octane as a specified fuel in the Operating Instructions, long after the Battle of Britain. Fact is for 100 Octane, a conversion schedule was found to implement the changes as part of the aircraft service inspection cycle and a Operating manuals with footnotes of "IF equipped". Not much difference from 1.42ata I am willing to be given the evidence of Bf-109G2 cleared for 1.42ata operating alongside de-rated Bf-109G2's. 1
NZTyphoon Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 (edited) If you produced a single Operating Handbook listing it as the specified fuel during the Battle of Britain, I would complete agree. Instead you built an entire argument for "all frontline fighters" based off logistical studies and non-operational documentation. It is not until 1942 that we see 100 Octane as a specified fuel in the Operating Instructions, long after the Battle of Britain. Fact is for 100 Octane, a conversion schedule was found to implement the changes as part of the aircraft service inspection cycle and a Operating manuals with footnotes of "IF equipped". Not much difference from 1.42ata I am willing to be given the evidence of Bf-109G2 cleared for 1.42ata operating alongside de-rated Bf-109G2's. As for Crump's state of denial - it is simply monumental, based on a completely inaccurate understanding of the RAF's operating procedures during a state of total war and Crump's belief that he cannot be wrong about anything. Edited February 28, 2014 by NZTyphoon 2
6./ZG26_Emil Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 This should be interesting. Pretty conclusive in my opinion.
MiloMorai Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 It is not until 1942 that we see 100 Octane as a specified fuel in the Operating Instructions, long after the Battle of Britain. Well if one uses a manual that is fresh out of stores without the revisions inserted........ 2
MiloMorai Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 The Narrow Margin, page 87:As it turned out, aviation spirit was to prove no worry for the R.A.F. By July 11th, 1940, the day after the Battle of Britain opened, stocks of 100 octane petrol used in the Merlin engine stood at 343,000 tons. On October 10th, twenty-one days before the battle closed, and after 22,000 tons had been issued, stocks had risen to 424,000 tons. With other grades of aviation spirit total stock available on October 10th, 1940, was 666,000 tons. Oil reserves were 34,000 tons. I guess RAF FC found other uses for the 100 octane besides putting it in their Spitfires and Hurricanes.
Rama Posted February 28, 2014 Posted February 28, 2014 I allready asked Please, could you continue this conversation without dispute and personal bashing? Second and last warning. Next step is a ticket to banville for all participants in a personal argument (And it will make no difference if someone started it or just continued it).
Crump Posted March 2, 2014 Posted March 2, 2014 (edited) There are also Bf 110 handbooks, for instance for March, July and September 1943 (issued in June, July, August and October) and it is blocked in all of them. Which is kind of odd because at the same time Bf 109 manuals do not restrict the take off boost. Both refer to the same engine document, the DB 605 A/B manual. Which never makes a distinction between A and B when it comes to boost limits. FWIW, the Motorenkarte of October 1942 was replaced with an updated version in July 1944, which has the limit removed. Since it is a disposable card, practice would not have it get corrections, rather a completely new card. Which means documents containing the limit would be around until mid 1944, which raises the questions what first the Luftwaffe mechanics and then the pilots went by. The Betreibsdatentafeln is Serial Number specific to an airframe. It is part of the serial number specific Operating Instructions and weight and balance documentation that is required to be in the aircraft at all times. It is the latest and best source of up to date information on what was authorized to be used operationally in the aircraft. It is definitive proof of use operationally. Edited March 2, 2014 by Rama cleared off-topic stuff 1
Kurfurst Posted March 2, 2014 Author Posted March 2, 2014 The point is I believe that the Betreibsdatentafeln were issued to the individual airplane, and being just a card in the cocpit, were more readily changed and were more up-to-date than the manuals which were updated less frequently and with some delay. It follows that if the British found the rating cleared in such cards in examined enemy, as was the case, its pretty conclusive evidence to the clearance and use of the full 1,42ata rating by frontline 109G units.
NZTyphoon Posted March 4, 2014 Posted March 4, 2014 If the British kept finding Betreibsdatentafeln in crashed G-2s, stating that 1.42 ata could be used, one wonders how many G-2s crashed because 1.42 ata was used? While Kurfurst estimates that the failure rates were about 1 in 1,000 sorties the fact that 1.42 ata was withdrawn so soon after being reintroduced shows that the failure rates must have been a great deal higher than he indicates. Some primary source documentation would be useful.
Sternjaeger Posted March 4, 2014 Posted March 4, 2014 The point is I believe that the Betreibsdatentafeln were issued to the individual airplane, and being just a card in the cocpit, were more readily changed and were more up-to-date than the manuals which were updated less frequently and with some delay. It follows that if the British found the rating cleared in such cards in examined enemy, as was the case, its pretty conclusive evidence to the clearance and use of the full 1,42ata rating by frontline 109G units. Kurfurst, to your best knowledge, was there anything that prevented a Luftwaffe aircraft to fly without their id card on board?
Kurfurst Posted March 4, 2014 Author Posted March 4, 2014 Nope but why would they fly without...? It was a very much standard card that contained all the essential specs for the pilot.. in contrast to the regular, "long" manuals which were often forbidden to be carried onboard, this one was meant to be carried and slid into a little holder in the cockpit.
bivalov Posted March 13, 2014 Posted March 13, 2014 thanks for discussion and documents... and thanks for your answer, Kurfurst... finally, from this video (on 2.22) - 30 min. 2500/1 min. 2700 for DB 601 E, and 30 min. 2600/1 min. 2800 for DB 605 A...
Crump Posted March 18, 2014 Posted March 18, 2014 It must have been a handy intelligence tool when the aircraft were captured, as confirmed by the British capturing so many of the Betreibsdatentafeln. No more so than every other aircraft flown during the war. Serial numbered Manuals, maintenance logs, load plans, and operating instructions were required to stay with the specific aircraft. Often these were kept by the ground crew chief that was responsible for aircraft. Just as often, relevant portions were carried in the aircraft for the crew to reference. Betreibsdatentafeln was just a quick reference card of operating limitations for that specific aircraft. Most Air forces had similar cards showing the operating limitations if they were not simply placarded in the cockpit. Here is some of the ones for the USAAF.
Crump Posted March 19, 2014 Posted March 19, 2014 The fact remains the documents posted were placed in the cockpit and the pilots trained to follow them. Despite having numerous hours in type, professional pilots still use a checklist, carry the Operating Instructions, and mechanics still placard items as required.
FG28Kodiak Posted March 19, 2014 Posted March 19, 2014 (edited) From Bf109G-2 Bedienungsvorschrift FL (June 1942) it's not allowed to use the "Start und Notleistung (1,42Ata) to avoid over pressures, this stage is blocked. Here a copy of the orginal manual: http://www.mediafire.com/view/jaop6hhd6ftq85j/Bf_109_G-2.pdf Edited March 19, 2014 by FG28Kodiak 1
Crump Posted March 19, 2014 Posted March 19, 2014 From Bf109G-2 Bedienungsvorschrift FL (June 1942) it's not allowed to use the "Start und Notleistung (1,42Ata) to avoid over pressures, this stage is blocked. Here a copy of the orginal manual: http://www.mediafire.com/view/jaop6hhd6ftq85j/Bf_109_G-2.pdf You should probably read the entire thread. Thanks for posting this but it is already well known and many of us already have a copy of this edition of the Operating Instructions.
NZTyphoon Posted March 20, 2014 Posted March 20, 2014 What this says is "A number of Me 109G are cleared to use full rating. What constitutes a number? It could mean that 25% of 109Gs were cleared to use 1.42 ata. Exactly how many Betreibsdatentafeln did the British find between November 1942 and April 1943 stating that the individual 109 was cleared to use 1.42 ata? How many such Betreibsdatentafeln were found in derelict or unserviceable 109s? How many Betreibsdatentafeln were found stipulating 1.30 ata?
NZTyphoon Posted March 20, 2014 Posted March 20, 2014 Some of the abandoned 109Gs found between November 1942 and April '43 The famous 'Black 6' - a report dated 31 December 1942 noted: It is known, however, that the ratings 1 and 4 (ie: 1.42 ata, Take off and Emergency ratings) were temporarily cancelled, and the engine was not supposed to operate in excess of the "climb and combat" ratings 2 and 5.It is to be expected that this restriction will eventually be removed, as engine cards were found on crashed aircraft where the full ratings, i.e. 1 and 4 were given without any restrictions.
MiloMorai Posted March 20, 2014 Posted March 20, 2014 I./JG27 Bf109G-2/Trop 10.42 2 lost to enemy action 12 lost not due to enemy action 11.42 12 lost to enemy action 5 lost not lost to enemy action Common sense says something changed for the drop in non combat losses.
Rama Posted March 20, 2014 Posted March 20, 2014 Since it seems impossible to stop or moderate the off-topic tendency of this thread, I'm moving it to the place off-topic is tolerated: the Free Subject forum. This discussion is about "Soviet trials of Bf 109G2, G4", not about general airplane maintenance. Any further off-topic in this discussion will get the standard and appropriate penalty, according to the forum rules.
NZTyphoon Posted March 20, 2014 Posted March 20, 2014 I./JG27 Bf109G-2/Trop 10.42 2 lost to enemy action 12 lost not due to enemy action 11.42 12 lost to enemy action 5 lost not lost to enemy action Common sense says something changed for the drop in non combat losses. It would be interesting to see the statistics for Bf 109 units defending Stalingrad. In fact it would be really interesting to know whether the Soviets captured 109s that had Betreibsdatentafeln stating they were cleared to use 1.42 ata; it's also possible the Luftwaffe decided it would be easier and safer to stick with 1.30 ata on the Russian Front because the 109 had such a performance advantage over the Soviet fighters, as suggested by the report quoted at the beginning of this thread.
Crump Posted March 22, 2014 Posted March 22, 2014 Common sense says something changed for the drop in non combat losses 1/JG27 was withdrawn from Tunisia in October 1942 due to combat fatigue? Think that might have played a role?
NZTyphoon Posted March 22, 2014 Posted March 22, 2014 (edited) 1/JG27 was withdrawn from Tunisia in October 1942 due to combat fatigue? Think that might have played a role? You're wrong about that - I./JG 27 was temporarily sent to Sicily after Marseille's death to a 109G engine fire, and was then hurried back to Africa in response to the start of the El Alamein campaign, while engine failures were a problem: Edited March 22, 2014 by NZTyphoon
Crump Posted March 23, 2014 Posted March 23, 2014 You're wrong about that - I./JG 27 was temporarily sent to Sicily after Marseille's death to a 109G engine fire, and was then hurried back to Africa in response to the start of the El Alamein campaign, while engine failures were a problem: No, I am right. I made a general statement as to the major cause and contributing factor to the high wastage rates for October. The additional of specifics does not make the general conclusion wrong. They were withdrawn to Sicily, sent back, and withdrawn again to Sicily. That is a lot of movement. Typically wastage rates for such movement exceed 70% being the point. I./JG27 Bf109G-2/Trop 10.42 2 lost to enemy action 12 lost not due to enemy action 11.42 12 lost to enemy action 5 lost not lost to enemy action Common sense says something changed for the drop in non combat losses.
MiloMorai Posted March 23, 2014 Posted March 23, 2014 1/JG27 was withdrawn from Tunisia in October 1942 due to combat fatigue? That is I. not 1 as 1. is just a staffel. Bari Italy 2.10.42 then to Pachino Italy, Athens-Eleusis Greece and then back to Africa, Tobruk 25.10.42. On 13.11.42 to Krefeld Germany (near the Dutch border). http://www.ww2.dk/ I made a general statement as to the major cause and contributing factor to the high wastage rates for October. You made a guess.
Crump Posted March 23, 2014 Posted March 23, 2014 That is I. not 1 as 1. is just a staffel. Yes it is just a staffel. However, you knew what I meant. You made a guess. Just like you made a guess trying to link the higher non-operational accident rate to the clearance of 1.42 ata. You made a pure guess and used false logic. I simply pointed out that the higher rate of airfield movements and combat fatigue of 1/JG27 was probably more of a factor in the high non-operational loss rate of October 1942. Simple as that. It was only 6 Spitfires losses due to airframe failure that caused the longitudinal instability noted by the NACA to be recognized by the Air Ministry and the bob weights added to mitigate that unacceptable longitudinal instability. It does not take many accidents at all to attract the attention of the designers, users, and aviation authority. In fact, every accident is investigated! If the Luftwaffe lost 6 times the aircraft to an engine design flaw as to the enemy, the type would be withdrawn from service. It takes considerable time and expense to train a fighter pilot, who in the world would send one out in an airplane that is going to fail 6 times the rate of enemy losses?? NOBODY. The high accident rate of JG27 was noted by the Luftwaffe. The major culprit was combat fatigue and why the unit was withdrawn. That is the same reason every other nation rotated units and personnel out of combat.
DD_bongodriver Posted March 23, 2014 Posted March 23, 2014 Except that the Germans were not particularily fond of rest and recuperation and were not noted for rotating combat fatigued crews. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STFdRrWBW2w
MiloMorai Posted March 23, 2014 Posted March 23, 2014 Yes it is just a staffel. However, you knew what I meant. Just like you made a guess trying to link the higher non-operational accident rate to the clearance of 1.42 ata. You made a pure guess and used false logic. Such a basic error. I see you still have your problem. I said: I./JG27 Bf109G-2/Trop 10.42 2 lost to enemy action 12 lost not due to enemy action 11.42 12 lost to enemy action 5 lost not lost to enemy action Common sense says something changed for the drop in non combat losses. I left the reason open. It should be noted that I./JG27 was taken off operations 13.11.42, yet it it is if what you claim, fatigue, why then did the non combat losses decrease?
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