Why the Germans lost WW2

[Kublai]

You can't use production figures to estimate front line strength. That's not how it works.

 

Ideally you check orders of battles and take it from there, or you can be a bit lazy and use secondary sources. Doing that by looking into the Groehler, you'll find for instance, that about 7500 Soviet aircraft were assigned for the battle of Berlin, or a front line strength of about 30000 for the US, 15000 for the SU and 9000 for the RAF in the last year of the war.

Agreed, but the thread was going along the lines of productive capability of respective nations. Remember the photos of 1000s of surplus USAF planes. My assertion is that the Soviets produced as many if not more combat planes in WWII to use against Germany as one of the point against the myth that the USAF won the war against Nazi Germany.

[MiloMorai]

[Kublai]

"Bomber" Harris wasn't in charge to define the allied strategy for strategical bombing, he was just in charge for the RAF Bomber command, and his declarations were contradicting allied plans.

 

The strategic bomber objective defined in the Pointblank directive 'Quebec conference) and applied in the CBO plans in 1944 for the Argument, were absolutly clear about the main goal of the bombardement.(destroy the Luftwaffe).

Harris was commander of RAF Bomber Command and did not have command of any USAF units true. However, his vision and strategy was for bombing alone to defeat the Germans. Yes, there were military and industrial targets for both RAF and USAF bombing missions but it was quickly learned that navigation and bomb sights were inadequate to the task. Area bombing became standard practice for USAF aping RAF BC.

 

The Pointblank Directive was a diversion of the main SBC strategy as it was realized that air superiority was a necessary factor for a successful invasion. Once Overload was executed and the beach head stabilized SBC went back to its original strategy and one of the first raids was the Dresden raid. It was a show of force of what strategic bombing could do and a grand inducement for the Germans to give up.

 

As we know, the US SBC was to achieve in the Pacific what it and RAF BC failed to achieve in Europe. 

[MiloMorai]

Dresden was in Feb 1945. That is quite the beachhead.

 

July 23/24: The first major raid (629 aircraft) on a German city for two months bombs, Kiel.

 

Yes many, many, many Japanese died in the American fire raids on Japanese cities.

[Rama]

The Pointblank Directive was a diversion of the main SBC strategy as it was realized that air superiority was a necessary factor for a successful invasion.

No, it wasn't a "diversion", it was the main strategic goal (decided at the highest level) during a full year (from September 1943 to September 1944). And even after, it was still an important goal.

[II./JG27_Rich]

Too many people to fight against could be it.

[Kublai]

No, it wasn't a "diversion", it was the main strategic goal (decided at the highest level) during a full year (from September 1943 to September 1944). And even after, it was still an important goal.

Tator it depend on whom you are talking about. Certainly for the top war planners - Eisenhower and staff, it was a piece of their strategic goal - gain air superiority to land an army in Western Europe to beat the Nazis. However, for 8th Air Force and RAF Command, it certainly was a diversion from their Strategic Goal, to defeat the Nazi through bombing them into submission compelling them to surrender. It is interesting that so many should not understand the doctrine of Strategic Bombing. Perhaps the practitioners of this doctrine had a sensibility (for lack of a better word) that is so alien from the sensibility of leisure video game players that it is almost incomprehensible to understand.

 

As stated what US Strategic BC failed to do in Europe, it succeed spectacularly in Japan. It was a big disappointment for them that the two nukes got all the credit for ending the Pacific War. They would like to claim it was their devastating fire bombing of 69 Japanese cities that compelled the Japanese to surrender. Here is some 1945 USAF documents promoting their effectiveness.

  http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_vault/2014/03/13/map_interactive_visualizing_firebomb_damage_done_to_japan_during_wwii_through.html

[Rama]

Tator it depend on whom you are talking about.

My pseudo is Rama

 

However, for 8th Air Force and RAF Command, it certainly was a diversion from their Strategic Goal

You're clearly wrong. All the historical documents, the directives, the argument plan, drive to a clear conclusion that contradict your affirmation.

Moreover, it worked..... After the big week, the Luftwaffe had lost the possibility to rule the sky in western Europe, and the landing saw no aerial oposition. Even Goering recocgnized it at Nuremberg.

 

It is interesting that so many should not understand the doctrine of Strategic Bombing.

It's interesting you don't understand that history is a matter of written documents and facts... not just a theory

 

Perhaps the practitioners of this doctrine had a sensibility (for lack of a better word) that is so alien from the sensibility of leisure video game players that it is almost incomprehensible to understand.

Perhaps you could leave this kind of guessing fantasy (to stay polite), outside the discussion.

 

it succeed spectacularly in Japan.

Japan and Europe were 2 different front, and on each of these front there was different periods with an evolution of strategical goals.

Nowhere, on no front, a strategy was a fixed and immutable doctrine that didn't adapt to the context and possibilities.

 

Yes "bomber" Harris was a tenant of the Douhet doctrine.... but he wasn't in charge to define the overall allied strategy.

[Kublai]

My pseudo is Rama

 

You're clearly wrong. All the historical documents, the directives, the argument plan, drive to a clear conclusion that contradict your affirmation.

Moreover, it worked..... After the big week, the Luftwaffe had lost the possibility to rule the sky in western Europe, and the landing saw no aerial oposition. Even Goering recocgnized it at Nuremberg.

 

It's interesting you don't understand that history is a matter of written documents and facts... not just a theory

 

Perhaps you could leave this kind of guessing fantasy (to stay polite), outside the discussion.

 

Japan and Europe were 2 different front, and on each of these front there was different periods with an evolution of strategical goals.

Nowhere, on no front, a strategy was a fixed and immutable doctrine that didn't adapt to the context and possibilities.

 

Yes "bomber" Harris was a tenant of the Douhet doctrine.... but he wasn't in charge to define the overall allied strategy.

My apologies Rama,

I am very confused as to what you are saying. Are you saying there was no such thing as Strategic bombing in Europe? Was not the area bombing of cities well recorded in many contemporary and historical documents? Are you saying strategic bombing was only theory and not practiced? I am not being facetious or sarcastic but what is the debate here?

Perhaps the confusion is over the understanding of what "strategic" means. By strategic on the Allied side, it was how to end the war and force unconditional surrender on the enemy. This was the strategic goal in both European and Pacific wars. Air superiority, Normandy landing etc were parts of the strategic plan but were not the strategic goal.The Air Force or more correctly the parts of it that were students of strategic bombing believed the war could be won (and thus fulfill the strategic goal) by saturation bombing of cites. This was practiced in Europe to devastation effect but was not ultimately the silver bullet that slayed the dragon. In the Pacific, strategic bombing without a doubt sealed the coffin for Japan, the climax being the two nuclear bombs. I don't  think the facts of this is much in doubt - it is not revisionist. I think the concept of strategic bombing and what it is has been downplayed by "history" because of what it purports to do - bomb civilian cities while the desire to glorify and make heroes of the air crews who were without a doubt very heroic and sacrificed a lot became the prime narrative.

[Rama]

I think you confound "strategic goal" and "war goal". You're right that we don't give the same significance to words. I'm using the common definition, and not any related to a specific doctrine.

Strategic bombing isn't exclusivelly defined by the Douhet doctrine. This is a definition, and they are many other, corresponding to other kind of doctrines. "Strategic Bombing" is any kind of infrastructure bombing, as opposed to Tactical bombing which only goal is to hit the ennemy troops.

So Strategic bombing goals may be very diverse, and they may concur only indirectly to the final war outcome. Only Douhet doctrines gives to strategic bombing the goal to win the war by itself. Harris was convinced by this doctrine, but certainly not the allied high command.

[312_strycekFido]

1. Hitler.

2. Goering

 

...

 

exactly what i was gonna write