What do you know about the "Kuban Stairs" tactic?

[ShamrockOneFive]

I've been reading Osprey Aircraft of the Aces "Soviet Lend-Lease Fighter Aces of World War 2" and its covering some of the exploits of Pokryshkin and his time in the P-39.

 

It says during the summer of 1943 he perfected the "Kuban Stairs" tactic of having a strike flight fly at one altitude with a second flight further behind and above covering them in-case they were bounced. Then, there was a third flight staggered further back ready to bounce any aircraft that attack the second flight. Sounds like an interesting setup and something we could fairly easily and flexibly implement on multiplayer servers with some coordination.

 

Anyone know more about this technique? Do you use it online?

[=WH=PangolinWranglin]

It's how I fly top cover for bombers, though normally it's only 1 or 2 bombers with 1 or 2 layers of single fighters above and behind

[katdog5]

I've been reading Osprey Aircraft of the Aces "Soviet Lend-Lease Fighter Aces of World War 2" and its covering some of the exploits of Pokryshkin and his time in the P-39.

 

It says during the summer of 1943 he perfected the "Kuban Stairs" tactic of having a strike flight fly at one altitude with a second flight further behind and above covering them in-case they were bounced. Then, there was a third flight staggered further back ready to bounce any aircraft that attack the second flight. Sounds like an interesting setup and something we could fairly easily and flexibly implement on multiplayer servers with some coordination.

 

Anyone know more about this technique? Do you use it online?

 

 

I can confirm -  Ive been obliterated with the method.  It works tremendously.  I didn't feel a thing. I thought I was almost catching up to a "lone" 109.  flying one moment,  screen black the next. Cut to: third person death plunge and a 109 zipping past at the speed of sound

 

 

watch your high 6 man

 

Ive seen it after that. superb tactic 

[MeoW.Scharfi]

It is there already. On TAW for example, when a coordinated flight with many planes is going on for a certain objective. There is top cover for the bombers and sometimes top cover for the top cover. But the tactic has also it's problems. If something heavily armed with a good dive quality like the Fw 190 bounces the thing you have to escort and dives away. Then you failed. If the highest cover gets bounced, then they are defensive and busy.

 

The best tactic is the seagull tactic!

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4BNbHBcnDI#t=1m4s

 

Edited February 7, 2018 by MeoW.Scharfi

[Feathered_IV]

The Royal Flying Corps used the same technique in the First World War

[Wulf]

I've been reading Osprey Aircraft of the Aces "Soviet Lend-Lease Fighter Aces of World War 2" and its covering some of the exploits of Pokryshkin and his time in the P-39.

 

It says during the summer of 1943 he perfected the "Kuban Stairs" tactic of having a strike flight fly at one altitude with a second flight further behind and above covering them in-case they were bounced. Then, there was a third flight staggered further back ready to bounce any aircraft that attack the second flight. Sounds like an interesting setup and something we could fairly easily and flexibly implement on multiplayer servers with some coordination.

 

Anyone know more about this technique? Do you use it online?

 

 

Yeah, was just going to say, they where doing this stuff (layers) in WW1.  Also, the RAF adopted similar tactics with their so-called fighter sweeps (which often incorporated a strike element to encourage the desired response from the LW ) over the Continent following the BoB.

Edited February 7, 2018 by Wulf

[unreasonable]

Quite. And RFC accounts mention that they had to be careful of attacking a single low Hun plane, since it was often bait, with a large Hun formation waiting high up sun.

 

That this should all have been considered innovative in the VVS just shows how incredibly backwards they were tactically for a long time. Of course they did learn in the end.

 

In the east front context, aside from allowing the higher formations to dive down, it also had the benefit of making the GAF think twice about using vertical tactics when attacking the low layers, otherwise they could find themselves almost stationary, topping out of their zoom, at the same height as a bunch of Yaks flying much faster than them.  

[PatrickAWlson]

The Kuban stairs were more than just bait with top cover.  They were large formations with mutual cover.  If the Germans attack the top then the attack planes get through.  If the Germans attack the attack planes then the fighters are in a position to make them pay.

[unreasonable]

The Kuban stairs were more than just bait with top cover.  They were large formations with mutual cover.  If the Germans attack the top then the attack planes get through.  If the Germans attack the attack planes then the fighters are in a position to make them pay.

 

None of which was new. RAF, GAF had been doing it for years.

 

edit:  Which you can read about from the RFC perspective here, although you will have to be registered to see the contents of the linked jpgs.  http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/showthread.php?t=66453

Edited February 7, 2018 by unreasonable

[PatrickAWlson]

None of which was new. RAF, GAF had been doing it for years.

 

edit:  Which you can read about from the RFC perspective here, although you will have to be registered to see the contents of the linked jpgs.  http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/showthread.php?t=66453

 

I was not suggesting that this was a Russian invention.  The Germans were doing it in BoB with stepped fighters covering bombers.  

 

IMHO your link demonstrates more of the small unit ambush: a couple of airplanes covering a few airplanes.  The Kuban Elevator was much larger formations with a somewhat different purpose: get the attack planes through.  

 

My point was that this method was done at a much larger scale with a different goal in mind.  The idea was not to bait the enemy in order to bounce them.  The Russians weren't fooling anybody with the Kuban Elevator and they weren't trying to.  They were trying to get their attack package through.  Any German pilot that went for the attack planes would have to deal with  a layered defense.  Any German plane that went after the escorts would never get to the attack package.  The only way the Germans were going to be successful was to have enough numbers to take on both the escort and attack package.  They did not have those numbers.  For the Russians this amounted to effective use of their numerical advantage as it did not allow the Germans to deal with their air units in detail.

[Sgt_Joch]

The Kuban Stairs is a fairly standard fighter division tactic. It is discussed in detail in Shaw's "fighter tactics".

 

It was partly a "bait" defence, but then most division tactics are. You have a low group followed by a group at medium altitude, followed by a group at a higher altitude. If the low group is bounced, it is supposed to drag the enemy fighters away so the medium group can bounce the bogeys from the rear.

 

As to why the Russians did not use it earlier, there are many reasons, but the main one is technological, i.e. no radios. Most Russian fighters in use in 41-42 either had no radio or a radio receiver only, so no ability to transmit. Formations like the "Kuban Stairs" require good communications so the various groups can coordinate their actions.

 

A good radio was the main reason Russian pilots liked Lend Lease planes like the P40 since it allowed them to use more sophisticated tactics. In fact, if you look at operations of P40 units in 41-42, you can see they were already using a simpler version of the "Kuban Stairs" formations:

 

During the creation of Soviet fighter planes, the priority was to obtain high speed and maneuverability, and all other qualities were considered to be of secondary importance. In the P-40, special attention had been paid to such "lesser qualities" as firepower of armaments (a one-second salvo of its guns was 1.5 times heavier than that of a MiG-3), protection (38mm frontal armored glass, seat-back armor), durability of the airframe (even during forced landings pilots normally were uninjured), comfort (precise, reliable radio communications, good vision from the cockpit with clear canopy glass and a reliable canopy jettison mechanism [7], and a comfortable cabin), and great (up to 1100 km) flight range. Therefore despite its deficiencies in speed and maneuverability, its sluggishness even in climbs (in this basic characteristic it fell behind the Bf-109, Yaks, and LaGGs), in the hands of experienced aerial warriors this aircraft turned out to be a threatening weapon. A special set of "group tactics" was developed for its use, in which an insufficiency of aircraft was compensated for by good coordination within flights and echelonment by altitude [8]. Therefore a majority of the victories in the 126th IAP were group victories: HSU S. G. Ridnyy (AN965)-9 personal plus 17 in group; HSU V. G. Kamenshchikov-7 + 10; and regiment commander V. M. Naydenko-5 + 11 [9]. Twelve pilots became aces (five or more victories), and 31 pilots of the regiment were awarded orders and medals for the battle for Moscow.

 

http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/articles/romanenko/p-40/

Edited February 7, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[unreasonable]

I was not suggesting that this was a Russian invention.  The Germans were doing it in BoB with stepped fighters covering bombers.  

 

IMHO your link demonstrates more of the small unit ambush: a couple of airplanes covering a few airplanes.  The Kuban Elevator was much larger formations with a somewhat different purpose: get the attack planes through.  

 

My point was that this method was done at a much larger scale with a different goal in mind.  The idea was not to bait the enemy in order to bounce them.  The Russians weren't fooling anybody with the Kuban Elevator and they weren't trying to.  They were trying to get their attack package through.  Any German pilot that went for the attack planes would have to deal with  a layered defense.  Any German plane that went after the escorts would never get to the attack package.  The only way the Germans were going to be successful was to have enough numbers to take on both the escort and attack package.  They did not have those numbers.  For the Russians this amounted to effective use of their numerical advantage as it did not allow the Germans to deal with their air units in detail.

 

I agree with all of that but my point is that this was nothing new. The RFC stacked whole squadrons by the end of WW1, with ground attack Camels as the bottom layer - cross Channel raids were done in wing strength - 100+ fighters with a bomber formation. The Germans tried to fly as a whole Jg - again 100 or so fighters, stacked at altitude.

 

The fact that it took so long for the VVS to figure this out is what you might expect to happen when you expand your airforce by a factor of 10 in a few of years, while simultaneously murdering or sending to the gulag the vast majority of the officers who had any technical or even secondary education, especially anyone with experience in, or even interest in, what foreigners were up to.  The VVS was backwards, ignorant and cut off from the world, whatever the communist apologists on this site may claim. They had to learn by doing while at the same time experiencing horrific casualty rates - eventually they came up with something that the Germans and British had already learned by 1918.

 

@Sgt_Joch No! Radios are no excuse. Nobody in 1918 had radios (except for primitive versions in arty spotters).  The reason it took the VVS so long to come up with this is because they had no idea what they were doing, and had to learn the hard way.

 

Yes it is a good formation - but please do not think that it was original in any shape or form.  

[Sgt_Joch]

 

 

@Sgt_Joch No! Radios are no excuse. Nobody in 1918 had radios (except for primitive versions in arty spotters).  The reason it took the VVS so long to come up with this is because they had no idea what they were doing, and had to learn the hard way.

 

 

 

They did not use this tactic in 1918, check again.

[unreasonable]

Oh yes they did.

[Sgt_Joch]

Oh yes they did.

 

this is like Monthy Python.

 

WW1 formations required everyone to be within visual range, so a GAF formation coming upon a RFC one knew exactly what they were going into.

 

With a formation like the "Kuban Stairs", all groups are at the edge of visual sight so when, say a group of LW fighters spot the low group, they do not know if this is an isolated group or if a mass of other Russian fighters are following. If the low group is attacked, they need radio communication to let the cover group know where they are located/heading and where the bogeys are located/heading. That can only be done with good radio communications.

 

so no, tactics like the "Kuban Stairs" have very little in common with 1918 tactics. 

Edited February 7, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[unreasonable]

this is like Monthy Python.

 

WW1 formations required everyone to be within visual range, so a GAF formation coming upon a RFC one knew exactly what they were going into.

 

With a formation like the "Kuban Stairs", all groups are at the edge of visual sight so when, say a group of LW fighters spot the low group, they do not know if this is an isolated group or if a mass of other Russian fighters are following. If the low group is attacked, they need radio communication to let the cover group know where they are located/heading and where the bogeys are located/heading. That can only be done with good radio communications.

 

so no, tactics like the "Kuban Stairs" have very little in common with 1918 tactics. 

 

It is only like Monty Python if you want to make vacuous fact free statements and add "check again".  TBH I am surprised at my forbearance at even responding to such a discourteous post, I must be mellowing in my old age.

 

Take a look at the diagram - the stacks are 1000m apart - similar to RFC distancing between layers in 1918. This is well within easy visual range. 

 

 

Edited February 7, 2018 by unreasonable

[Hauksbee]

I was not suggesting that this was a Russian invention.  The Germans were doing it in BoB with stepped fighters covering bombers. 

Until Goering demanded that the fighters fly in among the bombers.

[Trooper117]

A good explanation and reasoning, plus the tactical implications can be found in this excellent book.

Some really good information of the air campaign in the Kuban, and how the P-39 fared, with many pilot accounts etc...

 

 

[Sgt_Joch]

It is only like Monty Python if you want to make vacuous fact free statements and add "check again".  TBH I am surprised at my forbearance at even responding to such a discourteous post, I must be mellowing in my old age.

 

Take a look at the diagram - the stacks are 1000m apart - similar to RFC distancing between layers in 1918. This is well within easy visual range. 

 

 

kuban stairs.gif

 

That is a very simplified diagram for illustrative purposes only. The real formation did not function like that in real life. If it was that simple to see the entire Russian formation, the German fighters would just climb on top, bounce the top group and work their way down.

Edited February 7, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[Sgt_Joch]

This is from Shaw's "fighter tactics" (pp. 272-274) where he discusses the principle behind formations like the Kuban Stairs. In WW2, since it was relatively easy for fighters to avoid combat, the whole idea behind these division formations was to trap enemy fighters in a situation where they would be outnumbered and in an unfavorable position:

 

 

Other Division Formations

 

To this point little has been said about trail formations, largely because of their inherent defensive weakness. Trail, or sucked-echelon formations, can, however, be very effective offensively, since they are well suited to sequential attacks by the trailing elements. When more than two fighters are involved, trail formations can also be devised to offer a reasonable defensive posture. One example is the "battle box," an arrangement of sections in trail as shown in Figure 7-6. In this formation the defensive function is provided by visual crosscover within each section, which may be arranged in spread, as shown, or in acute echelon. The trailing section also covers the leading section and provides improved offensive potential. This and similar arrangements have been used by nearly all air forces at one time or another from World War I to the present day. Additional sections can be added to the string ad infinitum, each stepped up or down as desired to enhance visibility or to reduce detection. The maneuverability of trail formations is greatly simplified, since each element has only to "follow the leader," and cross-overs involve only two aircraft at a time. The defensive capability of trail formations, although greatly improved by two-plane elements, is still inferior to the more line-abreast arrangements, since with trail formations leading elements are poorly placed for rapid support of trailing elements. When the division is composed of only three aircraft, a modification of the old vie can be useful. This formation, depicted in Figure 7-7, places a section in loose trail on the lead fighter. This arrangement is particularly well suited to the use of decoy tactics. The lead fighter can "stooge" around looking helpless until it is attacked by the enemy, at which time the trailing section, often stacked high, can swoop in and pull off a rather rude surprise party. Separation between lead and trail elements of this formation normally should be such that a bogey cannot slip into its weapons parameters behind the lead fighter without entering the trailing element's firing envelope.

The [German] is a master at using stooge decoys who would probably be as helpless as they look, if half the Luftwaffe were not keeping a jealous eye on them from the sun. Group Captain Reade Tilley, RAF

 

The reverse of the vie is the "section-and-stinger" formation depicted in Figure 7-8. In this case the single fighter (the "stinger") trails the lead section to offer the element of surprise. This was one of the favorite tactics of the Flying Tigers during World War II. The Japanese, since they normally flew in three-plane divisions, could more easily be enticed into battle against a section of two. The stinger could then have his pick. Although beautiful when it works, this tactic has obvious defensive weaknesses, as the stinger is quite vulnerable. It is probably best suited as an occasional variation to standard two-plane section doctrine rather than as a steady diet. The best position for the stinger is usually high above the section on the sun side, and only slightly in trail. If he is attacked, the stinger should normally attempt to dive and drag his attackers down toward the support of the section. In a radar environment, a stinger positioned very low "in the weeds" may be able to avoid enemy detection. Tactics are much like plays in any team sport. Each tactic has weak and strong points and can be anticipated and defeated by the opponents if the fighters "go to the well" too often with the same routine. Probably the most effective system is to employ a basic fighting unit, the two-plane section, for example, so aircrews can become highly proficient in its use. Then, depending on the number of aircraft available, the mission, and the expected opposition, these units can be combined with others in trail or stacked high or low according to environmental conditions. This technique varies the look presented to the enemy and always leaves him guessing as to whether he has everyone in sight before he attacks. Enemy pilots tend to get rather paranoid after they have attacked a leading or low element a few times.

Edited February 7, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[Brano]

As Jochen wrote,that is simplified picture Unreasonable.In real horizontal distance inbetween bottom and top flight was 10km. Inbetween top and middle(or middle and bottom) was 5km.

[unreasonable]

As Jochen wrote,that is simplified picture Unreasonable.In real horizontal distance inbetween bottom and top flight was 10km. Inbetween top and middle(or middle and bottom) was 5km.

 

So I give you a Russian source describing the formation with measured distances but now you are saying "Oh no, that was not it"? Why? Because it does not fit your preconceptions?

 

Come off it. The distance between the steps could be what ever they thought was suitable under the conditions. Anyway - look at the diagram - there are four layers in this example, not a middle, bottom and top.

 

Yes, Sgt_Joch I have had Shaw on my shelves for years too. You might note that the RFC were also documenting the advantages of flying in pairs during WW1 - links in my previous post.

 

It does not matter whether the Soviets were trying to bait the Germans - or as PatW said earlier, not trying to bait the Germans, but trying to get their attack package through - having stacked formations is the optimum solution in either case.  And it is very definitely advantageous to have the formations within visual range even if you have radios. Radios can fail, and people can lose track of their relative location. Unnecessary radio chatter is dangerous. This is just basic stuff.

 

I give up, think what you like. The fact is that when the Germans invaded their semi-allies in 1941 the VVS was essentially incompetent, and not withstanding individual heroism etc, it took a while for the survivors to learn absolutely basic tactics about air warfare, tactics that had been known and practiced by the Germans and RFC (and maybe even the French, but who knows) since 1918 at the latest.   

 

Holding up the "Kuban Stairs" as any kind of innovation is ludicrous. 

[Brano]

I give up too. Think of of it what you want

[JtD]

As Jochen wrote,that is simplified picture Unreasonable.

Can either of you show a Soviet source? I just browsed what I have in Soviet tactical manuals, nothing on the stairs in there...

 

I consider it likely that there wasn't necessarily a dogma with regards to number of flights and spacing between them, which was to be upheld under all circumstances. I think one of the major lessons the VVS had to learn was flexibility, and they did. So it wouldn't be surprising to me if all of you were in fact right.

 

Personally I consider a spacing of 10-5-0 km extreme for Soviet WW2 aircraft, because either the lower flight would collide with the ground or the upper flight would operate at the edge of the operational ceiling. That cannot have been dogma - for technical reasons alone. It might have well been used under particular circumstances.

Edited February 7, 2018 by JtD

[Sgt_Joch]

As Jochen wrote,that is simplified picture Unreasonable.In real horizontal distance inbetween bottom and top flight was 10km. Inbetween top and middle(or middle and bottom) was 5km.

 

yes, close enough to sweep in quickly as required, but far enough that enemy fighters might not see them. Standard WW2 trail/echelon formation.

 

Again, you can only use such sophisticated tactics if you have good communication equipment.

[Trooper117]

In the book I mentioned above, Pokryshkin calls it the 'Bookshelf' formation... it was eventually adopted as standard as the war went on. (He literally risked being shot for demanding the soviet air force had to change their procedures)

[Sgt_Joch]

again, more from Shaw's book. (pp. 355-358). In a "trail" formation, the backup is usually situated at maximum visual range:

 

 

Trail

Description

 

A trail intercept is any intercept in which the fighters are arranged in a trail formation at the merge. Figure 10-6 depicts an example in which the two sections are approaching with some offset at time "1." The fighter leader turns immediately to collision heading for a FQ intercept. Meanwhile, the wingman repositions behind the leader in trail. The trailing distance is normally as great as visual conditions allow; the wingman must keep sight of his lead, and he cannot be so far behind that he cannot offer some support to the leader in case a bogey attacks the lead fighter from behind (i.e., trailer nose-tail distance should not greatly exceed weapons max range). If the trailer intends to fire a head-on missile on the leader's VID, separation between leader and trailer should exceed missile min-range parameters.

 

In this case the leader's intent is to make a VID on the bogey aircraft before firing. Sometimes target aspect, bogey size, and visibility do not allow a positive VID to be made within the firing envelope of a fighter's all-aspect weapons. The trail formation is useful in this situation, since the leader can make and relay the VID to the trailing wingman, who then can shoot before penetrating his min-range limit. The shooter must be certain that his weapon is indeed locked on and guiding on a target, and not on his leader!

 

Once he gains sight of the bogeys, the leader should usually attempt to make a visual attack, forcing them into a defensive maneuver. The enemy may not have sight of the trailer, and such maneuvering will often present the trailing wingman with easy shot opportunities. Another, generally less desirable, option is to bait the bogeys by allowing considerable lateral separation at the pass. The enemy may be tempted into turning for an attack on the leader, again turning in front of the trailer. The trailing wingman should maintain considerable vertical separation with the leader to reduce the chances of being detected. A low trailer is often the most difficult to detect because of radar clutter and visual masking against the ground. The resulting look-up angle should also optimize all-aspect weapons performance.

 

Advantages and Disadvantages

 

The trail intercept, or actually an intercept in the trail formation, can be very effective offensively. The VID/forward-hemisphere advantage has already been mentioned. In addition, a bogey engaging the lead fighter is a grape for the trailing wingman, while a bogey not turning on the leader is likely to be attacked by him. In short, the bogey is caught between a rock and a hard place.

 

Although the trail arrangement is good offensively, it is rather poor on the defensive side, particularly for the trailer. His position and distance from the leader make it impossible for the leader to cover the trailer visually, and it would be very difficult for him even to lend support if the trailer was attacked. For these reasons trail tactics are extremely hazardous in an uncontrolled, hostile environment, and very high speeds should be maintained to help guard the trailer's rear hemisphere. This danger can be reduced significantly with the addition of more fighters, however. For example, placing two sections, each in combat spread, one behind the other, offers the advantages of the trail formation while retaining mutual support within each section. This is commonly called a "box" formation. A single with a trailing pair (vie) is another option. 

 

This discusses tactics within a flight, but the same considerations would apply to multi-flight tactics.

Edited February 7, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[216th_Lucas_From_Hell]

Shamrock, here's one of the original schemes by A. I. Pokryshkin to demonstrate the technique, out of his notebooks. It might clear things up.

 

As said before, this combat disposal is meant to maximise offensive firepower and defensive mutual support. By distributing the flights across altitude brackets you have visibility over enemies approaching across all ranges, the ability to overwhelm the enemy at will from multiple directions and altitudes and to defend against it, and a way of bringing a high number of guns to bear in a non-conflicting way.

 

Like all things in an organised military, this tactic requires discipline to work out properly. Period writings always note that, imperatively, the highest group must be very experienced (ideally with the mission commander in it). This is because the leader has a) an unrestricted top-down view of the group, b) an unrestricted top-down view of the combat once it develops, c) the most altitude, thus being the 'insurance' of the whole group if things go south and d) no top cover, so if engaged from above the top pair will take longer to be assisted from lower elements. These factors mean that the leader must coordinate the actions of other pilots, always be on top of the situation and guarantee that they can do this by not getting into protracted dogfights.

 

I love flying in this kind of formation because it is extremely beginner-friendly as it doesn't require very tight formation, so you can integrate people who you don't fly with as often into it without much hassle. Whoever is flying lead needs to be constantly giving directions and coordinating the general flow of the flight - when and how to attack and when to not, what direction to take the fight to if possible, when to disengage and where to, etc.

 

[unreasonable]

It is hard to give up completely when Sgt_Joch now starts quoting from Shaw about lead and wingman tactics (not stacked formations) with respect to missile and radar equipped fighters! (Line 3, 5, 7). Hard to offer support from behind in trail with a gun armed plane at the limit of visual range, even for the Soviet planes in BoX .

 

This has absolutely nothing to do with the Kuban Stair, or anything else in WW2 for that matter.

 

Lucas's post on the other hand is eminently sensible. Or is that diagram also showing the "wrong" distances? (Hint - it is the same diagram).

Edited February 7, 2018 by unreasonable

[ShamrockOneFive]

Shamrock, here's one of the original schemes by A. I. Pokryshkin to demonstrate the technique, out of his notebooks. It might clear things up.

 

As said before, this combat disposal is meant to maximise offensive firepower and defensive mutual support. By distributing the flights across altitude brackets you have visibility over enemies approaching across all ranges, the ability to overwhelm the enemy at will from multiple directions and altitudes and to defend against it, and a way of bringing a high number of guns to bear in a non-conflicting way.

 

Like all things in an organised military, this tactic requires discipline to work out properly. Period writings always note that, imperatively, the highest group must be very experienced (ideally with the mission commander in it). This is because the leader has a) an unrestricted top-down view of the group, b) an unrestricted top-down view of the combat once it develops, c) the most altitude, thus being the 'insurance' of the whole group if things go south and d) no top cover, so if engaged from above the top pair will take longer to be assisted from lower elements. These factors mean that the leader must coordinate the actions of other pilots, always be on top of the situation and guarantee that they can do this by not getting into protracted dogfights.

 

I love flying in this kind of formation because it is extremely beginner-friendly as it doesn't require very tight formation, so you can integrate people who you don't fly with as often into it without much hassle. Whoever is flying lead needs to be constantly giving directions and coordinating the general flow of the flight - when and how to attack and when to not, what direction to take the fight to if possible, when to disengage and where to, etc.

 

 

Thanks for posting that! The separation is a lot less than I was expecting actually. They are pretty close together and I assume able to coordinate fairly closely.

 

Really interesting information. I was loosely aware of the technique and I've read some about the RAF's tactics (Ramrod and Circus for example) but this is really interesting to also read about some similar tactics on the eastern front.

I'm sure that if he were alive today, Marshall Pokryshkin would be crestfallen to discover that his tactics in the Kuban weren't quite innovative enough for the Internet.

 

I think this entire line of discussion is pointless. The fact that a tactic may have been used in the past by others is one thing, but actually implementing something that is "new to you" when your ass is on the line is another. FFS I will never understand why is it so hard for people to just give some credit where credit is due. It takes nothing away from anyone else.

 

I don't know if Pokryshkin even claimed to have invented stuff but he certainly knew that the VVS really needed to change tactics and by 1943 I guess there was enough of a pull for him to able to do that. Though as has already been pointed out... At great risk of running afoul of the conventional wisdom from HQ at the time. People are slow to change!

[[CPT]Pike*HarryM]

Apparently the RAF forgot lessons of WW1 also, if they started out in simple Vics and line abreast (or astern, aka the "idiots line" as the LW pilots called it). Plenty of dumbs to go around in early war.

[Sgt_Joch]

 

 

Lucas's post on the other hand is eminently sensible. Or is that diagram also showing the "wrong" distances? (Hint - it is the same diagram).

 

well again, anyone who knows anything about WW2 fighter tactics, and I presume you do?  ...would realize the diagram cannot be taken literally since a formation stacked one on top of another makes no sense. 

 

A. it makes the LW job too easy since with ACs stacked in a ladder:

 

1. they can easily see the entire formation and decide whether to attack or disengage;

2. if they decide to attack, they can easily see the "tail end" which is the "top" group and attack them;

3. the top group is especially vulnerable since they are not able to maneuver since if they leave, they leave the "middle" group right below them vulnerable.

 

B. it makes no sense from the VVS pov also since:

 

1. the "top" group, being directly above the "middle" group cannot watch them except by turning upside down or by radical turns which will slow them down?;

2. if the "middle" group is attacked, the "top" group is supposed to dive down at a 90 degree angle to engage? or do a dive turn which will burn up E and limit which way they can turn?

 

There is a reason why Shaw does not discuss this "ladder" concept, simply because it was never used that way. What Pokryshyn used was a "trail/echelon" formation where the "top" group was above and far enough behind the "middle" group where:

 

1. they could not be easily spotted by the LW and kept them guessing whether the "middle" group had backup; and

2. if the "middle" group did get attacked, the "top" group would do a straight ahead shallow dive to pick up E so they could turn right or left to attack the bogeys from the rear.

 

But I have given up trying to win internet debates. As Brano said, believe what you want to believe. 

Edited February 8, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[Wulf]

well again, anyone who knows anything about WW2 fighter tactics, and I presume you do?  ...would realize the diagram cannot be taken literally since a formation stacked one on top of another makes no sense. 

 

A. it makes the LW job too easy since with ACs stacked in a ladder:

 

1. they can easily see the entire formation and decide whether to attack or disengage;

2. if they decide to attack, they can easily see the "tail end" which is the "top" group and attack them;

3. the top group is especially vulnerable since they are not able to maneuver since if they leave, they leave the "middle" group right below them vulnerable.

 

B. it makes no sense from the VVS pov also since:

 

1. the "top" group, being directly above the "middle" group cannot watch them except by turning upside down or by radical turns which will slow them down?;

2. if the "middle" group is attacked, the "top" group is supposed to dive down at a 90 degree angle to engage? or do a dive turn which will burn up E and limit which way they can turn?

 

There is a reason why Shaw does not discuss this "ladder" concept, simply because it was never used that way. What Pokryshyn used was a "trail/echelon" formation where the "top" group was above and far enough behind the "middle" group where:

 

1. they could not be easily spotted by the LW and kept them guessing whether the "middle" group had backup; and

2. if the "middle" group did get attacked, the "top" group would do a straight ahead shallow dive to pick up E so they could turn right or left to attack the bogeys from the rear.

 

But I have given up trying to win internet debates. As Brano said, believe what you want to believe. 

 

 

Well, I imagine the Germans would see the whole formation (in actuality, a series of formations) developing on radar long before it could be observed approaching the front. either from the air or ground.  That said, whether they could actually respond in time to get their fighters to altitude to negate the layered nature of the attack is another matter again.  In most cases I suspect the assault would be over the target and away long before that could happen.

 

Remembering that by this stage of the war the LW only had about 400 or so fighters permanently stationed along the whole Eastern Front.  That being the case I suspect they had to choose their battles carefully.

Edited February 8, 2018 by Wulf

[HBPencil]

What do I know of the "Kuban Stairs" tactic? It's a more elaborate take on the "Russian Steppes" isn't it?

 

 

 

I'll show myself out now  

[ShamrockOneFive]

What do I know of the "Kuban Stairs" tactic? It's a more elaborate take on the "Russian Steppes" isn't it?

 

 

 

I'll show myself out now  

 

Superb!

[unreasonable]

well again, anyone who knows anything about WW2 fighter tactics, and I presume you do?  ...would realize the diagram cannot be taken literally since a formation stacked one on top of another makes no sense. 

 

A. it makes the LW job too easy since with ACs stacked in a ladder:

 

1. they can easily see the entire formation and decide whether to attack or disengage;

2. if they decide to attack, they can easily see the "tail end" which is the "top" group and attack them;

3. the top group is especially vulnerable since they are not able to maneuver since if they leave, they leave the "middle" group right below them vulnerable.

 

B. it makes no sense from the VVS pov also since:

 

1. the "top" group, being directly above the "middle" group cannot watch them except by turning upside down or by radical turns which will slow them down?;

2. if the "middle" group is attacked, the "top" group is supposed to dive down at a 90 degree angle to engage? or do a dive turn which will burn up E and limit which way they can turn?

 

There is a reason why Shaw does not discuss this "ladder" concept, simply because it was never used that way. What Pokryshyn used was a "trail/echelon" formation where the "top" group was above and far enough behind the "middle" group where:

 

1. they could not be easily spotted by the LW and kept them guessing whether the "middle" group had backup; and

2. if the "middle" group did get attacked, the "top" group would do a straight ahead shallow dive to pick up E so they could turn right or left to attack the bogeys from the rear.

 

But I have given up trying to win internet debates. As Brano said, believe what you want to believe. 

 

It is true that the formation as described in the diagram makes it hard for the top planes to keep the bottom ones in view, impossible in straight and level flight.  But this is a completely general property of stacked formations with low wing monoplanes. The interesting question is what should the horizontal spacing be if you want all of the lower planes to be visible to each higher one, given a specific vertical spacing? 

 

Someone might work this out using the angle of sight from a given cockpit - I have just looked empirically using the bubble Yak. From a few minutes playing around with the ME, I would say that for a 1,000m vertical spacing between pairs, as in the diagram, you need over 2,000 m diagonal spacing, when the lower pairs are in front. And it has to be at just about 45 degrees to the side, or the nose or wing will again cover the lower planes.  If you do that, with four pairs stacked at 1,000m intervals, the furthest pair is now about 8,000m from the upper pair: so we are again getting visibility problems of a different type, depending on weather and the terrain, plus the mutual support is considerable further away.

 

You can have a look at what it looks with this spacing using this mission file - player plane is top and right rear corner.  Kuban Stairs Offset.zip

 

(It was easier for many WW1 designs, where pilots could often lean out of their open cockpit and look straight down behind the lower wing).   

 

As to the assertion that the formation as drawn is useless because the Germans could just start from the top - again you could make the same claim about any stacked formation.  I think this is a poor objection, similar to saying that it is useless for ground units to deploy flank guards because the enemy can simply attack from a flank in force and roll up the whole line. There are all sorts of situations where it would be neither practical nor desirable for the Germans to do that in either air or ground case. 

 

Given that the diagram has carefully marked distances for height and horizontal spacing, I find it hard to believe the assertion that the author - who was there and meant the diagram to be a practical guide - did not mean exactly what he said. 

 

Finally - as to "winning an argument on the internet" - this holds no interest for me. What I am interested in is how this formation was used in practice. Could it have worked without radio? How dependent was it on having reasonably well trained and/or experienced flight leaders etc.  Was it really any different from the use of layered formations by other air forces?  Quotes from Shaw about jet fighter tactics in the missile age and assertions that the author of the diagram did not mean what he said hardly help answer any of these questions, even leaving out the "check again" cheap shots. 

Edited February 8, 2018 by unreasonable

[JtD]

Was it part of the stairs tactic to just fly straight? I always expect cover flights to move along curved paths, because they typically cruise faster than the bomber they are escorting, they need to check the blind spots of their own aircraft and they want to make it harder for the unsuspected bouncer to hit.

 

Movement within this formation, looking up or down from an aircraft banking at varying angles, makes it easier to keep track of everything around you. I don't think improved Soviet tactics would forfeit some basic principles just to fly the perfect stairs formation - that's something you'd in an air show, not in an air war. They would have needed to apply this tactic flexibly.

[unreasonable]

Was it part of the stairs tactic to just fly straight? I always expect cover flights to move along curved paths, because they typically cruise faster than the bomber they are escorting, they need to check the blind spots of their own aircraft and they want to make it harder for the unsuspected bouncer to hit.

 

Movement within this formation, looking up or down from an aircraft banking at varying angles, makes it easier to keep track of everything around you. I don't think improved Soviet tactics would forfeit some basic principles just to fly the perfect stairs formation - that's something you'd in an air show, not in an air war. They would have needed to apply this tactic flexibly.

 

I agree - but if you put the planes exactly as per the diagram, it is very hard to see any of the pairs below even when you bank and weave. My interpretation of what the unextended formation might look like as per diagram:   Kuban Stairs .zip

 

If the pairs are weaving about more independently, the sighting opportunities will be more frequent - but it is still hard to visually track planes so far below you unless they are very substantially offset horizontally.  So the question is then why did the diagram show horizontal spacings between pairs of 500m when you need 2,000+ to retain visibility? (P-37 visibility better?)

 

So either you have the Sgt_Joch interpretation - ie that the diagram is does not accurately represent the spacings, (in fact it is wildly inaccurate), the spacings must be more like my extended version, or alternately the pairs flew much more independently so would sometimes have been banking and/or horizontally offset, or that the formation relied on following some flight path and the fact that the upper planes could only rarely see the lower ones was just accepted as a preferable to having the formation spread over a wider horizontal area. The upper pairs would still be able to see enemy aircraft approaching the lower pairs in any of these scenarios. edit (except sometimes the extended formation, where the total LoS from top to bottom pairs is so far that enemies approaching the bottom pair would be almost impossible for the top pair to see).

 

I do not know the answer - but I am reluctant to just ignore the contemporary diagram. 

Edited February 8, 2018 by unreasonable

[busdriver]

I'm reading Attack of the Airacobras (Trooper117 posted the cover) and I think Sgt_Joch is terribly misinformed to think it (Bookshelf, Stairs...whatever you want to label it) couldn't have been effective using the dimensions of the diagram Lucas posted. That's how the Bookshelf is described as translated in Attack of the Airacobras. Apparently it was extremely successful initially because it was something new for the VVS. It was an innovation from their previous wheel/caravan/lufberry. The 109 and 190 guys were caught off guard initially. Just because some other iteration of a tactic or formation was used previously, doesn't render it instantly ineffective. Tactics evolve.

Edited February 8, 2018 by busdriver

[EAF19_Marsh]

Apparently the RAF forgot lessons of WW1 also, if they started out in simple Vics and line abreast (or astern, aka the "idiots line" as the LW pilots called it). Plenty of dumbs to go around in early war.

 

 

More complicated than that. The Vic was intended to allow fighters to bring firepower on un-escorted bombers and keep the formation close together so that people did not get lost when climbing to intercept. The Luftwaffe used the same pre-SCW and then abandoned it. FC began abandoning it summer 1940 (unofficially) and had largely ditched it by 1941, when they were running offensive formations composed of multiple fighter units and different altitudes (as the Luftwaffe had done in 1940).

 

Interestingly, the Luftwaffe come back towards something closer to the RAF tight formations in 1944 with the Sturmgruppe, suggesting that the approach did make some sense in theory if not in practice.

 

So 'Kuban' stairs is a VVS approach to basic principles that existed but were used in different ways by different forces.