Luftwaffe aircraft strength prior to Bodenplatte

[Dakpilot]

John Manrho and Ron Putz

 

Bodenplatte : The luftwaffe's last hope

The attack on allied airfields new years day 1945

 

(probably)

 

Cheers, Dakpilot

 

 

[LesG]

----wrong thread-----

 

 

Edited May 2, 2018 by LesG

[Sgt_Joch]

On ‎2018‎-‎04‎-‎28 at 12:04 AM, ATAG_Flare said:

 

What is the "Bodenplatte Book" you speak of? Just curious.

 

this one:

 

https://www.amazon.com/Bodenplatte-Luftwaffes-Stackpole-Military-History/dp/0811706869

[sevenless]

Also available on Scribd:

 

https://de.scribd.com/document/356897218/Bodenplatte-pdf

[Kurfurst]

For reference, production of Bf 109 types in 1944/45.

 

Only new production airframes are listed, i.e. conversions of older models to new models are not included.

[MiloMorai]

A much better document rather than a 'pretty picture' can be found here,

 

http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/attachment.php?attachmentid=1022&d=1171563417

 

Not only does it list the numbers but sub models and the factories the a/c came from.

 

Note that only one (1) Bf109G-6/AS was a new build.

 

		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
G 5	Erla	50	63	56	6	2				60							237
G 5/R2	Erla	Scheduled-not built															0
G 6	Mttr	430	309	135	343	550	659	662	260	242	50	53	109	1	9		3812
G 6	Erla	291	270	203	200	319	300	305			106	295		64			2353
G 6	WNF	Scheduled-not built															0
G 6/R2	WNF											130		2			132
G 6/U2	Erla								38	3	1	1					43
G 6/U4	WNF	119	51	303	404	118	144	240	33	40	14						1466
G 6/U4	Györ								16	15							31
G 6AS	Mttr									1							1
Ga 6	Györ	42	6	50	14	17	17	30									176
G 8	WNF		16	57	39												112
G 8/R5	WNF					59	110	111	208	92	77	21	67		63	107	915
G 8/R5	GYör								29	2							31
G 8/U3	WNF										1						1
G 10	Erla									1	52	279	67	103	38	4	544
G 10	Mttr										4	108	62	3			177
G 10/R6	Erla											49	191	269	178	284	971
G 10/U4	WNF													129	132	95	356
G 14	Mttr								440	144	30	59	11	1	157	47	889
G 14	Erla								232	472	339	25		78			1146
G 14/U4	WNF								59	148	219	98	56	11	2		593
G 14/U4	GYör									32							32
G 14/U4	KöB										9	20					29
G 14AS	Mttr									303	379	101	203	211	62	11	1270
G 14AS	Erla									95	9	3					107
K 2	Erla	Scheduled-not built															0
K 2	WNF	Scheduled-not built															0
K 3	Erla	Scheduled-not built															0
K 3/R2	Erla	Scheduled-not built															0
K 4	Mttr									15	293	221	325	338	233	168	1593
	Totals	932	715	804	1006	1065	1230	1043	1374	1718	1793	1558	1147	1221	876	716	17017

 

 

[unreasonable]

I wonder how many of those air-frames had engines?

[MiloMorai]

40 minutes ago, unreasonable said:

I wonder how many of those air-frames had engines?

 

You can check here, http://enginehistory.org/Piston/WW2GermanProduction/WW2GermanProduction.shtml

[unreasonable]

Cannot connect to that site for some reason.

[MiloMorai]

Try deleting text after 'org'.

[JtD]

1 hour ago, unreasonable said:

I wonder how many of those air-frames had engines?

 

All of them. In case you can't connect to the enginehistory.org site, DB605 production figures vary, sometimes below Bf109 production, mostly however significantly higher. Also, I don't suppose that "air frame" in this context refers to cells only, I think these are complete aircraft possibly short of some special/military equipment.

[unreasonable]

No, it is the whole site not responding, at least to me. Never mind.

1 minute ago, JtD said:

 

All of them. In case you can't connect to the enginehistory.org site, DB605 production figures vary, sometimes below Bf109 production, mostly however significantly higher. Also, I don't suppose that "air frame" in this context refers to cells only, I think these are complete aircraft possibly short of some special/military equipment.

 

I was not sure because I recall reports of allied troops finding very large numbers of engine-less and incomplete airframes at the aircraft factories.  Was it not normal practice to make considerably more engines than airframes to provide spares? 

[Bremspropeller]

25 minutes ago, unreasonable said:

I was not sure because I recall reports of allied troops finding very large numbers of engine-less and incomplete airframes at the aircraft factories.  Was it not normal practice to make considerably more engines than airframes to provide spares?

 

That could have been for a large matter of reasons (from the top off my head):

 

1) The "airframes" are just partial airframes, such as fuselages before the mating to the wings (makes sense in the 109, since the MLG was attached to the fuselage)

2) The supply of engines was cut short by a recent attack onto the logistics lines.

3) The impending overrun of the factory had somebody re-route the stream of newly-built engines to a farther out factory.

 

# 2 seems the most likely, but it could have been for any reason or a combination.

[sevenless]

4 hours ago, MiloMorai said:

A much better document rather than a 'pretty picture' can be found here,

 

http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/attachment.php?attachmentid=1022&d=1171563417

 

Not only does it list the numbers but sub models and the factories the a/c came from.

 

 

Thanks for that table. Impressive numbers of G-10s and G 14/AS. Didn´t expext the numbers to be that high.

[Kurfurst]

Of further interest, Luftwaffe aircraft with units on  31 January 1945, a month after Bodenplatte.

 

Detailed are the combat units of the Luftwaffe and their associated Erganzungs Einheiten, had the following strength in Bf109 types.

These are on hand totals, they include both 'frontline' and 'other' units.

Included are all aircraft operational and non-operational at the time. (combat/Ergänzungs=OTU).

Not included are aircraft delivered but in still storage, used as reserves or stockpiles.

 

Bf109G1/5 (0/1)
Bf109G12 (0/5)
Bf109G6 (71/328)
Bf109G14 and G14U4 (431/190)
Bf109G10, G10/U4 and G14/AS (568/3)
Bf109K4 (314/0)
Bf109G10/R6 (51/0)

Total Bf 109s (1435/527)

 

Other Jagd types totaled (1058/359)
Schlacht types totaled (680/375)
Nachtschlacht types totaled (422/95)
Zerstorer types totaled (42/0)
Nachtjagd types totaled (1241, no breakdown between the two)
Kampf types totaled (543/158)
Nahaufklarer totaled (407/27)
Fernaufklarer totaled (195/81)
See types totaled (78/17)
Transport types totaled (496/9)

 

Grand total (6597/1631)

 

Source: BA-MA: RL2III/1158

 

Worthy of note that roughly 2/3s of the 109s are high altitude types G-14/AS, G-10 or K-4.

K-4 frontline strength doubled since 1st December 1944, and all of them were frontline units.

G-6s are almost non-existent with frontline units, but large numbers are still serving with 2nd line (training etc.) units.

Zerstorers are similarly almost non-existant, they either disbanded - but a very large number of night fighters are still in existance. 

Traditional bomber are massively reduced in number since mid-1944 due to their fuel consumption, their role is largely taken up by Schlacht or close-support units, mainly Fw 190Fs, and Nachschlacht, or night harassment units which still flew things like Ju 87s, for instance.

[MiloMorai]

To bad that list is essentially useless as it doesn't breakdown the numbers by Front > ETO, MTO, Eastern.

 

If nonsense like this is accepted then so should total numbers for the RAF and USAAF as well. For Jan 1945 the USAAF had 17,332 fighters on hand.

 

Notice this number is slightly higher than the total Bf109 15 month production.

Edited December 3, 2018 by MiloMorai

[Sgt_Joch]

well the raw numbers are correct. The Germans produced large numbers of ACs in 1944-45. The real limiting factors were how many were operational at any one time. The biggest limiting factors were lack of fuel and lack of qualified pilots.

 

for example, there were 1400 or so me 262 produced, but once the GAF started intercepting heavy bombers in feb. 45, they only put up 15-30 at a time with a max. of 45 at one time.

 

throughout the fall of 1944 when fuel was more plentiful, the GAF would be dormant for 2-3 weeks while it gathered enough fuel, then would put up 400-500 prop fighters (max was 700)against heavy bombers.

 

During that time the total number of operational fighters went up from around 1500? in september to around 2200-2400 on December 16th. Heavy casualties were then suffered in the two weeks leading to "Bodenplatte".

 

the other limitng factor was pilot skills. Reading through "Bodenplatte" (currently half-way through), a typical German fighter unit in dec. 44 would have been made up of: 1) a handful of remaning "expertens" (Heinz Bar flew on jan.1 and got two kills); 2) 10-15% of experienced fighter pilots with up to two years combat experience including on the Russian front, these were the unit leaders; 3) 20-25% qualified bomber/transport pilots who had been transferred in (these had the piloting skills , but no fighter experience); and 4) 60-65% 18-19 year old rookies fresh out of flight schools.

[MiloMorai]

https://forum.il2sturmovik.com/topic/38474-luftwaffe-jan-10-1945/

 

[MiloMorai]

http://www.oocities.org/sturmvogel_66/LWOB45.html

 

Serviceable strength went from 4566 on Jan 10 to 3331 on Apr 9.

[ZachariasX]

On 12/3/2018 at 9:36 PM, Sgt_Joch said:

well the raw numbers are correct. 

What kind of numbers are those? Even from 1939 on, Germany had different classes of completed aircraft, when Program Nr.9 was commeced as industry plan.

 

„Industriefertig“ was different from „übernahmefertig“, was not the same as „GL-fertig“, but was still more than „Saur-fertig“ (the lowest category in Speers Technische Amt)

 

This all as a bureaucratic effort to fudge high production numers. 

 

„Saur-fertig“ meant an aircraft that had passed through the entire assembly process (and therefore already could be labeled as „complete“). However, it was still missing certain equipment components.

 

Added with that equipment parts (e.g. certain instrumentation), it became „Industriefertig“.

 

After that, weapons were installed and it became „GL-fertig“.

 

Once the weapons were aligned and harmonized and the aircraft was test flown, it became „übernahmefertig“.

 

These different degrees of complete make it actually very difficult to get an actual picture of real factory output and you have to look careful for those subtleties. It also illustrates why ferry pilots would encounter planes to be delivered in the late stage of the war that were still missing components. One really has to trace Werknummern to get a clear picture.

 

 

 

 

[Sgt_Joch]

The Allies had examined the figures after the war and agreed with them:

Quote

It must also be borne in mind that the production figures are not reflected in any proportional increase in the enemy battle order, which is the crucial datum. According to figures compiled by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey from German sources, a total of 25,860 single engine fighters were accepted from production in 1944. Of this total a large percentage seems to have represented aircraft repaired after battle damage. Such, at any rate, is strongly suggested by a document (Auswertung, der Einsatzbereitsch der fliegenden Verb. vom 1 August 1943 bis November 1944) now in the custody of the British Air Ministry and picked up at Berchtesgaden at the end of hostilities with the high classification common to files of the enemy high command. Its figures are compared with the USSBS totals in the following table:

USSBS		Fighters of the Jagd Type
Single-engine Acceptances		Newly Built (neubau)	Repaired
Jan.	1,315	1,162	237
Feb.	1,016	794	320
Mar.	1,377	934	373
Apr.	1,696	1,016	456
May	1,907	1,380	384
June	2,177	1,704	571
July	2,627	1,875	671
Aug.	2,779	1,798	676
Sept.	3,031
Oct.	2,735
Nov.	2,776
Dec.	2,424

It is readily apparent that the totals for the two right-hand columns compare very closely with those given at the left. The Germans wrote off an aircraft as lost when it was damaged by 60 per cent and classified the plane as damaged when injuries were estimated at 10 to 60 Percent. USSBS studies indicate that losses of single-engine fighters in front-line units came for the year to about 8,500 and that an additional 8,000 planes were damaged in excess of 10 per cent. According to the same source, the German order of battle in that category increased from 1,500 to no more than 2,200 during the year.82 Certainly the Luftwaffe as a fighting force seldom gave Allied analysts reason to doubt the accuracy of estimates of German production during 1944. which turned out to be much smaller than the official German figures.*

One answer to this problem lies in the supply and quality of German pilots. No matter how many aircraft were produced they were of no possible use unless men were available to fly them. This appears to have been the weakest point in the entire German air situation. The bottle-neck within this bottleneck was the training program. It has been discovered that, again as a result of too optimistic an estimate of requirements, the German high command found itself in need of a substantially increased flow of pilot replacements in 1943. Pressure was consequently put on the fighter training schools to speed up their program. But the training of pilots requires aviation fuel; and Germany did not have enough leeway in this respect to allow the schools to be prodigal in their gasoline consumption. In fact, it became difficult for the schools to obtain enough for a minimum program. They could, therefore, follow two alternative courses: either fall short of the required replacements or cut hours of training so that fuel allocations would be sufficient to produce the required number of pilots. They chose the latter policy, with the result that pilots entered combat increasingly ill-trained. Faced with thoroughly trained American and British pilots, these replacements fought at a disadvantage, which helps explain the increasing rate of attrition imposed on the GAF. The consequent rise in the demand for replacements simply completed the vicious cycle.

 

 

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-2.html  

 

(see pp. 61-62)

 

note however the discrepancy, 25,000 single engined fighters built in 1944, 16,500 destroyed or damaged, but front-line strength hovered between 1500 and 2200.

 

In a sense, how many fighters they produced was irrelevant since they did not have the fuel or the pilots to operate them, so most sat idle on the ground.

Edited December 5, 2018 by Sgt_Joch

[ZachariasX]

Thnx for the link!

 

Yes, they absolutely had higher production of fighters than they could actually use.

 

The point I was making is more directed to an assessment of how efficient was German production and ressource allocation. It appears to me that they were far from optimal and in consequence a big cause for „not enough of this or that“ availabe, hurting production in general.

 

In a good supply chain, production lot size should add up to make a product with minimum waste. Here, the product would be an aircraft with a proficient pilot. It appears to me that inflating numbers made the industry hurt themselves almost in a way as Allied bombs did.

[MiloMorai]

2 hours ago, Sgt_Joch said:

The Allies had examined the figures after the war and agreed with them:

 

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-2.html  

 

(see pp. 61-62)

 

note however the discrepancy, 25,000 single engined fighters built in 1944, 16,500 destroyed or damaged, but front-line strength hovered between 1500 and 2200.

 

In a sense, how many fighters they produced was irrelevant since they did not have the fuel or the pilots to operate them, so most sat idle on the ground.

 

Which someone fails to understand.

[Ehret]

1 hour ago, MiloMorai said:

Which someone fails to understand.

 

If only - to cite Göring himself:

Quote

furthermore I am of the opinion that the building of our aircraft should not depend in any way on the fuel programme. I would rather have a mass of aircraft standing around unable to fly owing to a lack of petrol than not have any at all.

 

There were more "good" ideas in the LW like sending technicians to infantry...

Edited December 6, 2018 by Ehret

[JV69badatflyski]

production number tells you just one thing: are there enough available airframes to  create an airforce and to compensate the losses.
You need pilots, without them those planes doesn't fly.
If you look at the spit production, you see that most of the airframes , after being build at factory, were in delivery for 2months (an average), but there were also airframes not being delivered to any kind of squadron, let it be flightschool or active squadron, just sitting in a delivery pool waiting for whatever will happen, some being just scrapped after the war with no flight time at all. +/-900 spits MK14 built, max assigned planes was something like+/-145 ....remove the losses from the general number and you get like 20% of build airfames were actually used. Production numbers shows only the industrial capacity, nothing more.

[JtD]

You think that at a time where the Luftwaffe fighter force had a turnover of 100% every 3 months or so and the ETO US fighters did the same every 9 months or so, the Spitfire XIV squadrons lost about 25% over a period of more than a year?

[JV69badatflyski]

 

1 hour ago, JtD said:

You think that at a time where the Luftwaffe fighter force had a turnover of 100% every 3 months or so and the ETO US fighters did the same every 9 months or so, the Spitfire XIV squadrons lost about 25% over a period of more than a year?

Don't want to start another mk14 topic but just as example, on the 10th may45 for the MK14 (not E/FR/FRE)
There were 189 airframes in maintenance/repair/delivery
                    100 airframes assigned to squadrons
                     82 aiframes exported to india   since Oct43
                    103 airframes SoC (struck of charge) since Oct43

Still working on the data to get a better view on the distinction btwn delivery /repair.

So , yes there was a 20/25% loss ratio compared to production numbers for the MK14

Edited December 6, 2018 by JV69badatflyski

[MiloMorai]

mistake, read the wrong year.?

Edited December 7, 2018 by MiloMorai

[JV69badatflyski]

12 hours ago, MiloMorai said:

Of the 799 Spitfires operational on May 1 1945 in 57 squadrons of ADGB and 2TAF  only 100 were operational Spit XIVs?

Yes milo, but you have to add 58 FR's  +11 E's +1 FRE to get the total of all MK14 versions all together, the number i gave are for the MK-14 "standard" only.

[NZTyphoon]

 

On 12/7/2018 at 1:37 AM, JV69badatflyski said:

production number tells you just one thing: are there enough available airframes to  create an airforce and to compensate the losses.
You need pilots, without them those planes doesn't fly.
If you look at the spit production, you see that most of the airframes , after being build at factory, were in delivery for 2months (an average), but there were also airframes not being delivered to any kind of squadron, let it be flightschool or active squadron, just sitting in a delivery pool waiting for whatever will happen, some being just scrapped after the war with no flight time at all. +/-900 spits MK14 built, max assigned planes was something like+/-145 ....remove the losses from the general number and you get like 20% of build airfames were actually used. Production numbers shows only the industrial capacity, nothing more.

 Your source for the maximum number of " +/- 145 Spitfire XIVs" assigned to operational service is..?

 

Spitfire XIV production RBxxx - RNxxx :

RB140 - RB189 = 50 airframes = 47 operational on ADGB & 2 TAF squadrons http://www.airhistory.org.uk/spitfire/p095.html

RM615 - RM625 = 11 airframes = 11 operational ADGB/2TAF

RM648 - RM887 = 239 airframes = 162 operational ADGB mostly 2 TAF http://www.airhistory.org.uk/spitfire/p096.html

thus, between RB140 & RM887 there were  220 Spitfire XIVs "assigned" to operational, frontline units of the ADGB & 2 TAF...

 

I could continue counting, but can't be bothered, because your guesstimate of "assigned" Spitfire XIVs is already way too low: see also http://www.airhistory.org.uk/spitfire/p097.html

NH653 - NH720 series = http://www.airhistory.org.uk/spitfire/p080.html

 

On 12/7/2018 at 11:34 PM, JV69badatflyski said:

Yes milo, but you have to add 58 FR's  +11 E's +1 FRE to get the total of all MK14 versions all together, the number i gave are for the MK-14 "standard" only.

Discounting the Es, and F.Rs plus the so-called "FRE" is dishonest, because the F.R variants in 2 TAF service engaged in air-air combat and scored several kills, while the F Mk XIVEs also saw combat in the time they were in operational service.

 

On 12/7/2018 at 5:53 AM, JV69badatflyski said:

So , yes there was a 20/25% loss ratio compared to production numbers for the MK14

The majority of F & F.R Mk XIVs lost on operations were due to causes other than fighter combat.

 

 

[JV69badatflyski]

Hello, 
So...here we go again...
I think you missed the part where i wrote "on the 10th may45 for the MK14 (not E/FR/FRE)" for whom i added the numbers in the next answer to Milo.
My source is the same as yours, the difference is that i put each airframe on a time line and categorized it.
You really think an airframe once delivered to operationnal unit was actually continually used?
You have to take the picture on a certain date and not making genaralizations that once active, it's active until the 8th may45...

My data looks like that: 10 days periods for each airframe, still working on it between tasks at work to get more precise info:
Here is your RB140-189 series you took as example, just a snippet. so, were all airframes operational at the same time???
Once done the file will be made available for everyone.
 

[Bremspropeller]

On 1/17/2018 at 11:45 PM, unreasonable said:

The Manrho-Putz book gives establishment, on strength, serviceable and actually used for all the GAF fighter units actually involved in the BoBd operation at Dec 31st 1944. It is striking how under-strength they were:

 

total authorized   2665   100%

on strength         1446     54%

serviceable          986      37%

flown                    929      35%

 

Just casually read through Werner Girbig's "Start im Morgengrauen" (I think the english version is called "Six months to oblivion") today and came about an important aspect, which isn't mentioned in Manrho/ Pütz:

 

During the last week of December 1944 (starting Dec 23rd) the Luftwaffe lost a total of ~260 pilots (missing, wounded, killed, captured), which is about on par with the losses of Bodenplatte. In general, the final week of December and Bodenplatte should be seen together as the neck-breaking; the final nail in the coffin of the Luftwaffe.

 

 

If you're interested: The book is an older piece of work, but Girbig has been strong in the work of finding missing german fighter-pilots. The book covers Bodenplatte heavily, too.

 

[MiloMorai]

Yes Brem that is the English title.

[LukeFF]

3 hours ago, MiloMorai said:

Yes Brem that is the English title.

 

Yes, and it's a very good book. 

[Bremspropeller]

The number of 260 is actually just for December 23 to 27.

 

Girbig gives the following numbers for the whole of December '44:

- 500 pilots KIA/MIA

- 35 pilots POW

- 194 pilots wounded

 

I think this pretty much illustrates why the units were below planned strength.

In fact, it's a total catastrophe and exposing the remaining forces to a doubtful endeavour such as Bodenplatte seems even more like a wasteful and completely useless adventure in this light.

 

Edited December 11, 2018 by Bremspropeller

[MiloMorai]

To add to Brem's data,

 

Dec 1 to Dec 16 - 136 fighter pilots failed to return

Dec 19 to Dec 22 - 83 fighter pilots failed to return

Dec 23 to Dec 31 - 316 fighter pilots failed to return.

[sevenless]

16 hours ago, Bremspropeller said:

The number of 260 is actually just for December 23 to 27.

 

Girbig gives the following numbers for the whole of December '44:

- 500 pilots KIA/MIA

- 35 pilots POW

- 194 pilots wounded

 

I think this pretty much illustrates why the units were below planned strength.

In fact, it's a total catastrophe and exposing the remaining forces to a doubtful endeavour such as Bodenplatte seems even more like a wasteful and completely useless adventure in this light.

 

 

They were near finished when Wacht am Rhein started 16th december and after 1st january it was game over.

 

Defending the Reich 1944-45 by Robert Forsyth, Luftwaffe Colours, Vol.5 Sect.3 Jagdwaffe has the following to say at page 252:

 

 

Edited December 12, 2018 by sevenless