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Spitfire IX discussion

HBPencil

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Pail

Pail

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Probably related to how they were employed and circumstances regarding contact.

 

Tempests as interceptors and Spitfires as patrollers and ground attack for example.

HBPencil

HBPencil

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Out of interest, has anyone heard of confirmed use in combat of the No.7 500lb cluster bomb? In March '45 it was tested for use on the IX/XVI and no problems were experienced however I don't know if it was actually officially cleared for use and deployed in combat.

 

Also, as interesting as production and service numbers of the XIV and various 109 models is it's totally irrelevant to this thread, thanks. Perhaps its own dedicated thread would be a good idea.

 

I rather think Clostermann had a considerable experience of flying Spitfires before becoming a Typhoon pilot and I'm not sure his opinion can be lightly brushed aside.  There is indeed a whole raft of memoirs from Spitfire pilots out there but most of the late war ones were just that - Spitfire pilots and nothing else.

 

They didn't get the experience of operationally flying other types.  By early 1945 the majority of spitfire pilots based in France and the low countries spent their time not on fighter sweeps but dropping bombs.

 

Typhoons were deployed to counter low level LW jabo attacks at dawn and dusk against allied vehicle parks, tank laargers, troop concentrations.   The Typhoon had a superior low level performance to the Spitfire IX. 

I wasn't lightly brushing aside his opinion as I certainly wasn't being sarcastic when I said "No doubt Clostermann had good reasons to hold that point of view", however I was balancing his opinion with those of other pilots. Put it this way, if plenty of Spitfire pilots had no problem talking about their frustrations with the Spitfire's range or the advantage the Fw190 had when it appeared on the Channel Front, wouldn't they then be ok with expressing their opinion if they found themselves "hopelessly slow" compared to late war LW fighters? Sure, they didn't often see the LW by that time but it did happen did it not?

 

It's called survivor bias. If you've got an aircraft that is 60-100 km/h slower than the opposition then you're gonna have a hard time, as the Fw-190A3 & 4 demonstrated so devastatingly against the Spitfire in 42.

I'd like some clarification on this please, do you mean Clostermann's opinion was based on survivor bias or those of other pilots who didn't mention feeling "hopelessly slow" in the late war period?

ShamrockOneFive

ShamrockOneFive

Posted
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I once again encourage folks to read Christopher Shores and Christopher Thomas' excellent 2nd TAF series (Vol 1 through 3) that cover the tactical air war including the part that Battle of Bodenplatte will surely cover. The Spitfire IX squadrons are very active throughout 1944 and 1945 in the tactical role flying tactical recon sweeps (fighter sweeps) as well as performing ground attacks against 'no-ball' (V-1 sites), transport and communications infrastructure.

 

The Spitfires don't rarely come across the enemy... They frequently do. Nearly every day of operations recorded you'll see some sort of enemy contact and a Spitfire involved. Much of the time these are the Spitfire IX/XVI squadrons and they seem to be doing ok regarding kills against enemy aircraft.

HBPencil

HBPencil

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I once again encourage folks to read Christopher Shores and Christopher Thomas' excellent 2nd TAF series (Vol 1 through 3) that cover the tactical air war including the part that Battle of Bodenplatte will surely cover. The Spitfire IX squadrons are very active throughout 1944 and 1945 in the tactical role flying tactical recon sweeps (fighter sweeps) as well as performing ground attacks against 'no-ball' (V-1 sites), transport and communications infrastructure.

 

The Spitfires don't rarely come across the enemy... They frequently do. Nearly every day of operations recorded you'll see some sort of enemy contact and a Spitfire involved. Much of the time these are the Spitfire IX/XVI squadrons and they seem to be doing ok regarding kills against enemy aircraft.

That's good to know, thank you.

unreasonable

unreasonable

Posted
Posted

I once again encourage folks to read Christopher Shores and Christopher Thomas' excellent 2nd TAF series (Vol 1 through 3) that cover the tactical air war including the part that Battle of Bodenplatte will surely cover. The Spitfire IX squadrons are very active throughout 1944 and 1945 in the tactical role flying tactical recon sweeps (fighter sweeps) as well as performing ground attacks against 'no-ball' (V-1 sites), transport and communications infrastructure.

 

The Spitfires don't rarely come across the enemy... They frequently do. Nearly every day of operations recorded you'll see some sort of enemy contact and a Spitfire involved. Much of the time these are the Spitfire IX/XVI squadrons and they seem to be doing ok regarding kills against enemy aircraft.

 

I would read it, looks interesting - but it is out of print and unlike Amazon the re-sellers will not deliver internationally. :(

 

As for rarely coming across an enemy [aircraft]  - I would have thought you can only measure that by looking at the ratio of contacts to missions flown, or a similar metric. With 50+ squadrons (not all Spitfires obviously) in 2nd TAF, flying on average at couple of missions per day, weather permitting, one or two contacts a day across the whole force would seem pretty infrequent from the POV of an individual pilot. Need the data to see how many sorties a Spitfire pilot would have to make to see an enemy plane.  But I take your point - there was still enough enemy air opposition that the Spitfires and others had to be prepared to fight.

Trooper117

Trooper117

Posted
Posted

The 2nd Tactical Air Force series of books are an excellent read and source of information, I have all four volumes, and Bodenplatte is covered.

They are large books, lots of photos and colour plates too, I would urge anyone with an interest to try and find them

unreasonable

unreasonable

Posted
Posted (edited)

The 2nd Tactical Air Force series of books are an excellent read and source of information, I have all four volumes, and Bodenplatte is covered.

They are large books, lots of photos and colour plates too, I would urge anyone with an interest to try and find them

 

If I send you my address will you send me your copies? ;)

Edited by unreasonable
unreasonable

unreasonable

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Posted (edited)

 

As I said - only available from Amazon via resellers, none of the ones I tried will deliver internationally. I know how to buy books. This series is out of print.

 

edit: Good paper BTW thanks for link.

Edited by unreasonable
ZachariasX

ZachariasX

Posted
Posted

I'd like some clarification on this please, do you mean Clostermann's opinion was based on survivor bias or those of other pilots who didn't mention feeling "hopelessly slow" in the late war period?

One has to be a bit careful with Clostermanns book. He‘s a great writer, but he was very much in the „fog of war“ when he wrote his diary. It is also of note, that his book is rather poorly translated (especially the German versions) when it comes to technical terms.

 

In the French original it says about the „powerless Spit“:

 

„.... Les avions de reconnaissance alliés et nos chasseurs bombardiers avaient la vie dure. Des formations de Typhoon perdaient parfois trois ou quatre appareils sur douze au cours de rencontres avec les FW-190 et les Me-109. Les Spitfire étaient impuissants. Il n'y avait qu'une escadre de trois groupes de Spitfire XIV, et le reste était équipé de Spitfire IX B ou de Spits XVI (Spits IX B avec moteurs Rolls-Royce construits par Packard aux USA). Tous les groupes de Spits IX opéraient d'ailleurs la plupart du temps comme chasseurs bombardiers. Les boches, connaissant les qualités du Spit en combat tournoyant, évitaient soigneusement de s'accrocher à eux –mais les Spits n'avaient ni la vitesse, ni le rayon d'action nécessaires pour forcer au combat les nouveaux chasseurs allemands. ...“

 

This means the Spitfire IXB (LF) was not able to catch the German fighters, not having neither the speed or the range to force a fight. They could not neutralize German fighter threat. The Germans in turn would not pick fights with them, knowing about the Spit IX‘s qualities in a dogfight.

 

Also he says that most Spit IX LF were operating mostly as fighter-bombers.

 

Clostermann also gives several assessments of the relative qualities of the fighters. And he didn‘t think the Spit XIV could seal-club the competition. Most fights were down on the deck, and this is not where the XIV is dramatically superior. But he did think that an Experte would clearly sealy-club any Allied pilot trying to mess with them, regradless of the plane he flew.

 

A plane is only as good as its pilot. And for someone risking his life every day, the realities definitely influenced his impression about what the Germans could do with their equipment:

 

„... Il est un point sur lequel tous les pilotes de chasse anglais, français ou polonais étaient d'accord : la supériorité évidente des pilotes allemands survivants en 1944 et 1945. Les Américains, à leur habitude, considéraient qu'ils étaient, eux, les meilleurs. Les chiffres hollywoodiens de victoires des P-51 et P-47, et de Messerschmitt abattus par les mitrailleurs des Forteresses Volantes B-17 et B-24, démentiels et ridicules, nous amusaient par leur naïveté –ainsi probablement que la Luftwaffe… Nous comprenions bien que c'était pour la consommation du public aux USA auquel on n'osait donner que des chiffres de pertes très partiels, ce qui les confortait dans la conviction de leur supériorité. ...“

 

Saying basically that all western Allied pilots agreed that the seasoned German pilots were the best out there. It is no help to one personally when the first 4 enemies you come across can hardly fly their aircraft when the fifth will take your life for certain. To their amusement, the Americans thought that they were the best of course and everyone would make fun of the American claims.

 

He also is rather clear about both the Dora and the 109K being able to pull up to a Tempest if the German knew what he was doing and you did something you shouldn‘t have done.

 

Especially in the new edition of his book (that used all of his diary) he is also rather clear about the serious losses they would still have in winter 1945, also due to German fighters. The way 2TAF was operating then, you had the losses distributed in a very uneven way. The Tempests were not so many, especially in regards to the still prevalent number of German fighters. They had a rather fair fight far behind the front lines and together with the losses due to Flak, Wing122 lost up to an entire squadron per month! Clostermann was one of very, very few survivors who outlasted the entire last 4 months of the war.

 

For pilots losing their nerve doing Tempest business, there was a saying „There is always a Typhoon waiting for you.“ And this was meant as a death sentence.

  • Upvote 2
unreasonable

unreasonable

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<snip> 

 

Wing122 lost up to an entire squadron per month! Clostermann was one of very, very few survivors who outlasted the entire last 4 months of the war.

 

For pilots losing their nerve doing Tempest business, there was a saying „There is always a Typhoon waiting for you.“ And this was meant as a death sentence.

 

Since 122 Wing had 5 Tempest squadrons (as at 1st Jan)  this is "only" 20% over a month. How many missions might be flown - what with weather etc? No doubt someone knows, but suppose we guess an average of one every other day for each aircraft, so 15 per plane,  then the daily loss rate is "only' about 1.5%.   (Since there is always one, +(1-0.015)^15 = 0.80)     In MP people would not even notice it.  ;)

 

I can well believe that flying Typhoons was considerably more dangerous, due to the constant exposure to ground fire.  I seem to recall a magazine article about Typhoons in Normandy with a staff officer commenting that the Typhoon Squadrons had by far the most dangerous job anyone was asked to do - worse than Bomber Command, but I cannot find it now. The other relevant fact is how the "tours" were arranged in 2nd TAF. Again I recall the article saying that the Typhoon pilots had fairly short tours based on sorties rather than flying hours, (something like 20-30 sorties comes to mind) but I do not know if this was also applied to the Spitfire and Tempest squadrons, who did less close air support and more deeper armed recce work. Edit - obviously flying CAS is not the same as endless patrol or escort work, in terms of the risk per hour.

 

Perhaps someone who has the famed Shores and Thomas books can shed some light on how the tours were organized.

 

Just one other point - even most of the experten got shot down, some several times. They were not supermen.

Edited by unreasonable
Pail

Pail

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Posted

I guess many would have watched Bunyap Sims "Four Months in the Life of a Spitfire IX Wing" series of videos ?

 

I don't know whether they have been mentioned already but they are worth looking at. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLoiMNu5jyFzRrxo412cswZ2TFtedKfTE3

 

"This is a research session that follows the 144 Wing, RCAF through four months in Normandy. Missions are examined day by day using unit records and first hand accounts."

ZachariasX

ZachariasX

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Posted

Just one other point - even most of the experten got shot down, some several times. They were not supermen.

 

Sure, they were not. They were shot down, like Konrad Bauer (~80 victories, >30 B-17/24). He had some exciting long minutes alone in his Fw190D with seven Mustangs. He shot down three of them before he was shot down, getting shot in the arm and losing two fingers. He stat himself in the next train like that to go back to Nordhausen.

 

So, yes, they were shot down. But If an allied pilot tried to catch them in a fair fight, the outcome was almost certain. Or certain enough for experienced allied pilotes not to pick a fight with them if they had the choice (as the Experten could be readily identified in their way of flying) or unless one had a whole squadron behind oneself.

 

It sure would be good having more detailed numbers on squadron strenghts. But one has to keep in mind, that it was way more difficult getting Tempest squadrons ready than and other squadron. On one side, it was for plane production that was stalled due to a strike at Hawker's. Over New Year, there were very few produced. The other issue is that only pilots that had a full tour of duty under their belt were eligible for Tempests.

 

That Lieutenant Clostermann became (acting, temporary and unpaid) "Wing Commander flying"is just illustring that point, losses were such that there were hardly any pilots with a lot of hours on Tempests. The first Wing Commander of 122 was the famous Beamont. He brought the Tempests on the continent (where they got converted to 130 octane fuel). He was shot down (survived and captured) and his replacement was Brooker. Brooker was shot down by Fw190 while shooting up locomotives. To the horror of his flight members watching him, he couldn't open the canopy of his burning aircraft. Nobody ever saw those 190's until a second of the four Tempests was downed. 2 out of 4 Tempests returned that evening. No more than 4 could be made servicable for the whole wing that day. Next was "Jim" K. F. Thiele. He was shot down by Flak soon after doing train business. This all in about 4 month time.

 

By Feb. 28th, 274 Sqadron lost half its operational strenght and was withdrawn to the continent to reform it. They often suffered losses that were not sustainable. When Clostermann met Brooker after arriving, Brooker told him that "he shouldn't listen to what pilots said", as the morale was low due to losses and weather.

 

No Spitfire unit had such a dire situation. With the Typhoons, it wa just better in the sense that they could resupply the constant bloodshed. For the Spitfires, things looked better, as Flak was the only opponent that actively sought confrontation. In the case of Johnnie Johnson, he had most enemy contact over Normandy, flying Spit IX LF. After conversion to Spit XIV in Holland, he didn't come across a single German.

  • Upvote 1
unreasonable

unreasonable

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Posted

Sure, they were not. They were shot down, like Konrad Bauer (~80 victories, >30 B-17/24). He had some exciting long minutes alone in his Fw190D with seven Mustangs. He shot down three of them before he was shot down, getting shot in the arm and losing two fingers. He stat himself in the next train like that to go back to Nordhausen.

 

So, yes, they were shot down. But If an allied pilot tried to catch them in a fair fight, the outcome was almost certain. Or certain enough for experienced allied pilotes not to pick a fight with them if they had the choice (as the Experten could be readily identified in their way of flying) or unless one had a whole squadron behind oneself.

 

It sure would be good having more detailed numbers on squadron strenghts. But one has to keep in mind, that it was way more difficult getting Tempest squadrons ready than and other squadron. On one side, it was for plane production that was stalled due to a strike at Hawker's. Over New Year, there were very few produced. The other issue is that only pilots that had a full tour of duty under their belt were eligible for Tempests.

 

That Lieutenant Clostermann became (acting, temporary and unpaid) "Wing Commander flying"is just illustring that point, losses were such that there were hardly any pilots with a lot of hours on Tempests. The first Wing Commander of 122 was the famous Beamont. He brought the Tempests on the continent (where they got converted to 130 octane fuel). He was shot down (survived and captured) and his replacement was Brooker. Brooker was shot down by Fw190 while shooting up locomotives. To the horror of his flight members watching him, he couldn't open the canopy of his burning aircraft. Nobody ever saw those 190's until a second of the four Tempests was downed. 2 out of 4 Tempests returned that evening. No more than 4 could be made servicable for the whole wing that day. Next was "Jim" K. F. Thiele. He was shot down by Flak soon after doing train business. This all in about 4 month time.

 

By Feb. 28th, 274 Sqadron lost half its operational strenght and was withdrawn to the continent to reform it. They often suffered losses that were not sustainable. When Clostermann met Brooker after arriving, Brooker told him that "he shouldn't listen to what pilots said", as the morale was low due to losses and weather.

 

No Spitfire unit had such a dire situation. With the Typhoons, it wa just better in the sense that they could resupply the constant bloodshed. For the Spitfires, things looked better, as Flak was the only opponent that actively sought confrontation. In the case of Johnnie Johnson, he had most enemy contact over Normandy, flying Spit IX LF. After conversion to Spit XIV in Holland, he didn't come across a single German.

 

 I must say that reading a little of Chris Thomas' book "Tempest Squadrons of the RAF" available as a sample gives a rather different impression. (Just bought it - now a long wait :( to get a clearer picture). 

 

According to that,  not only did Tempest patrols (generally 6 aircraft?) attack much larger formations of German fighters on occasion, rather than shying away from "experten", but there was no real pilot shortage, since the UK was swarming with fighter pilots who had completed one operational tour and were looking for another one.  I fully accept that Tempest losses were much higher than Spitfire losses at that time: but I wonder if the losses were particularly high compared to other periods when RAF squadrons sustained a high tempo of operations against determined opposition: Battle of France, BoB, North Africa etc.  Hard to say without data. 

 

Losses may be "unsustainable" due to the specific and very unusual shortage of Tempest replacement aircraft: but I doubt it was for lack of pilots.  I can also imagine that losses would be harder to take knowing that the war was all but won: but that is no different from the situation faced by tank crews and infantry platoon commanders who kept on being killed in considerable numbers right up to the end. BTW - in British Forces almost all war time command posts were filled by people with temporary, acting rank.  (Although they were usually paid - I hope).

 

Experten were pretty thin on the ground after Bodenplatte anyway - since no less than 22 staffel, gruppe or JG commanders were killed or POW during the BoBo operation.

ZachariasX

ZachariasX

Posted
Posted

I must say that reading a little of Chris Thomas' book "Tempest Squadrons of the RAF" available as a sample gives a rather different impression. (Just bought it - now a long wait :( to get a clearer picture). 

 

According to that,  not only did Tempest patrols (generally 6 aircraft?) attack much larger formations of German fighters on occasion, rather than shying away from "experten", but there was no real pilot shortage, since the UK was swarming with fighter pilots who had completed one operational tour and were looking for another one.  I fully accept that Tempest losses were much higher than Spitfire losses at that time: but I wonder if the losses were particularly high compared to other periods when RAF squadrons sustained a high tempo of operations against determined opposition: Battle of France, BoB, North Africa etc.  Hard to say without data. 

 

Losses may be "unsustainable" due to the specific and very unusual shortage of Tempest replacement aircraft: but I doubt it was for lack of pilots.  I can also imagine that losses would be harder to take knowing that the war was all but won: but that is no different from the situation faced by tank crews and infantry platoon commanders who kept on being killed in considerable numbers right up to the end. BTW - in British Forces almost all war time command posts were filled by people with temporary, acting rank.  (Although they were usually paid - I hope).

 

Experten were pretty thin on the ground after Bodenplatte anyway - since no less than 22 staffel, gruppe or JG commanders were killed or POW during the BoBo operation.

Is the book good then? I guess I have to order myself a copy too.

 

Two points about what I wrote above I want to clarify.

 

First, the issue about not having enough Tempests/pilots. They could issue enough of those (at least most of the time) to field the few Tempest squadrons. The issue is, there should have been much more of those Tempests by the end of 1944. Without them, the Gremans could have roamed alomost at leisure father behind the front in northern Germany. The Americans covered the southern part rather well. All the Brits managed were two, three squadrons, and they took most of the offensive air war. That is less than 24 aircraft at the time! And took the beating for it. Spitfires were employed in a tactical manner. Typhoons had the range, but it s not the weapon of choice against moder fighters. It is ridiculous that such few aircraft were responsible for so much. But they did their job.

 

Second, about „not messing with experten“. This is Clostermann speaking, a pilot from the top bracket of allied pilots. He could tell how an enemy from looking at him. The fresh pilots just saw aircraft. And died not knowing what they were up to. There is some self preservance in pilots. Also in the Experten. Every time they would take off, they‘d see the sky full of allied aircraft. Their art was in picking the right fights. It is no good getting in a situation where you die, even if you might take one or two with you. You want to take one and be able to do so the next day. Not engaging stupid odds was daily routine for them.

Johnnie Johnson put it in different words. The day his friend Wally McLeod got shot down by Siegfried Freytag, Johnnie saw the German flight leader pulling away when they bounced the 109 and called Wally out on the radio, warning him the leader „being an old fox“. Johnson himself being one of the best flight leader of the war clearly had an eye as well for what he was up against and acted accordingly. Wally pressed the fight on and that time he was in bad luck. Over Dieppe in 42, Johnson used the Flak of a destroyer (that was also shooting at him) to make him less attractive for that FockeWulf he was certain would have him if the fight went on. Discretion is sometimes the better part of valor.

Pail

Pail

Posted
Posted

Don't forget Rene Mouchotte http://yorkshireairmuseum.org/journal/commandant-rene-mouchotte-raf-dfc-cdg-1914-1943/

 

The RAF's French Foreign Legion: De Gaulle, the British and the Re-emergence ... https://books.google.com.au/books?id=rlhOD1V1jVsC&pg=PA123&lpg=PA123&dq=clostermann+and+death&source=bl&ots=l2O6ML5TRV&sig=HCFbiw9MzmzxGbtq6turgsHePgE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiSot7ot6jZAhWDJZQKHcZeDNkQ6AEItwEwFA#v=onepage&q=clostermann%20and%20death&f=false

 

 

 

That Lieutenant Clostermann became (acting, temporary and unpaid) "Wing Commander flying"is just illustring that point, losses were such that there were hardly any pilots with a lot of hours on Tempests.

 

Maybe it was because no one wanted him as a wingman ? I seem to remember he was involved in another flight of early Tempests where only he returned ? I'm a bit vague on it now but I think there were a few complaints about him from various people.

ZachariasX

ZachariasX

Posted
Posted (edited)

Don't forget Rene Mouchotte http://yorkshireairmuseum.org/journal/commandant-rene-mouchotte-raf-dfc-cdg-1914-1943/

 

 

The RAF's French Foreign Legion: De Gaulle, the British and the Re-emergence ...

 

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=rlhOD1V1jVsC&pg=PA123&lpg=PA123&dq=clostermann+and+death&source=bl&ots=l2O6ML5TRV&sig=HCFbiw9MzmzxGbtq6turgsHePgE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiSot7ot6jZAhWDJZQKHcZeDNkQ6AEItwEwFA#v=onepage&q=clostermann%20and%20death&f=false

 

 

 

Maybe it was because no one wanted him as a wingman ? I seem to remember he was involved in another flight of early Tempests where only he returned ? I'm a bit vague on it now but I think there were a few complaints about him from various people.

His contoversy about his way of geing wingman came from his early flights with the free French. He once lost contact in a fight with his leader Martell, and that one got some holes in his Spit then. Later, he was wingman of Renee Mouchotte during that ones last flight and Clostermann lost contact with him in a fight. Muchotte however was not shot down, he must have passed out to fatigue because of his lng service. Muchotte was found dead rather far from where the combat took place. The rest of the Squadron however let Clostermann feel it was his fault. Consequently, he requested transfer to 602 Squadron, where lifetime friend Jaques Remlinger was posted. Until Summer 1944 they mostly flew missions together, even changing lead sometimes in flight.

 

By the time he was sent to a Tempest unit (274), he was leader anyway and it was not up to the rookies to pick him as leader or not. Besides, the culling among the Free French from 1940 to 1945 was a staggering 99%. By the time he flew Tempest, none of the people involved in the affair Muchotte were near aircraft anymore. DeGaule himself banned Clostermann from joining active units and it took lots of massaging from Clostermann to get his go. It was fair to say he was a very well know character compared to other pilots also due his abilitis in langauges and to get some more money he used to write articles for newspapers, also Brazilian ones (he was born there after all).

 

Most losses flying Tempests were due to flak. To kill pilos, a flight leader had to order his wingmen in bad situations. In contrast to Fairbanks (who also always found a wingman), Clostermann wouldn‘t go vulching as a hobby, but only if specifically tasked. It is the trailing aircraft in such business that were the bitter bitten. An an ordered attack on Schwerin, where anti Flak Typhoons didn‘t show up resulted in (edit) 6 losses out of 8 aircraft. Just he and Bay Adams survived. Unknown to them, just before Himmler arrived at that airport with his personal plane plus 3 extra Flak batallions. There were times where the word „Flak“ was forbidden in the mess.

 

Also, while being Wing Commander flying, he was indeed flying regularly. So that certainly was no move away from unwelcoming wingmen.

Edited by ZachariasX
Pail

Pail

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Posted

Thanks for that explanation ZachariasX it sounds like you know the story well.

Stryker07

Stryker07

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replying about Konrad Bauer, Luftwaffe.ce has his fight downing 3 Mustangs and then being downed himself on September 11, 1944 in Fw-190A8 W.Nr. 681 469 "Red 21", not in a D9. Incidentally that's my birthday 39 years later.  

  • Upvote 1
Wulf

Wulf

Posted
Posted

 

I can well believe that flying Typhoons was considerably more dangerous, due to the constant exposure to ground fire.  I seem to recall a magazine article about Typhoons in Normandy with a staff officer commenting that the Typhoon Squadrons had by far the most dangerous job anyone was asked to do - worse than Bomber Command,

 

 

Sure, in the latter stages of '44 and early '45, when the LW fighter force was at such a low ebb that Bomber Command was able to recommence daylight operations over the Continent.  But from 1939 through to D Day, the air war over the Continent, and over Germany in particular, was an entirely different kettle of fish. 

MiloMorai

MiloMorai

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Posted

There wasn't a shortage of Tempest pilots.

 

1-5-44

53 pilots for 24 a/c

 

1-9-44

125 pilots for 87 a/c

 

4-1-45

94 pilots for 60 a/c

 

26-4-45

135 pilots for 95 a/c

unreasonable

unreasonable

Posted
Posted

Someone might have mentioned it before, but since we are discussing teh Spitfire IX which was by the BoBo used mostly as a fighter bomber, I cannot recommend too highly "Air Power at the Battlefront" Ian Gooderson. I got a copy from Amazon - still in print.

 

Written by an specialist rather than a journalist, generalist historian or ex-pilot with books to sell and an axe to grind, it covers the history, organization, weapons and tactics of both UK and US uses of air support for ground troops, with special focus on the results of contemporary quantitative Operations Research.  

 

I am not going to give a synopsis of conclusions: the sort of person who collects tactical information as well as aircraft Pilots' Notes and manuals would find it a very useful addition to their library. 

ZachariasX

ZachariasX

Posted
Posted

There wasn't a shortage of Tempest pilots.

 

1-5-44

53 pilots for 24 a/c

 

1-9-44

125 pilots for 87 a/c

 

4-1-45

94 pilots for 60 a/c

 

26-4-45

135 pilots for 95 a/c

And how „old“ did they get on average?

NZTyphoon

NZTyphoon

Posted
Posted

Sure, they were not. They were shot down, like Konrad Bauer (~80 victories, >30 B-17/24). He had some exciting long minutes alone in his Fw190D with seven Mustangs. He shot down three of them before he was shot down, getting shot in the arm and losing two fingers. He stat himself in the next train like that to go back to Nordhausen.

 

So, yes, they were shot down. But If an allied pilot tried to catch them in a fair fight, the outcome was almost certain. Or certain enough for experienced allied pilotes not to pick a fight with them if they had the choice (as the Experten could be readily identified in their way of flying) or unless one had a whole squadron behind oneself.

 

It sure would be good having more detailed numbers on squadron strenghts. But one has to keep in mind, that it was way more difficult getting Tempest squadrons ready than and other squadron. On one side, it was for plane production that was stalled due to a strike at Hawker's. Over New Year, there were very few produced. The other issue is that only pilots that had a full tour of duty under their belt were eligible for Tempests.

 

That Lieutenant Clostermann became (acting, temporary and unpaid) "Wing Commander flying"is just illustring that point, losses were such that there were hardly any pilots with a lot of hours on Tempests. The first Wing Commander of 122 was the famous Beamont. He brought the Tempests on the continent (where they got converted to 130 octane fuel). He was shot down (survived and captured) and his replacement was Brooker. Brooker was shot down by Fw190 while shooting up locomotives. To the horror of his flight members watching him, he couldn't open the canopy of his burning aircraft. Nobody ever saw those 190's until a second of the four Tempests was downed. 2 out of 4 Tempests returned that evening. No more than 4 could be made servicable for the whole wing that day. Next was "Jim" K. F. Thiele. He was shot down by Flak soon after doing train business. This all in about 4 month time.

 

By Feb. 28th, 274 Sqadron lost half its operational strenght and was withdrawn to the continent to reform it. They often suffered losses that were not sustainable. When Clostermann met Brooker after arriving, Brooker told him that "he shouldn't listen to what pilots said", as the morale was low due to losses and weather.

 

No Spitfire unit had such a dire situation. With the Typhoons, it wa just better in the sense that they could resupply the constant bloodshed. For the Spitfires, things looked better, as Flak was the only opponent that actively sought confrontation. In the case of Johnnie Johnson, he had most enemy contact over Normandy, flying Spit IX LF. After conversion to Spit XIV in Holland, he didn't come across a single German.

Relying on Clostermann's book as an unimpeachable source of information is fraught with pitfalls. Just to take the example of Clostermann's account of what happened to Wing Commander Brooker, who went MIA on April 16 1945: Brooker was leading 6 Tempests of 80 Sqn on an armed reconnaissance patrol, when they encountered 3 Fw 190s.

As they were chasing these, the Tempests were bounced by 4 or 5 more Fw 190s: they were seen as they attacked the Tempests, and two of them were shot down.

In return 2 Tempests, flown by Brooker and a Sgt Turner went missing, albeit an R/T call was heard from Turner, stating that his engine was cutting out. None of the pilots saw anything of what happened to Brooker, and it is certain that they didn't "look on in horror as he struggled to open the canopy of his burning Tempest"; that bit is just pure fantasy by Clostermann

The claim that a mere 4 Tempests of 122 Wing were serviceable next day (April 17) is also a fantasy, because on 17 April 80 Sqn. alone were able to send out 9 Tempests on an early morning operation. (For Brooker and 122 Wing serviceability, see 80 Sqn ORB pages April 1945)

 

post-868-0-63858400-1519292614_thumb.jpgpost-868-0-34169800-1519292642_thumb.jpg

 

post-868-0-12439800-1519292679_thumb.jpg post-868-0-83398800-1519293364_thumb.jpg

 

Other points of note:

Only pilots that had a full tour of duty were allowed to fly Tempests is also nonsense: what is true is that all pilots, new or experienced, received a thorough training before they became operational on any 2 TAF fighter squadron.

Clostermann did not become a temporary, unpaid wing leader of 122 Wing, because Wg Cdr. Evan Mackie took over command of 122 Wing the day after Brooker went MIA.

Jim Thiele was not "next" after Brooker, because New Zealander Jim Thiele was 3 Sqn's Squadron leader, who was shot down and became a POW on 10 February 1945, over two months before Brooker went MIA.

At no point did 274 Sqn lose half its operational strength, such that it was withdrawn to anywhere: 274 Sqn was, however, moved from 122 Wing to 135 Wing on 17 March 1945, meaning that it was non operational for two days at most. I have the 274 Sqn summary of events February and March 1945, as evidence.

 

So, no, the the 2 TAF Tempest units were not in such dire straits as Clostermann claimed, albeit they did experience some tough times.

Please read other sources, such as Chris Thomas' Tempest Squadrons of the RAF Chris Thomas and Christopher Shores' Typhoon and Tempest Story or Shores and Thomas' 2nd Tactical Air Force: Vol 3 before taking Clostermann's accounts as gospel: in addition, many unit Operational Records can be found at, and downloaded as pdf files from the UK's National Archives, Kew

 

  • Upvote 1
EAF19_Marsh

EAF19_Marsh

Posted
Posted (edited)

NZTyphoon is 100% correct, The Big Show is a fantastic read in many sense of the word. I spend a while in 2nd TAF book looking for the airfield attack where Clostermann lost 6 out of 8 a/c in 30 second but oddly it never seemed to happen. Also, Jim Sheddan never noticed his would-be French 'Wing Co' when he was leading 486....

 

122 Wing was pushed hard took losses and the Napier-Sabre never achieved a very good standard of serviceability cf. contemporary engines, but Clostermann is in fantasy land as regards most of his accounts.

Edited by EAF19_Marsh
  • Upvote 1
ZachariasX

ZachariasX

Posted
Posted

Relying on Clostermann's book as an unimpeachable source of information is fraught with pitfalls. Just to take the example of Clostermann's account of what happened to Wing Commander Brooker, who went MIA on April 16 1945: Brooker was leading 6 Tempests of 80 Sqn on an armed reconnaissance patrol, when they encountered 3 Fw 190s.

As they were chasing these, the Tempests were bounced by 4 or 5 more Fw 190s: they were seen as they attacked the Tempests, and two of them were shot down.

In return 2 Tempests, flown by Brooker and a Sgt Turner went missing, albeit an R/T call was heard from Turner, stating that his engine was cutting out. None of the pilots saw anything of what happened to Brooker, and it is certain that they didn't "look on in horror as he struggled to open the canopy of his burning Tempest"; that bit is just pure fantasy by Clostermann

The claim that a mere 4 Tempests of 122 Wing were serviceable next day (April 17) is also a fantasy, because on 17 April 80 Sqn. alone were able to send out 9 Tempests on an early morning operation. (For Brooker and 122 Wing serviceability, see 80 Sqn ORB pages April 1945)

 

attachicon.gif2nd Tactical Air Force Vol 3107a.jpgattachicon.gif2nd Tactical Air Force Vol 3108a.jpg

 

attachicon.gif80 Sqn Record of Events Apr 194511.jpg attachicon.gif80 Sqn Record of Events Apr 194512.jpg

 

Other points of note:

Only pilots that had a full tour of duty were allowed to fly Tempests is also nonsense: what is true is that all pilots, new or experienced, received a thorough training before they became operational on any 2 TAF fighter squadron.

Clostermann did not become a temporary, unpaid wing leader of 122 Wing, because Wg Cdr. Evan Mackie took over command of 122 Wing the day after Brooker went MIA.

Jim Thiele was not "next" after Brooker, because New Zealander Jim Thiele was 3 Sqn's Squadron leader, who was shot down and became a POW on 10 February 1945, over two months before Brooker went MIA.

At no point did 274 Sqn lose half its operational strength, such that it was withdrawn to anywhere: 274 Sqn was, however, moved from 122 Wing to 135 Wing on 17 March 1945, meaning that it was non operational for two days at most. I have the 274 Sqn summary of events February and March 1945, as evidence.

 

So, no, the the 2 TAF Tempest units were not in such dire straits as Clostermann claimed, albeit they did experience some tough times.

Please read other sources, such as Chris Thomas' Tempest Squadrons of the RAF Chris Thomas and Christopher Shores' Typhoon and Tempest Story or Shores and Thomas' 2nd Tactical Air Force: Vol 3 before taking Clostermann's accounts as gospel: in addition, many unit Operational Records can be found at, and downloaded as pdf files from the UK's National Archives, Kew

 

Nothing is impeachable, certainly not in such a forum. It shouldn‘t be. Any good references are and shoukd always be appreciated.

 

Of not is the comment on Brooker that the exerpt you posted does not technically contradict Clostermanns yarn in principle. It is obvious that he was very much in the fog of war when he wrote his account (a diary that was written down at the tome he was flying PLUS he was a well known man of „great stories“, something that does and did not imply that he personally liked to make things up). Hence all his „data“ on issues beyond his personal flight is to be cross checked anyway, as with any other personal account. Like Galland in his book where it is very obvious that he had litte idea how you build an aircraft and put it in mass production.

 

For many of the occurrences only relatively recently the required material became availabe. But looking forward for the books mentioned on 2TAF.

ZachariasX

ZachariasX

Posted
Posted

BTW, about Clostermann becoming a temporary, unpaid wing leader of 122 Wing. He was the most experienced pilot at that time and he was (still having a rank of lieutenant; in Paris they still were more busy un-loosing their war than botheting with the promotion of someone else) just used as a stand-in for Evan Mackie. He was rather clear about it just being the British sense for humor and fair play that they put him there and tolerated him in this de facto position. But as it was, you will not find him in the roster as Wing Commander.

 

This was the main problem the wing faced with the attrition. It lacked the experienced personel and it often required pilots faster than they could be promoted to their operative positions.

 

When looking at rosters, one has to be careful how much they actually followed up present realities. Same as first hand accounts, ledgers and rosters have their own „preferences“ in depicting realities.

 

But again, nothing that would not escape the ardent forists eye. ;)

 

 

 

I‘m still looking for the books on 2TAF by Thomas/Shore, but again the „out of print“ issues...

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