Bf-110/Wildcat: "Bad" Fighters or Poor (Pre-War-ish) Tactics?

[Gambit21]

With respect, I understand it's purpose and use perfectly - I have for a number of decades now...it's a defensive maneuver. I don't argue that it has it's utility.
I don't need to read pg 211 at this point. Again it works fine so long as things go exactly your way when you set it up and the Zero (or other enemy pilot) cooperates with it.

 

When PTO gets here you and one buddy grab Wildcats, I'll take a single Zeke. You guys Thach Weave till you're heart's content  and we'll see how things shake out. 

Then we'll go 2 on 2 and see again. 

All in good fun of course.

[busdriver]

Respectfully, it's NOT simply a defensive maneuver when one good guy takes a high aspect (face shot) against the bandit. Nor is it as you described, a last ditch maneuver. A guns jink is a last ditch maneuver.

 

The IJNAF didn't fight as a two ship. They were originally a three ship...without the benefit of radios or team speak. Mutual support for them depended upon familiarity and months of flying together, but often their flight integrity dissolved into 1-v-X (samurai mindset and all that). I honestly don't know what you flew, but I was trained that what might be defensive one moment can easily become counter-offensive. Tactics evolve.

 

I accept that you understand and have decades of this understanding, but even you must admit (if only to yourself) that you made a statement of factual error dismissing the efficacy and purpose.

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

No, he did not. In a way Thach Weave or Beam Defense Manuever as it was also called (or simply "weaving"). That was a defensive maneuver, it required a pair to commit into a form of protective scissors with an attempt to bring an attacker into firing position for the wingmen. Yes, it could be effective. If enemy pilot did not recognize it or was foolish enough to follow, but like with all kinds of scissors all you gotta do is not to follow and go up. 

It's a defensive maneuver also in a way such as it requires pair to focus their attention only on themselves and attacker, while whatever else actions are happening around are of lesser importance. In regard to Thach himself, that maneuver allowed him and most of his flight to survive repeated attacks by Zeros during their escort mission, but it came at a price - Wildcats were forced to concentrate on self defense and provided little to no help to bombers, particularly TBD torpedo bombers that were decimated. 

 

Secondly, the 1942 tactics of fighter formations was not that entirely different for Japanese and Americans. Whiles US did apply a four men formation, Japanese three men was vastly different from British or Soviet Vic, since it was flexible and loose, based on experiences gained in China. Japanese also did have radios. 

I'm not sure what you mean about their flight integrity, but usual integrity of shotai was quite good. 

[Gambit21]

you made a statement of factual error dismissing the efficacy and purpose.

I think Hiro about covered it...and I'll follow up with you regarding our 'appointment' when Midway gets here. Edited May 14, 2017 by Gambit21

[busdriver]

No, he did not. In a way Thach Weave or Beam Defense Manuever as it was also called (or simply "weaving"). That was a defensive maneuver, it required a pair to commit into a form of protective scissors with an attempt to bring an attacker into firing position for the wingmen. Yes, it could be effective. If enemy pilot did not recognize it or was foolish enough to follow, but like with all kinds of scissors all you gotta do is not to follow and go up. 

It's a defensive maneuver also in a way such as it requires pair to focus their attention only on themselves and attacker, while whatever else actions are happening around are of lesser importance. In regard to Thach himself, that maneuver allowed him and most of his flight to survive repeated attacks by Zeros during their escort mission, but it came at a price - Wildcats were forced to concentrate on self defense and provided little to no help to bombers, particularly TBD torpedo bombers that were decimated. 

 

Secondly, the 1942 tactics of fighter formations was not that entirely different for Japanese and Americans. Whiles US did apply a four men formation, Japanese three men was vastly different from British or Soviet Vic, since it was flexible and loose, based on experiences gained in China. Japanese also did have radios. 

I'm not sure what you mean about their flight integrity, but usual integrity of shotai was quite good. 

Where to begin? As I tried but clearly failed to communicate when I  typed..."it is NOT simply a defensive maneuver." As in, we can weave even when we are not being shot at. The maneuver can be performed simply to check the formation's six...it can be a DEFENSIVE reaction by 1 of the pair while the other (free) fighter is OFFENSIVE...it could be DEFENSIVE for both.

 

Having actually flown a RL more modern equivalent, I double down and repeat it is NOT a last ditch maneuver. (This is specifically the error IMO Gambit21 has made.) It might BE the last ditch effort of somebody caught unaware, but as a tactic it would and could be employed prior to the bandit squeezing the trigger. Last ditch maneuver to this former RL fighter pilot means bullets on their way toward my pink little body. Seriously...we used the expression "last ditch maneuver" for guns jinking/defense not weaving/counter flowing. I don't recall any WWII literature using that phrase, so I'm going with what modern RL fighter pilots take it to mean. A relatively level turn to drag a bandit to your wingman's high aspect gun shot does not meet that criteria. You and Gambit21 have different opinions I'm sure. The basic patrol formation used by Thatch evolved to the 1000' line abreast, from previous closer/tighter sections & divisions. Tactics evolve. But they didn't wait until they were engaged to weave. That's my point. And just to repeat in case there's somebody that still doesn't understand what I'm trying to say, it's NOT a last ditch maneuver.

 

No disrespect intended to sim pilots, but I don't use common virtual fighter pilot expressions to describe air combat (I don't say B&Z, I say energy or vertical fight. I don't say turn and burn, I say turning fight. I don't say drag and bag, I just say drag. I don't say squad cause that's ground pounders not flyers.) So when folks use phrases that have a specific meaning to RL air combat, they should know what they're saying.

 

[And nothing was going to protect the TBD...] 

 

I recognize the superiority of IJNAF fighter pilots early in the war. Years of combat experience and an awesome airplane will do that for you. Contemporaneous USN pilot reports showed great uncertainty on how to fight the Zero. At least until Koga's Zero was flown.

 

My remark about no radios...my humble error, not sure what outdated source material I was drawing upon.   I was mistaken. (A phrase few posters on this forum use.) Even Koga's airplane had American radio parts. 

 

Gambit21...really? A virtual fighter pilot challenge to prove what exactly while sitting at 1 G in a comfy chair in front of a big screen TV? Every virtual fighter pilot online can kick my virtual fighter pilot's ass, just ask Requiem (I suck).

[Gambit21]

I get what you're saying...not waiting until engaged to weave etc.

Point taken.

 

However in regards to the end of your post... 1G and comfy chair are neither here nor in this context - this wasn't about ego on my part, not one little bit.

Energy/physics, tactics apply just the same.

 

I maintain that it only works if the bandit plays along, is target fixated, and further allows itself to be dragged in a nice level turn into your sites.

 

Also I think most of us are aware that "BnZ" is the same thing as energy fighting, TnB is a turn fight etc...let's not get lost in the weeds on that one.

Edited May 14, 2017 by Gambit21

[busdriver]

Also I think most of us are aware that "BnZ" is the same thing as energy fighting, TnB is a turn fight etc...let's not get lost in the weeds on that one.

I'm cool with gamers' use of BnZ or TnB. It is afterall a game, not RL. I'm blessed with the RL experience, might as well act and talk like it.

[ZachariasX]

@Gambit

 

I it is not helpful to phrase it "falling victim to Thach weave". It is a maneuver to increase your situation awareness as well as improving your and your wingmans position towards the enemy. Pilots fall victim to not checking their six.

 

It is just one way of denying the opponent a gun solution through positional advantage. The only difference to other such strategies is that you factor in a wingman other than speed and altitude. As the Wildcat couldn't easily provide such, Thach was ingenious enough to come up with another way to ensure positional advantage.

 

Looking at the poor doctrine emplayed by many nations (such as the British for example), formation flying in a way to make the superior rank look good instead of elements that actually work together, it is an impressive evolution.

 

 

@busdriver

 

Also hearing from you how little it is of use to practise air combat on a simulator for real world fighter pilots, I find it apalling that there is absolutely no effort done in armed forces throughout the world to maintain an airfleed consitsing of types that are affordable enough to be bought in sufficient numbers as well as constructed in a way to ensure sufficient uptime to provide adequate training to the aircrews.

 

I wonder how many nations provide something like the 40 hours of combat training a month that would be required to remain an "Experte". What helps is probably most of the competition is down on the level of "oh, where is he now?". Air combat is a perishable skill, as anyone finds out whou hasn't flown for some time and then gets back on WoL.

 

The numbers I have at hand show that an F-16 would allow 36 hours flight time per month, 33 in the case of an F-15. F-22 or F-35 (Should it ever get airborne. Probably right after Stonehenge.) probably half those hours. This means as an airforce with 4th gen fighter planes, you would actually require an about equal number of jets as you have operational pilots. Thus, with stealth fighters you would require twice that number. And what do you get with them in numbers?

 

Selling expensive things with blinkenlights seems to be more attractive to leaders and the industry than having skilled aircrew.

Edited May 14, 2017 by ZachariasX

[Gambit21]

Zacharias, I edited the part of my post that you referre to since I didn't care for how it came off after re-reading.

However I disagree slightly in that you can indeed fall victim to that tactic - and the kill shot doesn't come from your 6 necessarily if it works. It's a matter of overall situational awareness...but then that's probably what you meant.

 

In any case the salient point with me is the matter of the Thach Weave neutralizing the Zekes maneuverability across the board - which it didn't.

[ZachariasX]

Zacharias, I edited the part of my post that you referre to since I didn't care for how it came off after re-reading.

However I disagree slightly in that you can indeed fall victim to that tactic - and the kill shot doesn't come from your 6 necessarily if it works. It's a matter of overall situational awareness...but then that's probably what you meant.

In any case the salient point with me is the matter of the Thach Weave neutralizing the Zekes maneuverability across the board - which it didn't.

That is true indeed. A Wildcat going after a Zeke would still prefer doing so at a high combat speed (or else), Thach or not. But I guess that it is less the maneuvrability that is the true advantage of the Zeke confronting a careful pair of Wildcats, but rather the increased likelyhood that the Zero can choose to engage the fight or not. And it would be wisely only to engage when the pair of Wildcats has done a mistake. Or the Zeke found a friend and they turned the situation by going at both Wildcats at the same time. Must have come to a shock to the Japanese aircrews that they didn't have the time anymore to as usual, outturn the enemy and go for the kill.

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

That is true indeed. A Wildcat going after a Zeke would still prefer doing so at a high combat speed (or else), Thach or not. But I guess that it is less the maneuvrability that is the true advantage of the Zeke confronting a careful pair of Wildcats, but rather the increased likelyhood that the Zero can choose to engage the fight or not. And it would be wisely only to engage when the pair of Wildcats has done a mistake. Or the Zeke found a friend and they turned the situation by going at both Wildcats at the same time. Must have come to a shock to the Japanese aircrews that they didn't have the time anymore to as usual, outturn the enemy and go for the kill.

Actually, I can recommend a fair read about that - John B. Lundstorm "The First Team", both tomes actually. You will be surprised by the fact that Japanese Navy, at least those trained before the war pilots, relied a lot more on energy fighting and hit and run tactics than it is credited to them. This and the way Shotai operated comes from the fact that since mid 1940 Zeros regularly operated over China against I-15s, Hawk IIIs, I-16s and other types of aircraft that were extremely maneuverable but did not have sufficient power to weight ration to carry a vertical combat, hence instead of engaging in a dogfight Japanese would attack from higher altitude in sections (or more shotai after shotai) and extend. In case of emergency a Hineri Komi maneuver could be used which utilized good power to weight ration and low stall speed of a Zero. 

 

Contrary, Wildcat pilots were not always fighting with altitude advantage and exclusively maintaining it. In the Guadacanal campaign (during 1942) Marine units in some cases specifically sought to "dog fight" Zeroes whose quality of pilots they perceived as having declined. One has to remember that Wildcat was probably the most maneuverable of all US fighters at that time, neither P-40, P-39, P-38 or F4U-1 were as good, and thus Wildcat had the best chance to gain on a Zero in some instances. 

 

IJN fighter tactics in 1942 were section, not individual based, and often energy, not turn and burn based. They were not as entirely different from the actual tactics used by the U.S. Navy in 1942 as is often assumed. Later on US tactics became more oriented specifically towards the Japanese (for example widespread of Thach Weave in the USN, though that mainly since mid 1943 and introduction of Hellcat along with a new generation of fighter pilots who were trained by those who draw basics of new tactics when fighting in 1942), as more was learned about them. Later still the Japanese did adopt tactics more exactly like those of the US air arms.

 

@Busdriver

 

Alright, I see your point. No need to get emotional over this. But I think you do not see mine. I am no real life pilot, I do not have experience behind my back. I am a part time historian and I'm speaking from historical perspective, how Thach Weave was created and adopted, specifically in the perspective of Midway battle or few other occasions in 1942 (as mentioned it was not in widespread use in 1942, despite what is publicly thought). That means that your and your buddies interpretation, late war and post war sanctioning in documents, and currently used terminology and nomenclature do not exactly apply to this. 

Regardless, the point is that engaging in this maneuver Thach and rest of his unit saved themselves. But they could not provide any support to the machines they were escorting. And this is the point I'm making, being escort their duty was to protect bombers. 

 

 

Anyway, I think there is a lot more about Wildcat than just a Thach Weave. Thing is it was possibly the best 1942 fighter used in the Pacific by Allies, neither P-40, P-39 or even P-38 could claim similar record - 1:1 against Zeros. 

[BMA_Hellbender]

Superior tactics and armor kept the Wildcats alive. Only the latter is something that we should expect to be modeled correctly in the sim, the rest will be down to pilot skill and sheer numerical superiority. It's highly doubtful that this will be the case in multiplayer, as your average fighter jock will naturally gravitate towards the Zero.

 

I'm greatly looking forward to flying the Wildcat, by far my favourite plane of that theatre of war, but I hold no illusions that you absolutely need a Hellcat or Corsair to be on even footing against the Zeke.

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

But this is the point I am making Hellbender. Tactics were not exactly superior, for 1942 combat they were relatively similar as both sides worked in teams, but once combat broke out and sides got mixed, they tended to act individually, even though for the most part team work was appreciated and primarily exhibited. Armor and fuel tank protection certainly saved more than one Wildcat pilot, though a 20 mm slug hitting even a protected fuel tank would cause ignition. That happened, particularly when round hit from below of the tank.  

 

As long as Zero has 20 mm rounds it should be very lethal to Wildcat, once they are gone though you got to fire plenty of those 7.7 mm rounds (even as some of them were HE rounds). 

 

Also, if experience from Warbirds, Aces High and Pacific Fighters tells me anything I will expect and anticipate the opposite - most of the guys flying right now, Luftwaffe in particular, will jump into Wildcats. 

[wtornado]

100% incorrect.

I suggest you do a bit of reading on Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands campaign for starters.

 

 

I have quite a few WWII magazines I have bought for over 10 years with a

few on Guadalcanal  and the Naval and land battles there.

 

 

Henderson Airfield with 50-to 60 aircraft.

 

With even minimal losses and damage after carrier attacks on the airfields

 

 

Shelled by Battle ships and then assaulted with ground troops later on

and attacked  once again attacked by the Japanese when the field was

heavily re-enforced by Marines.

 

A few U.S Carriers here and there with less than 200 planes.

 

 

The battle of Santa Cruz is worth mentioning.

 

For me personally the USN air Force played their part but it

was the poor Marines that fought the land battles that got

my attention the most.

 

The land island battles were horrific for both sides.

 

Solomon islands you have the Battle of the Coral sea

 

I still say it was about the poor fighting men and the fanatical,ruthless

attacks they had to endure by the Japanese

 

After that when the Japanese lost their 4 carriers at

Midway it was pretty well down hill from there.

 

We did not even mention bitter fighting the fall of the

Philippine islands and the prisoners of war taken.

 

Horrible.

 

It depends how you view all of the Island battles before and after Midway.

Edited May 14, 2017 by WTornado

[busdriver]

@ =LD=Hiromachi

 

Like you, I consider myself a passable air combat historian (not simply a former fighter pilot) having amassed over 400 air combat titles in my library. Your criticism regarding Wildcat pilots inability to defend their escorts was noted. I found nothing to quibble with, so I neither argued or agreed since it was tangential to my point.

 

However, I found the reference about the lack of radios and the breakdown of formation mutual support. It's Samurai by Martin Caidin and Saburo Sakai. I first read it in 1971 (at Clark Air Base on Luzon) again sometime in the 80s. I infer that removing radios was a practice of land based fighters rather than fleet fighters. 

 

Miyazaki was flying some 1,500 feet below the bombers. He was in a fantastic position. Without radio (they had been ripped out to increase our range), I could not call him to return to position, and we dared not leave the bombers unprotected. [edit: Miyazaki is blown out of the sky in the next paragraph. There is also a picture of a Zero with the caption--I flew this zero in 1940. Later we cut off the radio mast and took out the radios to lighten the fighters.]

^{Caiden, Martin. Samurai! [illustrated Edition] (Kindle Locations 1658-1660).}  

 

Later in describing his squadron being transferred to Iwo Jima in June 1944 he mentioned radios again.

 

Maps are notoriously misleading, however, and in the vast reaches of the Pacific the distance between each small outcropping of land can assume terrifying proportions. Without radar, indeed, without even radios in our Zero fighters, we dared not risk the loss of most of our planes.

^{Caiden, Martin. Samurai! [illustrated Edition] (Kindle Locations 3900-3902).} 

 

Sakai described several scenes in 1942 of Zero pilots nearly colliding or shooting each other in an attempt to close for a kill on a single bandit. He also faulted USN Hellcat pilots for doing the same over Iwo Jima two years later. He does make a passing (non-specific) observation about effective USN/USMC weaving counter-attacks while trying to pursue a Wildcat.

 

Our greatest failing in aerial combat lay in the fact that we lacked teamwork, a skill, unfortunately, which the Americans developed so thoroughly as the war went on. Miyazaki’s loss, as well as that of three other Zero pilots shot down early in April, I can attribute only to the inability of our fighter pilots to function as a closely knit team. When encountering enemy fighters, our pilots were more apt to scramble in all directions for a wild free-for-all, one plane against another, much as in the days of World War I. To the Japanese pilots of the late thirties, the most valued quality of a fighter plane was its ability to cut inside an enemy fighter’s turn. Maneuverability was desirable above all other characteristics.

^{Caiden, Martin. Samurai! [illustrated Edition] (Kindle Locations 1676-1682).} 

 

Sakai's book left me with a question though. He wrote that a friend and ace Kenji Okabe was killed in Sep 1943 over Bougainville. But Japanese Naval Fighter Aces by Hata, Izawa & Shores indicate Okabe was assigned to the Shokaku's air group that went to Rabaul in Nov 1943. Then he went back to Japan later the Phillippines and finally back to Japan.

 

 

 @ZacharaisX

 

I am far removed from modern fighter pilots. But the use of simulators for maintaining air-to-air skills has increased exponentially since I last flew the F-16 in 1989. Back in the 80s there was a system at Luke AFB called Tac Aces. The visuals were the first generation video lime green and black. The ground looked like a chess board, flat with green & black squares. The sky was black and the single adversary was a MiG-21 in that bright green. The system linked two F-4 front cockpits (that slid into individual domed screens). Engagements were air starts, 1-v-1. The cutting edge feature back then was the seat cushion and G-suit inflation while pulling Gs. Meaning the seat cushion would deflate (simulating being pushed down by Gs) and your G-suit would inflate harder and harder (so you would strain harder against the pressure as you pulled more Gs). I came out of it soaking wet after 45 minutes.

 

Today pilots in squadrons across the country link up and fly entire missions. It's pretty awesome from what I gather.

[Gambit21]

I have quite a few WWII magazines I have bought for over 10 years with a

few on Guadalcanal and the Naval and land battles there.

Magazines....

I suggest 3 books for starters...I would consider these the defining works as far as veracity of information goes on the Solomons/South Pacific.

 

Fire in the Sky - Eric Bergerud

Guadalcanal - Richard B. Frank

Islands of Destiny - John Prados.

 

That's not even touching New Guinea, just the Solomons.

 

This material should clear up any confusion about things being "one sided" after Pearl Harbor.

That couldn't be further from the truth, and I don't have time to type a page-long post on the situation just after Pearl Harbor.

Suffice to say, things were not as grim as one might think. It was coming, just based on carriers in the pipeline alone, but that impact came later.

For a time both sides kept their carriers out of reach of the other side. If fact there was no carrier action at all basically to speak of between Oct of 1942 and June of 1944.

 

No - after Pearl Harbor, there was a pretty much complete parity in force strength, especially where the Solomons were concerned, and the air war was land based.

In fact this parity of forces is one of the defining aspects of the Guadalcanal campaign, and is what makes it so interesting.

 

Anyway...those books are stellar.

Edited June 6, 2017 by Gambit21

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

It was some of the Japanese Navy land based pilots choice to remove radios, it was never ordered and never sanctioned by military. For the carrier based units it was absolutely mandatory to carry radios since service over seas required not only communication but also vectoring  to carriers. Tainan Ku is relatively famous for removing their radios, other units did so too but not all and not always. A lot has changed when Type 3 Ku 1 radio set was introduced with newer Zeros.

Or to be fair radios were never a problem in Zeros, they were not of bad quality at all. Real reason why they were deemed poor and inadequate was due to not the best wiring and especially quality of insulating, poor isolation gave high static levels which many pilots found so bad that they have decided to remove radios.

 

But Zeros were manufactured with radios and most of them were kept in machines.  

[Bearfoot]

 

 

Islands of Destiny - John Prados

 

Quite a bit off-topic ... but why does Prados keep calling the US crypto attack against the Japanese codes "Ultra" rather than "Magic"? I found it so jarring every time I read "Ultra" when I was sure he meant "magic". Was he mistaken? Being sloppy -- loosely using "Ultra" to refer to all Allied cryptanalysis efforts? Or am I misremembering?

 

Also, as far as histories go, I think that for general overview of the conflict, nothing beats Ian Toll's works (the second volume of which covers the Guadalcanal campaign in superb detail):

 

Pacific Crucible 

 

Conquering Tide

 

I would also consider John Toland's "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire" great for "complete picture" crucial background/antecedents.

[Gambit21]

I can't recall the specifics on the Ultra vs Magic thing Beafoot...

 

Regarding Conquering Tide - haven't read it yet, but on my short list.

Haven't read "The Rising Sun" yet either, I'll add that to my list.

[Wulf]

It was some of the Japanese Navy land based pilots choice to remove radios, it was never ordered and never sanctioned by military. For the carrier based units it was absolutely mandatory to carry radios since service over seas required not only communication but also vectoring  to carriers. Tainan Ku is relatively famous for removing their radios, other units did so too but not all and not always. A lot has changed when Type 3 Ku 1 radio set was introduced with newer Zeros.

Or to be fair radios were never a problem in Zeros, they were not of bad quality at all. Real reason why they were deemed poor and inadequate was due to not the best wiring and especially quality of insulating, poor isolation gave high static levels which many pilots found so bad that they have decided to remove radios.

 

But Zeros were manufactured with radios and most of them were kept in machines.  

 

 

I know very little about the air war in the Pacific, in fact almost nothing.  However, that said, I find the notion that individual Japanese pilots made the decision on whether an aircraft was to have a radio or not totally unlikely.  I don't doubt that radios were removed in some instances but I suspect it had little if anything to do with the wishes of the individual pilots.  When Japanese airmen use words like "we" I suspect they mean  'we the Japanese' not 'we the individual pilots'.  'We the individual pilots' would lead to almost total chaos.

[BlitzPig_EL]

Wulf, the Japanese military, both Army and Navy, were not the hierarchical, top down organizations that we in the west portray them to be.  Certainly a far cry from the German military in WW2.

 

For one they were spread over a vast area, far from their central command structure, if you can even call it that.   There was significant infighting at all levels and between services.

It was common for junior officers to countermand orders from above if they felt the orders were not aggressive enough, for example.

It is not hard to believe that a unit or individual pilot would yank their radios, or elect not to wear parachutes, to gain even a perceived advantage in performance, much like American and Commonwealth units altered the supercharger gearing and boost regulators in their P40s to be able to run them at 72" of manifold, even though it was not a sanctioned modification.

 

Another example is the attempt by junior officers to over throw the Emperor at the end of the war because they did not want to surrender.

[Tomsk]

Superior tactics and armor kept the Wildcats alive. Only the latter is something that we should expect to be modeled correctly in the sim, the rest will be down to pilot skill and sheer numerical superiority. It's highly doubtful that this will be the case in multiplayer, as your average fighter jock will naturally gravitate towards the Zero.

 

I'm greatly looking forward to flying the Wildcat, by far my favourite plane of that theatre of war, but I hold no illusions that you absolutely need a Hellcat or Corsair to be on even footing against the Zeke.

 

As I understand it (and I'm no expert on the Wildcat vs Zero matchup) one key advantage of the Wildcat was a better dive, and even more crucially, better handling at high speeds. If you know how to make use of this it can be a powerful advantage in the defensive. Providing the Wildcat has altitude there's little an attacking Zero can do to prevent the Wildcat from diving straight down and taking the fight into a high-speed regime where the Zero is at a serious disadvantage. The Zero is a very manoeuvrable plane ... but not at 400mph. The Wildcat is also (slightly) faster on the deck, so after gaining separation using the superior dive they can just keep running. It does require quite a lot of discipline though.

 

From what I've read this was more or less the approach the Wildcats ended up taking in reality: if you have an altitude advantage feel free to engage (boom and zoom), the Zero cannot easily dive away. If you don't have an altitude advantage: dive away. If you had an advantage but you've lost it: dive away. If unsure: dive away. As Hiromachi points out, not so great for the bombers you're supposed to be defending ... but better than just being shot down.

 

As for the average fighter jock taking the Zero ... I agree with Hiromachi ...

 

Also, if experience from Warbirds, Aces High and Pacific Fighters tells me anything I will expect and anticipate the opposite - most of the guys flying right now, Luftwaffe in particular, will jump into Wildcats. 

 

This has been my experience also: a lot of Luftwaffe pilots will fly US planes in a US vs Japan scenario. The techniques and tactics needed to be successful in US planes are actually quite similar to the ones needed for the FW, so it tends to attract the same players. I'm an example of that as someone who mostly flies German (especially the FW) and US planes, and a lot of the people I used to fly with were the same. We just liked BnZ style planes, it's how we liked to fight.

Edited June 7, 2017 by Tomsk

[Wulf]

Wulf, the Japanese military, both Army and Navy, were not the hierarchical, top down organizations that we in the west portray them to be.  Certainly a far cry from the German military in WW2.

 

For one they were spread over a vast area, far from their central command structure, if you can even call it that.   There was significant infighting at all levels and between services.

It was common for junior officers to countermand orders from above if they felt the orders were not aggressive enough, for example.

It is not hard to believe that a unit or individual pilot would yank their radios, or elect not to wear parachutes, to gain even a perceived advantage in performance, much like American and Commonwealth units altered the supercharger gearing and boost regulators in their P40s to be able to run them at 72" of manifold, even though it was not a sanctioned modification.

 

Another example is the attempt by junior officers to over throw the Emperor at the end of the war because they did not want to surrender.

 

 

So let's say you have a flight of Zeros and half the pilots unilaterally decide to remove their radios.  They do this because they 'imagine' it might give them an edge in combat - which of course it probably wouldn't.   As a consequence you now have a flight of Zeros that's about half as effective as it might otherwise have been had the decision to remove the radios not been made.  

Are you suggesting that flight and/or squadron commanders, who would have been perfectly aware  of the damaging consequences of such decisions, and who would, by the way, have been held responsible/accountable for the combat effectiveness of the pilots under their command, would have gone along with this insanity?  I find that most unlikely.

 

More likely scenarios IMO 1) an air staff officer somewhere decided it was worth a try and as a consequence an order was given to remove radios in some squadrons on a trial basis and 2) due to supply issues there weren't sufficient radios to go around so a story was concocted that the aircraft were actually better off without them.

 

Remember, this is the military we're talking about, not some sort of fraternal society.  The decision to fit radios would have been made at Air Ministry level after lengthy trials with certain tactical goals in mind. To imagine that those tactical consideration could be thwarted by some wet behind the ears pilot with perhaps little or no actual experience in air combat just seems preposterous.

[Gambit21]

 

Remember, this is the military we're talking about, not some sort of fraternal society.  The decision to fit radios would have been made at Air Ministry level after lengthy trials with certain tactical goals in mind. To imagine that those tactical consideration could be thwarted by some wet behind the ears pilot with perhaps little or no actual experience in air combat just seems preposterous.

With respect - I think you should be careful making such statements (not just what I quoted) based on what you know about other military entities of WWII. Especially when you admittedly know nothing of how the Japanese operated during WWII. You've already been lent some insights which you've chosen to ignore based on nothing but assumptions.

 

I can point out a number of things about the Japanese military that contradict your assumptions, including how the services dealt with each other. This bears little resemblance to how things operated with other nations during the war, especially Germany, Britian and the US.

Radios are the tip of the iceberg.

 

Fire in the Sky (and others) would be particularly useful for you in coming to terms with some of the peculiarities of the Japanese war machine. In the meantime I'd be less quick to contradict those that are vastly more researched than you when they attempt to give you insight - and I mean that in the friendliest way.

[Wulf]

With respect - I think you should be careful making such statements (not just what I quoted) based on what you know about other military entities of WWII. Especially when you admittedly know nothing of how the Japanese operated during WWII. You've already been lent some insights which you've chosen to ignore based on nothing but assumptions.

 

I can point out a number of things about the Japanese military that contradict your assumptions, including how the services dealt with each other. This bears little resemblance to how things operated with other nations during the war, especially Germany, Britian and the US.

Radios are the tip of the iceberg.

 

Fire in the Sky (and others) would be particularly useful for you in coming to terms with some of the peculiarities of the Japanese war machine. In the meantime I'd be less quick to contradict those that are vastly more researched than you when they attempt to give you insight - and I mean that in the friendliest way.

 

 

If you're right about that, and you may be for all I know, we now have some idea why the Japanese military (which, as I understand it ,was actually based closely on western methods) failed so spectacularly.  

 

But pray tell, what insights are you talking about?  What, that there was inter-service rivalry; that the various arms of the military were spread thinly??  Seriously; that could be a description of the German military establishment during the War, or the British if it comes right down to it.  

 

Essentially what you and others are telling me is that the Japanese military structure was upside-down.  It was the lowest of the fighting ranks, in this case nco pilots and pilot officers who made the actual decisions about how their equipment would be configured and used and what tactics would consequently be employed, while the senior ranks just sucked it up and went along; even though they were aware that these decisions effectively sabotaged broader objectives.

 

Ummm ... okay, if you say so, I guess but it still sounds most unlikely to me.

Edited June 7, 2017 by Wulf

[Gambit21]

If you're right about that, and you may be for all I know, we now have some idea why the Japanese military (which as I understand it was actually based on a western methods) failed so spectacularly.  

 

But pray tell, what insights are you talking about?  What, that there was inter-service rivalry; that the various arms of the military were spread thinly??  Seriously; that could be a description of the German military establishment during the War.  

 

Essentially what you and others are telling me is that the Japanese military structure was upside-down.  It was the lowest of the fighting ranks, in this case nco pilots and pilot officers who made the actual decisions about how their equipment would be configured and used and what tactics would consequently be employed, while the senior ranks just sucked it up and went along; even though they were aware that these decisions effectively sabotaged broader objectives.

 

Ummm ... okay, if you say so, I guess but it still sounds most unlikely to me.

The inter-sevice rivalry existed at a level where the word 'dysfunction' didn't begin to describe it.

So then this would be a good example of not using what you've read about inter-service rivalry in the US or Germany as a gauge for what occurred in Japan. Which is the reason I mentioned it. Logistics is another one.

[Bearfoot]

Essentially what you and others are telling me is that the Japanese military structure was upside-down.  It was the lowest of the fighting ranks, in this case nco pilots and pilot officers who made the actual decisions about how their equipment would be configured and used and what tactics would consequently be employed, while the senior ranks just sucked it up and went along; even though they were aware that these decisions effectively sabotaged broader objectives.

 

 

No, it was not all one way or another. It is hardly the bottom-up revolution you are describing. Many -- and maybe most -- decisions were made by the powers that be. But others were made by lowly pilots and NCO's.

 

This is hardly unusual in any armed services of the time, Japanese or not, or, for that matter, most armed services even today (especially if engaged in active operations rather than a peace time deployment). There is a standard term for this in our language even, "field modifications". Some (many, even) field modifications percolate upstairs and get incorporated in the next revision of the technology. Others spread rhizomatically and become widespread, but never quite formalized into an "official" design. Others are dead-ends or remain limited to a particular time and space. Read practically any monograph on any major platform of the war, and you will find records of such field modifications.

 

If you want to learn more about the development --- and management of the development --- of IJN aviation in all its aspects, then you are in luck. Because the seminal work on this is not only available, but is a fascinating, fascinating, fascinating read!

 

Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941

https://www.amazon.com/Sunburst-Japanese-Naval-Power-1909-1941/dp/159114664X

 

And, oh yes, regardless of where your beliefs, imagination, speculation, etc. takes you, an incontrovertible, objective, verified-many-times-over-in-the-historical-record fact is that yes, individual pilots did rip the radios from their planes.

Edited June 7, 2017 by Bearfoot

[Gambit21]

On that note Bearfoot - how many field mods instituted by enlisted ground crew were adopted at the factory level eventually?

I've read of a few for sure.

Edited June 7, 2017 by Gambit21

[Bearfoot]

On that note Bearfoot - how many field mods instituted by enlisted ground crew were adopted at the factory level eventually?

I've read of a few for sure.

 

I'm afraid that I cannot remember specifics without looking them up, and certainly have no tabulated the statistics to answer "how many" ...

 

But I am under the impression that features in various iterations Bf-109 series, the Spitfire, the Mustang, Ju-8, Ju-88, the Yak-1/3/9, etc. etc. and, of course, the eponymous Il-2 had their origins as field mods? I could be wrong on some of these (not so much that field modifications were not done --- all these a/c and many more were subject to many field mods --- just whether or not it became incorporated at the factory level), and would be happy to learn this, if so!

[Gambit21]

I'm afraid that I cannot remember specifics without looking them up, and certainly have no tabulated the statistics to answer "how many" ...

 

But I am under the impression that features in various iterations Bf-109 series, the Spitfire, the Mustang, Ju-8, Ju-88, the Yak-1/3/9, etc. etc. and, of course, the eponymous Il-2 had their origins as field mods? I could be wrong on some of these (not so much that field modifications were not done --- all these a/c and many more were subject to many field mods --- just whether or not it became incorporated at the factory level), and would be happy to learn this, if so!

Yeah the "how many" part was rhetorical, as it's impossible to answer. I know that in my years of reading I've come across a few on the US side of things at least.

[BlitzPig_EL]

Wulf, another example I can give you.

 

The prototype Kawasaki Ki-61s had, for Japan, high a wing loading, to enhance speed over maneuverability.

 

The Japanese Army test pilots that flew it rejected the aircraft on that basis alone.  They wanted more turning ability.   So Kawasaki put more wing on the Hein in order to get the pilots to fly it.

This never would have happened in a western air force, as you flew the planes you were given and that was that.

 

You cannot apply current Western cultural mores to the Japanese military of WW2 and prior.  They considered themselves to be the modern incarnation of the Samurai, fighting heroically, mano a mano against the enemies of the Empire.  This line of thought was by far most prevalent in their air services, and it showed in their rigorous training, and tactical doctrine.

 

Try to see it this way.  Our western air doctrine came to see the aircraft as a virtual flying gun emplacement, that took teamwork to bring to bear on the enemy.   The Japanese saw the airplane as an extension of the Samurai's sword.  A weapon to be wielded in honorable 1 v 1 combat, to prove who was the better warrior.

 

To understand the Japanese war machine, you need to come to grips with this, and not fall back on your western data points.

 

Another case in point, the Japanese Navy could not organize a proper supply convoy, even as late as 1944.   It was never something that was ever considered before that.

Edited June 7, 2017 by BlitzPig_EL

[JtD]

The Japanese Army test pilots that flew it rejected the aircraft on that basis alone. They wanted more turning ability. So Kawasaki put more wing on the Hein in order to get the pilots to fly it. This never would have happened in a western air force, as you flew the planes you were given and that was that.

Many changes were made to aircraft based on the tests made by test pilots. This happened in other air forces, both Axis and Allied. Aircraft weren't allowed into service, based on these tests, until modified to remedy the perceived faults. Sometimes heavily. SB2C had to be heavily modified before accepted into USN service, and was completely rejected by the British. Based on the test pilots verdict.

 

Admittedly, other nations air forces weren't to keen on adding wing area.

[Lusekofte]

 

 

Magazines....

 

I read Flypast, very entertaining

And it got quite good information on pilots from Transport squadrons , bomber campaign . There are very few that can challenge what printed there with solid material to back it up 

[Gambit21]

I'm not saying they're useless.

I've written for magazines in the past.

 

The point is that on this subject there are some outstanding books with vastly more, and sometimes more accurate info.

Edited June 8, 2017 by Gambit21

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

It seems things went overboard quite rapidly. 

 

The idea how things were going with radios is based on selected interviews and memoirs I have collected over the years in books or articles. I'm not going to dig in now to find specific ones because I have no time nor desire to do so Wulf. Japanese radio systems from technical perspective were of the same quality as the American ones (in fact some of the sets were direct copies or even purcheased models, B5N2s that crashed during Pearl Harbor attack were found with Fairchild models, some wild discussion was sparked on why western companies sold their technologies and devices to the "enemy"), but were about one step behind newest western systems - which is not surprising at all, given that Japan was a nation less industrialized, of lesser use of electronics and machinery in the society. Japanese radios - the Type 96 radio telephone - did not perform well due to poor shielding of the engine ignition system, the transmossion was too often obsucred by interference and static, and reception of voices was therefore too often fuzzy.

 

This led to a consideration among some pilots, land based ones, whether they need such radio sets or they could cut antena mast and get rid of radio set from the cockpit. Busdriver brought a couple of quotes from M. Caiden book, which gives in one of the very first chapters an explanation how and when all this started - it started on Formosa when some of the pilots decided to remove masts and radios. However Zeroes operating from carriers used the radios, it was mandatory due to the specifics of the service over the vast waters. Second thing is that pilots on carrier service had to master Morse code for the teletype key and different kind of communications with ships. Sets were simply mandatory. Land-based units like the Tainan Ku could make up their own decision to remove all radio equipment or leave it there, but it always came down to a pilot - not commander. Same thing happened with armor. There is a series of pilot reports from 1943 when Japanese Army pilots fighting in China appreciated greatly the addition of protected fuel tanks and armored plates behind their backs up until Spitfire VIIIs came in 1944 with such a performance edge that some of the pilots ditched the plates to save the weight and increase aircraft performance, even by a very small bit. I have similar for Allied pilot btw., who removed from his P-40K armored plate and followed A6M3 in a climb up to a stall, where at its edge pilot claimed firing a burst and setting afire the opponent. Pilot claimed he had better climb rate when he removed all the armor from the aircraft.

 

The JAAF had similar problems, and in the autobiography of Yohei Hinoki, he had ordered his radio removed due to the same issues as mentioned above. However, Hinoki was promptly ordered to have the radio re-installed by 64th Sentai commander Tateo Kato, because Kato believed in the importance of radio co-ordinated combat.

 

If you are further interested in Zero radio equipment I encourage you to read the following article: http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm

 

 

If you're right about that, and you may be for all I know, we now have some idea why the Japanese military (which, as I understand it ,was actually based closely on western methods) failed so spectacularly.  

 

Fail of Japanese Air Forces was no greater than fail of Luftwaffe. Or VVS during 1941-1942 operations. And while communication was one of the issues in aircombat throughout the war, it was only one of the elements. 

 

 

 

The prototype Kawasaki Ki-61s had, for Japan, high a wing loading, to enhance speed over maneuverability.   The Japanese Army test pilots that flew it rejected the aircraft on that basis alone.  They wanted more turning ability.   So Kawasaki put more wing on the Hein in order to get the pilots to fly it. This never would have happened in a western air force, as you flew the planes you were given and that was that.

You confuse things. There were two aircraft - Ki-60 and Ki-61, one was of high wingloading and high speed for interceptions and one was for versatile combat. Ki-60 was dropped somewhere around 1942 though in trials it performed considerably better than Bf 109 E, despite having the same engine. While the maneuverability was a concern, it wasnt the only one. At similar time Ki-44 reached mass production status and fulfilled role of an interceptor so having two fighters of same type was deemed unnecessary. 

Edited June 7, 2017 by =LD=Hiromachi

[busdriver]

Magazines....

I suggest 3 books for starters...I would consider these the defining works as far as veracity of information goes on the Solomons/South Pacific.

 

Fire in the Sky - Eric Bergerud

Guadalcanal - Richard B. Frank

Islands of Destiny - John Prados.

 

Anyway...those books are stellar.

 

I agree with that recommendation. Throw in Bruce Gamble's work about Rabaul (2 of the 3 in his trilogy). William Wolf's trilogy about the 5th Air Force Fighter Command should have been a two volume work at most. And as =LD=Hiromachi mentioned previously, Lundstrom's First Team two volume set. Lundstrom's scholarship is superb.

[BlitzPig_EL]

Thank you Hiromachi for the correction.

 

It still does point to the fact that Japanese pilots still placed a great value on maneuverability over speed, though the Ki 61 actually was good in both areas.

[busdriver]

OFF TOPIC>>>>FREE OFFER

 

Trying to cull titles from my library. I have two paperback titles in the Stackpole Military History Series that I bought only to discover I already had hardback (clothbound) Grub Street editions. The titles are Japanese Naval Fighter Aces 1932-1945 and Japanese Army Fighter Aces 1931-1945. Both are in pristine condition.

 

If you live in the USA and want these PM me with your snail mail name and address. I'll send them priority mail at no cost to you. If you feel like it, make a donation to a local animal shelter/rescue or support the Devs and gift somebody one of the scripted campaigns.

 

Fair enough?

 

 

[Bearfoot]

 make a donation to a local animal shelter/rescue 

 

Just want to say, love the cause! (the "support the dev" one, too, but the animal shelter/rescue more!)

[busdriver]

Just want to say, love the cause! (the "support the dev" one, too, but the animal shelter/rescue more!)

Thank you kindly! Gambit21 will be getting both books. I'm sure I'll be giving away more (for the same price).