Night Fighting

[TheJay13]

I am curious about night fighting over the eastern front (although I know it was more prevalent in the West and Pacific) and if it can be accurately replicated in the sim. It doesn't seem like there is very much information floating around on this topic and it is something I want to know a bit more about.

 

Also a bit of a side note but how did the early radars work in the later war night fighters. I have seen pictures but they seem to be two separate screens, I don't understand how an image of whats a head can be deduced from that.

[GrendelsDad]

Bf 110 G-4 is the nightfighter version. As far as I know it was the most successful German nightfighter. It is a good starting point as I believe they carried onboard radar operated by a 3rd crewman.

Edited February 13, 2017 by II./ZG1_GrendelsDad

[Feathered_IV]

Nightfighters are one of the areas I'd really like to experience in a sim.

 

Regarding the two screens, one usually displays the enemy aircrafts relative position while the other shows it's height.

[hames123]

I think that the radar can be depicted just as killerfish games do sonar in their Atlantic Fleet game(really good game, one of the only serious ones on mobile), in which the area with the target is shaded, in this case, the water around a U-Boat is shaded green, to tell the player that one of his destroyer has found a sub. Every turn, the Destroyer will tell the player the depth, range and bearings to the submarine. In BOS, it could be a green area in a black sky, with the radio operator telling the pilot the bearing and height of the target every minute or so.

[Pail]

This 'Luftwaffe Operations at Stalingrad' pdf has a section on night fighters on pdf page 43. http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a213571.pdf

 

It Mentions Po 2s and TB3s being shot down and a modified Heinkel 111 being used as a night fighter (!!) as well  as Focke Wulf 58 'Weihe's , while the Bf 110s ended up doing ground attack.

 

Focke Wulf 58 'Wehe' (because I didn't really know it)

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zv5frxDPEe0

[JG13_opcode]

 

 

Nightfighters are one of the areas I'd really like to experience in a sim.

 

A night-fighter/night-bomber study sim tracking the so-called "battle of the beams" and related developments in radio nav would be pretty cool.  Tracking down Heinkels via their X-gerat waves would be quite fun.

[Scojo]

Night bombing was very prevalent on the Eastern front. It was one of the main duties given to quite a few aircraft that were either older or didn't perform as well.

 

The SU-2 almost flew entirely at night, and supposedly the Pe-8 was relegated to flying at night while leaving day operations to the other Peshkas.

 

But like you, I don't know much about it. The most I know about it comes from snippets I've read around or learned from the book about a Shturmovik pilot suggested on these forums

[Feathered_IV]

I don't think I would enjoy warping from the pilots seat to a cathode tube and back so I could peer hopefully out the window.  I'd much rather a simpler approach and get vectored onto a target the same way a real pilot would have in those days, with the radar operator murmuring in my headphones, "Contact, bearing three four zero..."

[Field-Ops]

Bf 110 G-4 is the nightfighter version. As far as I know it was the most successful German nightfighter. It is a good starting point as I believe they carried onboard radar operated by a 3rd crewman.

Definitely something i would look forward to even as a premium.

 

I don't think I would enjoy warping from the pilots seat to a cathode tube and back so I could peer hopefully out the window.  I'd much rather a simpler approach and get vectored onto a target the same way a real pilot would have in those days, with the radar operator murmuring in my headphones, "Contact, bearing three four zero..."

I could see it working for someone determined to use it in single player. But having audio recorded specifically for a readioman giving you heading and such would be above and beyond... and really awesome. 

 

I would honestly like to see a night fighter be released along with a campaign teaching the basics and leading up to more demanding missions later on. The best application would be 2 to 3 people actually manning those positions and telling you whats up in teamspeak (can you say coop campaign?).

[Dakpilot]

I do like the thought of more/all multi crew positions being available in an aircraft, having a fully human crewed aircraft could be great fun

 

How much actual demand and use this would get is hard to guess, immersion in co-ops and MP could be huge with the correct player base

 

Cheers Dakpilot

[Pail]

There is some interesting stuff on radar (and radar trains used on the Eastern Front) here http://www.gyges.dk/Ln%20zbV%202.htm

 

And this has some interesting stuff on German radar developments including radar navigation. http://www.radarpages.co.uk/download/AUACSC0609F97-3.pdf

 

And a couple of things on Eastern Front Luftwaffe night fighters.

 

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=218143

 

http://falkeeins.blogspot.com.au/2011/08/eastern-front-night-fighters.html

 

It seems we don't really have the types of planes in game to be the targets of German night fighters, or at least for the period this game deals with.

 

Po2s would be good to have in the game for lots of reasons but TB-3s might be a bit of an extravagant use of resources....and hunting Po2s could conceivably get a bit stale fairly quickly...

 

A couple of radar train carriages could be pretty easy and cheap to make...although implementing radar....sounds tricky and expensive.

[Scojo]

....and hunting Po2s could conceivably get a bit stale fairly quickly...

Po2s as an AI target wouldn't be much more stale than attacking a supply collumn

[Pail]

Po2s as an AI target wouldn't be much more stale than attacking a supply collumn

 

I'm not against the idea at all. I'd like it but I'm just not sure if adding more light slow planes is that cost beneficial to the project. If you had Po2s you would have to have some German equivalent like a FW 189 (which

might be popular) or Fieseler Storch. Which sounds really good but makes it quite possibly a fairly expensive addition.... and can you imagine flying them with this AAA? You'd have to be very sneaky or something. I just

wonder in the long run whether they would really work in the game and be used by people. I still have to afford/justify spending on the Ju 52.

Edited February 19, 2017 by Pail

[Scojo]

I'm not against the idea at all. I'd like it but I'm just not sure if adding more light slow planes is that cost beneficial to the project. If you had Po2s you would have to have some German equivalent like a FW 189 (which might be popular) or

 

Fieseler Storch. Which sounds really good but makes it quite possibly a fairly expensive addition.... and can you imagine flying them with this AAA? You'd have to be very sneaky or something. I just wonder in the long run whether they would

 

really work in the game and be used by people. I still have to afford/justify spending on the Ju 52.

You can add them as AI only. They don't have to be available to players

[Gambit21]

Fieseler Storch... I just wonder in the long run whether they would really work in the game and be used by people. I still have to afford/justify spending on the Ju 52.

Yes it would work and be used - we've discussed it here more than once. You might be lagging on the Ju52, but that's you...not us.

[Pail]

You might be lagging on the Ju52, but that's you...not us.

 

Yeah well it was surely fair to include that as a kind of disclaimer... A fair way north of $100 dollars by our exchange rate in the space of a few months for BoK and Yak 1b is already kind of extravagant whichever way I look at it so 'not right now'.

 

I would have thought the FW 189 would be more popular but I don't know that much of its operational use. It would be a trickier piece of work to make perhaps.

 

 

 

You can add them as AI only. They don't have to be available to players

 

That might be a way to bring them in gradually to minimize cost but people will insist on flying them no doubt.

Edited February 18, 2017 by Pail

[Avimimus]

Honestly,

 

It would be great to have a Lisunov 2 night bomber (to complement the Ju-52) and a Po-2/U-2 biplane for the 'Night Witches'...

 

There were attempts to use the He-111 as a night fighter on the Eastern Front btw. Although, my ideal would be a Fw-189! :D

[Pail]

This article has some interesting stuff about Soviet night fighters during the Battle of Moscow as well as other Battle of Moscow air war information that might be interesting to mission builders.

 

https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2016/11/21/general-leitenant-pavel-zhigarev/

 

...if it hasn't already been posted somewhere...

[Retnek]

Is there any trustworthy, first-hand data about those early Soviet radar sets? Oral history reported by the operators, that would be a dream! Researching this topic there is a nasty mix of western arrogance, Soviet war propaganda and directed disinformation effective until today. I never found a source presenting something better than rough estimations and data by hearsay.

[[APAF]VR_Spartan85]

Night bombing would be a thrill and being able to see the visual effect of bombs and lighting.

However, I suppose they didn't have any russian/german "pathfinders" of sort like the RAF did they? Else otherwise you'd have to do some serious flight planning and navigation if the moon isn't out

[Dakpilot]

Night bombing would be a thrill and being able to see the visual effect of bombs and lighting.

However, I suppose they didn't have any russian/german "pathfinders" of sort like the RAF did they? Else otherwise you'd have to do some serious flight planning and navigation if the moon isn't out

 

See the link from Pail a couple of post up, it describes some of the Luftwaffe prep for bombing Moscow at night re navigation

 

Cheers Dakpilot

[Pail]

@Dakpilot - It looks like most of that article comes from 'War over the Steppes: The air campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941-45' by E. R. Hooton , I think.

 

There is a bit more on Kampfgeschwader 100 “Wiking” on the Eastern Front here http://www.chronicles-of-the-luftwaffe.de/?page_id=234

 

..And there seems to be a few books about that unit.

[Gunsmith86]

For information on Nightfighting:

https://www.amazon.com/German-Night-Fighter-Force-1917-1945-ebook/dp/B01JJ3Y88I/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1488393555&sr=8-1

 

Some small parts from the book: ( and the reating of the book is wrong it should be defently five stars so dont get fooled by it )

 

‘illuminated’ night fighting:

The night fighters flew into standby zones east of the searchlight ring, so that the listening posts could clearly hear the approaching bombers, unaffected by the engine noise of their own aircraft. At this time there was still no ground control for the fighters. On hearing the code word Fasan (= enemy raid expected) the night fighters would take off into the standby zones east of the ‘illuminated belt’, and there lie in wait, often for hours. The flight logs of the pilots who took part reveal that sorties of three hours or more were not all that uncommon (three years later, pursuit night fighting with the Bf 110G-4 called for sorties of two hours at the most). When the sudden switching on of searchlights indicated the start of a raid, each night fighter pilot would go into action of his own accord. If he saw a target lit up by the searchlights, he would dive from his standby position above the estimated height of the enemy bomber and would fly at top speed into the searchlight zone. With only three minutes before the bomber disappeared into the darkness again, he had to fall behind the target, slow down in order not to overshoot, and attack from the side or rear. At this time some pilots were already trying the tactic, later to become universal, of attacking from below and behind. This was something quite different from daytime tactics and took a lot of getting used to.

The fundamental disadvantage of this procedure was that only one night fighter could be operated in each zone.
it became fatal when the night fighter, irritated by the uncontrolled lighting up of searchlights, began an engagement from the wrong direction. Before he noticed his mistake, his opponent had dived into the protective darkness and was gone. It was this shortcoming that stimulated the further development of controlled night fighting.
Furthermore, the searchlights were only effective in a maximum of 5/ 10th cloud cover.




‘dark’ night fighting

After the withdrawal of the searchlights Kammhuber left the ground radars in their former places, even though their range would have allowed for wider deployment. One Würzburg-Riese ( Red Giant ) at each station detected and acquired the enemy; the other ( Green Giant ) took the bearings of the fighter, and both vectors were transmitted to the Seeburg plotting table. Acting on the information displayed on the tables, the fighter control officers would then guide the night fighters to the enemy. This procedure became known as the Himmelbett method.      
Himmelbett had three basic disadvantages. For one thing, only one fighter could be controlled in each night fighting zone. Certainly, it was possible to send three aircraft from the control posts into one zone, for the Himmelbett zones overlapped each other by 50 per cent, but then the two outer zones would be unoccupied. Furthermore, if one fighter dropped out, it took some time before the replacement aircraft arrived on station. For a long time the Korps command resisted the suggestion from the flying crews that a second, unguided fighter should be allowed to circle the radio beacon in the night fighting zone, as they were afraid that the presence of two fighters would confuse the ground radar operators. The last disadvantage was that the fighter had to return to the radio beacon after each attack in order to be picked up by the ‘Green Giant’. The fighters still did not have a system that would show them to be friendly (IFF), and this was the only way of identifying them.      
The method was even more cumbersome when an inept ground radar crew lost the fighter during an interception and could not find it again amongst the multitude of target echoes on their screens. The resulting chorus of ‘Return to the little screw’ (code for secondary radio beacon) was not eliminated until the introduction of the FuG 25a Erstling IFF.      
On the whole, Himmelbett night fighting without AI radar was a matter of considerable luck. At longer ranges the difference between the altitude measurements of the two ‘Giants’ could be as much as 500 m (1,640 ft), while errors in reading the radar data and in their transmission could exaggerate the mistakes still more. Pilots often did not have a target in their field of vision at all, even when the red and green dots covered each other on the Seeburg table!



 




Lichtenstein B/ C FuG 202.
Although it was not expected to mass-produce this system in its experimental form, Lichtenstein was ordered into high-priority production in summer 1941. The first set was flight-tested at Rechlin, where the range and close-up resolution
were found to be completely satisfactory at 3– 4 km (1.8– 2.5 mls) and 200 m (656 ft) respectively. The search angle of the beam was a mere 30°, however, so that a sharply turning target was easily lost. As yet, neither Freya nor Würzburg had any IFF capability. Nevertheless, with the help of the plotting table a night fighter could now be guided towards its target even on nights of only moderate visibility, before manoeuvring closer until visual contact was achieved.      
The Rechlin test pilots gave the new radar a good report, but stressed one major disadvantage common to all airborne radars mass-produced by German industry during the war: high-drag of the aerials, which reduced the maximum speed of the Bf 110 by at least 40 km/h (24.8 mph). Major Helm, who led the experimental detachment at Rechlin and later the experimental centre for radar development at Werneuchen, then tried to find out if it was possible to retract the antennae into the fuselage or at least make them more streamlined. Impossible with the decimetric AI radar, this would have worked with the centimetric radar. But experiments in that line had been stopped once again in 1941 as a result of Hitler’s order that no more new developments should be started during the war.
During the first Lichtenstein operations Becker developed a tactic which was later taken up by the whole night fighter force. He would fly towards the
target at a height just below that shown by the radar. Then, on sighting the target, he would push over and accelerate to avoid being seen by the rear gunner of the bomber, match speeds and climb steadily to 50 m (164 ft) below the target. He would then pull up and open fire. Because the fighter had lost speed, the bomber had to fly through the stream of shells.
 








‘free’ night fighting.

The first step towards the introduction of ‘free’ night fighting was taken in spring 1943 by the night fighting adviser to the RLM Technical Office, Otl von Lossberg, in a report to his chief, GenMaj Vorwald. He and Lossberg then presented this proposal to Gen Kammhuber. The idea was to introduce selected crews with fast aircraft such as the He 219 into the bomber stream and let them operate on their own within that airspace, carrying out ‘free chases’, detecting, intercepting and attacking the enemy bombers during their approach, over the target and on the way out. This method depended on the availability of a wide-ranging AI radar and a ‘running commentary’ from the Korps command post to keep the night fighters informed of the progress of the bomber stream. But Gen Kammhuber was not convinced. In fact, he considered the chances of operating this way as remote from the start. Without ground control, he believed, the night fighters would not be able to find the enemy; without IFF (then still not available) they would shoot each other down; over the target they would come under fire from their own Flak batteries; and finally they would be unable to find landing places in unfamiliar areas. He remained unconvinced by Lossberg’s presentation on the expected performance of the SN-2 (with which the night-fighter pilot could find his target completely independently), the practicability of a pilot correcting his course in response to a running commentary from the ground, and the fact that the enemy bombers were without exception four-engined, which would preclude any shooting encounters between German night fighters. Kammhuber persisted in his opinion, although he did agree later to accept ‘pursuit’ night fighting provided he was given a way of keeping the fighter formations ‘on the leash’. While the possibilities of free night fighting were still being discussed at a higher level, some night-fighter aces had already flown such sorties off their own bat by leaving the Himmelbett zones and finding their own way into the enemy bomber stream. Eventually von Lossberg got to know about these ‘freelance’ activities, which led him to hope that he would get a certain amount of backing from the operational crews during any future arguments with Kammhuber.

 








‘Wild Boar’ night fighter force.

At the beginning of 1943 Major Hajo Hermann, a former bomber pilot and then adviser to the Luftwaffe Command, had suggested the introduction of unguided single-engined night fighters in addition to the Himmelbett method. The suggestion was turned down at first,
but on 8 April, when the British offensive against the Ruhr was reaching its peak, Hermann once more presented it to Lw.Befh.Mitte, who this time gave him permission to form an experimental detachment of four aircraft to test his tactics over Berlin. On 27 June Hermann presented his ideas to Göring on the Obersalzberg. He supported his idea by pointing out that in controlled night fighting only a limited number of fighters could be brought to bear on the enemy and that they could only be acceptably effective against scattered raiders. When used against raids that were tightly massed in time and space, they could achieve only a limited number of kills because the concentration of bombers over the target was not faced by a corresponding concentration of defending fighters. The simplest way to achieve that would be to allow unguided night fighters to fly in the light from the searchlights, over the searchlight and Flak zones of the Ruhr or other conurbations. Hermann brought up several reasons why this tactic was likely to be successful.
Since the disbandment of the searchlight divisions the bombers were being faced by a mass of searchlights around their targets, so that in the raids on the Ruhr up to 100 bombers were caught in the lights. There would therefore be enough time for several attacks on the bombers. When there was heavy cloud cover which could not be penetrated by the searchlights, it would be possible to illuminate the clouds with parachute flares so that the enemy bomber would show up like ‘flies on a lighted ground-glass screen’.
Compared with the Bf 109Es used two years previously by the single-engined experimental night fighter Staffel at Cologne, the Bf 109G-4 and Fw 190A-4 carried much better instrumentation and could be used at night without much difficulty by pilots experienced in blind flying. Such pilots— blindflying instructors, and former bomber and transport pilots being employed on flying duties for various staffs were available in sufficient numbers in the Reich. In Hermann’s opinion there was no need for great numbers of additional aircraft, as day fighters would do just as well. These aircraft would not even need to be transferred, for, thanks to the efficient early warning system and the high speed of the single-engined fighters, such a night fighter formation could always appear over the objective on time. Hermann’s criticism of the existing system was very much to the point. But what won the day for the new method was Göring’s and Jeschonnek’s vision of a large British bomber formation already missing a few of its numbers, lost on the approach flight being savaged by a hundred or more fighters over the target. The Flak would surely score additional hits, and the disintegrating formation would then meet its Waterloo on the return flight through the Himmelbett zones. That was the solution!      
Hermann received permission to develop his experimental detachment further. After the first operation from Hangelar, when the unit shot down four four-engined bombers and reported 17 engagements on the night of 3/ 4 July, Hermann was ordered to form a complete Geschwader.



Zahme Sau (Tame Boar). Lossberg’s idea was to use the Y-control system to ‘sluice’ a few night fighters preferably equipped with the SN-2 (then still under test) into the bomber stream. Once there, these machines would constantly transmit direction-finding signals and attract other night fighters. On 29 April 1943 von Lossberg flew Milch to a conference with Göring and put his ideas to his important passenger during the flight. Next day von Lossberg reported his proposal to Göring, who promptly replied: ‘Well, Lossberg, get going then!’       On 31 August there began a series of hard negotiations with Kammhuber and Weise, both of whom feared total chaos as a result of introducing two unguided night fighting methods. However, von Lossberg had the necessary backing in the person of Oberst von Brauchitsch, Göring’s ADC. Every objection from the generals was countered by a quiet reminder that the method was being introduced ‘On Reichsmarschall’s orders’.      
These discussions of the new methods resulted in none too clearly expressed orders by Göring dated 1 August 1943:   1. With immediate effect the Commanding General of XII Fliegerkorps is empowered to adopt the pursuit night fighting method proposed by Oberst von Lossberg within his Korps. 2. The night fighting controlled by him up to now remains unchanged. 3. All units not required for controlled night fighting are available for pursuit night fighting. 4. In co-operation with XII Fliegerkorps, the General of Bombers will commence longrange night fighting over Britain.
From these vague guidelines Kammhuber then evolved usable operational instructions:   1. In night fighting zones penetrated by the enemy the Himmelbett zones were to remain manned, if possible with double or triple crews, during both the inward and outward passage of the bomber stream. 2. Fighters from neighbouring areas not penetrated by the bomber stream were to be directed to the enemy by the ‘Tame Boar’ method, flying with the enemy and then going over to the attack by the Wild Boar’ method at the target. 3. Fighters from unpenetrated divisions were to be directed immediately to the target area to attack by the ‘Wild Boar’ method. 4. The reverse procedure was to be used during the return flight of the bombers. All fighters engaged in ‘Wild’ and ‘Tame Boar’ operations were to fly along with the enemy until their available fuel was exhausted. The pursuit was to be continued to the British coast by the Lange Kerle (Tall Fellows) method.




Night reconnaissance:
Formation of a night reconnaissance Staffel attached to I JKorps, based on experience of operational units with running commentary aircraft. This unit was to keep in contact with the enemy bomber stream, release sky markers for its own night fighters, pass on all observations as a running commentary to the command, interfere with or attack the enemy Master Bomber (‘ Master of Ceremonies’) aircraft, and report on its own
air defences (the performance of the night fighters and Flak, and the effect of artificial fog and decoy installations). In the event this Korpsstaffel was never formed; instead seven day and night observer Staffeln were activated and distributed among the seven JDivisionen. The aircraft used by these Staffeln were to be equipped with the latest electronics, and each crew was made up of an experienced night fighter pilot and a Flak officer.





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The British also produced Mosquito night fighter versions which developed into extremely dangerous opponents for the Luftwaffe night fighters. The Mosquito night fighters were first encountered by II/ NJG 1 on 12 March 1943, when 12 aircraft of this type shot up their base in a lowlevel raid. To begin with, attempts were made to keep these uninvited guests away by mounting standing patrols with Bf 110 night fighters. But this soon proved to be not only unsuitable but downright dangerous because the Mosquitoes were equipped with an AI radar that could also detect targets near ground level. The standing patrols were therefore abandoned and the task passed on to the light Flak batteries, which did not prevent two Do 217s being shot down by Mosquitoes late in May and in July. The Do 217 was particularly vulnerable to such attacks by marauding long-range night fighters. The cabin glazing would regularly steam up during the approach, obliging the pilot to open one of his side windows and fly a few circuits until the glazing was clear again. Such an aircraft, cruising slowly around its base and possibly with its navigation lights on, was an ideal target for any longrange intruder. Most of these sudden attacks resulted in panic landings that ended with fractured undercarriages and badly shaken crews.      







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On the Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe had complete control of the air during the first few months of this campaign. However, as the resistance of the Red Army stiffened in winter 1941–42, so the Soviet Air Force also became more involved in the battles. Night after night hundreds of ground support aircraft, transporters and bombers flew into the German occupied area to raid base installations, set down or supply partisans and to attack airfields. But, just like the Home Defence Flak in Germany, the fixed local air defences did not manage to discourage the enemy from coming back again. Some fighters and Zerstörer then tried ‘free’ night fighting operations by moonlight. Various pilots from JG 54 around Leningrad were especially outstanding in these operations. Even the He 111 crews of KG 53 attacked the unwieldy TB-3 bombers which circled their bases at night.
^^Hptm Seiler 16 night victories, Lt Heyer 6, Oblt Fink 9, Lt Leykauf 8 (6 on 22.6.42), Oblt Dr Feise 2.


 From summer 1941 onwards the Soviets
had been raiding East Prussia in moonlit nights with twin and four-engined bombers. At first these attacks were carried out by handfuls of aircraft which dropped their bombs blindly without causing much damage. But, if only for propaganda reasons, aircraft of the Red Air Force simply could not be allowed to fly around unmolested over German territory. So in June 1942 a detachment of NJG 5 under Oblt Lechner was transferred to Dammgarten and Labiau, where, in co-operation with a rail-mounted ground radar station codenamed Sumatra I, it attempted to put a stop to the Soviet incursions. No precise details of their activities are known, and only two night kills, achieved by Lechner on 18 August, have been substantiated. The mobile radar station belonged to the LN-Flugmeldeabteilung( E) z.b.V. 21 (Luftwaffe Signals Service Special Air Reporting Detachment, railway-mounted). Each of its companies had the use of a train consisting of a radar installation (one Freya and two Würzburg sets), an evaluation section,
Lechner on 18 August, have been substantiated. The mobile radar station belonged to the LN-Flugmeldeabteilung( E) z.b.V. 21 (Luftwaffe Signals Service Special Air Reporting Detachment, railway-mounted). Each of its companies had the use of a train consisting of a radar installation (one Freya and two Würzburg sets), an evaluation section, workrooms, generator wagon and accommodation wagons. Nine of these radar-equipped trains, coded Sumatra, Java and Borneo I-III, had entered service by summer 1943.9      
On the Eastern Front the Soviet pilots were not at all deterred by the Flak or the improvised night fighting efforts of individual crews. Night after night light bombers and harassing aircraft would appear over German positions, supply lines and bases. Still more worrying was the use of Soviet aircraft to land partisans behind the German lines. The transfer of 2./ NJG 3 under Hptm Böhmel to the Smolensk area during February— March 1942 gave only temporary relief because the unit had to return to the Reich Air Defence. When the calls for help could no longer be ignored, Kammhuber authorised Falck, his Operations Officer, to find a solution to the problem. Falck accordingly travelled along the whole Eastern Front in August 1942 before making his recommendations. He concluded that as the present supply of personnel and material was only just sufficient to maintain the operational readiness of the Reich Air Defence, a transfer of night fighter units to the Eastern Front was out of the question. Consequently, the local Luftwaffe formations would have to organise their own, either by retraining and re-equipping individual Zerstörer Staffeln or by giving special training to pilots who had already gained
experience in air combat at night and then re-equipping their aircraft accordingly. It would also be possible to adapt slow but manoeuvrable aircraft for use against the Soviet night harassment aircraft, the obsolete U-2 (Po-2) biplanes. The most suitable German aircraft available in sufficient numbers would be the Fw 58.      
As a result of Falck’s fact finding tour the Eastern Front Luftwaffe Command was ordered to begin ‘auxiliary’ night fighting operations in the Poltava area on 6 October. The successful crews from the various bomber, reconnaissance and Zerstörer units were ordered to Wiener Neustadt for night fighter training, and their aircraft were also adapted there; these often bizarre-looking machines will be dealt with later.      
The training phase was completed by 10 November and the Luftwaffe High Command ordered the activation of five NJ-Schwärmen within Luftflotten 1 and 4 and Luftwaffen-Kommandos Don and Ost. In addition, 10. and 12./ ZG I were also ordered to fly night fighting operations. However, the crews were hardly back at
the front when the Soviet forces broke through the German lines near Stalingrad and Donets, and even Vyasma-bend had to be evacuated. Hardly any of the designated aircraft took part in night fighting operations: the auxiliary night fighters were used up in ground support operations and low-level attacks on Soviet supply columns and railways, and personnel of 2. Schwarm of Luftflotte 4 had to blow up their aircraft as Soviet tanks approached their airfield. The surviving aircraft were reassigned on 18 January 1943 to the railway Jagdstaffeln of the bomber Geschwader and the auxiliary night fighter force was disbanded only a few weeks after its creation. When the front stabilised once more in February the auxiliary night fighters reappeared in limited numbers, the three NJ-Schwärme of Luftflotte 1 and LwKdos Don and Ost together mustering six He 111s, one Ju 88C-6 and one Bf 110. The situation did not improve until April, when the Luftflotten had 28 aircraft operational. At the end of May the General of Night Fighters sent some experienced pilots to the east in order to help the auxiliary units to operate more effectively.        
In spring 1943 the Eastern Front developed a broad westerly curve at Kursk and a concentration of strong Soviet forces pointed to a big offensive at this point. To pre-empt this, in June 1943 Hitler ordered a massive
pincer operation (code-named Zitadelle) to straighten the front and surround the Soviet forces that had pushed to the west. These measures did not remain concealed from the Soviets, whose air force tried hard to disrupt the German preparations. At the start of the operation the German command had to reckon with massed Soviet raids at night.But the NNJ-Schwarm of Luftflotte 6, with just three operational aircraft, was much too weak for this task and Kammhuber was therefore ordered on 26 June to transfer a regular night fighter Gruppe into this area. The only available formation was IV/ NJG 5 under Hptm Prince zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, which had also already gained experience in fighting Soviet bombers, and in the last days of June this unit transferred to the airfields at Bryansk and Orel. Himmelbett units took over five of the nine available ground radar trains. When, at the end of July, the German offensive broke down, IV/ NJG 5 was kept on in the east because of its extraordinary successes. Divided up into several Schwärme, it flew in the night fighter zones between Smolensk and Bryansk (Luftflotte 6 area) and near Poltava and Stalino (under Luftflotte 4). The command could not as yet do without the auxiliary night fighters, however, and Luftflotte 1 in the north and Luftflotte 4 in the south operated one Schwarm each; in addition there was 10.( N)/ ZG1. Co-ordination of the flying formations and their control posts was taken over by the newly formed Aussenstelle Ost des Gen.d.NJ (External Command Post East of the General of Night Fighters); this centre was for some reason not made responsible for the auxiliary night fighters.      
The successes of the night fighters could have been greater if the Gruppen had had anything like their full complement of aircraft. In the summer of 1942 their actual strength was 60 per cent of establishment, and of those only 65 per cent were operational.



At first glance the list of aircraft used for ‘improvised’ night fighting on the Eastern Front suggests a scraping of the bottom of the barrel: next to some ‘true’ Zerstörer such as the Bf 110, Ju 88C and Do 17Z-10 there were the Fw 58, He 111P, He 111H-3 and H-6, Do 17P, Ju 88D, Ju 88A-4 and Bf 109E. But this hotchpotch was not as crazy as it would seem. Some of these types had already been used in successful night interceptions and had won the confidence of their crews. Apart from that, fast fighters could not be used to combat the Soviet night harassment biplanes, and this naturally led to some ‘remodelling’ of bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. Thus, for instance, a He 111 would be fitted with a ‘tin nose’ accommodating up to four 20 mm MG FF cannon, plus four MG 17s in a ventral tray and two WB 81Z gun pods on the ETC bomb racks— in other words, a total of 16 fixed forward-firing automatic weapons. With such a hail of bullets one simply had to hit the target!      
In the course of summer 1943 most of these improvised types such as the He 111, Do 17P and Ju 88D were apparently used up and replaced by true night fighters of the Bf 110 and Ju 88 series. Nevertheless, some Ju 88A-4s remained in operational service to hunt the slow Soviet night harassment aircraft. With their dive brakes out, the A-4s were able to slow down in level flight as well.    



The successes of the night fighters on the Eastern Front, in Romania and the Mediterranean area cannot in any way be compared with those achieved by units of the Reich Air Defence. This has nothing to do with the lower qualifications of the crews. Rather these units were too weak and too thin on the ground, and had no compact net of air reporting and ground control centres to support them. Even the occasional major defensive effort gave only a temporary boost to their achievements. The enemy soon recognised areas with night fighter concentrations and simply avoided them, attacking elsewhere.      


Night fighting on the Eastern Front was affected by the peculiar conditions of that theatre and presented quite a different picture. In summer 1942 there were only a few fighter and bomber crews who felt confident
enough to take off and face up to the Soviet bombers on moonlit nights. Among the earliest recorded night interceptions are the successes achieved by Lt Leykauf of JG 54, who shot down six Soviet aircraft during the night of 23 June, and Uffz Döring of 9./ KG 55, who in his He 111 pursued and fought down three large TB-3 bomber-transports near Stalingrad. The newly activated auxiliary night fighting sections (BehNJ-Schwärme), which still had not managed to get into their stride during the winter of 1942– 43, had to face up to overwhelming odds in the early summer of 1943. However, by this time the training they had received from experienced Reich Air Defence crews began to pay dividends. Thus, during April– June 1943 the few available night fighters shot down more than 30 Soviet bombers in the Orel– Bryansk area alone. Among the more successful pilots were Hptm Schneeweis of NNJSchw Lfl 6 with 17 victories and Ofw Heiner of NNJSchw Lfl 4 with 11. But while these were remarkable personal achievements, the Soviet losses did not even amount to one per cent of the aircraft used. The picture began to change only after the arrival of IV/ NJG 5 in the Orel area. In July 1943 alone this Gruppe achieved 49 confirmed victories. It was at that time that Prince zu Sayn-Wittgenstein established a new record by shooting down seven aircraft during the 24 hours of the night of 25 July. Size for size, even more successful was 10./ ZG 1, which shot down 28 Soviet aircraft in June while flying ‘illuminated’ sorties over the Kertch peninsula. Most of these victories were achieved by Ofw Kociok. The German Flak also began to profit from these night fighter successes. Until then the Soviet bombers had not seemed to be particularly worried by German Flak and searchlights; now the aircraft had only to be lit up by one searchlight and the Soviet pilot would hurriedly drop his bombs and turn back.      
These local successes were all interceptions of Soviet medium bombers. Combating the Polikarpov R-5 and U-2 (Po-2) night harassment aircraft was quite a different story. These biplanes were extremely difficult to intercept because they tended to fly very low and slow and were also highly manoeuvrable. The ground radar sites were very hard put to detect them at all, or— because of ground echoes— would give the night fighter pilots bearings that varied by 180 ° so that they were forced to fly dangerously low, practically skimming the ground, to make out the enemy aircraft against the lighter sky (the AI radar was also useless so close to the ground). To add to the difficulties, the night fighter had to fly with its engines throttled right back to avoid overshooting the target. To slow down a Ju 88 and Do 217, as used by 12./ NJG 5, to about 200 km/ hr (124 mph) it was necessary to lower the flaps and sometimes even the undercarriage. At this low speed the controls of the Ju 88 were decidedly sloppy, while the Do 217, with its higher wing loading, could hardly be held on course. And when the fighter finally reached a firing position, victory was still far from assured: standard HE ammunition simply went straight through the fabric-covered target, only taking effect if it hit the small engine or the pilot. The aircraft best able to intercept and combat these ‘highway crawlers’ was without doubt the Fw 58 proposed by Falck. For a while some of these aircraft were temporarily allocated to various auxiliary night-fighting sections, but inexplicably they disappeared again after the catastrophe of the winter of 1942– 43. It took some time before somebody started to pay attention to the loud requests for similar aircraft from the Eastern Front night fighter units. Night defence of the South-eastern sector was the responsibility of Befehlsstelle Südost, established in June 1943 by Otl Falck. The next step was the formation of a new night fighter unit, IV/ NJG 6, the main task of which was the protection of the Romanian oil fields. Though this new formation moved to Zilistea and Pipera in July, everything remained quiet on this sector until the end of August.



Lechner’s Kommando succeeded only temporarily in stopping the Soviet raids. In the winter of 1941– 42 the Soviets came back in straggling formations of 30 or more aircraft, and the precise timing of their arrival was almost uncanny. But this rigid method of attack also allowed the defenders to prepare themselves. This went on until January 1943, when Lechner’s Kommando was relieved by 10. and 12./ NJG 5, the nucleus of the future IV Gruppe under Hptm Prince zu Sayn- Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and his formation were so successful in the time they were stationed in the Insterburg area that the Soviets stopped their raids completely, freeing the Gruppe for duties in Western France.


Wittgenstein brought two Ju 88C-6 night fighters with him to the Eastern Front, coded C9 + AE and C9 + DE. He used the latter (‘ Dora-Emil’) on nights when there were many Soviet aircraft about and when it was advantageous after attack to return to the radio beacon as quickly as possible to search for the next victim. The specially modified ‘Dora-Emil’— the ventral gun position and all armour protection were removed and the skin was highly polished— was capable of achieving a good 40 km/ h (25 mph) more than the standard version.




The night fighting on the Eastern Front was based on assumptions quite different from those which applied in the Reich territory; and the development of its aircraft, electronic equipment, organisation, strength, tactics and operations also went its own way. Whether to differentiate the Eastern Front night fighters even more distinctly from the Western formations, or to give an impression of strength, two new night fighter Geschwader with improbably high service numbers, NJG 100 and NJG 200, were created with one stroke of the pen in August 1943. NJG 100, of which initially only I Gruppe actually existed, was brought into being by redesignating IV/ NJG 5; it was allocated the formation code W7 +. On 8 August the command of this Gruppe was taken over by Hptm Schoenert from Hptm Wittgenstein. On 17 August 11. and 12./ ZG 1 were detailed as reinforcements to I/ NJG 100, primarily as a means of activating 3./ NJG 100. NJG 200 was also officially activated on that day. During its existence this unit was even more of a ‘phantom’ Geschwader than NJG 100, which at least had Gruppen HQ staffs; neither unit ever had a Geschwaderstab. The largest NJG 200 units were Staffeln. The Geschwader was created simply by redesignating various provisional night fighter sections: NNJSchw of Luftflotte 1 became 1./ NJG 200 (equipped with the Ju 88C-6), 10./ ZG 1 with eight Bf 110s was renamed 4./ NJG 200, and NNJSchw of Luftflotte 6 became 7./ NJG 200 and flew a strange collection of Ju 88A-4s, Ju 88C-6s and Fw 190s totalling just four aircraft. NJG 200 formation code was 6V +.      
Apart from these strength returns very little is known about NJG 200. It could be that, like its forerunners, this unit was never even under the auspices of the General of Night Fighters, since there is not a word about NJG 200 in his activity report for August 1943. It might also have been planned to form full-strength Gruppen for NJG 200, because from mid-August onwards the strength returns list 1. Staffel as I/ NJG 200 and 5. and 7. Staffeln as II/ NJG 200. But only II/ NJG 200, which received an allocation of 20 Bf 110G-2 night fighters, numerically deserved to be called a Gruppe; with its three Ju 88C-6s and one Bf 110 I/ NJG 200 was not even of Staffel strength. The strength returns of late August also mention an 8./ NJG 200; judging by its aircraft complement— three He 111s, two Ju 88A-4s and one Fw 190, evidently from the aircraft passed on by
7./ NJG 200— it was probably a descendant of the old provisional night fighting sections. In October 8./ NJG 200 was at Neuburg near Danube for re-equipment. Soon afterwards, redesignated 3. and 4./ NJG 100, it moved to the Eastern Front, where it was based at Orsha and Baranovicze. The smallest independently operating unit of both NJG 100 and NJG 200 was the Schwarm, the result of the far-flung deployment of the Eastern Front night fighter Geschwader.      
Each of these Schwärme was practically a small Staffel, and had full disciplinary powers. Each NJG 100 Schwarm operated with its own rail-portable Himmelbett station, while NJG 200 was presumably confined to illuminated night fighting.      
In summer 1943 all Eastern Front night fighter Schwärme were still operating near the front lines. Their operational bases changed frequently, depending on the intensity of Soviet air activity, or had to be moved westwards because of Soviet advances. Tactically, they were employed by Luftflotten 1, 4 and 6. In August a night fighter ‘barrier’ between Bryansk and Smolensk was being patrolled by Gruppenstab, l. and 3./ NJG 100; further north were two Himmelbett zones around Vitebsk and Nevel, all in the area controlled by Luftflotte 6. Operating in the southern sector of the front under Luftflotte 4 were Schwärme from 2./ NJG 100 based at Stalino and Poltava. The gap between the northernmost and southernmost Schwärm was 1,000 km (621 mls) in a straight line. The operational areas of NJG 200 were even more widely spaced out. Thus, during bright summer nights 1./ NJG 200 would fly moonlight interceptions along the Baltic coast while 5./ NJG 200 was operating mainly in the Crimean area; nothing is known about the bases and activities of 4., 7. and 8./ NJG 200.      
During the autumn of 1943 Allied air incursions into the Danube and Carpathian areas increased in frequency. These aircraft attacked the Romanian oil fields, mined the Danube and flew in supplies to the partisans in the whole of Eastern Europe. When this trend became evident, sections of 3./ NJG 100 were transferred back to Galitsia (based at Radom, Bielce and Biala Podlaska). IV/ NJG 6, until then the only unit combating these Allied forays, was reinforced by 3./ NJG 100, and its three Ju 88C-6s and two Bf 110s. At this time the Romanians formed their own night fighter squadron, equipping it with four Bf 110C- 1s and E-4s.      
In winter 1943/ 44 the Soviets achieved significant successes in the Northern sector and the Ukraine, and the front stabilised again only in March 1944. At this point in time the deployment of Luftwaffe night fighter units on the Eastern Front was more or less as follows:
Lfl 1 tactical area and the newly set up Fighter Sector Tallinn-Helsinki: NJ-Kdo JG 302 at Helsinki 1./ NJG 200 at Jekabpils (Latvia) 4./ NJG 100 at Riga, Tallinn-Ulemiste and Helsinki-Malmi. All these units were guided from the night fighter control ship Togo stationed off Tallinn from 15 February. Lfl 6 tactical area Stab, 1. and 3./ NJG 100 at Orsha, Bobruisk, Pinsk and Radom; 8./ NJG 200 Lfl 4 tactical area: 5./ NJG 200 (reduced from II/ NJG 200) at Nikolaiev. This Gruppe
had apparently suffered terrible losses, having only four Bf 110s and one Ju 88C-6 on hand by this time. Lw Kdo Südost (South-Eastern) tactical area: IV/ NJG 6 and 2./ NJG 200 deployed at Bucharest, Focsani, Buzau, Otopeni (all in Romania) and Telish (Bulgaria). In April, these units were reinforced by the transfer of 1./ NJG 200 to Bulgaria. In May 5./ NJG 200 was disbanded after the loss of Crimea. This deployment remained largely unchanged until the start of the Soviet offensive against Army Group Centre on 23 June 1944. 1./ NJG 200 was however disbanded on 27 January and redesignated 5./ NJG 100, followed by the new 6./ NJG 100 (also in the South-Eastern area) which came into being on 7 May, formed from 4./ NJG 200 which until then had been based at Neuburg/ Danube.


Probably the strangest German night fighter type of all belonged to NJG 100 late in 1943: a Ju 87D-5 acquired by Hptm Schoenert to hunt the Soviet ‘runway crawlers’, the slow Po-2 biplane night harassment aircraft. Schoenert wanted his aircraft fitted with oblique armament, but it is not known if it was ever used operationally. In any case, Schoenert, who was transferred to Werneuchen late in December, did not fly it again, but ‘his’ Ju 87D-5 appeared on strength returns for some time afterwards.      
Meanwhile, the Fw 189, a make-shift 1942 night fighter, was reborn. At Werneuchen an aircraft of this type had been equipped with the wide-angle FuG 212, and an oblique-firing MG 151 was fitted at Tarnewitz. Thus modified, the Fw 189 was sent back to the Eastern Front, where the pilots practically fell over themselves to fly it operationally. Two more similarly converted Fw 189s followed in May.

 


Except for the period July– August 1943 hardly anything detailed is known about the successes of the night fighters on the Eastern Front. During the Kursk offensive IV/ NJG 5 shot down 49 enemy aircraft, and another Soviet aircraft was destroyed on the ground. In the following months this Gruppe achieved 41 confirmed kills and 17 probables, and there were another 28 inconclusive combats which may well have resulted in additional victories. Most of the victims were  twin-engined 11-4 (DB-3F) bombers, but the tally also included some four-engined Pe-8 (TB-7) and single-engined Po-2 (U-2) light night harassment bombers known to the Germans as ‘sewing machines’. These victories were achieved by 14 pilots, of whom the most successful was Hptm Wittgenstein with nine, followed by Hauptleute von Meien, Lechner, Schoenert, Bonow, Oblt Pützkuhl and Fw Düding.       Then came the autumn nights, during which the Soviets did not fly at all. Nevertheless, the night fighters were always in their Himmelbett zones, ready for action. The Eastern Front night fighters had no choice but to wait in this way because, unlike their Western allies, the Soviets never gave away an impending operation hours beforehand by detailed tuning of radio sets or switching on of electronic devices.      
The rail-portable Freya and Würzburg sets remained the only search and ground control radars on the Eastern Front because the Soviets never used any electronic devices that could be detected by a ground position indicator. As a result, there was a great disparity between the number of operational flights and shot down enemy aircraft, a fact that served the Inspector of Night Fighters several times as grounds for criticism. His alleged observations that ‘the Eastern Front night fighters would be better employed digging anti-tank ditches’ was also anything but helpful and only strengthened the view among fighting troops that the gentlemen in Berlin had no idea of the true conditions in the Soviet Union and the needs of the units. Examples of such ignorance were not in fact hard to find. Thus, for instance, NJG 100 was allocated the completely unsuitable Do 217 night fighter, while deliveries of the Fw 189 to combat the Soviet biplane night harassment aircraft were continually refused.      
Night fighting in the East was a waiting game for which quite a large proportion of the officers serving there were particularly well suited. In no other units were there so many former factory, test and Lufthansa pilots who, partly because of their advanced years, were no longer daredevils but made up for it with invaluable experience, flying skill and perseverance. Nevertheless, there were some stars among them with quite respectable victory scores, the most successful being Gustav Francsis with 56 confirmed kills.      
The night fighting methods used in the East remained the same until the end of the war: Himmelbett for NJG 100, and illuminated night fighting for NJG 200. When in February 1944 the Soviet bombers began to break through more frequently north of the Courland night fighting zone over the Baltic area to raid Helsinki or Riga, the control ship Togo was deployed to the Gulf of Bothnia. With her support aircrews of 4./ NJG 100 and 1./ NJG 200 managed to score numerous victories, particularly on the night of 23 March 1944, when the night fighters and Flak destroyed 23 Soviet 11-4 (DB-3F) bombers near Tallinn. The most successful pilot that night was Hptm Bellinghausen with four kills.      
NJG 200’ s sections fought under the most unfavourable conditions: their aircraft had no AI radar; all they had to rely on for operational control were the general air reporting or Flak air reporting services; and, to cap it all, their activities near the front line were limited to between 2300 and 2400 hrs because the rest of the time the Flak had permission to fire at anything that happened to be flying. To extend the interception time without endangering themselves some crews attached organ pipes to their aircraft which emitted Morse-type tones in a predetermined rhythm, making it known to everyone over a radius of 5 km (3.1 mls) that they were friendly. The NJG 200 sections (Schwärme) stationed in the north— 1. Staffel under Oblt Jank at Dno and Siverskaya, for example— enjoyed far better hunting conditions than the units in the southern sector of the Eastern Front. For one thing, the nights were never really dark over Courland, which helped considerably. Oblt Jank himself achieved nine kills in the course of illuminated night fighting, his score including a four-engined Soviet courier aircraft that was on its way to Leningrad with several generals aboard. From its remains German Intelligence recovered an intact Soviet cypher machine.      
Night fighting in the southern sector was the responsibility of 2./ NJG 200, which flew long-range night interceptions over the Crimea from Nikolaiev and achieved its 30th kill in May 1944. Air defence of the valuable oilfields in Romania was in the hands of IV/ NJG 6, although to begin with this unit had little to do because these targets were attacked mainly by US day bombers. Night intrusions from the east and south began to increase only in May 1944 and then grew in intensity so rapidly that it was decided to form II/ NJG 100 to operate over the south-eastern sector.





The night fighter units on the Eastern Front are, quite undeservedly, hardly mentioned in the literature of the last war. The confirmed victory total of 510 enemy aircraft shot down by NJG 100 in 22 months speaks for itself, and is even more impressive considering the fact that most of the time this unit had fewer than six Staffeln. Likewise, the figure of 30 pilots who achieved more than nine kills each while serving with NJG 100 is quite respectable. The Eastern Front night fighter ace was Oblt Francsi with 56 confirmed night victories.      
True enough, the Eastern Front night fighters did not have to face streams of four-engined bombers escorted by long-range night fighters. Nor did they have to contend with the high frequency jamming suffered by their comrades in the West. Nevertheless, their victories were achieved under very difficult conditions, and they had to master completely different problems, ranging from the development of special tactics to a lack of suitable aircraft. For one thing, in the East the night fighters had to combat an enemy who never gave away his intentions with a high volume of radio traffic. For this reason the Himmelbett centres had to be manned at random throughout the night. If an enemy aircraft was detected by the ground sites, the details which they passed on to the night
fighters were often very inaccurate because most of the time the Soviet intruders were flying very low. Under these conditions the airborne AI radars did not show anything either.      
Odd as it may sound, the shooting down of a Soviet Po-2 biplane night harassment aircraft— which could fly safely at speeds below 100 km/ h (62 mph)—mph)— called for exceptional flying ability on the part of a Ju 88 pilot. He had to stalk his prey close to the ground with wheels and flaps down, all the while risking a sudden stall that he would have no chance to correct. At these low airspeeds it was also extremely difficult to follow the enemy if he made a quick turn.       But the Eastern Front night fighter units had more to cope with than these small single-engined biplanes. There were also the twin-engined Il-4 and North American B-25 Mitchell, and the four-engined Pe-8, none of them easy opponents. These bombers were fast, manoeuvrable, well armed and could take a lot of combat damage. Apart from that, from summer 1944 onwards all night fighter units stationed in the East also had to fly operations against the RAF raids in the West. Another extra restriction was the directive that the Eastern Front night fighters should operate near the front line only between 2300 and 2400 hrs; at all other times the Flak had permission to fire at anything that moved in the air.      
Technical conditions in the East were also much more unfavourable than in the Reich Air Defence area. If the Ju 88 and Bf 110 proved of little use for the interception of the slow-flying harassing aircraft, the Do 217N— regarded by officials in Berlin as the ideal ‘short-life’ aircraft for the East— turned out to be completely unsuitable. Its principal defects were the undercarriage, which would shear off in rough field landings; and the DB 603 powerplants, for which there were no spare parts at all.      
The complete equipment of the Eastern Front night fighters with AI radar came very late, the first SN-2 arriving only after all units in the Reich Air Defence area had had their fill. It is also beyond question that stockpiling and the supply of replacement parts were incomparably worse than in the Reich. Finally, the repeated redeployment of units had a damaging effect on their combat efficiency, there being long delays before the ground personnel joined the aircraft and crews in the new operational area.      
As with all other Luftwaffe formations on the Eastern Front, the operational use of the night fighter force depended on the ground situation, and the requirements of the Army were more or less paramount. Thus in May, because the Army General Staff expected the major enemy effort in the Southern sector and the area of Army Group North Ukraine, the night fighter formations were transferred from the Baltic to the South.      
It was intended that the new II/ NJG 100 should reinforce III and IV/ NJG 6 stationed in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, while I/ NJG 100 occupied the Biala– Podlaska– Pinsk– Orsha– Minsk– Baranovichi triangle in the Central sector. Stationed further north, over the Western Baltic area, were the operational sections of NJG 102, and even Ar 196A floatplanes from the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen deployed outside Liepaja (Libau) took part in night interceptions. A few crews from IV/ NJG 5 at Mainz were also temporarily transferred to Stubendorf in Upper Silesia to intercept Soviet aircraft bringing supplies to the partisans in the Beskide area during the full moon period of June 1944.      
Against all expectations, the Soviet summer offensive started on 22 June on the Central sector, and within a month the Red Army had penetrated right up to the borders of East Prussia and the River Vistula. The crews of I/ NJG 100 piled up successes as never before— Oblt Pützkuhl alone shot down 12 enemy aircraft in just three sorties, for instance— but could do nothing to hold up the Soviet offensive in any way. After the front line had stabilised early in August the crews of I Gruppe found new bases in East Prussia and the Warsaw area, from which they flew sorties against both Soviet and British night bombers. In this they were joined by parts of NJG 5 also stationed in East Prussia at that time.       Of the night fighter formations deployed in the Southern sector only the units based in Hungary were used more frequently. These comprised III/ NJG 6, parts of II/ NJG 100, Einsatzkommando of NJG 101, and the Hungarian night fighter squadron 5/ 1. These crews fought with great success against British Wellington bombers dropping mines in the Danube, formations of four-engined bombers penetrating over Czechoslovakia, and Soviet courier aircraft supplying Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia.      
On the other hand, IV/ NJG 6 and most of II/ NJG 100 stationed in Romania were hardly used at night because the Ploesti oilfields were raided only by American day bomber formations. As a result, the Luftwaffe night fighters had to act as daytime Zerstörer and, as over the Reich territory, often suffered heavy losses at the hands of enemy escort fighters. Nevertheless, a few night fighters managed to shoot down a P-38 Lightning now and again.      
The Soviet offensive in the Central sector was followed by a breakthrough into Romania, and the Luftwaffe night fighter units were redeployed once more. Their dispersal was complete: IV/ NJG 6 was transferred into the Reich, II/ NJG 100 moved back via Gross Beckereck and Bašaid (north of Belgrade) and Tapioszentmarton to Malacki (near Bratislava); 4. Staffel went to Silesia and was redesignated 3./ NJG 100; and the former 3. Staffel became 4. Staffel and was based near Brno (Brünn). Only these two Staffeln remained active in the night fighter role until the end of the war, operating mainly over Silesia against Soviet bombers and courier aircraft, and flying evacuation and supply sorties to help surrounded German troops.      
Although 5. and 6. Staffeln of NJG 100 received the latest Ju 88G-6 night fighters in November, they were used only for low-level attacks on trains and road transport, while as in nearly all Luftwaffe formations most of the personnel of both units had to fight as infantrymen for the last few months of the war. Some were more fortunate than others: III/ NJG 6 and the operational sections of NJG 101, for instance, managed to withdraw back into Germany just in time. Almost simultaneously with Romania, Finland repudiated its alliance with Germany, and the German forces stationed there were pulled back into northern Norway. NJ-Staffel Finnland, formed only a few months earlier, was transferred to Trondheim and later renamed NJ-Staffel Norwegen.      
In the last few months of hostilities I/ NJG 100 and II and IV/ NJG 5 were fighting a war on several fronts: by night against British and Soviet bombers, by day against American and, particularly, Soviet spearheads on the ground. At times they were even called on to act as day Zerstörer against Soviet raiders.       This period also had its ironic aspects. Thus, during the retreat a flight of NJG 100 somehow found itself in Norway and, as the fortunes of war would have it, was tasked— together with parts of NJ-Staffel Norwegen, based at Gardemoen— with flying all the way around South Sweden to Courland in Latvia to evacuate soldiers and civilians before the Soviet occupation.      
All night fighter operations against Soviet raiders terminated late in April, and the final moves saw I/ NJG 100 transferring to Lübeck while II/ NJG 100 collected its forces near Linz and Hörsching. On 4 May this Gruppe received orders to fly with 11 aircraft to Prague-Rusyne (Rusin) airfield. A day later came the Czech uprising in that city, and the night fighter crews flew on to Saaz where they destroyed all but one of their aircraft and surrendered to the Americans. This last aircraft of II/ NJG 100, with its national insignia painted over with four-pointed stars, landed at Lechfeld on 7 May, to the surprise of the American Air Force personnel on that field.








 

[Pail]

Nice info there thanks, Gunsmith.

 

 

 

Meanwhile, the Fw 189, a make-shift 1942 night fighter, was reborn. At Werneuchen an aircraft of this type had been equipped with the wide-angle FuG 212, and an oblique-firing MG 151 was fitted at Tarnewitz. Thus modified, the Fw 189 was sent back to the Eastern Front, where the pilots practically fell over themselves to fly it operationally.

 

It sounds like we need one...

 

.....and hunting Po-2s in the dark.....in a Heinkel or Junkers 88......I'm still not sure whether it would make a great mission (but I do still want them in the game as they would be great to use in other missions and circumstances).

 

 

 

Combating the Polikarpov R-5 and U-2 (Po-2) night harassment aircraft was quite a different story. These biplanes were extremely difficult to intercept because they tended to fly very low and slow and were also highly manoeuvrable. The ground radar sites were very hard put to detect them at all, or— because of ground echoes— would give the night fighter pilots bearings that varied by 180 ° so that they were forced to fly dangerously low, practically skimming the ground, to make out the enemy aircraft against the lighter sky (the AI radar was also useless so close to the ground). To add to the difficulties, the night fighter had to fly with its engines throttled right back to avoid overshooting the target. To slow down a Ju 88 and Do 217, as used by 12./ NJG 5, to about 200 km/ hr (124 mph) it was necessary to lower the flaps and sometimes even the undercarriage. At this low speed the controls of the Ju 88 were decidedly sloppy, while the Do 217, with its higher wing loading, could hardly be held on course. And when the fighter finally reached a firing position, victory was still far from assured: standard HE ammunition simply went straight through the fabric-covered target, only taking effect if it hit the small engine or the pilot.

 

 

 

Odd as it may sound, the shooting down of a Soviet Po-2 biplane night harassment aircraft— which could fly safely at speeds below 100 km/ h (62 mph)—mph)— called for exceptional flying ability on the part of a Ju 88 pilot. He had to stalk his prey close to the ground with wheels and flaps down, all the while risking a sudden stall that he would have no chance to correct. At these low airspeeds it was also extremely difficult to follow the enemy if he made a quick turn.

[Retnek]

For information on Nightfighting:

https://www.amazon.com/German-Night-Fighter-Force-1917-1945-ebook/dp/B01JJ3Y88I/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1488393555&sr=8-1

 

 

Interesting, an English translation of the Aders - thanks! The only attempt to write a history of the German nightfighters by a German author, afaik. First edition was printed in 1977 - a typical "Motorbuch"-publishing. Sadly nearly no sources cited, lot's of hearsay, a tour of patches and sketches more than a history book written systematically. Anyhow, in contrast to a lot of Motorbuch publications, this book it worth the reading and trustworthy in general.

[Juri_JS]

An excellent summary Gunsmith.

As I've already mentioned in another thread, I will probably do a 10.(NJ)/ZG1 nightfighter campaign on the Kuban map. The Bf-110s of the unit were not equipped with radar and there was also no ground based radar available, so the pilots cooperated with searchlights. 10.(NJ)/ZG1 was mainly responsible for the defence of the Kerch Strait, but single aircraft sometimes also flew missions directly over the front against Po-2 and R-5.

[Gambit21]

I wish there was a historical precedent for nighttime tactical operations. It never gets truly dark on our maps, and would be a fun campaign to make.

[Scojo]

I wish there was a historical precedent for nighttime tactical operations. It never gets truly dark on our maps, and would be a fun campaign to make.

If Alaska has 6 months of no darkness, does Russia as well?

[Sokol1]

I am curious about ni

 

ght fighting over the eastern front (although I know it was more prevalent in the West and Pacific) and if it can be accurately replicated in the sim. 

 

For this will be need a MOD "real night" ON.

 

The actual nights is done for allow people do dogfight at midnight with daylight fighters - is always full moon. 

Edited March 3, 2017 by Sokol1

[Gambit21]

It's not always full moon, but it's not very dark when there's no moon.

[Finkeren]

If Alaska has 6 months of no darkness, does Russia as well?

Russia spans a great number of lattitudes, so that varies a great deal. The maps we have in the sim are all sufficiently southern, that they should experience fully dark nights almost all year long.

[Sokol1]

It's not always full moon, but it's not very dark when there's no moon.

 

"Full moon" in the sense that nights always have good visibility.

Edited March 3, 2017 by Sokol1

[Gambit21]

Most definitely.

[Lusekofte]

Russia spans a great number of lattitudes, so that varies a great deal. The maps we have in the sim are all sufficiently southern, that they should experience fully dark nights almost all year long.

 

Northern part of Norway does, Where I live we are north of Murmansk,  Murmansk is south of arctic circle while I live 600 Km north of it. There is not much of Russia that got midnight sun, not the populated one

[Finkeren]

Northern part of Norway does, Where I live we are north of Murmansk, Murmansk is south of arctic circle while I live 600 Km north of it. There is not much of Russia that got midnight sun, not the populated one

Obviously, but there is a large area south of the Arctic Circle (including where I live) where it never gets truly dark for a certain period during summer. These "light nights" IIRC are defined as the Sun never going more than 15 degrees below the horizon.

[hames123]

Maybe one day we will have missions where the RAF attacks a German city, with hundreds of AI Lancasters in flights bombing the city(can you put and area target command in the Mission Editor?), with Flak Towers blazing away and searchlights scanning the sky. Then, the Germans can spawn and despawn their Me110 and Ju88 nightfighters at an airfield, and the RAF Mosquito opponents and the AI Lancasters will spawn and despawn at an airstart point. Imagine tracking targets in the dark, a duel between nightfighters.