Eric Winkle Brown about the Battle of Britain

[6./ZG26_Klaus_Mann]

34:20 if the link doesn't work properly.

 

Amongst being one of my Idols, I think this is an interesting point against some RAF supremacists. 

Can only recommend those who haven't watch the whole thing. 

Edited December 15, 2016 by 6./ZG26_Klaus_Mann

[=38=Tatarenko]

fantastic video, thank you

[6./ZG26_Custard]

A fascinating documentary indeed.

 

The RAF in the Battle of Britain had a huge amount of luck. The tactical blunders of Göring, the fact that there was a large body of water that limited the operating time for the Luftwaffe over the UK and Hitler's decision to look to the Soviet union and move men and materials to that theatre were all major contributing factors.

 

That doesn't take away the fact that a professional, battle hardened air force was held to a draw by young pilots many of whom had scarcely 8-12 hours on Spits or other fighter types.

 

It also doesn't take away the fact that the Luftwaffe was a superb fighting force who had many disadvantages in the BOB

 

The lack of trained pilots was a massive concern for fighter command in the early war years. This of course lead to the Arnold Scheme and much better training for RAF pilots.

 

Quoting my idol Günther Rall on allied pilots:

 

Rall said of the campaign of 1943–1945: "In my experience, the Royal Air Force pilot was the most aggressive and capable fighter pilot during the Second World War. This is nothing against the Americans, because they came in late and in such large numbers that we don't have an accurate comparison. We were totally outnumbered when the Americans engaged, whereas at the time of the Battle of Britain the fight was more even and you could compare. The British were extremely good (Kaplan 2007, p. 65)

 

Edit:

PS: I'm not an RAF supremacist!

Edited December 15, 2016 by 6./ZG26_Custard

[Lusekofte]

 

 

That doesn't take away the fact that a professional, battle hardened air force was held to a draw by young pilots many of whom had scarcely 8-12 hours on Spits or other fighter types.

 

That is the fact that made the Spit better than the 109, it could with luck bring a inexperienced pilot back home after a battle. I do not think you can say the same about the 109. I have seen this documentary before. It really brings the perspective needed  

[DD_Arthur]

I'm not sure what other outcome there could have been for the battle of britain?  I'm not sure if the Luftwaffe had any firm idea of what they were trying to do either.

 

After the sudden collapse of France,  the Germans found themselves in an unexpected situation and the British responded by risking it all rather than settle for an armistice. 

 

The option chosen by the Germans was the application of force in a way which gave all the strategic advantages to the British.   Whats really odd is the British decision the following year to commit to essentially the same operations over northern France which produced exactly the same results; a large drain on experienced forces for no strategic gain.

 

It took four months for the Germans to reach this conclusion against the British eighteen months.

 

FW190 anyone?   

[6./ZG26_Custard]

 

 

That is the fact that made the Spit better than the 109

Personally, I don't think that one was supremely better than the other. They each had advantages and disadvantages over each other. 

 

They are both iconic aircraft that were in a race to nose out in front right up to the wars end.

[6./ZG26_Custard]

.

FW190 anyone?   

 

[Sokol1]

 

 

...young pilots many of whom had scarcely 8-12 hours on Spits or other fighter types.

 

And despite this British win B of B, because this battle was not this "Spit x 109" from YT "historic" documentary, was a battle of Lw against the best integrated defense system at the world at time, that German intelligence fail to figure how work.

 

To the reduced time in fighters in some stage of B of B, add that RAF pilot fighters training are more about nice and tight formations than fighting.

 

"Standard RAF training practically ignored fighting...In August 1940, James Edward ('Johnnie') Johnson, who was to become the top-claiming ace on the Allied side during the war, was still in training at an Operational Training Unit (OTU) at Hawarden in Cheshire.

There he was taught how to fly Spitfires, but not how to fight in them, despite the fact that the instructors were battle-experienced. The fledgling pilots were longing for information about the Bf 109, turning circles, deflection shooting, how to keep a look-out and so on, but all they got were a few vague chats in the bar. 

No lectures on combat tactics had yet been written. The instructors' priority was to 'keep the sausage machine turning'. As a result most of the sausages were dead meat when they arrived at their squadrons."

 

Leading by British bureaucracy:

 

"When Keith Park arrived at 23 Group, Flying Training Command in December 1940, he found that it was working at two-thirds capacity and following peace-time routines, which put his shortage of pilots in a new light."

 

Things where worst for Russian pilots in 1941/42:

 

https://www.quora.com/How-many-hours-of-flight-training-were-required-of-Allied-pilots-during-World-War-II

Edited December 15, 2016 by Sokol1

[Dakpilot]

British Pilots passed on valuable tips to newcomers

 

 

Cheers Dakpilot

[BlitzPig_EL]

 

And despite this British win B of B, because this battle was not this "Spit x 109" from YT "historic" documentary, was a battle of Lw against the best integrated defense system at the world at time, that German intelligence fail to figure how work.

 

This is it exactly.

 

From radar, to the human spotters, to the communication network, to the excellent command and control structure, the RAF leadership had conceived a system that was pure genius.  Not only did it work, it worked well and continued to work even while under direct attack.  If one comms center or radar was knocked out, another would take over, and the repairs to damaged nodes were quick and effective.

 

Add the fact the German economy was not on a war footing, that the aircraft industry was not keeping up with losses, while the British aircraft industry was actually increasing production over the course of the BoB, and indeed the entire war.

 

The failure of the Luftwaffe in the BoB,and indeed over all, was an inevitability.

[6./ZG26_Custard]

And despite this British win B of B, because this battle was not this "Spit x 109" from YT "historic" documentary, was a battle of Lw against the best integrated defense system at the world at time, that German intelligence fail to figure how work.

 

Personally, I don't believe it was a British win but a draw. Regardless of the fact that Radar was in operation, a large element of luck was involved for the RAF holding the Luftwaffe to a draw.

 

 

 

The failure of the Luftwaffe in the BoB,and indeed over all, was an inevitability.

 

With regards to the rest of the war its a case of "what if?" We have the luxury of hindsight but some of the decisions made from German high command beggars believe (fighting on multiple fronts being just one of them)  The German armed forces in the very early period of the war seemed almost unstoppable.

Edited December 15, 2016 by 6./ZG26_Custard

[Y29.Layin_Scunion]

So casualty rates for the UK were more than the Germans before the end of the BoB.  So what?

UK fighter production went up during the BoB while the Germans suffered, basically, unsustainable losses at their production capability.

There was no chance, in any rational scenario, of the Germans taking the UK.  Impossible.  British naval assets dwarfed the Germans' which is a huge factor considering there is a body of water separating Britain from the rest of Europe.  

Here is a solid breakdown from Max Hastings "Inferno":
 

Through August the Luftwaffe progressively increased the intensity of it's assaults, attacking Fighter Command Airfields; though only briefly radar stations. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, C-in-C of Fighter Command, began the battle with an average of 600 aircraft available for action, while the Germans deployed a daily average of around 750 serviceable bombers, 250 dive-bombers, and over 600 single-engine and 150 twin-engine fighters, organized in three air fleets. Southeast England was the main battleground, but Dowding was also obliged to defend the northeast and southwest from long-range attacks. (Pg 85)

Both air forces wildly overestimated the damage they inflicted on each other. But the Germans’ intelligence failure was far more serious, because it sustained their delusion that they were winning. Fighter Command’s stations were targeted by forty Luftwaffe raids during August and early September, yet only two—Manston and Lympne on the Kent coast—were put out of action for more than a few hours, and the radar receivers were largely spared from attention. By late August the Luftwaffe believed Fighter Command’s first-line strength had been halved, to 300 aircraft. In reality, however, Dowding still deployed around twice that number: attrition was working to the advantage of the British. Between 8 and 23 August, the RAF lost 204 aircraft, but during that month 476 new fighters were built, and many more repaired. The Luftwaffe lost 397, of which 181 were fighters, while only 313 Bf-109s and Bf-110s were produced by German factories. Fighter Command lost 104 pilots killed in the middle fortnight of August, against 623 Luftwaffe airmen dead or captured. (Pg 85-86)

There is no "luck" involved from the British in the BoB....German loss was inevitable (or a "draw")  There wasn't any possible chance of the Germans winning the UK.  

And I'll just say this:  British civil defense was arming willing civilian men with pikes to defend Britian in case of an invasion.  There would be no scenario of a British surrender.  Period.  If Operation Sea Lion somehow miraculously succeeded (it never would have) the attrition from taking the island of Britain would have probably been war ending.  Not just because of British morale but because of the absolute logistical nightmare that it would have been for the Germans.  And I hope we all know how absolutely awful German logistics were.....you can't drive horses across a channel.

Edited December 15, 2016 by Y-29.Layin_Scunion

[DD_Crash]

It was a "draw" that changed the war

[6./ZG26_Custard]

There is no "luck" involved from the British in the BoB....German loss was inevitable

 

There is always an element of luck involved where war is concerned. If Germany had not invaded the Soviet Union at the time it did and instead concentrated its efforts purely in the west who knows what would have happened.  Who would of thought at the time that France with an effective force of 3,200,000 soldiers double the artillery pieces and with approximately 1000 more armoured vehicles than Germany would fall in 1 month and 15 days.

 

Was it luck that stopped the German advance short of Dunkirk which in turn allowed the Miracle of Dunkirk to take place?

 

The Soviet invasion was probably the number one factor in losing the war for Germany. Even thought they were at war on paper, it was bizarre that Germany would declare war with the USA and therefore bring the USA fully into WWII just at the time while they were fully engaged with the Red Army. I have read that is was due to the fact that Germany did it to preserve access to Japanese rubber.

 

As I said earlier we have the advantage of hindsight but massive tactical blunders made by Göring, that fact that Britain is an Island, and that the main thurst would be made against the Soviets certainly helped to get the win or the "draw" even if people believe only in a small way.

 

It was a "draw" that changed the war

 

It was a turning point, no doubt.

Edited December 15, 2016 by 6./ZG26_Custard

[Heliopause]

Adolf was planning his lebensraum in the east. To keep stalin guessing he continued his attacks/pressure on britain.

But that was a decoy.

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

 

 

The tactical blunders of Göring

I've read various accounts on Goring, I've read his biography and memoirs of those had personal or strictly military relations with him. I think there is more blame placed on his back than he deserves (in terms of mistakes and responsibility for Luftwaffe actions) and its mostly done by former Luftwaffe pilots and commanders, critics who have their interest in placing a blame somewhere else, particularly when person cannot defend himself any more.

There has yet to written an objective confrontation of Goring policies and the way they were carried by his subordinates.

 

 

 

That is the fact that made the Spit better than the 109, it could with luck bring a inexperienced pilot back home after a battle.

German numbers for Luftwaffe losses in August-October 1940 period indicate a loss due to enemy action of over 1050 aircraft and additional 245 heavily damaged. The fatality rate among crews of fighter units is estimated over 40+ % (based of JG 26, which in August/September lost 39 109s and 34 pilots - 17 dead, 17 became POWs, two were wounded and three were unharmed).
British side for August/September period indicates a loss and combat damage of 975 Spitfires and Hurricanes. Of these 696 were total losses (71%). In the same time units recorded loss of 615 pilots, 307 dead/missing and 308 wounded/injured. Thus a rate of fatalities compared to total losses of aircraft was about 44 %. That means that if a RAF machine was heavily struck, it was likely to be a total loss and almost as likely that its pilot would become a casualty. And that was despite a close proximity of airfields.

 

 

 

Personally, I don't believe it was a British win but a draw.

German goal was to achieve a complete air superiority over Britain, or at least Southern part of it. Did they manage to achieve that ? No. Thus they did not reach the goal, while British managed to defend air over their island - it was a British victory, however achieved with heavy losses. Still a victory.    

[6./ZG26_Custard]

I think there is more blame placed on his back than he deserves (in terms of mistakes and responsibility for Luftwaffe actions)

 

I not going to disagree with you there, it wasn't just Göring, he did however make some extremely bad choices.

 

 

 

it was a British victory, however achieved with heavy losses. Still a victory.

 

I won't 100% agree with you on this but I respect your opinion and I'll shake your hand on it

 

Lets take a look from an American point of view.

 

Edited December 15, 2016 by 6./ZG26_Custard

[DD_Arthur]

 it wasn't just Göring, he did however make some extremely bad choices.

 

Poor old Hermann; not easy being a transvestite and a morphine addict

[Soarfeat]

British Pilots passed on valuable tips to newcomers

 

 

Cheers Dakpilot

Well done !!

cheers--sf--

[unreasonable]

snip

 

German numbers for Luftwaffe losses in August-October 1940 period indicate a loss due to enemy action of over 1050 aircraft and additional 245 heavily damaged. The fatality rate among crews of fighter units is estimated over 40+ % (based of JG 26, which in August/September lost 39 109s and 34 pilots - 17 dead, 17 became POWs, two were wounded and three were unharmed).

British side for August/September period indicates a loss and combat damage of 975 Spitfires and Hurricanes. Of these 696 were total losses (71%). In the same time units recorded loss of 615 pilots, 307 dead/missing and 308 wounded/injured. Thus a rate of fatalities compared to total losses of aircraft was about 44 %. That means that if a RAF machine was heavily struck, it was likely to be a total loss and almost as likely that its pilot would become a casualty. And that was despite a close proximity of airfields.

 

 

German goal was to achieve a complete air superiority over Britain, or at least Southern part of it. Did they manage to achieve that ? No. Thus they did not reach the goal, while British managed to defend air over their island - it was a British victory, however achieved with heavy losses. Still a victory.    

 

Surely most WW2 fighters were fairly fragile and likely to be total losses when damaged especially if hit by cannon fire. The image of the heavily damaged plane limping home must have been very much the exception. Bailing or forced landing a damaged aircraft while it was still in control must have been SOP, so it is hardly surprising that most damaged fighters were total losses. Bombers would be another story.

 

I think that comparing casualty rates is very difficult: the sides were trying to do different things with different force structures.  

 

I completely agree with your last comment.

[Wulf]

I not going to disagree with you there, it wasn't just Göring, he did however make some extremely bad choices.

 

 

 

 

I won't 100% agree with you on this but I respect your opinion and I'll shake your hand on it

 

Lets take a look from an American point of view.

 

 

 

Hahahaha ...  that so-called American 'perspective' is at best propaganda and at worst a total fantasy.

 

Points worth noting about the BoB and the so-called 'German invasion plan'.  Firstly, at no stage during the battle over Dunkirk was the Luftwaffe sufficiently in control of the air over the beaches to allow its bombers to finish off the BEF.  During the battle, both sides lost about the same number of aircraft - with the LW being slightly ahead but not sufficiently so to achieve control at any point. So, if the Luftwaffe wasn't in a position to exercise even temporary control over the embarkation point for British troops leaving the Continent, how was it going to achieve control over the air space over Southern England sufficient to facilitate the much anticipated airborne invasion of that country?  Well clearly it wasn't.  That task was simply beyond its resources.

 

Point number two.   If you have a look at the preceding German assault on Belgium and Holland, you'll notice that about 3/4 of the Luftwaffe's entire transport fleet had been shot down during  the operations to subdue those two countries. Assuming air supremacy could have been achieved by the Luftwaffe over Southern England (which of course it couldn't), what were the Germans then going to use to ferry (what was left of) their paratroop force across the channel? 

[ZachariasX]

Poor old Hermann; not easy being a transvestite and a morphine addict

 

A transvestite? Who said so? (Apart from you of course... The sight of him trying on Hanna Reitsch' garments must have been memorable). Regarding the use of morphine, he had a nurse helping with that. Alles nach Vorschrift!

 

Besides, the German promotion system (for the higher echelons) relied on personal fame and goodwill from Hitler. Thus, he faced many more constraints in taking a decision than the common forum lurker judging him ex post. Also loss of rank was coupled with loss in personal lifestyle. So he personally was under a lot of pressure. I suppose Goerings display of schizophrenia, depending who he was talking to, is something you could see happening with almost anyone in his situation. Given what he personally had at stake, I don't think he performed so badly. Hitler was similar in this matter.

 

Long story short, the Nazis were in for a ride they didn't properly plan for in the beginning (German industry in spring 1939 was not in a state that it could sustain the demands of a war as political realities and industry were not at all in sync) and the whole thing Hitler was in for was way more than they could chew under any circumstances whatsoever.

 

Goering didn't make poor choices and consequently made Germany lose the air war. He made poor choices in life and that earned him a place at the bottom of the barrel of mankind. That's the guys main problem. Not so much that he did a line too much or was fishing in the wrong closet...

 

Edit: Klaus, good vid, thanx for posting that!

Edited December 16, 2016 by ZachariasX

[unreasonable]

The trouble with this whole line of argument (@Wulf's) is that it leaves open the question - if the German high command was not in fact serious about the possibility of invasion, contingent on air superiority, what on earth was the point of the German air attacks on the UK during summer 1940? Are you seriously suggesting that the GAF lost a large proportion of its pilots over southern England for no reason at all?

 

In addition

 

1) Sealion was primarily an amphibious plan, not an airborne plan. Parachute drops would have been purely in a supporting role. One division of parachutists is not going to have much effect.

 

2) The GAF intelligence was hopelessly ill-informed, not just about the effectiveness of the air-defence system, but also about RAF strength and its ability to replace losses. All the evidence I have seen suggests that the Germans thought they had good prospects for success in the BoB. 

 

Whether you think that Sealion was a bluff or not, the Germans still lost the BoB.  The whole point about a bluff is that it has to be credible for the opposition to buy it, and it would only have been credible if air superiority had been achieved.

Edited December 16, 2016 by unreasonable

[ZachariasX]

The trouble with this whole line of argument (@Wulf's) is that it leaves open the question - if the German high command was not in fact serious about the possibility of invasion, contingent on air superiority, what on earth was the point of the German air attacks on the UK during summer 1940? Are you seriously suggesting that the GAF lost a large proportion of its pilots over southern England for no reason at all?

 

In addition

 

1) Sealion was primarily an amphibious plan, not an airborne plan. Parachute drops would have been purely in a supporting role. One division of parachutists is not going to have much effect.

 

2) The GAF intelligence was hopelessly ill-informed, not just about the effectiveness of the air-defence system, but also about RAF strength and its ability to replace losses. All the evidence I have seen suggests that the Germans thought they had good prospects for success in the BoB. 

 

Whether you think that Sealion was a bluff or not, the Germans still lost the BoB.  The whole point about a bluff is that it has to be credible for the opposition to buy it, and it would only have been credible if air superiority had been achieved.

 

Yes, indeed! It is an interesting question whether Sea Lion was a bluff or much rather some sort self deception on the part of the Germans. The latter for two reasons:

 

First, the Germans got used to having things their way. Why shouldn't it work the next time? Their own shortcomings have been masked so far. For instance in France, the high losses suffered by the GAF were made up by getting the pilots back as soon France decided siding somehow with the Germans.

 

Second, Hitler never really wanted to invade England. He kind of liked them (in his own way) and giving them a trashing was just the only way he knew in how to deal with the actual realities. From the very beginning, Hitler’s ambitions lay in Russia.

 

One has to keep in mind, Britain’s situation late 1940 was not that great anymore. So for the Germans, why wait another year to do what you always wanted to do, Barbarossa, when you at least contained most of the problems with Britain by beginning of 1941? At some point you're just fed up and move on to "greener pastures" once you see that your present play starts to get really expensive wthout yielding appropriate results. And you didn't like the game anyway.

 

In order to get Sea Lion going, they had to take about all shipping available to Germany, this includes most fishing travelers etc., creating a significant impact on German food supply. Those ships were on standby for months for this operation instead out fishing. They knew they could ask a lot from people even things like totaler Krieg, but you can only do that as long as you are winning (something).

 

Mind you, the German public is not forgiving at all. Apart from the incurable Nazis, most Germans comfortably sided with Hitler because he was winning. And as soon as things started to turn for the bad, they started bitching (although discreetly. A spine, then and now, is a rare commodity). From Nazi to "Muss-Nazi" in one lost battle.

[Feathered_IV]

This thread is soooo 2011 

[Wulf]

The trouble with this whole line of argument (@Wulf's) is that it leaves open the question - if the German high command was not in fact serious about the possibility of invasion, contingent on air superiority, what on earth was the point of the German air attacks on the UK during summer 1940? Are you seriously suggesting that the GAF lost a large proportion of its pilots over southern England for no reason at all?

 

In addition

 

1) Sealion was primarily an amphibious plan, not an airborne plan. Parachute drops would have been purely in a supporting role. One division of parachutists is not going to have much effect.

 

2) The GAF intelligence was hopelessly ill-informed, not just about the effectiveness of the air-defence system, but also about RAF strength and its ability to replace losses. All the evidence I have seen suggests that the Germans thought they had good prospects for success in the BoB. 

 

Whether you think that Sealion was a bluff or not, the Germans still lost the BoB.  The whole point about a bluff is that it has to be credible for the opposition to buy it, and it would only have been credible if air superiority had been achieved.

 

 

No it wasn't pointless.  I strongly believe the whole thing was a calculated gamble/bluff intended to put pressure on the British to accept the new political reality on the Continent and to sue for peace.  After all, Hitler had gambled since the re-occupation of the Rhineland that the western democracies would back down and mostly that's exactly what they did.  Right up to the conquest of Poland his plans had worked very well.  The German military was nowhere near as powerful in 1939-40 as the National Socialist state would have had everyone believe.  Just compare the German tank force in 1940 with its French counterpart.  The French had more tanks and better tanks than the Germans ; they just failed to use them.  The French air force, despite what we're told was easily a match for the Luftwaffe in 1940 - if they'd just bothered to use it.  The German success in France had far more to do with the  panic stricken government of that country and much less to do with the effectiveness of the so-called Blitzkrieg. 

 

And as for Sealion being primarily a seaborne invasion plan, just how were the Germans expecting to get their "fast barges" loaded with troops past the Royal Navy?  Still at that time the most powerful navy in the world.   

Edited December 16, 2016 by Wulf

[ZachariasX]

This thread is soooo 2011 

 

 

You have a point there!

Edited December 16, 2016 by ZachariasX

[unreasonable]

This thread is soooo 2011 

 

(Discussion about) war - (discussion about) war never changes.

 

 

 

And as for Sealion being primarily a seaborne invasion plan, just how were the Germans expecting to get their "fast barges" loaded with troops past the Royal Navy?  Still at that time the most powerful navy in the world.   

 

Well it was primarily a seaborne plan - look it up, the details are easy enough to find. The Germans had one division of airborne troops, hardly enough to invade the UK.

 

I agree that it was implausible, it could only have worked if the GAF was able to completely destroy the RN if it tried to intercept. Not impossible, but unlikely.

 

But the fact is that without a credible threat of invasion there was no necessity for the UK to ask for peace. So a bluffing attack that failed to make the enemy fold and gutted your own pilot strength- and this is supposed not to be a defeat? The only way the GAF can claim even a draw is by pretending that the battle was purely attritional and this is totally implausible.

Edited December 16, 2016 by unreasonable

[Dakpilot]

Thread not so 2011..

 

Is it a gaffe to use GAF? personally I don't GAF but some, I am sure DGAF 

 

Cheers Dakpilot

[Brano]

Hard to believe that germans bluffed wasting hundreds of airplanes and crews in BoB to "cover" their real intentions of attacking USSR later (where they missed those lost assets badly). That would be as stupid bluff as there can be. They simply needed GB out of war before turning east. They didnt succeed and took high risk of attacking USSR leaving Britain to be "starved out" by submarine blockade. Another wishful thinking on the part of german leadeship.

[unreasonable]

Thread not so 2011..

 

Is it a gaffe to use GAF? personally I don't GAF but some, I am sure DGAF 

 

Cheers Dakpilot

 

FYI, "GAF" is standard for German Air Force in British military documents; or at least it was in WW2 and until the 1980s when I had to draft one.

 

Since foreign language words are rarely, if ever, used in this kind of writing, abbreviations like "LW" are also out. So the French Air Force = FAF, rather than Armée de l'Air  = Adl'A ?  You can see why.

[kendo]

No it wasn't pointless.  I strongly believe the whole thing was a calculated gamble/bluff intended to put pressure on the British to accept the new political reality on the Continent and to sue for peace.  After all, Hitler had gambled since the re-occupation of the Rhineland that the western democracies would back down and mostly that's exactly what they did.  Right up to the conquest of Poland his plans had worked very well.  The German military was nowhere near as powerful in 1939-40 as the National Socialist state would have had everyone believe.  Just compare the German tank force in 1940 with its French counterpart.  The French had more tanks and better tanks than the Germans ; they just failed to use them.  The French air force, despite what we're told was easily a match for the Luftwaffe in 1940 - if they'd just bothered to use it.  The German success in France had far more to do with the  panic stricken government of that country and much less to do with the effectiveness of the so-called Blitzkrieg.

 

I think you have a point in that Hitler would likely have been willing to settle for the British being forced to where they would 'accept the new political reality on the Continent and to sue for peace'. It may even have been a preference. That would have been an acceptable outcome in the west and would have allowed him to turn his attention to Russia with a free hand.  But calling it a 'bluff' goes to far .There had to be a credible threat of invasion and a plan to execute it if the British proved too stubborn to 'see reason' and the hopelessness of their position in summer 1940.

 

But even judged on these grounds the objective (Britain suing for peace) was not achieved, therefore the result is still a German strategic defeat.

 

And as for Sealion being primarily a seaborne invasion plan, just how were the Germans expecting to get their "fast barges" loaded with troops past the Royal Navy? Still at that time the most powerful navy in the world.

 

The Luftwaffe would keep the Royal Navy at bay. This is precisely why the RAF had to be destroyed and German air supremacy established over southern England. They knew right from the outset that this was essential. 

Edited December 16, 2016 by kendo

[Wulf]

(Discussion about) war - (discussion about) war never changes.

 

 

 

Well it was primarily a seaborne plan - look it up, the details are easy enough to find. The Germans had one division of airborne troops, hardly enough to invade the UK.

 

I agree that it was implausible, it could only have worked if the GAF was able to completely destroy the RN if it tried to intercept. Not impossible, but unlikely.

 

But the fact is that without a credible threat of invasion there was no necessity for the UK to ask for peace. So a bluffing attack that failed to make the enemy fold and gutted your own pilot strength- and this is supposed not to be a defeat? The only way the GAF can claim even a draw is by pretending that the battle was purely attritional and this is totally implausible.

 

 

Well, you're free to believe whatever you wish, of course.  If you think Hitler seriously believed that his air force, despite it's record over Dunkirk and the losses it suffered in the Battle of France, would somehow come right, and successfully reverse it's fortunes on the other side over of the English Channel and at the same time somehow eliminate the threat posed by the RN to the 'proposed sea borne invasion force' (in their fast barges) and presumably also transport and re-supply a paratroop force, of some size, with 1/4 of the transport fleet available to it in 1939, and despite ongoing losses, then good luck to you.  But to me, that just seems so far fetched as to be silly.

 

And while you may think gee... hahaha ...that's quite a "gamble", isn't it, the reality is that Hitler needed Britain out of the War.   The losses incurred in pushing the British into a position where they concluded that throwing in the towel, on their own terms, was the logical course of action (because they brought into the German invincibility myth)  would pale into insignificance against the realities of an actual seaborne invasion.  And don't forget, there were plenty of people in the UK after the Battle of France who thought chucking in the towel and leaving the continentals to put their own house in order really was the best course of action.  So from Hitler's point of view, bluffing was well worth a try.  Indeed Churchill had to work hard to secure a consensus within the ruling establishment for a continuation of a war many people believed had already been lost.

Edited December 16, 2016 by Wulf

[kendo]

...If you think Hitler seriously believed that his air force, despite it's record over Dunkirk and the losses it suffered in the Battle of France, would somehow come right, and successfully reverse it's fortunes on the other side over of the English Channel

 

...

 

You can't be serious on this?

 

You really think the prevailing mood in the German high command and Luftwaffe after the incredible victories in France and the low countries was  "Wow! we took a real hiding there. Better not do that again"?!

Edited December 16, 2016 by kendo

[Wulf]

 

 

 

The Luftwaffe would keep the Royal Navy at bay. This is precisely why the RAF had to be destroyed and German air supremacy established over southern England. They knew right from the outset that this was essential. 

 

If the Luftwaffe couldn't establish air supremacy over Dunkirk, and it couldn't, even using advance bases in France, how was it going to achieve air supremacy on the other side of the Channel?  And without air supremacy, how was it going to successfully cover an invasion force and how was it 'also' going to eliminate the most powerful navy in the world?

 

Do you actually imagine that the German military wasn't fully aware of the realities of attempting to mount an invasion in such circumstances? 

[kendo]

I don't think they thought it would be a 'picnic'. The difficulties and challenges were clear. Nonetheless the strategic situation demanded a resolution. And therefore the best plan had to be developed and implemented.

 

how was it going to achieve air supremacy on the other side of the Channel? By defeating the RAF through sustained attrition and attacks on infrastructure. 

 

And without air supremacy, how was it going to successfully cover an invasion force? Without air supremacy there wasn't going to be an invasion. It was a prerequisite.

 

how was it 'also' going to eliminate the most powerful navy in the world? Provided air supremacy could be achieved the Luftwaffe would be uncontested and would use overwhelming aerial power to destroy any RN attempt to intercept an invasion fleet. 

 

Do you actually imagine that the German military wasn't fully aware of the realities of attempting to mount an invasion in such circumstances? Of course they were. But the military's role is to implement the instructions of their political masters - no matter how challenging.

[Brano]

I'd say GAA = German Air Arms would be more appropriate translation.

[kendo]

In Ireland GAA is well known ....as the Gaelic Athletics Association.

[unreasonable]

I'd say GAA = German Air Arms would be more appropriate translation.

 

GAF is not a translation of a proper name or title - merely an acronym of a descriptive phrase. 

[Brano]

In Ireland GAA is well known ....as the Gaelic Athletics Association.

Damn