Ok, sell me the Pacific theatre planes.

[Sokol1]

 

I too am bitterly disappointed that it went to Kuban, and not to Finland.

 

Fortunately is Kuban, and not Finland, a good motive there:   

 

http://forum.il2sturmovik.com/topic/25185-ok-sell-me-pacific-theatre-planes/page-4?do=findComment&comment=391585

[DD_Arthur]

Corsair KD431 in the Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovilton.  Original FAA colour scheme, August 1944.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.fleetairarm.com/aviation-museum-past-projects.aspx

[TheElf]

lovely pics Arthur, thanks for sharing.

[Haza]

Although I've stated the planeset and the continuation of the Eastern front doesn't interest me I'm encouraged by the direction jasons posts are pointing towards. With the prospect of the Pacific war on the horizon I'm seriously considering throwing my support into the new direction by purchasing kuban.

Great photo shamrock

 

Rolling_Blunder,

 

I'm waiting to see that BOK Gold bar underneath your name.  You can escort my A-20 in your nice Vb. 

 

Note:

As a kid growing up listening to my Grand Father (Served 152 Sqn RAF) talking about his war experiences, I could not get enough of going to various museums (Hendon, Duxford) just to look at the various aircraft on display.  I never in my wildest dreams thought that one day a computer would allow me to experience just a little of what it was like to fly any of these aircraft.  I have no great passion for BOK, BOF nor BOS, but what excites me most is trying to master all of the plane sets on offer and to understand what it was like to have either the best or the worst.  I admire the real pilots of the day who had to fly their *hitty aircraft against a better opposition, whilst not having the choice to wait until the next Battle came along.  I do not know any of you guys, but I'm just glad that at least there are "Aircraft Nerds" out there who enjoy aircraft as much as I do.  Just looking at some of the photos makes me want to go to my local museum to look at the BF109 G6 again!!

 

Regards

 

Haza

Edited September 20, 2016 by Haza

[Gambit21]

Yes Arthur, good stuff.

If I had any kind of real camera I'd take pictures of some of the beauties at the "Flying Heritage Collection" near me.

 

A Hellcat, an Oscar, a Zeke..(not to mention an IL2, a Storch, a 109D and others) and many of them fly now and then.

[BlitzPig_EL]

 

Two Zekes I saw a few years ago at the Thunder Over Michigan airshow...

 

Oh, and some memories from days past in IL2 '46.  BlitzPigs ready for a strike mission, somewhere in the Pacific...

 

Edited September 20, 2016 by BlitzPig_EL

[Cybermat47]

Just looking at some of the photos makes me want to go to my local museum to look at the BF109 G6 again!!

 

Regards

 

Haza

Your local museum? You make it sound so small...

 

 

Your local museum is one of the best holiday destinations on the planet!

Edited September 20, 2016 by Cybermat47

[ShamrockOneFive]

I was at an airshow on the weekend and thought there were very few historic types.... There was one P-51D (which did serve in the Pacific!).

 

Edited September 21, 2016 by ShamrockOneFive

[ACG_KaiLae]

FYI to OP:

 

[Haza]

Your local museum? You make it sound so small...

 

 

Your local museum is one of the best holiday destinations on the planet!

 

I can just make out the G-6 attacking "G" for George.

Didn't realise that they had a 262 there.

Nice pics!

Edited September 21, 2016 by Haza

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

 

 

FYI to OP:

Just in case, its a very simplified perspective and omits many important factors. Youtube is not a best place to learn history. 

[Legioneod]

Just in case, its a very simplified perspective and omits many important factors. Youtube is not a best place to learn history. 

It just depends on what you watch. The Great War is an excellent channel. Sry for being off topic.

[unreasonable]

Just in case, its a very simplified perspective and omits many important factors. Youtube is not a best place to learn history. 

 

We all have to start somewhere, and simplified perspectives are an essential part of getting a grip on a complex issue.

 

I am am sure we all know by now what a dedicated historian you are: by all means add some insight if you can spare the time.

 

That would be a much more valuable use of your sophisticated skills than denigrating someone else's attempts to make sense of the topic.

[216th_Lucas_From_Hell]

Hiromachi has been one of the most active members in terms of educating others on the Pacific, and he's done that throughout this very thread a few times already. No need to jump on the guy for simply giving a word of caution that the documentary has some oversimplifications which must be taken with a grain of salt.

 

It reminds me of this Military Channel documentary on the Fw-190 when they talk about it fighting the RAF in the West then say something like 'in 1941 Operation Barbarossa was launched; the Russians had only biplanes and were no match for the Fw-190; losses were great' when the nearest Fw-190 to the front was probably in an assembly line deep in Germany

[unreasonable]

Hiromachi has been one of the most active members in terms of educating others on the Pacific, and he's done that throughout this very thread a few times already. No need to jump on the guy for simply giving a word of caution that the documentary has some oversimplifications which must be taken with a grain of salt.

 

It reminds me of this Military Channel documentary on the Fw-190 when they talk about it fighting the RAF in the West then say something like 'in 1941 Operation Barbarossa was launched; the Russians had only biplanes and were no match for the Fw-190; losses were great' when the nearest Fw-190 to the front was probably in an assembly line deep in Germany

 

There is a big difference between making statements that are completely false and making statements that may be necessary simplifications in order to fit within some publishing constraint, as you am sure fully understand.

 

All historical claims have to be taken with a grain of salt, including Hiromachi's and even yours. (And especially mine). They can only ever be a partial view, whether true or not. Sometimes a more simplified view is considerably more useful than a nuanced and detailed view, especially to someone making their first forays into the subject.

 

I appreciate Hiromachi's educational efforts - I have just ordered one of the books he recommended so that I can replace my Midway myths with .... some different Midway myths probably.

But I would prefer that people who are contributing something that they found interesting were not discouraged by an oppressively fastidious attitude by those with more expertise, especially if it is couched in such general terms.

 

If there is something specific that he thinks is important and wrong, or omitted, by all means say what it is.

[Tyberan]

Your local museum? You make it sound so small...

 

 

Your local museum is one of the best holiday destinations on the planet!

 

WTF, i had no idea the museum had an ME-262, a G6, and a komet. 

 

Now there is a reason to visit Canberra

[Feathered_IV]

WTF, i had no idea the museum had an ME-262, a G6, and a komet.

 

Now there is a reason to visit Canberra

The G6 is still in its original paintwork too...

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

 

 

I am am sure we all know by now what a dedicated historian you are: by all means add some insight if you can spare the time.

Well, there is no need for that. I'm amateur historian, not professional. Dedication comes from passion. I'm sure there are many like me, just that they are interested in Italian or other aircraft. We certainly have quite a few Luftwaffe specialists on this boards. 

Anyway, I can add some insight if I can find time which recently is a problem due to simple fact that I prepare for 8-9 hours a day (studying) for entry exams for profession courses of legal adviser/prosecutor/judge. If I find time I try to add as much as possible.

 

For example: 

~6:20 - indeed battleship played an important role in Japanese doctrine, but its hard to say that fleet organization focused on battleships. During the 20s-30s and WW2 Japanese Navy build only two battleships - Yamato and Musashi ( Mutsu and Nagato were completed in early 20s, but they were laid down in 19with a plan of further two, one of which was completed as aircraft carrier.) while other Navies either replaced older ships (still in tonnage limits) or built more of them - for US that would be Colorado class, North Carolina class, South Dakota-class followed into war by Iowa, Britain that would be Nelson class and King George V class. Oh and that last one,  HMS Vanguard. 

 

Secondly, if you follow most of the operations battleships were always in support role because Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise and Hyuga were too slow to keep up with most of Japanese aircraft carriers. The only ships able to do so were Kong-class battlecruisers. Mutsu, Nagato, Yamato and Musashi were considered by most of Japanese airmen as luxurious hotels, serving no purpose or adding little in battles as those were carried by Carrier Divisions (1st and 2nd Carrier divisions creating Kido Butai - Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu and 5th Carrier division with Zuikaku and Shokaku) and mentioned Kongo-class battlecruisers. By 1944 Japanese established biggest possible force of carriers (possible for Japan) called 1st Mobile Fleet containing 9 aircraft carriers. Carrier divisions were organized and their aircraft for the most part combined into one Air Group.

 

~7:00 - this is correct, Japanese indeed made a huge mistake by not focusing their submarine force to attack and break enemy communication lines.

 

~8:20 - correct but too simplified, inability to construct airfields quickly enough and most importantly to construct large and hard landing strips contributed to many non-combat losses - more here:  http://www.historynet.com/japans-fatally-flawed-air-forces-in-world-war-ii-2.htm

But this is mostly due to simple fact that Japanese society was less industrialized and wasnt motorized in similar manner as American or French society was. If civilian demands were lesser and military focused only on combat equipment, there was little room left for other vehicles. For example after capturing Guam Japanese construction units praised bulldozers that Americans forgot to destroy as they could much quicker clean the area and prepare for air operations. 

 

~8:30 - that is again half true, Japanese radar development before the war was not far from US one. However Americans by 1940 placed a lot more money and resources into development of combat effective radar and Japanese lagged behind, having no radar on their ships by late 1942 (when first radars would be mounted on several ships). 

 

~8:50 - I dont see that as a problem at all, B-17s were also used for transporting. Hell, Liberators and Flying Fortresses dropped supplied on Warsaw during 1944 Uprising. Use of bombers in transport role is not unusual. 

 

~9:26 - It's not a problem that aircraft were too close as if you look on many pictures from Marine or Army units, Americans also parked their machines close. Lack was in ability to construct shelters to protect machines from any shrapnel's. As mentioned in video other lack was in early warning systems, in particular that cost Japanese Army over a 100 aircraft lost in a single day when American Army strafed Wewak area. 

 

~9:50 - Radios issue was debunked some time ago, cant find materials now but actual issue was not with radios which had only one channel but were relatively good quality even though less modern than American ones. Issue was protection against static and noises, it seems cables were not properly protected from various effects having an impact on quality of received messages. Later radios dealt with this somewhat better, in A6M5 you would find a very nice Type 3 Ku 1 radio set. 

 

~11:00 - Not quite exactly. And sidenote, Germans started providing their aircraft with some protection based on Spanish War experiences. But their fighter units were only provided with protection when 1939 was coming to an end, fuel tanks were not self sealing but there was a duralumin laminated bulkhead that provided only moderate protection. 

 

For now that's about it, I will later add more to this but for the moment duty is calling. 

 

 

 

I appreciate Hiromachi's educational efforts - I have just ordered one of the books he recommended so that I can replace my Midway myths with .... some different Midway myths probably.

Oh yeah, Jon Parshall admitted some time ago that he made similar assumption as others before on War Games carried by Navy command and its importance. Shattered Sword is not perfect. No human work is perfect. Well, maybe except for Aston Martins but its my personal perspective on those cars

Here is what Jon recommended to read to understand War Games:

https://www.academia.edu/1184454/The_Urban_Legend_of_the_Fixed_Japanese_Wargaming_of_the_Midway_Campaign 

[unreasonable]

Interesting article, even if I did have to give my inside leg measurement to Google+ to get it.

 

Nicely illustrates the difficulty of:

 

1) Doing history

 

2) Military contingency planning 

 

3) Proof reading

 

All in one document.

[JtD]

indeed battleship played an important role in Japanese doctrine, but its hard to say that fleet organization focused on battleships. During the 20s-30s and WW2 Japanese Navy build only two battleships - Yamato and Musashi ( Mutsu and Nagato were completed in early 20s, but they were laid down in 19with a plan of further two, one of which was completed as aircraft carrier.) while other Navies either replaced older ships (still in tonnage limits) or built more of them - for US that would be Colorado class, North Carolina class, South Dakota-class followed into war by Iowa, Britain that would be Nelson class and King George V class. Oh and that last one, HMS Vanguard.

Allow me to derail the topic a little further...

 

Imho, it is very clear that IJN doctrine did indeed focus on the battleship. The Japanese naval strategy was always focussed on the one decisive battle against the US, in home waters. It was assumed that, once the Japanese would conflict with the US for instance over the Phillipines, the US would send their battle fleet en route to set things straight. Defeating this force in a decisive battle is essentially what the Japanese war planning was all about. That battle was to be fought pre-dominantly with battleships.

Because of global depression a naval arms race was politically prevented with several naval treaties in the inter war years, including a near 20 year construction stop for battleships. As you say, Nagato and Mutsu were the last Japanese battleships completed prior to the treaties, they were laid down 1917. The next battleships were of the Yamato class, laid down 1937. This break in battleship construction has nothing to do with Japanese naval strategy, it has solely economical reason. In fact, world wide. With the exception of the British Nelson and Rodney, built for political reasons, no new battleships were laid down world wide until the Germans restarted the arms race with their radical Deutschland class heavy cruisers, laid down in 1929.

All navies possessing battleships instead modernized their existing ones, and the Japanese certainly did that with their bits as well. In fact, at the outbreak of the Pacific war it had arguably the most modern battleship force in the world. Carriers were thought to be support, and were being built in the inter war years mainly because the treaties allowed for it.

The Nagato class consisted of two units, Nagato and Mutsu. No Nagato class was ever converted into a carrier. This happened to two of the follow up battlecruisers of the Amagi class - Akagi and Amagi. The latter was damaged in 1923 an earthquake, so that the Tosa class battleship Kaga was used instead. All designs part of the 8/8 plan, which called for a modern battlefleet of no less than 16 new ships.

The fact that Japan did not complete battleships with the exception of the Yamato class in WW2 is much more a testament to the industrial limits than to the naval strategy at that time. In addition, it had lost the bigger part of the carrier force at Midway, while their battlefleet still had suffered no loss. So it is no miracle that the focus of naval construction was shifted towards carries and the much needed smaller units.

[J2_Trupobaw]

Just in case, its a very simplified perspective and omits many important factors. Youtube is not a best place to learn history. 

 

 

It just depends on what you watch. The Great War is an excellent channel. Sry for being off topic.

 

That's why I prefer to ask other simmers . Problem with Youtube is, by the time you can tell solid material from rubbish, you don't need to be educated anymore. (And, I was going to give Great War as example of the latter )...

[Legioneod]

That's why I prefer to ask other simmers . Problem with Youtube is, by the time you can tell solid material from rubbish, you don't need to be educated anymore. (And, I was going to give Great War as example of the latter )...

How is the great war rubbish? Just wondering.

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

Apologies for taking this so long ...

 

 

 

Imho, it is very clear that IJN doctrine did indeed focus on the battleship.

I wasn't precise, what I meant was that fleet doctrine did not focus entirely on battleships and subsequently less attention was given to their development and tactics as new weapons created new problems. 

 

 

 

The Japanese naval strategy was always focussed on the one decisive battle against the US, in home waters. It was assumed that, once the Japanese would conflict with the US for instance over the Phillipines, the US would send their battle fleet en route to set things straight. Defeating this force in a decisive battle is essentially what the Japanese war planning was all about. That battle was to be fought pre-dominantly with battleships.

I'd say that they were rather right as War Plan Orange was based on entirely same principle of decisive battle (Alfred Mahan doctrine) in which fleet was expected to rush from West Coast and relieve blocked Phillipines in a manner of decisive battle would be fought, little consideration was given to naval aviation or submarines either. Only later was that corrected and plans execution was in original form scrapped after Pearl Harbor where battleship line was put out of action, leaving aircraft carriers untouched. 

 

But in relation to that plan Japanese aware of treaties limitations imposed on Japan focused put heavy emphasis on attrition tactics (zengen sakusen) to weaken the American battle line during its long voyage across the Pacific. These were based on night torpedo attack by destroyers and cruisers, and, as they became more capable, aircraft. First Japanese aircraft carrier, Hosho, could hardly change any game since in 1920s its moderate aircraft group was composed mostly of light naval aircraft. By 1930s this changed but with newer and larger aircraft Hosho was limited only half of its original complement. So it was no strategy changer. 

Of course with Akagi and Kaga this started changing, though carrier force was still seen in a supportive way. 

 

Following is based on Sunburst.

The general idea of the role of naval aviation in a fleet action was rather similar in US, British and Japanese navies before the war. Each held to the primacy of the heavy surface gun as the final arbiter of naval combat, none viewed such combat as simply a replay of Jutland. Rather, all saw the future clash between capital ships as being decisively affected by the introduction of naval air power, either through damage to the enemy's battle line (but only after destruction of his air power) or through the disruption of his gunnery. High ranking officers had a confidence that battleships could withstand all but fiercest attacks from incoming aircraft and expressed serious doubts if any carrier could long survive unprotected in a clash with battleships. This opinion was not blindly based on hopes of old admirals but on actual studies and practical experiments carried in 1930s, which showed that the bomb loads of the most naval aircraft were inadequate to destroy a capital ship under way and took into account the meager protective armor on aircraft carriers. Yet as we know quickly changing technology made it possible soon for aircraft to decide naval battles without an eye contact of battleships.

 

In regard to Japanese Navy, their doctrine started to take into account naval aircraft in early 1930s. In 1933 the Navy General Staff set up a committee to study the problem of revision of the instructions. Its members were so divided at that time on the issue of naval air power that the committee made little progress. Eventually what emerged in 1934 was a set of vacillating and far narrower guidelines, called "Draft Instructions for Air Combat (Kokusen yomu soan), which satisfied no one and was regarded rather as a temporary conclusions. At the same time, with increase of range and power of new machines a serious discussion was taken on what should be the primary targets of aircraft carriers and if commitment of aircraft should only relate to reconnaissance or something more valuable. Around 1932-1933 Japanese Navy realized that to complete all the other tasks it was necessary to possess air superiority over field of battle which required an elimination of enemy aircraft carriers, thus Navy began to shift its initial aerial targets from enemy battleships to his carriers, and by middecade with the modern aircraft, destruction of the enemy carrier force became the focus of intensified research and practice by naval air forces. 

 

In 1937 the Navy worked out a new scheme of air operations against US Pacific Fleet that included the following principle: air operations were to take place before the decisive battle, and such operations would have, as their objectives, both the command of air space over the battle zone and the destruction of enemy carriers and battleships. To achieve this it was crucial to deliver a strike to an enemy but avoid being hit as well, and Japanese thought that possession of range advantage would be crucial factor here, thus adding to all aircraft requirements a range that could hardly be found in contemporary western designs. 

 

The realization of policy of "outranging" enemy naval air power thus gave substance to the concept of preemptive mass aerial strike. This in turn made it possible to free Japanese carriers from only supportive way, as now they could and would operate in the vanguard of the fleet as a means of strengthening the fleets reconnaissance capabilities, acting either independently or in cooperation with cruisers. In 1936 a Staff College carried a study, which proposed that smaller Japanese aircraft carriers would be operated in dispersed formation and large fleet carriers were to operate alone. Dispersed formations were to be deployed in such a manner, as to encircle the enemy fleet, enabling individual carriers to concentrate their attacks on the enemy forces without themselves becoming exposed as a massed target. With this thinking serious losses were still to be expected and in study writings it was accepted, in its words Japanese carrier "must be prepared to be impaled as it impales the enemy". 

 

At the end of 1930s Japanese started to revise their tactical principles and priorities, as the navy realized that to create an overall naval air doctrine could only be achieved by a major reorganization of the formal principles of Japanese naval thought. Naval Staff College drafted a "Supplement to the Battle Instructions: Air Operations" (Kaisen yomurei zokuhen: kokusen-bu), later distributed by the Navy General Staff to all units and stations. This was an intermediate step to revise former Battle Instructions, stressed the importance of preemptive attacks; a shift in target priorities for air attacks from the enemy's battle line to his carriers; decisive air combat as a necessary prelude to victory by surface units; and the identification of land-based air groups as one of the principal elements of naval power. This measures were not fully implemented by the outbreak of the war though.

 

Yet the most important factor, a need to mass and concentrate of aircraft carrier force was still in progress. Based on Commander Minoru Genda "discovery" of need to concentrate fleet in a box formation to operate together, Combined Fleet decided to undertake a number of operational experiments in the concentration of aircraft carriers. Early in 1941 the Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu combined to forma  temporary training unit to perfect such operations. While these trials had some success, the absence of an overall carrier commander and the lack of standardized training program for the fleets carrier divisions pointed up the need for a permanent carrier command. Here was a chance of Rear Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa to authorize a formation of an "air fleet" within the Combined Fleet, so that all its air units - either land or carrier based - would come under a unified command, in order to train and fight together. In December 1942 Yamamoto authorized implementation of this policy which resulted in real concentration of naval air power in April 1941 with the creation of the First Air Fleet, headed by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and composed of First, Second and Third carrier divisions (later this year to Third carrier division was detached as Zuikaku and Shokaku were commissioned and created a Fifth carrier division). At the time of its creation, First Air Fleet was the single most powerful formation of naval air power in the world, specifically including the US Pacific Fleet and British Royal Navy, comprising as it did, all of Japan's fleet carriers in commission and 464 aircraft. Activation of the First Air Fleet was not a total break with the traditional mission or force structure of the Japanese navy, fleet was still existing to participate in a decisive engagement whose main contestants would be opposing battleships and this was not dismissed until creation of 1st Mobile Fleet. 

For the time being Navy created only one component, even though the single most important one, of the mobile task force (kido butai). Though creation of even this single element was revolutionary in strategic concept and certainly without it, there would be no possibility to carry an attack on Pearl Harbor. 

 

Interestingly there were men who advocated for complete revision of principles and not only reorganizing the navy structure but completely revising doctrine. Most important person was Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi, who realized that with the advent of aircraft and submarines, command of the sea involved three dimensions, not just two. He argued that surface control of the oceans was dependent upon domination of the vertical dimension, particularly upon control of the air. For this reason, rapid dominance over the western Pacific must first be obtained by aircraft, only after that by surface ships. For any navy man, this was a doctrinal heterodoxy. He even went further (which proved somewhat wrong) - insited that even the context of command of the air had changed in recent years: whereas the aircraft carrier had until recently been considered a prime element in naval air power, with their rapid development, land-based bomber and flying boats had become the navy's most potent air weapons. Thus, in Inoue's view, control of the air could be seized by aircraft alone without the involvement of any surface units, even aircraft carriers.

This basically is what we know an air power doctrine, so similar to ideas of Mitchell. 

 

So to conclude, even if Navy was not as most think it should have been, it was by the late autumn of 1941 the most potent offensive force of any of the three major navies. First Air Fleet was still not regarded by the Japanese naval leadership as the main element of the Combined Fleet, a position reserved in Japanese naval orthodoxy for "big ships and big guns." The completion of super-battleship Yamato on the even of the Pacific War confirmed somehow this line taken by Navy General Staff. But at the same time in less than 10 years Navy has revised its doctrine and placed aircraft carriers from the rear of formation to the very front giving confidence into their ability to project power and effectively cripple if not defeat enemy fleet. From initial ideas of dispersing aircraft carriers and leaving them alone there was created a force within a Combined Fleet that could deliver such a powerful blows as Pearl Harbor and then vanish before enemy could even react.  

 

 

 

So it is no miracle that the focus of naval construction was shifted towards carries and the much needed smaller units.

 

Focus on the naval construction of aircraft carriers was only boosted by the loss of Kido Butai, but actual process of increasing the numbers of carriers started before the outbreak of the war when マル急計画, 出師準備第一着作業建艦計画 (Rapid Naval Armaments Supplement Programme) was signed in summer 1941 with decision to construct Unryu-class carriers (starting with Unryu), convert two passenger liners for aircraft carriers ( Hiyo and Jun'yo). And since 1939 there was already in plans and work Taiho.

This was indeed further revised after Midway, when in summer 1942  改マル5計画, 戦備促進第二次実行計画 (Modified 5th Naval Armaments Supplement Programme) was signed, calling for construction of dozen more aircraft carriers (starting with Amagi, Katsuragi, Kasagi and others) and conversion of some other vessels. 

 

So thats for this quite long rant, took me quite a few hours to read Sunburst and than produce this. Damn, that excitement in me about Pacific is really working

Edited September 22, 2016 by =LD=Hiromachi

[PatrickAWlson]

@Hiromachi - appreciate your taking the time to post.  Very informative.

[JtD]

I wasn't precise, what I meant was that fleet doctrine did not focus entirely on battleships and subsequently less attention was given to their development and tactics as new weapons created new problems.

OK, I'd agree with that and the more detailed summary you've given above. I've always wondered if the treaties had not restricted battleship development, and the big ships had gotten the full attention all the time, what kind of ships and what type of naval war would have (been) fought in WW2.

[Bearfoot]

Apologies for taking this so long ...

 

 

 

I wasn't precise, what I meant was that fleet doctrine did not focus entirely on battleships and subsequently less attention was given to their development and tactics as new weapons created new problems. 

 

 

 

I'd say that they were rather right as War Plan Orange was based on entirely same principle of decisive battle (Alfred Mahan doctrine) in which fleet was expected to rush from West Coast and relieve blocked Phillipines in a manner of decisive battle would be fought, little consideration was given to naval aviation or submarines either. Only later was that corrected and plans execution was in original form scrapped after Pearl Harbor where battleship line was put out of action, leaving aircraft carriers untouched. 

 

But in relation to that plan Japanese aware of treaties limitations imposed on Japan focused put heavy emphasis on attrition tactics (zengen sakusen) to weaken the American battle line during its long voyage across the Pacific. These were based on night torpedo attack by destroyers and cruisers, and, as they became more capable, aircraft. First Japanese aircraft carrier, Hosho, could hardly change any game since in 1920s its moderate aircraft group was composed mostly of light naval aircraft. By 1930s this changed but with newer and larger aircraft Hosho was limited only half of its original complement. So it was no strategy changer. 

Of course with Akagi and Kaga this started changing, though carrier force was still seen in a supportive way. 

 

Following is based on Sunburst.

 

[FANTASTIC summary of development of Japanese naval/air doctrine snipped ...]

 

@Hiromachi, magnificent work. Worthy of an independent article/citation in and of itself for such a clear yet concise summary of the development of Japanese doctrine. Loved it. The Japanese development of naval war tactical concepts and framework are at least as innovative and revolutionary and original and brilliant as the evolution of the Blitzkrieg/Panzer tactical concepts by the Germans on the other side of the world in land-based war. And just as fascinating and interesting in how it all played out. But for some reason, not as widely recognized as such, by many in this community as well as others. 

 

Anyway, I should bill you for the $20 I just spent without meaning to to get "Sunburst".

Edited September 22, 2016 by Bearfoot

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

OK, I'd agree with that and the more detailed summary you've given above. I've always wondered if the treaties had not restricted battleship development, and the big ships had gotten the full attention all the time, what kind of ships and what type of naval war would have (been) fought in WW2.

I honestly dont think it would be that different, even if treaties wouldnt be signed or come to conclusion there are economical and social arguments that would be raised. Japan had limited resources and amount of shipyards and in 1920s wasn't on a collision course with future Allies, US military during 20s and 30s had rather sad experiences and I dont think society (in particular after 1929) would see any benefits in throwing money at those big battleships. And Britain ? Well, Britain would be rather kept within "limits" by society as well. Huge military spending in peace time is rarely a thing (except for US today, but thats what happens when things get out of control). 

 

On the other hand I think larger ships would be built, with larger caliber guns and probably some other advancements in gun aiming. 

 

Still aircraft by 1930s started posing a threat and so consideration to an aircraft carrier wouldnt be neglected. Japanese would probably build larger aircraft carriers than Hiryu/Soryu/Ryuho, though first two werent actually bad. For the tonnage they had pretty impressive characteristics. 

 

Though above is rather an amateur speculation ...

 

 

 

Worthy of an independent article/citation in and of itself for such a clear yet concise summary of the development of Japanese doctrine.

It's got its article/citation in that book and even more. Mark Peattie did a great job by presenting this to western readers, credits rather should go to him  

 

 

 

Anyway, I should bill you for the $20 I just spent without meaning to to get "Sunburst".

I bill myself every month so much ... and still have to find funds for that BoK ! Sunburst will be nice addition, it nicely explains raise and fall of Navy airpower and consequences of various mistakes. 

 

Anyway, when it comes to Pacific I still wonder if instead of Okinawa a battle of Leyte or Phillipinea Sea wouldn't be a better idea. 

[TheElf]

Hiromachi,

   

      You seem pretty well read on the Pacific.  More so than the usual grognard.  

 

Have you ever heard of this little guy?...a little project I had a minor role in.  You might enjoy it while we wait.

 

http://www.matrixgames.com/products/294/details/War.In.The.Pacific

[unreasonable]

 The Japanese development of naval war tactical concepts and framework are at least as innovative and revolutionary and original and brilliant as the evolution of the Blitzkrieg/Panzer tactical concepts by the Germans on the other side of the world in land-based war. And just as fascinating and interesting in how it all played out. But for some reason, not as widely recognized as such, by many in this community as well as others. 

 

 

If they were at least as innovative and revolutionary as the evolution of Blitkrieg/Panzer tactical concepts, arguably it is only because neither set of developments was particularly revolutionary, but logical incremental developments of previous practices.

 

Leaving the German case aside for the moment, the main advantage the Japanese had in their early naval engagements seems to have been lookouts who looked, rather than relying on radar, outstanding torpedoes that simply out-ranged and out hit allied equivalents - while using essentially identical cruiser/destroyer tactics - plus aircraft specifically designed for the long range work the theatre needed. The Zero additionally being an outstanding aircraft, especially when set against air forces that had not yet identified its weaknesses.

 

Since they had taken the initiative when the US was not yet mobilized and the UK and other allied forces had concentrated their forces in Europe, they were able to dictate the time and place of battle and defeat allied forces in detail. Even the attack at a fleet in it's base in Pearl Harbour attack was not unprecedented: the RN had pulled off this trick at Taranto, arguably with a greater strategic impact on the naval balance of power in the relevant theatre.

 

Additionally, the Japanese failed to make best use of their submarines and proved incapable of mounting a serious defense against the US's unrestricted submarine warfare.

 

A very mixed report card, all in all.

[unreasonable]

Hiromachi,

   

      You seem pretty well read on the Pacific.  More so than the usual grognard.  

 

Have you ever heard of this little guy?...a little project I had a minor role in.  You might enjoy it while we wait.

 

http://www.matrixgames.com/products/294/details/War.In.The.Pacific

 

I remember that: for some reason I found invading Australia and NZ particularly satisfying.  Good game!

 

In particular, it gave you the problems, playing as Japan, of strategic dispersal. You start with the all the advantages of concentration of force against enemies that cannot provide one another with mutual support, but as you push out your perimeter your forces spread out and your enemy is pushed back on his bases, until you reach a point where your own forces start to be defeated in detail. Or, if you concentrate, the allies simply roll up the areas you have left weakly defended.

 

Wargames often, (much more often that not IMHO), fail to capture the real dilemmas commanders faced, usually because logistics is underplayed, redeployment is way too easy and fog of war absent rather than because the outcome of individual battles is implausible. (We have hindsight too, even if FOW is modelled).  This game was one that got those elements done well. 

 

The scope and depth was daunting, but as a game vehicle to get into understanding the big picture of PTO and SEA operations, it was outstanding.

[Bearfoot]

If they were at least as innovative and revolutionary as the evolution of Blitkrieg/Panzer tactical concepts, arguably it is only because neither set of developments was particularly revolutionary, but logical incremental developments of previous practices.

 

"incremental developments of previous practices." 

 

Yes, of course. 

 

As are most scientific/technical revolutions.

 

But not all incremental developments are revolutionary. This development of naval warfare was.

 

Classic work on this subject is Thomas Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolution". In this work's parlance, the Japanese developments led to a paradigm shift in naval warfare.

Edited September 23, 2016 by Bearfoot

[Bearfoot]

 

 

So, if you were teleported back to 1941 and could whisper 3 things about doctrine rather than tactics into the heads of the admirals while the slept, what might you say?

 

-  In the brave new world of aircraft delivering destruction across the clouds and beyond the horizon, scouting/intelligence is not an after-thought. The distances and resulting time lag over which these engagements develop means that you need to make scouting a first-class part of the equation, alongside fighters/dive-bombers/torpedo-planes so that you can use these assets properly

 

- Your most valuable, slowest-to-replace assets are not your aircraft or your battleships. They are your superbly trained pilots and mechanics. 

 

- If your CAP is uncoordinated, you will lose to the first multi-wave/multi-axis attack. Central control and direction of CAP to vector fighters to threats is crucial. Of course, this means you need a way of spotting threats. Sharp-eyed lookouts, OK. But there is this thing called "radar" ....

 

And if we were allowed to go back a little more in time and whisper into more heads to influence carrier systems and crew training ...

 

- Damage control should become a religious calling not only for everyone on board every carrier, from the captain to the lowest-ranking ensign, airmen included, but ships and ship systems design as well; in particular, it is not enough to design the damage control to work; crucially, damage control systems/policies/training should be designed to work while the ship is actually damaged as well! And maybe damaged multiple times.

Edited September 23, 2016 by Bearfoot

[Gort]

I found flying over water ramps up the tension considerably. Staring intently for that first sign of land or enemy fleet. Or even more - engine failing and fuel running low, hoping for that first sign of a friendly carrier. Coming out of a fight and trying hard to remember your last known position and climb back to altitude. Trying to plot a course at the same time as you keep an eye out for hostile threats. No forests rivers and towns as friendly signposts. Pure airmanship and bird sense needed to get you home. The final challenge of landing on and that first big exhalation of breath in relief as your hook catches the wire and you are safely home. Then the big grin of satisfaction as you fold your wings and taxi to the forward elevator...

 

We need a MK-3A cockpit plotting board in the USN aircraft.

 

http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2014/01/finding-way-home.html

 

I have no idea how the IJN pilots navigated.

Edited September 23, 2016 by Victory205

[unreasonable]

"incremental developments of previous practices." 

 

Yes, of course. 

 

As are most scientific/technical revolutions.

 

But not all incremental developments are revolutionary.

 

Classic work on this subject is Thomas Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolution". In this work's parlance, the Japanese developments led to a paradigm shift in naval warfare.

 

"Shut that book and never open it again".

 

Seriously, that book is crap. Kuhn's main contention is not the obvious point that old men are reluctant to change ideas that have made their names, given them tenure and so on, or even that people sometimes have difficulty accepting new frameworks that go against their established points of view. All of these points were well understood well before Kuhn arrived.

 

No, Kuhn's USP is that the clashing sets of ideas in a "scientific revolution"  are somehow "incommensurate", although he was often unusually reticent in saying exactly what he thought that meant.

 

Dictionary definition = "not able to be judged by the same standard as something; having no common standard of measurement".

 

But this is simply untrue. The new ideas - in science - replace the old because they they are judged according to exactly the same standards as the old, namely their fit to the body of scientific knowledge about past events and their utility in creating testable hypotheses.

 

Unfortunately, the worst parts of Kuhn's book - the jargon of "paradigm" and "paradigm shift" have entered popular popular discourse as cool-sounding terms devoid of real meaning, while the same ideas have been co-opted by the pseudo-science of sociology as a  cop-out from having to exercise any sort of fact based critical assessment. 

 

Edit - OTOH agree with your post about tactical/training priorities!

Edited September 23, 2016 by unreasonable

[Bearfoot]

"Shut that book and never open it again".

 

Seriously, that book is crap. Kuhn's main contention is not the obvious point that old men are reluctant to change ideas that have made their names, given them tenure and so on, or even that people sometimes have difficulty accepting new frameworks that go against their established points of view. All of these points were well understood well before Kuhn arrived.

 

No, Kuhn's USP is that the clashing sets of ideas in a "scientific revolution"  are somehow "incommensurate", although he was often unusually reticent in saying exactly what he thought that meant.

 

Dictionary definition = "not able to be judged by the same standard as something; having no common standard of measurement".

 

But this is simply untrue. The new ideas - in science - replace the old because they they are judged according to exactly the same standards as the old, namely their fit to the body of scientific knowledge about past events and their utility in creating testable hypotheses.

 

Unfortunately, the worst parts of Kuhn's book - the jargon of "paradigm" and "paradigm shift" have entered popular popular discourse as cool-sounding terms devoid of real meaning, while the same ideas have been co-opted by the pseudo-science of sociology as a  cop-out from having to exercise any sort of fact based critical assessment. 

 

I cannot speak for how the book is consumed and used by the masses. But I can tell you that Kuhn nailed it in how science evolves. I know this because I work in the field. Not the history of science, but science. I am a scientist. I read all the papers. I have seen[*] two successive paradigm shifts in my own narrowly-defined specialty exactly follow Kuhn's outline: i.e., the old hands die, and the revolution becomes just business-as-usual for the next generation. It may work differently in your field or others, but TBH, and I have no doubt that there are probably a lot of responses/argument/etc. to Kuhn's view, but the notion of "brick-building" leading to "paradigm-shifts" is really, really, really, really, not the claptrap you make it out to be. Sorry, as far as authority on technological/scientific progress, going to have to go with Kuhn and my own experiences over you, here. 

 

[* half of this happened before I was born, and a lot of the rest happened before I even finished high school; but the battles continue to be fought, especially the second one, during my early years. The second "war" was between the victors of the first one and next generation. These "victors" are mostly all retired, emeritus, or dead now. So except for one journal and few a hard-core holdouts, mainly the last students of the previous, the second revolution is mostly complete. ]

 

[EDIT:  This is so OT. So let's just agree to disagree on this one]

 

EDIT: Better yet, striking out this whole OT section; would delete it entirely except already responded to below, so did not want to be misleading.

 

 

 

Leaving the German case aside for the moment, the main advantage the Japanese had in their early naval engagements seems to have been lookouts who looked, rather than relying on radar, outstanding torpedoes that simply out-ranged and out hit allied equivalents - while using essentially identical cruiser/destroyer tactics - plus aircraft specifically designed for the long range work the theatre needed. The Zero additionally being an outstanding aircraft, especially when set against air forces that had not yet identified its weaknesses.

 

Since they had taken the initiative when the US was not yet mobilized and the UK and other allied forces had concentrated their forces in Europe, they were able to dictate the time and place of battle and defeat allied forces in detail. Even the attack at a fleet in it's base in Pearl Harbour attack was not unprecedented: the RN had pulled off this trick at Taranto, arguably with a greater strategic impact on the naval balance of power in the relevant theatre.

 

Additionally, the Japanese failed to make best use of their submarines and proved incapable of mounting a serious defense against the US's unrestricted submarine warfare.

 

A very mixed report card, all in all.

 

Hi unreasonable, you are so missing the forest for trees, here!

 

Japan's revolution in naval warfare was not flying in some planes to shoot some ships in the harbor. It was not a great torpedo or some sharp-eyed lookouts. It was the employment of balanced coordinated concentrations of ..... 

 

You know what? I simply cannot do a better job of summarizing the innovation that Hiromachi did. Give that a closer read. Focus on the concepts rather than what the planes looked like or how the torpedoes worked. 

Edited September 23, 2016 by Bearfoot

[unreasonable]

I cannot speak for how the book is consumed and used by the masses. But I can tell you that Kuhn nailed it in how science evolves. I know this because I work in the field. Not the history of science, but science. I am a scientist. I read all the papers. I have seen two successive paradigm shifts in my own narrowly-defined specialty exactly follow Kuhn's outline: i.e., the old hands die, and the revolution becomes just business-as-usual for the next generation. It may work differently in your field or others, but TBH, and I have no doubt that there are probably a lot of responses/argument/etc. to Kuhn's view, but the notion of "brick-building" leading to "paradigm-shifts" is really, really, really, really, not the claptrap you make it out to be. Sorry, as far as authority on technological/scientific progress, going to have to go with Kuhn and my own experiences over you, here. 

 

 

Of course - but I also trained initially as a scientist, before switching to philosophy, which included rather a lot of time spent of the philosophy of science, so I am quite happy with my ability to make my own assessment here.

 

I think that the problem is not your description of what happens when scientists change their ideas, but your misunderstanding of what Kuhn actually said.

 

He did not say that brick building led to paradigm shifts. Exactly the reverse. In Kuhn's view, the paradigm shifts come independently and episodically, and lead to a complete rearrangement of the bricks. Not only that, but the paradigms are "incommensurate" - ie cannot be judged one against the other by any independent standard.

 

Believe what you like - but if you insist on throwing in a reference like that do not be surprised if someone points out discrepancies in your interpretation.

 

Shall we get back to the evolution of naval doctrine without these appeals to old philosphers?

Edited September 23, 2016 by unreasonable

[Bearfoot]

 

Shall we get back to the evolution of naval doctrine without these appeals to old philosphers?

 

Sure.

 

A case might be argued that the IJN development of naval warfare was not revolutionary.

 

But you are not making it.  

 

And, as long as you cannot tell the difference between a transformation of the conceptual framework on the one hand, and the nuts-and-bolts of torpedo types and sharp-eyed lookouts and fighter aircraft capabilities etc., on the other, you are not going to be able to make it, either, I am afraid. Saying that Pearl Harbor was not innovative because Taranto preceded it is correct in the sense that they were both attacks on harbored ship by aircraft, but misses the point of conceptual evolution of naval doctrine with regards to carriers and aviation so completely that we are not even n the same room. 

 

Nor have submarines have anything to do with it. Yes, the Japanese misused the submarines. And no, that does not have anything to do with how the transformed naval warfare and in particular the role of shipboard aviation in naval warfare.

 

Maybe you are mistaking innovation/revolutionary with successful? Because sure, the irony is that the conceptual revolution started by the Japanese saw its ultimately successful expression and implementation not in the IJN, but the USN, which made some different implementation choices that history shows us worked out better. 

 

Just finishing "Shattered Sword", after which I am going to read "Sunburst". I highly recommend them.  Failing that, as I said, read Hiromachi's summary, focus on the concepts, and don't get distracted by the planes and torpedoes and submarines (??) and who was more successful etc.

Edited September 23, 2016 by Bearfoot

[unreasonable]

The problem with "focusing on the concepts" as you put it, is that it underestimates the material factors that dictated the outcomes. (Napoleon liked to say that the moral factor was ten times the material in war - when he was winning, almost always with the bigger army). 

 

The IJN did not win it's early cruiser and destroyer engagements because it had better "concepts", it won them because it had better weapons and men whose training overcame the disadvantages of inferior radar.

 

The IJN did not win it's early carrier battles because it had better "concepts". Those that it did win, it won because it had better aircraft and weapons - and numbers - to do the job. There is absolutely nothing revolutionary about this, and no "new paradigm". Carrier vs carrier battles did not happen in the ETO for the simple reason that geography made both the Italians and the Germans downplay their usefulness compared to ground based air power so they never completed a carrier. There was plenty of discussion about how they would be used in many navies. The IJN simply put these ideas into practice when others did not; a) because the navy was sufficiently powerful to ensure the financing of a large carrier programme and; b) the distances over which they expected to fight meant that they had no choice.

 

Pearl Harbor was not a new concept - nor was it "not in the same room" - except insofar as it was a surprise attack delivered in a country which was not at war. That part was clearly new: everything else was the same, just on a bigger scale. 

 

I do not have to prove that the IJN's naval concepts were not revolutionary. In my opinion it is a judgment of that kind that needs to be justified, and I have not yet seen anything yet that even begins to make a coherent case.

Edited September 23, 2016 by unreasonable

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

 

 

The problem with "focusing on the concepts" as you put it, is that it underestimates the material factors that dictated the outcomes.

Concepts in some way are also valuable. Japanese were obsessed with decisive battle and this led to specific set of air groups and tasks, leaving other tasks rather neglected. To havea  chance and win decisive battle Japanese had to sink or damage certain part of US fleet so carrier groups had twice as many attackers as fighters, at some point in mid 30s it was considered to entirely drop fighter (war in China corrected this view) and so standard air group was 1:1:1 (or precisely 21:21:21 on Shokaku/Zuikaku) for fighter, dive bombers and torpedo planes respectively. Midway led to revision of this since battle (regardless of the loss) indicated clearly that there werent enough Zeros on board to provide CAP for the fleet and to escort bombers to their target. Post Midway air group on Shokaku or Zuikaku (cant remember now) was adjusted to 27 Zeros, 27 Vals and 18 Kates and on Zuiho it went even further with twice as many fighters as dive bombers (Zuiho would play a role of an escort carrier, providing CAP rather than carrying offensive operations). This of course reduced offensive capabilities but at the same time allowed finally to have somewhat sufficient escorts and CAP (even though CAP at Midway did a very good job). 

 

Other negligence was reconnaissance which was left largely to floatplanes from cruisers, unfortunately floatplanes had much shorter range and their crews were relatively of lesser skill than any crew on board of aircraft carrier. This was slowly corrected later and each aircraft carrier had dedicated group of reconnaissance machines (for the most of the time it would be D4Y or C6N), and at least according to Halsey in this only respect Japanese not only improved but exceeded Americans having much better reconnaissance but that happened only when rest of the things were beyond saving.

 

Leaning to one part of doctrine, left the other uncovered and it got exploited by Americans when opportunity happened.  

[Bearfoot]

The problem with "focusing on the concepts" as you put it, is that it underestimates the material factors that dictated the outcomes. (Napoleon liked to say that the moral factor was ten times the material in war - when he was winning, almost always with the bigger army). 

 

The IJN did not win it's early cruiser and destroyer engagements because it had better "concepts", it won them because it had better weapons and men whose training overcame the disadvantages of inferior radar.

 

The IJN did not win it's early carrier battles because it had better "concepts". Those that it did win, it won because it had better aircraft and weapons - and numbers - to do the job. There is absolutely nothing revolutionary about this, and no "new paradigm". Carrier vs carrier battles did not happen in the ETO for the simple reason that geography made both the Italians and the Germans downplay their usefulness compared to ground based air power so they never completed a carrier. There was plenty of discussion about how they would be used in many navies. The IJN simply put these ideas into practice when others did not; a) because the navy was sufficiently powerful to ensure the financing of a large carrier programme and; b) the distances over which they expected to fight meant that they had no choice.

 

Pearl Harbor was not a new concept - nor was it "not in the same room" - except insofar as it was a surprise attack delivered in a country which was not at war. That part was clearly new: everything else was the same, just on a bigger scale. 

 

I do not have to prove that the IJN's naval concepts were not revolutionary. In my opinion it is a judgment of that kind that needs to be justified, and I have not yet seen anything yet that even begins to make a coherent case.

 

(Sigh). "Winning"? Is this your criteria for whether or not it was revolutionary? Ok, buddy ...

 

For the rest of us ...

 

Yes. They did not win. But I am not talking about winning. Yes, their material implementation was poor. But the concepts were still revolutionary. And brilliant. And when done right, did "win". But win or lose, the concepts were revolutionary, and set the foundations/framework for future of naval warfare.

 

And Pearl Harbor was not about the attack. It was about the ways carriers were used to effect the attack.

 

Back to you, unreasonable ...

 

You are still bumping into trees while looking for the forest.

Edited September 23, 2016 by Bearfoot