The Luftwaffe's lack of Strategic Bombing Initiative....

[FTC_Riksen]

Not sure how Marines are related to this topic, but there is no such thing as revisionist history. Of course we can happily say that all modern historians are damn revisionists when they try to reevaluate already described topics, but that would lead to acceptance of Soviet version of events in a year of 1939 when they crossed Polish borders on September 17th and claimed liberation of the eastern part of country. Or those bloody historians who reevaluate the aerial victories of pilots, how dare they. I guess biggest revisionist (albeit in different area) in our history was Nicolaus Copernicus when he placed the Sun rather than the Earth at the center of the universe. He should not do that ...

 

Reality is that there is absolutely no proof of a relation between dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and decision-making by the Japanese Government and Imperial General Headquarters. In fact there are multiple accounts from the shelter beneath the Imperial Palace which indicate that it did not cause any reaction in discussions over surrender :

 

P. Ham, "Hiroshima-Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath", 2012, page 345 of digital version.

 

 

P. Ham, "Hiroshima-Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath", 2012, page 347 of digital version.

 

 

P. Ham, "Hiroshima-Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath", 2012, page 353 of digital version.

 

As for the post war arguments for using it:

 

P. Ham, "Hiroshima-Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath", 2012, page 426 of digital version.

 

 

I can keep quoting the materials to point that there simply is no proof of any relation between usage of bombs and change of policy among Japanese leaders. I can also bring quotes about the lack of any serious considerations in regard to alternatives of using A-bombs, as there were none. No deep investigation over different targets, over invasion or diplomatic solution was taken. You may try to open mind for different perspective and read different than usually quoted accounts, as even post war USSBS survey argued that it was absolutely unnecessary :

 

Or you may believe in what you believe.

 

Of course there is revisionism. Saying that history cannot be changed based on evidence is simply denial of the truth. We have better technology today to be able to assess some facts that were just given to us without foundation so any attempt to correct these mistakes or to further understand the related events should always be welcome as long as they have a logical foundation and proof of course. You have to also remember that history is flooded with propaganda from both sides but mainly from the victors who in the end dictate what become facts and what is left out ...

[FTC_Riksen]

Sorry but again you are trying to justify the killings of civilians for a greater good which is ot acceptable as the other side could also have the same argument. Both sides did wrong and bombing civilians is just not justfiable by any means. Your view of the matter just shows me the hero mentality the US has when it comes to the idea that they are the saviors of the world and can do just about anything in order to do that. Killing innocents is just wrong no matter what and what u say is just theur explanation to make their war crimes seen acceptable and less cruel. My opnion of course but i respect yours....

 

Cheers

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

In a historical discourse revisionism is perceived negatively and word carries a negative connotation. As a term it is often known in my country in relation to Holocaust or Katyn, to either disprove or dissipate the responsibility of extermination (examples like David Irving or Léon Degrelle) of Jewish population or trying to prove that Katyn was a German action and documents that prove Soviet responsibility are false (example Yury Mukhin). 

 

And no, history cannot be changed, just like truth. There is one history and one truth, which is where it is and not where x or y thinks it is. What changes is perspective and perception of the events, that changes under the influence of new discoveries or verification of old ones. But that is positive. 

 

You have to also remember that history is flooded with propaganda from both sides but mainly from the victors who in the end dictate what become facts and what is left out

It is true that history is poisoned by propaganda, especially when politicians try to use it to achieve their own, political goals. While old phrase that history is written by the victors is true, I'd not go as far as to say that it is mainly poisoned by Allies.

 

 

 

Hiromachi - I couldn't care less about who "gets credit" for winning the war.

It is not about who wins the war, it is about whether the decision to destroy two cities and annihilate their population was justified by the circumstances at a given time and moment and if any other choice was considered.

 

 

 

The issue I have with your post is that unless I read it wrong you basically accused President Truman of murdering hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians solely to shape the post-war US/USSR balance of power. To support that claim you've referred to the decision-making process of the Japanese leadership and the bombing effectiveness study report of 1946. All great stuff, in HINDSIGHT, that should certainly inform our decisions in the future. 

This is misinterpretation of my post Rekt. Although the target selection made it clear that target must be a city with big population and deep cultural relation as well as military value. But the goal was simply outlined in discussions during each conference in that period - to cause terror and havoc bringing Japanese to sign unconditional surrender. And only unconditional surrender which was further outlined in Potsdam declaration. This was also discussed in Potsdam :

 

 

The President, unable to contain his excitement at the ‘world-shaking news’ of the bomb, showed the Prime Minister the Trinity cables. Awed, Churchill wondered how, and when, to tell Stalin of the discovery – if indeed he should be told? The news might jolt the Russians into the war in a bid to claim their share of territory: ‘The President and I,’ Churchill later wrote, ‘no longer felt we needed [soviet] aid to conquer Japan.’ They agreed, however, that failing to inform the Russians of the bomb would deepen their nominal ally’s distrust – little realising that the spy Fuchs had kept Stalin abreast of the developments in Los Alamos. The British and American leaders decided to inform Stalin, but not until the bomb was almost ready; then, at an appropriate time, Truman would casually mention to the Soviet leader that America possessed an ‘entirely novel form of bomb … which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war’.
 

Churchill then raised the vexed subject of unconditional surrender, warning of the ‘tremendous cost in American and to a lesser extent in British life’ if they enforced it. Were there not words that ensured victory and gave ‘some assurance’ of Japan’s military honour and national existence’? To which Truman sharply interjected that Japan had no military honour left after Pearl Harbor. ‘At any rate,’ Churchill responded, ‘they had something for which they were ready to face certain death in very large numbers.’ Truman would hear no more talk of compromise, given the terrible resonsibilities upon him in regard to the ‘unlimited effusion of American blood’, Churchill later noted. The terms of ‘unconditional surrender’ would remain.

 

 

I've brought Japanese officials memoirs from the events to point that atomic bombs had no severe impact on the mindset of military leaders while Soviet Invasion did forcing them to accept the terms before it was too late. You may point that we know this now and how Trumman could know this, but Trumman was already aware of the effects of destruction of over 60 other cities, Japanese desperate moves to use Soviet Union as a mediator to end the hostilities and condition that was denied only to be accepted later. He was also fully aware of Japanese inability to continue the war due to complete lack of resources and drastic decrease of food reserves due to US Intelligence having full access to Japanese codes and communication. 

 

 

 

As Venturi listed, the losses from an invasion of mainland Japan were projected to be catastrophic. A new weapon had just been developed at enormous cost to the nation, and the President was determined to use it before committing to a costly invasion. It was his grim responsibility to prioritize the lives of his own people over the lives of his enemies. Why is that so hard for people to understand?

Why is it so hard to understand that it was never an alternative ? Invasion was dropped before even Trinity test was completed and would be extremely unlikely even if it failed and Atomic bomb would not be working exactly for the reasons you outline - the chances of high casualties made it unthinkable for Trumman. Even though they were only estimates. 

 

 

 

Keep in mind that the young American men who would have been killed in OLYMPIC were civilians too before the Japanese started the war. Their lives didn't magically become expendable compared to Japanese civilians just because they got drafted to end what was effectively a genocide in China and Southeast Asia.

This is pure assumption of what if if. There would be no losses as there was no operation going to be executed. 

 

 

 

but I submit that anyone who wants to second-guess the use of the Atomic bombs in 2016 needs to put themselves in the mind of someone who has just fought their way across the Pacific against a brutal and suicidal enemy and defend the notion that they would have been so much wiser when presented with the same choices that Truman faced in 1945. I think that is a fantasy fueled by everything that we have learned and experienced since. 

Someone who makes decision to kill thousands of civilians should seriously consider other options. There were no other options seriously considered, especially after positive results of New Mexico test.

 

And what Truman faced in 1945 was that Japan in a short time would be attacked by Soviet Union cutting off any hope of using Manchuria and Korea to continue resistance, by estimates of US intelligence BEFORE the use of atomic bombs it was known that Japanese merchant fleet was destroyed, that Japanese had not enough resources to manufacture new aircraft, to continue any aerial or naval operations except for last resort suicidal. And that they were looking for means to end the war by a diplomatic solution, initially with 4 conditions, ultimately that would be dropped to 1 to which United States eventually agreed anyway. 

As early as in June US leadership faced the condition of leaving Emperor unmolested and for two months they denied that until they finally agreed on August 15th. 

 

 

Sidenote, I would like to keep emotions out of this. It is a civilized discussion and I hope it remains like that or else this thread may be quickly locked. 

[FTC_Riksen]

Dont confuse history with the truth. History should be the truth but we all know it is not. Thats why events have to be based on evidence otherwise it is just fable. And you said yourself, or someone else inthe topic, victors write history and in this case the Allies won so it is safe to assume the so called true is their view of the events. Maybe for you or in your country revisionism is seen in a negative perspective or a way to falsify facts but, in my view, as long as a fact can be proven and based on true evidence, there is absolutly no reason to be seen a wrong or untruefull and no im no talking about the holocaust as i rather not really go into that (discussiob of those war crimes are not the purpose of this topic)

[JtD]

I agree with what you say. Unfortunately, you can also take that lesson from hundreds of large conflicts prior to WW2, which just shows how good mankind is at ignoring lessons.

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

Rekt, I mostly agree with what you say and share similar view on the mentioned "lesson". I only argue about the means of ending the conflict and that I personally do not find them justified on basis of materials quoted above.

[PatrickAWlson]

Disappointed.  I thought the thread was about the Luftwaffe's lack of a strategic bombing campaign.  Then it predictably turned into good guys vs bad guys.  Now we're in the Pacific.  Was hoping for better.

[Ace_Pilto]

IMHO the impact of strategic bombing in WWII is always an interesting and contentious one.  If you look at the productivity of the Allied strategic campaign there are any number of metrics that indicate it was not terribly effective.  Blew up lots of cities and did take the Luftwaffe off of the front, but it didn't really impede production of war material.  German industry never ceased production.  Arguably the most significant impact was oil and even in that case there are metrics that indicate that taking back the oilfields is what really stopped production, not bombing.the fields.

 

Western allied tactical superiority was crushing.  I have always though that the armor kill numbers were inflated but the impact on logistics and freedom of movement was not, and those aspects were far more important than killing tanks.  

 

Now take it from the German perspective in the east.  The Germans never had the numbers or the equipment.  Given the Allies success or lack thereof, I really can't second guess the German decision not to even try.

 

That's because apologist historians only tell you the conformist side of the story. Industrial output is irrelevant. You can make a billion tanks but if they have no drivers they don't do much.

 

The real significance of the bombing campaign was the denial of rail and road facilities to Germany. Pinpoint attacks by strategic bombers against marshaling yards and rolling stock in conjunction with a tactical stranglehold on Germany's road network prevented the distribution of food and medicine to that country for the best part of three years. The upshot of this was that, by 1945, most Germans were homeless because their cities had been wiped out or overrun, starved/malnourished because of manpower shortages and the impossibility of moving anything along road or rail and at high risk from diseases like typhus. The campaign against industry was never intended to destroy industrial capacity, it pinpointed the most important targets are critical times like it did at Ploesti but the overall strategy was to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition while creating a nation of homeless people and to ensuring that several thousands of men were kept at their posts on Flak guns instead of on the frontline. 

 

And then there's the tertiary purpose of raids later in the war, which served no strategic purpose against the defeated nation Germany whatsoever. Raids like the attack on Dresden which were specifically devised as a "vulgar display of force" so that advancing Soviet forces would see first hand what the RAF and USAAF would do to them if they stepped out of line. 

 

The reason we're fed the conformist version that we have today is because post war "historians" were largely working from sanitized source material provided to them after being vetted and redacted by organisations like G-2, the OSS (later to become the CIA) and Mi5. Very few of these historians ever went anywhere near Europe and the few who did hardly spoke to anyone outside their "handlers" (Blimey, it's not safe to talk to those Jerries guv'ner). You see, nobody wanted a bunch of history books pointing out the war crimes perpetrated upon Germany by the strategists in charge of the ETO. These crimes were pre-meditated, deliberate and barbaric and it's not until now that we (through non-conformist historians who consult unredacted primary sources wherever possible instead of incestuously referencing each other) are beginning to scratch the surface on the extent and magnitude of the Allied post-war propaganda campaign.

 

The digging is dirty, unrewarding and dangerous work but there's a very deep and dark rabbit hole down there.

Edited September 2, 2016 by VA_JimmyBlonde

[LuftManu]

Is not a matter of wich country starts the war, its a matter of why

[Kurfurst]

You have completely ignored the truth and facts I have presented and repeated your mantra.

 

Wielun, London, Warsaw, Eindhoven etc were not tactical targets connected to ground support. Those were atrocities by Luftwaffe on allied civilians. No real military goals were achieved.

 

The fact that Germany has conquered those places with terror on the ground doesn't help. Luftwaffe on many occasions was just a prelude and moved on to another target. It changes nothing because Luftwaffe was still part of those atrocities. And civilian population was targeted.

 

You need to do some reading on the subject first before declaring what the facts are...

 

Besides, JtD has already described the historical reality well. There was no particular doctrine in the Luftwaffe for strategic air war, no potential and/or influental "bomber barons" who would want to win a war all by the air force based on Douhet's lousy theoretics. The air force was meant to support ground operations, in various ways, most prominently battlefield interception or attacking supply and logistics, wherever it was to be found. Attacks on purely civillian targets was definietely not in the doctrine and even less in practice, save for reprisal actions for similar enemy actions. Direct or close air support came only later and it was neither a particularly emphasized role (just look at the numbers - the vast majority of the bombers were some 1500 level bombers vs a bare 300-odd Stukas), despite the propaganda flicks and overemphasis made on Stukas screaming down on hapless enemy troops. Close support was really a thing from only 1943 onwards, induced by the strategic realities of the Eastern Front, where a handful of dedicated 'tank hunter' squads could appear quicky to supress armored breakthroughs, faster than the Army's own dedicated tank hunter units or reserves. The vast majority of the bombing missions were still interdictions on railroad and logistics/supply line targets like rail stations, bridges and supply depots.

Edited September 2, 2016 by VO101Kurfurst

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

You need to do some reading on the subject first before declaring what the facts are...

Coming from such a high position Kurfurst I assume you could recommend any good reads based on high quality scholarship ? Which author would you recommend ? Could it be by any chance dr. Joseph Goebbels ? 

[Aap]

 

 

Coming from such a high position Kurfurst I assume you could recommend any good reads based on high quality scholarship ? Which author would you recommend ? Could it be by any chance dr. Joseph Goebbels ?

 

Honestly, to me Kurfurst's and JtD's posts seem more in line with facts than Solty's. 

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

Honestly, to me Kurfurst's and JtD's posts seem more in line with facts than Solty's. 

Maybe, but before Kurfurst edited his post it sounded like he denies everything what Solty said. Including Luftwaffe atrocities and actions and reasoning. 

 

Also, since I'm part-time historian and reader on daily basis I still would like to learn the positions and authors recommended by Kurfurst, just for the sake of learning something new. 

[Kurfurst]

Maybe, but before Kurfurst edited his post it sounded like he denies everything what Solty said. Including Luftwaffe atrocities and actions and reasoning. 

 

Also, since I'm part-time historian and reader on daily basis I still would like to learn the positions and authors recommended by Kurfurst, just for the sake of learning something new. 

 

It sounded like because it is, Solty is posting hogwash on the air war and in partcular about these bombings, out a position of complete ignorance on the subject matter. For starters, he claims for example Warsaw lacked tactical targets. A city, under siege by the Heer, defended by 125 000 Polish troops, lacked tactical targets you see. :D Now, when the nonsense meter gets that high, should I go from point to point and refute it, waste time on digging up facts and sources, where it is obviously a waste of time? 

 

But, since you are not taking this seriously, you know what. Just stick with dr. Goebbels, who evidently hadn't got a slightest clue about military operations, if you like him so much. 

 

Or just start with lets say, Corum or Hooton. At least they give detailed and sourced accounts.

Edited September 2, 2016 by VO101Kurfurst

[MiloMorai]

What was the name of the Spanish town the Germans bombed in the SCW?

[Ace_Pilto]

Guernica

[Kurfurst]

What was the name of the Spanish town the Germans bombed in the SCW?

 

Nice bait - no catch. :D

[MiloMorai]

Rhetorical question Jimmy.

 

German bombers and other air groups dropped heavy bombs in daily attacks, from morning till night, on hill positions, tunnels, command posts, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. Also, they continually bombed the passes north of Miravelles to interrupt all traffic. All air groups were ordered not to bomb, under any circumstances, villages or populated areas.

 

The latter order, forbidding the bombing of populated areas, was soon violated. Madrid was the first European capital city in history to suffer aerial bombardment. The Germans bombed most of the residential districts of the city in a vain attempt to break the morale of the civilian population.

[Aap]

Also, since I'm part-time historian and reader on daily basis I still would like to learn the positions and authors recommended by Kurfurst, just for the sake of learning something new. 

 

Here is one source for example: US Air University material, page 10 has summary from the official Luftwaffe doctrine of WWII.

The main points about Luftwaffe doctrine are brought out in Wikipedia also, from the biggest Luftwaffe proponent of strategic bombing, Walther Wever. After his death Luftwaffe's focus concentrated even more to tactical and operational areas and further away from strategic bombing.

[PatrickAWlson]

@VA_JimmyBlonde

I agree that the attacks on transport were effective.  I disagree that eliminating industry was never a real objective and it was all a clever ploy to draw the Luftwaffe into a battle of annihilation.  That's the way it turned out, but it was not the intent,at least of US strategic bombing.  I think that the US absolutely believed that it could damage German industry.

 

The British are a different story.  I don't think the British even thought about elimination of industry.  They were just fire bombing cities to eliminate German morale. It worked about as well as German attempts to wipe out British morale - not at all.  German morale was broken by battlefield losses and territorial losses, not by bombing.  For all of the thousands of Germans killed by bombing, I doubt that made any more of an impact than US bombing did on industry.

 

In both cases, as well as in German bombing of Allied cities, mass civilian casualties were seen as a desirable outcome, if not a primary purpose.

 

IMHO lessons learned are that killing civilians really is not effective.  Unless taken to genocidal levels, it pisses people off more than subdues them.  Taking out industry is viable, but the heavy bomber raids of WWII were not an effective way of doing it.  The weapons were not accurate enough or individually powerful enough to do the job properly.

 

I'm not talking morality in any way.  Just what works and what doesn't.  Strategic bombing in WWII for the most part did not work.  The atomic bombs were actually the exception.  They were so destructive that they actually achieved their purpose.  

[MiloMorai]

In 1945, the deserts that had once been cities bore mute testimony to what American and British bombing had wrought in the course of the war. The question posed then, and with increasing frequency since, is what did that terrible destruction contribute to the winning of the war? Bomber Command's achievements through the spring of 1944 were largely indirect, even though the destruction of population centers was obvious and extensive, and the damage to industrial production in the spillover of "area" bombing attacks at times important. Yet, the night bombing campaign's greatest contribution to the winning of the war was precisely what Harris claimed and what the conventional wisdom has so often discounted: The "area" bombing attacks did have a direct and palpable effect on the morale of the German population, and the German leadership, in response to that impact, seriously skewed Germany's strategy. Recent scholarship in the Federal Republic indicates that as early as the summer of 1942, the night bombing campaign was affecting German attitudes.² In 1943, the heavy bombing caused a dramatic fall off in popular morale. Knowledge of what had happened at Hamburg spread throughout Germany; and in south Germany, the attacks on Nuremburg, Munich, and Augsburg made the population restive, angry, and bitter. The SD (Sicherheitsdienst, Secret Police) reports on what the population was saying (reports widely read in the highest levels of Nazi leadership) noted that people no longer exchanged the Nazi salute, reviled the party as the author of their trouble, regarded Goebbels as an outright liar and cheat, wore party badges less and less, and were depressed and embittered at the course of the war. The population singled out the Luftwaffe particularly for their reproaches, and as early as the "Lancaster" attack on the MAN works in Augsburg in April 1942 wondered why such an important location had not received sufficient protection. Even more alarming to Germany's leaders were comments by women "of the lower classes" that even 1918 was not as bad as this.

 

from Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1939-1945

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

By Hooton you mean "The Luftwaffe: A Complete History 1933-1945" ? 

And by Corum you mean "The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" ? 

First one I have somewhere in my library, but I'm not sure how it addresses the issue of validity of bombings of cities. Latter one I hear first of, it seems to be an interesting read. Thank you.

 

Now, coming to a point.

 

 

It sounded like because it is, Solty is posting hogwash on the air war and in partcular about these bombings, out a position of complete ignorance on the subject matter.

So far you present no more than ignorance yourself Kurfurst.

 

 

 

For starters, he claims for example Warsaw lacked tactical targets. A city, under siege by the Heer, defended by 125 000 Polish troops, lacked tactical targets you see. :D

Now, there wouldnt have to be any soldiers there if their country wasn't invaded right ? And for that matter Warsaw was initially declared an open city but it was quickly found that this cannot be carried due to quick changes on front and Luftwaffe actions SINCE DAY 1 OF WAR. The named city of Wielun was bombed on the very first day without any military value, despite some historians like M. Emmerling claiming it to be occupied by Polish soldiers. 

 

 

I also assume that in general means you refer to article 25 of IVth Hague Convention from 1907 ? 

From the time it was established lots of things have changed and its regulations were outdated even by World War I standards, since it created a paradox in which a defenseless ammunition factory is protected by disposition of legal norm of article 25, while a civilian target such as city or village with a single machine gun may be considered a valid target. To show some scale, during London bombings in World War I British Command decided not to install any AA batteries in the city not to loose the "undefended" status (more in:  W. H .Parks, Air Law and the Law of War, „The Air Force Law Review”, 1990.)

 

By 1920s standards, this article was assumed pointless and completely illogical, as stated by R. Bierzanek. It was solely based on land warfare experiences which by that time hardly could follow the changes going in aviation.

Even though a "Hague Air Warfare Rules" from 1923 did not became a so called hard law, articles 22 and 24 still changed the whole view on terrorist bombings and valid military targets.

 

Some countries even adopted them as a principle and guidance for the air crews. For example Poland, here is a quote from "WYTYCZNE DOTYCZĄCE BOMBARDOWANIA LOTNICZEGO" by Sztab Główny, L.dz.687/Mob/S.Lotn./39, L.26/Teka 1/Subt.5 - which is an instruction related to aerial bombing provided by Polish High Command:

"I. Instrukcje brzmią jak następuje: Jedynie niżej wymienione obiekty, ściśle wojskowe w najwęższym tego słowa znaczeniu mogą być bombardowane z morza lub powietrza. Dowódcy winni ogólnie stosować się do ducha tych instrukcji.

a/ Siły morskie, tzn. okręty wojenne oraz pomocnicze, stanowiące w danym momencie część floty wojennej, doki morskie, składy i inne urządzenia nadzorowane i prowadzone przez personel marynarki wojennej.

b/ Jednostki armii, fortyfikacje, urządzenia obrony nadbrzeżnej, zabudowania, obozy, kwaterunki i inne urządzenia nadzorowane i prowadzone przez personel wojskowy.

c/ Jednostki floty powietrznej, lotniska wojskowe, depot, składy jednostek i składy bomb oraz inne urządzenia nadzorowane i prowadzone przez personel lotniczy.

d/ Transporty oddziałów wojskowych (czy to na morzu czy w porcie), drogi, kanały, linie komunikacyjne służące do komunikacji o charakterze wojskowym, drogi wojenne i transporty rzeczne. Pociągi i drogi wewnętrzne oraz transporty rzeczne winny być atakowane tylko w razie słusznego przypuszczenia, ze posiadają charakter wojskowy.

e/ Połączone składy morskie, lądowe i powietrzne ( nie upoważnia to jednak do ataku na fabryki)

f/ Urządzenia i składy ropy pędnej morskie, lądowe i powietrzne oraz budynki położone w polu względnie w granicach zabudowań marynarki, lotnictwa lub armii wymienione pod a/c

 

Uwaga: zapasy ropy o charakterze ogólnym, nie zdefiniowane powyżej nie powinny być w związku z niniejszymi instrukcjami bombardowane

 

II. Działalność wymieniona w poprzednim paragrafie, skierowana przeciwko wymienionym obiektom winna być zgodna z następującymi zasadami ogólnymi:

 

a/ bombardowanie ludności cywilnej jest niezgodne z prawem międzynarodowym,.

b/ rozpoznanie i zidentyfikowanie obiektów winno być możliwe,

c/ bombardowanie powinno się kierować słusznym przypuszczeniem, że szkód doznają tylko te obiekty i że ludność cywilna w sąsiedztwie nie zostanie zbombardowana przez niedopatrzenie. Jest rzeczą niezgodną z prawem międzynarodowym bombardowanie obszarów w nadziei na natrafienie na obiekty uzasadniające to bombardowanie, o których się wie, że istnieją w takich okolicach, lecz nie zna się dokładnego miejsca ich dyslokacji.

 

III. Zgodnie z wymienionymi wyżej postanowieniami, dowódcy winni przy wydawaniu rozkazów zwracać uwagę raczej na ducha tych wytycznych, a nie koniecznie stosować się do ich litery. W szczególności winno się pamiętać o tym, iż fakt, że obiekt posiada niewątpliwy charakter wojskowy, nie koniecznie i nie zawsze usprawiedliwia jego bombardowanie. Tak więc urządzenia przeciwlotnicze i działa obrony przybrzeżnej w centrum zaludnionego okręgu, mogłyby być bombardowane tylko w przypadku gdyby zachodziło słuszne przypuszczenie, że wywołane szkody uzasadniają to bombardowanie. Drobne oddziały na kwaterach, oddział wojskowy przechodzący przez miasto, względnie wojsko znajdujące się na nabrzeżu handlowym ( w porcie) - są obiektami niewątpliwie o charakterze wojskowym, tym niemniej bombardowanie tego rodzaju obiektów w mieście mogło by spowodować nieproporcjonalne niebezpieczeństwo dla ludności cywilnej, w stosunku do wojskowego znaczenia tej akcji, a tym samym nie było by uzasadnione. Uzasadnienie bombardowania nawet zdecydowanie wojskowych obiektów musi być uzależnione od okoliczności i powinno być decydowane przez dowódców działających zgodnie z duchem niniejszej instrukcji.

 

Generalny Inspektor Sił Zbrojnych /-/
Edward Rydz-Śmigły Marszałek Polski"

 

I will be kind enough to provide a decent (possible by my skills which are still limited to a some degree in this foreign language) translation:

"I. Instructions have to be understood as follows: Only following objects, strictly military in the most direct way of understanding of that word can be bombed from sea or air. Commanders should generally follow l'esprit of this instructions.

(here is a exhaustive quotation of targets, I'm not going to translate that)

 

II. Activity mentioned in previous paragraph, aimed at mentioned objects should be in accordance with following set of rules:

 

a/ bombing of civilian population is forbidden by international law,

b/ reconnaissance and identification of objects should be possible,

c/ bombing should be based on just assumption, that only the aimed targets will be damaged and civilian population living in the close vicinity will not be bombed by any negligence. It is illegal by the rules of international law to bomb areas in hope of hitting targets justifying the bombing, of which commander knows, that they exist in the vicinity, but he does not know the accurate position of them.

 

III. In accordance with mentioned above guidelines, commanders should, when giving orders, give utmost attention rather to l'espirit of this guidelines, rather than their literal meaning. Especially it should be remembered that the fact, that object possess undoubtedly a military character, does not necessary and always justify its bombing. As so, the anti-aircraft weapons and coastal defense guns in center of populated area, could be bombed only in situation when there was a fine assumption, that caused damage justify bombing. Small units placed in lodging, military units crossing the city, relatively military forces standing in port - are targets undoubtedly of military value, but despite that bombings of such objects in the city could cause disproportional danger to civilian population, in comparison to military value of the action, and thus is not justified. Justification of bombing of even decisively military objects must be related to circumstances and should be decided by commanders following the above instructions.

 

General Inspector of the Armed Forces /-/

Edward Rydz-Śmigły Marshall of Poland"

 

Source: http://marszalek.com.pl/INNE/prac03.pdf

 

League of Nations after mentioned above Guernica and bombings of cities in China has made a resolution on September 30th, 1938 in defense of civilian population from negative consequences of aerial operations: "Recognizes the following principles as a necessary basis for any subsequent regulations:
1) The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal;
2) Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be identifiable;
3) Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in the neighbourhood are not bombed through negligence"

Source: Protection Of Civilian Population Against Bombing From the Air in Case of War, League of Nations, 30 September 1938 

 

This view was deemed as the only legitimate in accordance with humanitarian law by Institute of International Law in Amsterdam in 1938 - Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War. Amsterdam, 1938. 

 

So when you say that Warsaw bombings were perfectly justified (not even mentioning Wieluń) due to occupation of the city by Polish soldiers I have to ask:

1. Were those soldiers stationed there (defending the city) because they wanted or because they have been successively defeated in defense of country borders and pushed by the invading forces leaving them no choice but to surrender ?

2. Why would civilian or military Command assume that city will be safe completely undefended if already non-military targets were hit and civilian population was a subject of terrorist attacks for days (including strafing of columns of refugees) ? Especially since Warsaw was struck on the very first day, when it wasn't occupied by mentioned 125,000 Polish soldiers.

 

I can see that you disagree with Solty. And that he may not be right. But complete denial of EVERYTHING he said, including the Luftwaffe actions and intentions leading to Luftwaffe atrocities is a nonsense. Especially in the presence of instructions and resolutions existing by the outbreak of the war, recognizing that just because target is occupied by soldiers or that there is any armament placed there, it does not become a valid target that can be bombed without any regard to life of civilian population (not to even mention private property). "Hague Air Warfare Rules" indicate in article 24 that bombing can be carried only in justified assumption of military concentration in the area, justifying the attack. To paraphrase it, a military attack on civilian population can only be justified by military needs. Article 22 adds to that an extremely important requirement: existence of direct and obvious military gain and circumstance justifying the assumption of existence of such gain. In this case bombing of a city (especially with aims at non-military targets) could not be proportional to a military gain, which was complete occupation of the city. Polish forces were defeated and surrounded with no way to break the front and escape. So when any operation was carried it must have been not only assumed but known that bombing of the city will cause great civilian casualties.   

 

 

 

Now, when the nonsense meter gets that high, should I go from point to point and refute it, waste time on digging up facts and sources, where it is obviously a waste of time? 

Right, it's nonsense because you claim so.  

 

 

 

The main points about Luftwaffe doctrine are brought out in Wikipedia also, from the biggest Luftwaffe proponent of strategic bombing, Walther Wever. After his death Luftwaffe's focus concentrated even more to tactical and operational areas and further away from strategic bombing.

Yes, I am aware of Luftwaffe doctrine and absence of direct orders to bomb civilian targets (like it is in case of Wieluń or Guernica) but there is another aspect which is an intention. I have already mentioned here, before, Hermann Goering speech to Luftwaffe crews from September 1st, 1939 or speech of general Kesserling to the students of air schools which directly inspired attacks on civilian population. 

 

The very first point to actually start this could be made by the fact that the sole doctrine of using Ju-87s as machines aimed to hit civilian settlements was in conflict with basic principles of Blitzkrieg and instructions Luftwaffe was given before the attack on Poland, which as a first goal set reaching a complete domination in the air. And yet full three units of Ju-87s were used against a single, small city (Wieluń) which wasn't even in a direct line of Wehrmacht offensive. 

Even if Luftwaffe doctrine did not recognize strategic bombings, such actions were still carried. On September 25th, 1939 known in Warsaw as a "Black Monday" Luftwaffe carried throughout the day attacks against the city with more than 400 bombers since 7:00 AM dropping about 630 tons of incendiary and explosive bombs. Bombs were dropped on obvious non-military targets marked with Red Cross such as hospitals. In a Hospital of Holy Spirit there were 700 wounded of which most died. Italian war correspondent noted: "Luftwaffe dropped bombs and strafed with machine guns even barricades on streets. Its the first time in history of warfare that aircraft fought with barricades." 

[Heliopause]

What was the name of the Spanish town the Germans bombed in the SCW?

 

 

 

 

Durango

Edited September 2, 2016 by Heliopause

[Ace_Pilto]

@VA_JimmyBlonde

I agree that the attacks on transport were effective.  I disagree that eliminating industry was never a real objective and it was all a clever ploy to draw the Luftwaffe into a battle of annihilation.  That's the way it turned out, but it was not the intent,at least of US strategic bombing.  I think that the US absolutely believed that it could damage German industry.

 

The British are a different story.  I don't think the British even thought about elimination of industry.  They were just fire bombing cities to eliminate German morale. It worked about as well as German attempts to wipe out British morale - not at all.  German morale was broken by battlefield losses and territorial losses, not by bombing.  For all of the thousands of Germans killed by bombing, I doubt that made any more of an impact than US bombing did on industry.

 

In both cases, as well as in German bombing of Allied cities, mass civilian casualties were seen as a desirable outcome, if not a primary purpose.

 

IMHO lessons learned are that killing civilians really is not effective.  Unless taken to genocidal levels, it pisses people off more than subdues them.  Taking out industry is viable, but the heavy bomber raids of WWII were not an effective way of doing it.  The weapons were not accurate enough or individually powerful enough to do the job properly.

 

I'm not talking morality in any way.  Just what works and what doesn't.  Strategic bombing in WWII for the most part did not work.  The atomic bombs were actually the exception.  They were so destructive that they actually achieved their purpose.  

 

Shades of meaning.

 

If you destroy a factory it makes an impact, if you starve the labour force and make them homeless it completely shuts down the war economy. Not only that but the bombing did disperse a lot of German industry and this, once again, compounds the effect of targeting rail and road. You might be making 1,000 Bf-109's a week but they're stuck in a cave somewhere and can't be moved except at night time on horse drawn carts because you have no fuel, trucks, trains etc. 

 

The Allied High Command wanted their pawns (military and civilian) to believe that they were targeting and destroying factories so that they could fulfill their patriotic duty in good conscience, or at least with a just sense of "An eye for an eye", this is where morality is important, if those men were ordered to bomb civilians they would object and rightfully so, maybe even to the point of disobedience and mutiny. I think that the Allied High Command knew precisely what they wanted to achieve and exactly how to do it.  Remember that they were reading Germany's mail the entire time while launching larger and larger raids so somebody knew exactly how ineffective this bombing was against certain types of factories but they also knew that most of the factory workers lived or were billeted near those factories. The "collateral" damage was working in their favour and, the bigger the formation you send over to bomb indiscriminately, the bigger the "collateral" damage.

 

If this is not the case then why did both the RAF and the USAAF keep stop-lossing their aircrews by continuously extending Tour of Duty requirements in an environment where they had attained air supremacy during the Post D-Day aerial offensives? It boggles the mind. 

 

Bomber command was highly effective by 1944. The pathfinder squadrons had picking targets in the Ruhr down to a science if men like Leonard Cheshire and others are to be believed and I do believe him. (I also think I understand why he spent most of his post war life in seclusion as a humble philanthropist and firm religious devotee) Remember also that I'm not talking about your 1941 Bomber Command raids here either, not some poor group of sacrificial lambs pottering about in the dark with their Wellingtons and hoping that their bombs hit Germany, let alone any specific target in Germany, this refers to raids involving thousands of aircraft that used a highly sophisticated system of radio beams and flares for target indication and illumination, some were also equipped with flares that gave the RAF 'as it happened' photographic evidence of their accuracy and effectiveness.

 

The lack of Luftwaffe initiative in the field of strategic bombing is hardly surprising. Germany was against bombing civilian centers from the start adn they controlled the tactical tempo by locking down road, rail and communication lines. There's no need for a strategic bomber when your war is over in 6 months. There are even specific and direct orders given by Hitler himself prohibiting the practice of bombing London and it isn't until retaliation from the RAF starts to hit German cities that he reluctantly began allow it. This isn't to say that the Luftwaffe did not operate against other civilian centers when it suited them tactically but it does show a definite and well documented political stance from the very top of the Nazi leadership against this kind of terrorism, make of that what you will.

[Ace_Pilto]

I disagree, there is a definite political progression there from deliberate and explicit prohibition of terror bombing in the cases of Paris and London in 1940 through to the use of vengeance weapons in 1944/45. Our perception of how the Nazis (and the Japanese for that matter) prosecuted their war effort is conveniently sculpted to pass off all the blame onto them while our own excesses are palmed off as righteous patriotism.

 

Things aren't that simple

 

But that's a political discussion and not really on topic so I'll leave it at that.

[Bearfoot]

My 2c ...

 

In WW2, the real success and, later on, explicit objective, of the Allied strategic bombing was not so much in infrastructure destruction, but, as formalized and epitomized in Operation Pointblank, drawing up the Luftwaffe fighters to to the sky where they could be destroyed, deliberately dismantling the Luftwaffe fighter force in a war of attrition so as to ensure complete control of the skies by D-Day. 

 

Source: To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944 https://www.amazon.com/Command-Sky-Superiority-Smithsonian-Spaceflight/dp/0817353461

 

Same source and others note that the Nazi lack of strategic bombing is lack of foresight and planning, and over-estimation/investment/faith in what could be achieved with tactical airpower. 

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

 

 

At the end of the war, the US and UK were in a position to abuse and enslave the defeated German and Japanese societies to the same extent that the Germans and Japanese were actively working for years to abuse, enslave, and liquidate others'...BUT THEY DIDN'T. Today people have the luxury to act like this distinction is somehow irrelevant. To me it is the only difference between the belligerents in this horrific conflict that really matters at all.

Yes, this is one obvious thing I learnt from reading and talking to some Japanese people - despite all the fire bombings and Hiroshima and Nagasaki they still admit (especially veterans) that they are thankful it was US that occupied Japan, not Soviet Union, since the latter one captured many Japanese soldiers in Manchuria and barely any of them ever returned home while all POWs captured by American, British and other Allied soldiers returned home eventually. 

 

 

 

In my view, the tragedy that befell the Germans and Japanese at the hands of the Allies in World War 2 was the natural, even predictable result of combining the aggressive behavior of Axis forces during their early triumphs with the easily frightened and excessively wrathful nature of mankind. It wasn't 'right', it just was.

That is not such a simple thing to answer or even admit. What we tend to see now is only history and that some politicians were bad (or monsters like Stalin or Hitler) but at given time it was politics. With all the issues that exist in politics.

For instance Japanese tried to reach a diplomatic solution to avoid war but they failed to provide sufficient bases to diplomatic table. Tojo himself was deeply afraid of war and its result, despite being seen always as hardcore militarist, even Tojo and Anami inside felt that this conflict is hardly possible to be won. But then there is a problem with Japanese politicians up to this date - the so called Honne and Tatemae. Honne reflects persons true feelings buried inside which he may show only in closest relation, while Tatemae is what is expected from person. Tojo in private conversations tried to push the efforts of diplomatic solution, but at the same time representing Japanese Army and soldiers in China he could not act different than he did.

 

At the same time American politicians denied all the proposals provided by Japanese (mostly by indirect sources, such as private conversations with diplomats or drafts), every time expecting greater concessions. A perfect example is Cordell Hull who refused to accept anything less than open negotiations on US terms, he also (based on private conversations) was a racist and simply considered Japan as inferior state that should loose influence over Pacific. 

 

Things most of the time in politics are not black and white only. 

[Holtzauge]

What was the name of the Spanish town the Germans bombed in the SCW?

 

 

Nice bait - no catch. :D

 

I can understand why you phrase it like that Kurfurst because it was truly an eye-opener to read your view on the Fascist bombing of Guernica a few years back. Do you still stand by your views expressed there?

[LuftManu]

What was the name of the Spanish town the Germans bombed in the SCW?

From a Spaniard this is a very close thing to me and I say that yes, it was a mass murder! like the ones commited in all wars, there is no "More evil than that" A single assasination is evil in all the meanings. In war ALL COUNTRIES MADE THOSE THINGS! There is no real "Hero" even when some "win" an the others are "bad" because they are "evil". Both sides did this kind of things and we cannot aprove these things because one side won.

 

All sides are always evil. End of the story.

 

And I now this has something to do with aviation but what the hell guys? I really hate this PRO-USA(Allies) or PRO-GERMAN (Not even Nazi) What is wrong with you all? I find this a disrespect, for both sides. 

 

Enough of this my side has a bigger **** or your side is worse because *****.

 

Like it or not, things are like they are, there is no need to modify or glorfy history, only learn about it.

 

EDIT: And I must comment one of the most disrepectful and disgusting comments I have ever seen: There wouldnt be Hiroshima if there was not Pearl harbour. What? Really? So you trully think that I have a bigger gun or I kill more of you is the way? In my opinion and with all of the respect, You did not learn anything about history.

Edited September 4, 2016 by ManuV

[darthdooboss]

From a Spaniard this is a very close thing to me and I say that yes, it was a mass murder! like the ones commited in all wars, there is no "More evil than that" A single assasination is evil in all the meanings. In war ALL COUNTRIES MADE THOSE THINGS! There is no real "Hero" even when some "win" an the others are "bad" because they are "evil". Both sides did this kind of things and we cannot aprove these things because one side won.

 

All sides are always evil. End of the story.

 

And I now this has something to do with aviation but what the hell guys? I really hate this PRO-USA(Allies) or PRO-GERMAN (Not even Nazi) What is wrong with you all? I find this a disrespect, for both sides. 

 

Enough of this my side has a bigger **** or your side is worse because *****.

 

Like it or not, things are like they are, there is no need to modify or glorfy history, only learn about it.

 

EDIT: And I must comment one of the most disrepectful and disgusting comments I have ever seen: There wouldnt be Hiroshima if there was not Pearl harbour. What? Really? So you trully think that I have a bigger gun or I kill more of you is the way? In my opinion and with all of the respect, You did not learn anything about history.

Well done mate!!!

I´m with you, bomb a city its always a war crime....

[Lusekofte]

Bombing cities was a effort started, because that was all the allied could do at the time Stalin took the beating and was alone. Bomber Harris had support for many reasons , one of them was simply the feeling of giving back, other the pressure from Stalin. And the thing we always forget when these discussions rises, they did not know better, it was the first major war where civilians where targeted. Already in late 1942 the bombing of the cities was so bad that Germans soldiers fighting in the east preferred to go back fighting , rather being helpless victims in stricken cities, . 

This is especially true from mid 43 and duration of the war. Just read any biography from a soldier of the time. There was a belief among allied strategic thinkers that carpet bombing cities would demotivate German fighting spirit, we know that not to be true now, it might have been a major factor why they fought to the last bullet, another thing was Russian criminal conduct in occupied areas , where probably millions of women from age 5 to 90 was raped. A feeling of got nothing to loose.

Anyway in any case it so easy to judge, sitting in a comfortable chair and have all the information

[ZachariasX]

Nice, OP, interesting material, a bit on a slippery slope the following discussion is…

 

First, on topic for the OP, I guess it is safe to say that strategic bombing is a very expensive way to conduct war. At the time, people were trying to prove a theory. For the proponents, it was the golden way to instantly win a war without losses (“the bomber always gets through”) probably with the side effects of having nice weather and more fertile women back home. Some thought however that it might no be so easy.

 

What, especially today, people completely miss is the fact that strategic bombing only worked well if used as a bluff. Today, we have a bigger bluff, ICBM’s using them like MAD. People back in the 30’s though of stratecic bombing dome by Do-17’s etc. in a similar way as we thing of nukes now.

 

It is safe to say that GERMANY is the only nation ever to win a war (in Clausewitz’ sense, meaning a lasting change “for the better”) by strategic bombing. They successfully conquered Czechoslovakia just threatening to bomb it. The Czechs folded at the bluff “to exterminate them by use air force”.

 

Why is it a bluff? ALL efforts of doing strategic bombing HAVE to be supplemented by the use of troops on the ground for any remote hope of success, very much in contrast to Douhets theory. Only the Czechs gave in, that time. Since then, and especially today, we can’t see any improvement to the situation by the use of airpower anywhere between Morocco and Afghanistan.

 

No one except that one time people gave in (or gave up) because of airpower. Back then, why not let Harris and LeMay have a try? It would be in lieu of doing nothing. So, bomb them. It surely hampered production, but never destroyed the production capabilities. It however surely forced the Germans to shift their military resources away from other theaters of war. It is a very simple thing.

 

Most history is written about the topic with the myopic view of “we are using strategic bombing, so should everybody”. How futile this approach can be is also demonstrated by the Americans when they dropped fife fold the amount of explosives on a place that has only a tiny fraction of targets available, such as Vietnam. Again, we had a very expensive way of behaving in an autistic manner. Only, that time they lost the war. The fact that they were not allowed to bomb the factories where the enemy weapons were originating from (Russia and China) helped to remain convinced that strategic bombing is an efficient way of waging a war. It is astonishing how far you can depart from Douhets original (failed) theory to justify a costly action just because you have no better idea.

 

For the Germans, it would really have made little sense to “do things the American way”. Wever himself signed off the cancellation of big four engine bombers just the day before he crashed and died. For the one time strategic bombing worked, it was the number of planes that mattered and that scared people. Not the subtleties of how many engines they had. And if you can have 2 twin engine for the price of one 4 engine bomber, you know your shopping list.

 

Given Germany ALWAYS was expecting and preparing for a short, continental war, this choice is logical.

 

There were instances where LeMays flying club was VERY effective, and this was the time he used them, halfheartedly though, for tactical warfare like before Overlord. But strategic… What strategy? If the strategy was to deny production of weapons or any other goods, they failed. Production was on in the 3^rd Reich to the very end. Yes, it was less than it could have been, but the direct extent is hard to measure.

 

 

In a historical discourse revisionism is perceived negatively and word carries a negative connotation.

 

Revisionism is often enough associated to a vastly inflated sense of what „leaders“ can directly influence at nothing but their own will. Threading your own ideas on the actions partially understood or known on other peoples actions, this is what you do with revisionism, and thus it deserves the negative connotation.

 

Most things didn’t go according to plan (and still don’t), some may have worked out somewhat but even if the associated tactical success leads leads to strategic defeat. Seeing that for example with operation “Market Garden”, it is not revisionism to call a failure such, instead of going with the original gospel of “a bridge too far” (as if the entire thing would have made any military sense at all but helping the Germans). Total successes (especially in the sense of Clausewitz) are a very rare event.

 

The perception of what happened in WW2 was damaged over the years by Guido Knopp and folks like him. While not qualifying for outright revisionism, his shallow way of making entertaining showing the suffering of the poor Germans really skews the perception of what people of that time thought they were doing.

 

Historians typically never were statesmen or in the very least leaders of a big corporation (such as the people they are elaborating about) and have very little idea of what you can do and what you can’t but  are often enough ready to interpret anything freely into the actions of these men. The lesser the education, the greater the emotional freedom of connecting circumstantial evidence. Threading on such action is revisionism. Disagreeing with previous ways of looking at happenings, using new facts, is NOT revisionism.

 

Thus, if you want the truth, here:

 

And the thing we always forget when these discussions rises, they did not know better

 

This sums it up.

 

This however:

 

it was the first major war where civilians where targeted

 

is wrong. Just ask the residents of Carthage (or so many more cities, even the old testaments gives a couple of examples). Get used to the fact that taking it out on the civilians is common practice. It was, it is and it will be. That’s one of the charms with us people.

 

And one more thing, but OT, good post #39 #34 Hiro about the non-correlation of using nukes and the Japanese surrender.

 

“You can’t go to hell without becoming a devil.”

Edited September 5, 2016 by ZachariasX

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

 

 

It is safe to say that GERMANY is the only nation ever to win a war (in Clausewitz’ sense, meaning a lasting change “for the better”) by strategic bombing. They successfully conquered Czechoslovakia just threatening to bomb it. The Czechs folded at the bluff “to exterminate them by use air force”.

That is huge exaggeration, bluff or not Czech Republic (and its government) were completely aware of their inability to defend the country since the occupation of Sudeten. Hácha of course acted under huge pressure and suffered heart attack which certainly affected his decision making, but resulting surrender was not as much ensured by bluff as former actions. Whole concept of Czechoslovakian defense was based on very good defense lines on borders which covered mobilization and would allow to survive long enough for expected French offensive. Of course know now, after events in 1939, that France even trying to help, was simply incapable of "rolling" any offensive action in a time necessary to respond. 

Along with that came a betrayal of Czechoslovakia by France in Munich, when "others" decided whats best for Czechoslovakians and for the rest of the Europe. Since fall of 1938 Czechoslovakian politicians were aware of German advantages and inability to resits any German demands without support from the west. And since they couldnt count on any of this it seems Hácha did what he might have perceived as best at given time. 

 

Also, its hard to say anyway that Germany won "the war". Technically the invasion was not recognized by anyone as a state war due to almost no resistance and immediate surrender. 

 

 

And one more thing, but OT, good post #39 #34 Hiro about the non-correlation of using nukes and the Japanese surrender.

 

“You can’t go to hell without becoming a devil.”

I'm not sure I agree with this view of things ...

[ZachariasX]

Also, its hard to say anyway that Germany won "the war". Technically the invasion was not recognized by anyone as a state war due to almost no resistance and immediate surrender.

 

 

That is just how you do it. Everything else is a mess. And yes It was several factors that lead to the Czechs "folding", but still it was Goering that convinced them in the end. Giving up was not an option without alternative. You can always put up a fight. It is questionable if Germany had its way all teh way to Paris if they had to let lose back then already.

 

 

it seems Hácha did what he might have perceived as best at given time

 

And THAT is exactly the bluff.

 

 

I'm not sure I agree with this view of things ...

 

Then pardon me. But Japan surrendered the moment it was implicitly clear that the Tenno could stay "in office", making it a somewhat conditional unconditional surrender. At some point people, even Americans, don't give a s**t anymore about not giving a s**t.

[novicebutdeadly]

The original post (which has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor or the atomic bombs) is interesting.

 

It reminds me of what my commanding officer said when I was in the Australian Air League, which was in effect that Germany lost the war because it didn't have any strategic bombers (or in his words "any 4 engined bombers")

Thinking about this over the years and looking at the OP I would have to disagree.

 

In that Germany was always using it's bomber force, they didn't have the numbers to be able to put the effort in to be able to effectively support the ground force and to put pressure on the enemy industry, similar to the fighter force in Africa not having the numbers and material to carry out their mission and to roam (find and destroy) on the way back to their bases.

 

Given the limitations of the German war machine there is only a few ways that Germany could ever have won the war.

 

The first is to commit to total war in 1940 which would mean an understanding that the war isn't going to be over in 12 months, and so gear up every facet of the country for war. This would lead to among other things:

 

- More training of pilots (at a more advanced rate)

 

- Continued development of technologies (combine this with a pressure to perform and an organisation to ensure that all the teams are working together...).

 

An example as to the narrow vision early on in the war, Messerschmidt on it's on initiative (and money) developed the Me309, however due to the lack of all round urgency it took 2 years from the drawing board to the first flight, followed by lengthy testing, at which point it was out performed by the BF109G6....

Whilst it is tempting to say that victory lay in the hands of new technology for example if Germany had built the HE100D-1 they would have had an aircraft that was far superior to the 109E series and perhaps could have obtained aerial superiority over England during the Battle of Britain.

 

At the end of the day Germany still loses, because England still would never have surrendered, because England decided early on that it was in it for the long term (giving technologies to America at the start of the war, because they realized that the US being away from the fighting would be able to further develop them), their citizens whether organised or not would have fought the Germans like all the citizens in German occupied countries did.

 

An interesting aside is that Germany tried to scare the British with a propaganda campaign of using the HE100D-1, the idea was to scare the British into believing that  Germany had wonder aircraft, so they should just give up, which I feel actually was one of the things that led the British to agree to North Americans promise to build an aircraft that would be better than the P40 by being: faster, packing more firepower, better performance at altitude and better range (than the P40).

As a further aside it is interesting that the North American company  were able to come up with a new design in just 102 days!! One does have to wonder how on earth that is even possible for a company that had no experience in fighter design. My own thoughts given that James H. "Dutch" Kindelberger had toured Germany in 1938 (and visited both Messerschmidt and Heinkel) that along with production techniques that he perhaps also got fighter designs (just putting it out there), and perhaps in a GENERAL way combined the 109's wings (the E variant) with the streamlined fuselage of the he100 as a STARTING point for his engineers.


But back to the main topic, since the traditional timeline could never lead to Germany winning the war, we must first look to what the main goal should be before working out how to Germany could get to it.

 

Firstly I believe the goal should be Russia, England couldn't be conquered, even what they ran out of finances in early to mid 1941 they still found a way to keep going (and Europe is just a pipe dream).

Now how to get Germany to that goal.

 

- play on how Germany was hard done by after ww1 (which is true which gives it basis for being easily believable)

 

- Don't bomb any cities in the Spanish Civil war (or at any point during the next campaigns)

 

- Don't discriminate against the Jews, this lead to not only Germany loosing a whole heap of scientists but also the banning of the use of any scientific theorem that originated from a Jewish Scientist (also America would be more inclined to remain neutral)

 

- still  invade Czechoslovakia and Poland

 

- Still conquer Norway

 

- After conquering France, make a peace agreement combined with trade agreements etc with France and then withdraw all military forces, and release all POW's

 

- Withdraw all sea units from the Atlantic

 

- By not engaging the British and in fact doing the opposite, there would be less public feeling in Britain that war with Germany is even necessary (after all France is free again), maybe even drop propaganda fliers etc on Britain etc.

 

- With the threat from France neutralized, and England perhaps being more negotiable I believe that it would have been possible to bring them to the  point of view that the Soviet union is a threat,

and to not only not attack Germany on it's Western border, but to also help remove the threat through combined forces.

 

- Treat Soviet POW's nicely and convince them that you are in fact freeing them from Slavery etc, that way even if they don't choose to take up the fight to help free their country, they won't try to continue the war once "Moscow falls"

 

From my point of view once" Moscow falls", like France it shouldn't remained conquered, that is not divided among the winners, but rather reshaped in it's structure to bring it more in line with the "Western way of thinking"
 

Just my thoughts

 

Edited September 9, 2016 by novicebutdeadly

[PatrickAWlson]

I have often had the same thought.  What if Germany took Alsace and Lorraine back and just unilaterally declared peace?  Would the British really want to continue the fight?  To what end?

[Ace_Pilto]

Moscow was what lost them the war, not bombers. It was a show piece battle approved to appease elitist 'noble' idiots in the Wehrmacht general staff. The original plan devised by Hitler was to drive on the Caucasus and Leningrad, linking up west of the Urals and thereby cutting off Soviet access to their Siberian and Mongoloid toybox of infinite reinforcements. Farting about with diverting 1/3rd of that effort to a pointless drive on Moscow lost Germany the war. It has nothing to do with bombers, just a bad allocation of men and resources that were more than capable of getting the job done.

[Aap]

The original plan devised by Hitler was to drive on the Caucasus and Leningrad, linking up west of the Urals

 

If Hitler really had such a plan then it was the craziest plan of all of his crazy plans. If going directly at Moscow created lots of logistical problems due to long supply lines and bad infrastructure, just imagine a 3000 km circle around Moscow with next to no infrastructure. Just open up google maps and look where Leningrad (St. Petersburg), Moscow and Stalingrad (Volgograd) are located and imagine a circle around Moscow from Leningrad to Stalingrad. Look at what kind of road network there is even nowodays - you can imagine it 70 years ago.

 

thereby cutting off Soviet access to their Siberian and Mongoloid toybox of infinite reinforcements.

 

Next, open up a population density map and see if the "infinite reinforcements" really came from Siberia or actually from the European part of Russia. So in reality such an idiotic plan would have cut the Germans off of all their own reinforcements, supplies and put them on non-existent infrastructure, while letting the Russians keep practically all of their assets.

 

Farting about with diverting 1/3rd of that effort to a pointless drive on Moscow lost Germany the war.

 

I would say the opposite, due to Hitler not listening to his generals and stopping the offensive towards Moscow when they had good initiative was the final nail to Germany's coffin. If Germany would have got to Moscow when the weather was still good, before the USSR got to build up their defenses and get reinforcements from far east, then they could have had some kind of chance for victory. In ancient times it was known that all roads lead to Rome, but in Russia all roads lead to Moscow, so getting that logistically and industrially vital area should have been more of a priority than it was.

 

But basically Germany lost the war already when it failed to negotiate peace in the west before going to war against USSR. Once USA entered the war, there could be no doubt about the final outcome.

Edited September 9, 2016 by II./JG77_Kemp