70 years ago...

[Reflected]

70 years ago Today the US dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

 

“LeMay said, "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." And I think he's right. He, and I'd say I, were behaving as war criminals. LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?”

 

www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdmfPThGZ-s

 

This clip was taken from "The Fog of War", a documentary that I would highly recommend to everyone.

 

There are several arguments pro and con, all of them make sense in one way or another, but it doesn't change the fact that it was one of the saddest days in the history of the human race. May it never happen again!

Edited August 6, 2015 by Reflected

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

I usually recommend reading a book from this review : https://lareviewofbooks.org/review/hiroshima-nagasaki-american-militarism

 

Personally I never saw it necessary to drop those bombs, they after all did not cause any greater damage to the area the previous fire bombings did. The side effect however of A-bombs was radiation and all kinds of unimaginable consequences of people being irradiated. The actual reason for surrender seems to be a Soviet Invasion, which was rapid and rolled Japanese Army in a blink of an eye, creating a real threat to Kuriles and Hokkaido.  

Edited August 6, 2015 by =LD=Hiromachi

[Finkeren]

The bombs really weren't the last shots fired in WW2 as much as they were the first shots fired in the Cold War. It was not as much a means to force a Japanese surrender as it was a demonstration to the victorious world powers.

 

I'm just grateful, that no more of those weapons were ever used in anger.

Edited August 6, 2015 by Finkeren

[unreasonable]

The bombs really weren't the last shots fired in WW2 as much as they were the first shots fired in the Cold War. It was not as much a means to force a Japanese surrender as it was a demonstration to the victorious world powers.

 

I'm just grateful, that no more of those weapons were ever used in anger.

 

Or ever used by accident! I have read a couple of very sobering accounts recently of incidents in which early computerized systems to detect massive incoming missile attacks failed and started emitting launch warnings. Fortunately one or two individuals broke the rules and did not act on the warnings immediately. If they had not done what they did millions might have died, (including me, as someone on or close to military bases during the cold war).

 

Could not happen now of course, computer developers never make mistakes anymore ..........

Edited August 7, 2015 by unreasonable

[LukeFF]

The actual reason for surrender seems to be a Soviet Invasion, which was rapid and rolled Japanese Army in a blink of an eye, creating a real threat to Kuriles and Hokkaido.  

 

 

It was not as much a means to force a Japanese surrender as it was a demonstration to the victorious world powers.

 

Oh, such simplistic answers.

[DD_Arthur]

Oh, such simplistic answers.

 

I'll say.

 

  Since my dad would have been an infantry platoon commander if Operation Coronet had gone ahead I'm glad uncle sam dropped the horrible thing on 'em.  

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

Oh, such simplistic answers.

Dear Luke, if you expected a long elaborate than I must admit, I have no desire to write such. I left the link to the book which does that for over 640 pages, if you are interested in it feel free to purchase it. I can personally recommend it.

 

I'll say.

 

  Since my dad would have been an infantry platoon commander if Operation Coronet had gone ahead I'm glad uncle sam dropped the horrible thing on 'em.  

 

There were certain attempts to terminate it and bring peace but Allied police of unconditional surrender made it impossible to even begin any negotiations. In fact Emperor himself eventually tried to take actions: "His Majesty the Emperor … desires from his heart that [the war] may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on."  - this comes from the message from Tokyo to Moscow on 11th July 1945, intercepted by American codebreakers.

 

Since Japan’s defeat at the battle of Luzon on 11 February, with 205,535 Japanese dead, Emperor Hirohito had lost faith in the military’s chances of victory: American air supremacy ensured the annihilation of the Homeland. Somehow a way had to be found to end the war, His Majesty privately intimated to Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, in a rare breach of custom: the Emperor was expected to act on advice, not give it. Great historical changes hinge on private whispers between great men: ever so quietly the Emperor had dared to intervene, thus setting the Imperial Household on a collision course with the army.

Kido acted immediately. He drafted a counter plan designed to thwart the military clique and end the national death wish. Indeed, it accepted the termination of the war on terms ‘only very slightly removed from unconditional surrender’, as Butow noted: the laying down of arms; a universal withdrawal from occupied territory; and Manchurian neutrality. Kido, however, refused to countenance the presence of foreign troops on Japanese soil or the destruction of the Imperial system.

 

And it was just a beginning. So after all your dad might aswell not go there simply because the peace negotiations would be attempted and finalized, there would be no need to commit a mass murder on civilians too. 

Edited August 7, 2015 by =LD=Hiromachi

[Rjel]

It amazes me how when the tide turned against the aggressor nations in WWII, that somehow 70 years on they've become the victims. While it's a shame that "innocent" lives were lost, those same innocents had seemingly little regard for the death and destruction their nations visited on others in the early years of the war. If the same outcry had been made in the beginning, millions upon millions of lives might have been spared. The cruelty of those same aggressors is well documented across the globe. Considering that, can anyone truly believe that had Axis powers possessed an atomic bomb or any other weapon they might have come up with that could cause wide spread mass destruction, that it wouldn't have been used?

[Cybermat47]

It amazes me how when the tide turned against the aggressor nations in WWII, that somehow 70 years on they've become the victims. While it's a shame that "innocent" lives were lost, those same innocents had seemingly little regard for the death and destruction their nations visited on others in the early years of the war.

 

But the random Japanese civilians who were killed by the bombs weren't the ones who chose to go to war. It was the military leadership.

 

And I doubt that they knew about Japanese war crimes, or that they were the agressors in WWII. A lot of them don't even know that today.

 

Frankly, I don't see how anyone can argue that Hiroshima wasn't a horrifying event. It was justified, but still horrifying. It was a war. Everything is horrifying.

 

And when innocent people get killed, I honestly don't care what country they come from.

Edited August 8, 2015 by Cybermat47

[unreasonable]

 

Indeed, it accepted the termination of the war on terms ‘only very slightly removed from unconditional surrender’, as Butow noted: the laying down of arms; a universal withdrawal from occupied territory; and Manchurian neutrality. Kido, however, refused to countenance the presence of foreign troops on Japanese soil or the destruction of the Imperial system.

 

 

A proposal very like the treaty of Versailles, then, another occasion where the victors did not insist on the unconditional surrender of a militarist regime. We know how that turned out. The fact is that the Japanese militarists choose the war, choose not to end it even when it was clear that they would lose however hard they resisted, and showed with their use of biological and chemical warfare in China that they would have used an A bomb if they had made one first.

 

The death of all the innocent civilians - and the equally innocent young men conscripted to fight on all sides - is indeed sad, but the blame lies squarely with Japan's leadership, nobody else.

[Rjel]

And I doubt that they knew about Japanese war crimes, or that they were the agressors in WWII. A lot of them don't even know that today.

 

One of the favorite phrase I see getting tossed around so casually is that it's the victors who write the history. I'd suggest, that it's those regimes who were the most eager for war, were the most brutal and inhuman in waging it and were finally defeated in such complete devastation that have now sprung up in their modern day followers, revisionist historians and apologists who twist the events of the time and distort the truth to their own desired versions. 

[Cybermat47]

One of the favorite phrase I see getting tossed around so casually is that it's the victors who write the history.

 

Something that I didn't say, so I'm not sure why you're saying that...

 

I'd suggest, that it's those regimes who were the most eager for war, were the most brutal and inhuman in waging it and were finally defeated in such complete devastation that have now sprung up in their modern day followers, revisionist historians and apologists who twist the events of the time and distort the truth to their own desired versions.

 

Thanks for removing the part of my post where I said that the attacks were justified.

 

And as you seem to be insinuating that I support the ideaology of the Axis powers, let me spell it out for you.

 

I don't support the ideaology of the Axis powers.

 

If I was alive in Nazi Germany, thanks to my autism, I would have been marked for death.

 

Members of my family were willing to die in order to defeat Japanese agression.

 

I've shaken the hand of a RAAF veteran who almost died multiple times in order to defeat Nazi Germany.

 

The Germans who planned the July 20th plot are some of my personal heroes.

 

I hope that makes it clear.

[6./ZG26_Emil]

It amazes me how when the tide turned against the aggressor nations in WWII, that somehow 70 years on they've become the victims. While it's a shame that "innocent" lives were lost, those same innocents had seemingly little regard for the death and destruction their nations visited on others in the early years of the war. If the same outcry had been made in the beginning, millions upon millions of lives might have been spared. The cruelty of those same aggressors is well documented across the globe. Considering that, can anyone truly believe that had Axis powers possessed an atomic bomb or any other weapon they might have come up with that could cause wide spread mass destruction, that it wouldn't have been used?

 

I agree with this sentiment. Like the bombing of German cities it was all part of total war and like it or not it helped bring the war in the east and west to an early close [by how much is debatable but cannot be denied]. Lets hope we never see a war like this ever again and learn from history.

[Bearcat]

It never cease to amaze me how people want to analyze and second guess wartime decisions base on70 years of hindsight. While I am certain that there probably were other options than dropping the bombs from the perspective of the decision makers at the time I have absolutely no right to second guess the decisions to drop those bombs based on any perspective gleaned 70 years after the fact.

The fact that Japan wanted to surrender but the allies demanded unconditional surrender which they were opposed to is a moot point and when you really consider the nature of war, particularly war on the scale waged in WW2 by both aggressor nations... ask the Koreans, Chinese and Phillipino (just for starters) civilians about how much leverage Japan should have been given beyond complete and unconditional surrender... I am certain they would have had some ideas on the subject.

I am sure that there were probably other factors besides military expediency that played a factor in the decision making process on dropping the bombs or not but there is no doubt in my mind even with 70 years of hindsight that an invasion of Japan would have been even worse than DDay..... If I were a CIC at the time and I had to choose between allied military lives and Japanese civilians and military I would have chosen to err on the side of allied lives as well.

[Cybermat47]

...

Eh, screw it Rjel, we've both got better things to do than exchange barbs over the internet.

 

Have a good day

Edited August 8, 2015 by Cybermat47

[6./ZG26_Custard]

War really is hell and the innocent are nearly always the first to suffer. The Axis powers propagated total war, they wanted it and they started it.  After the war the world found out about the final solution, the Burma death Railway the comfort girls and the atrocities committed in china to name but a few.  We now have numerous denial theories about the atrocities that took place in WWII which are completely bonkers. The Bomb was and is an horrific weapon and lets hope one is never used again. Saying that approximately 672,000 Japanese civilians died in WWII compared to the 15,000,000 that died in china. it's use ended the war in which over 60 million people were killed.

 

 

 

Lets hope we never see a war like this ever again and learn from history.

 

Amen to that.

Edited August 8, 2015 by JG5_Custard

[Cybermat47]

 We now have numerous denial theories about the atrocities that took place in WWII which are completely bonkers.

I think that my favorite denial 'theory' about the holocaust is the one where Hitler 'just' wanted to force the Jews out of Germany, but they refused, so he had no choice but to kill them

 

It's hilarious how people think that saying Hitler was a racist who wanted to expel an entire ethnic group from his country will make people view him as the good guy

[6./ZG26_Custard]

 

 

I think that my favorite denial 'theory' about the holocaust is the one where Hitler 'just' wanted to force the Jews out of Germany, but they refused, so he had no choice but to kill them

I think what is really scary is that you have some people that really believe that these events and atrocities never took place.

[Cybermat47]

I think what is really scary is that you have some people that really believe that these events and atrocities never took place.

Absolutely. If you can say that one good thing came from those atrocities, it would be that people would remember them and try to make a better world to stop them from happening again.

 

The more people who believe that they didn't take place, the more likely they are to happen again. And that frightens me.

Edited August 8, 2015 by Cybermat47

[6./ZG26_Emil]

It never cease to amaze me how people want to analyze and second guess wartime decisions base on70 years of hindsight. While I am certain that there probably weere other options than dropping the bombs from the perspective of the decision makers at the time I have absolutely no right to second guess the decisions to drop those bombs based on any perspective gleaned 70 years after the fact.

 

The fact that Japan wanted to surrender but the allies demanded unconditional surrender which they were opposed to is a moot point and when you really consider the nature of war, particularly war on the scale waged in WW2 by both aggressor nations... ask the Koreans, Chinese and Phillipino (just for starters) civilians about how much leverage Japan should have been given beyond complete and unconditional surrender... I am certain they would have had some ideas on the subject.

 

I am sure that there were probably other factors besides military expediency that played a factor in the decision making process on dropping the bombs or not but there is no doubt in my mind even with 70 years of hindsight that an invasion of Japan would have been even worse than DDay..... If I were a CIC at the time and I had to choose between allied military lives and Japanese civilians and military I would have chosen to err on the side of allied lives as well.

 

exactly

[Bearcat]

But the random Japanese civilians who were killed by the bombs weren't the ones who chose to go to war. It was the military leadership.

 

And I doubt that they knew about Japanese war crimes, or that they were the agressors in WWII. A lot of them don't even know that today.

 

Frankly, I don't see how anyone can argue that Hiroshima wasn't a horrifying event. It was justified, but still horrifying. It was a war. Everything is horrifying.

 

And when innocent people get killed, I honestly don't care what country they come from.

 

The innocent civilians always pay.. in every war ever fought.

 

They knew about the war crimes.. believe me.. just as they knew about the extermination camps..

 

One of the favorite phrase I see getting tossed around so casually is that it's the victors who write the history. I'd suggest, that it's those regimes who were the most eager for war, were the most brutal and inhuman in waging it and were finally defeated in such complete devastation that have now sprung up in their modern day followers, revisionist historians and apologists who twist the events of the time and distort the truth to their own desired versions. 

 

Yes but you cannot possible know if the latter is the intention..

 

I think that my favorite denial 'theory' about the holocaust is the one where Hitler 'just' wanted to force the Jews out of Germany, but they refused, so he had no choice but to kill them

 

It's hilarious how people think that saying Hitler was a racist who wanted to expel an entire ethnic group from his country will make people view him as the good guy

 

That is not the revisionist history that alarms people.. or that would make Hitler appear to be a more sympathetic figure.. (let's face it.. under no stretch could Hitler ever be considered a "good guy" ) it is the revisionist history that says that the Holocaust never happened and that it was all a Zionist plot that alarms people..

[coconut]

Not developing the atom bomb was not an option for the US, considering the theory of the bomb was well-known to all participants of the war, and being the first was vital. From this point, with the bomb available, what reasons are there not to use the bomb, knowing it had good chances to put a quick end to the war? As a president, how would you defend yourself if it was revealed to the public you had the option to end the war quickly but chose not to?

 

That does not excuse the act, but I don't see how it could have gone otherwise.

 

Regarding the argument that dropping the bomb of them was morally acceptable considering that Japanese committed war crimes and murdered innocents by the million, I don't accept that. Responsibility and punishment must always be assigned on an individual basis, never on a collective basis (be it national, religious, ethnic...).

[Cybermat47]

Regarding the argument that dropping the bomb of them was morally acceptable considering that Japanese committed war crimes and murdered innocents by the million, I don't accept that. Responsibility and punishment must always be assigned on an individual basis, never on a collective basis (be it national, religious, ethnic...).

I agree. The bombings were strategically justified, not morally. Strategy and morals don't often mix.

[[DBS]El_Marta]

Hiroshima and Nagasaki are just 2 of the uncountable evindences to proof that human beings are inclined to support and take part in improportional aggresion and extinction of other human beings as soon and as long they are encouraged to do so by the authorities and their peer group. Just define it as a "necessity without alternative" and quite a considerable amount of people willingly do anything to surpass each other in cruelty .

 

The common justifications are hollow variables - the "big ideals" - like "humanity", "freedom", °honor°, "religion" and "the market". In reality the fiight is not about any of those "ideals" except for the last one mentioned; which tells a lot about the current state of western civilisation.

Edited August 9, 2015 by [DBS]El_Marta

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

I agree. The bombings were strategically justified, not morally. Strategy and morals don't often mix.

No, they were not. I wanted to stay away from the discussion as I figured there is no way that I can at least provoke someone to a rethinking his view, not to mention of changing it. It's also interesting that anyone who dares to oppose the view is called revisionist, I should say - thanks God for revisionists. My entire life I was taught a critical thinking and not to accept the common view but seek the details myself to create my own opinion. It must certainly not be a part of modern education.

 

 

 

But ad rem, it was hoped by the President and military services to bring the war to an end, however there was no guarantee that this will happen - in this case. And in fact bombs did not cause the immediate surrender as the protocols reveal that far greater concern to the Japanese was a Soviet Invasion. 

 

On the morning of the 8th the Emperor received Minister Togo in the shelter beneath the Imperial Palace. His Majesty and the Foreign Minister shared a deep concern at the course of events; both were mindful of the ‘new type of bomb’ and the military’s refusal to capitulate. Togo gravely advised the Emperor that the country had no option other than to accept the Potsdam Declaration. His Majesty appeared to agree; the war should end “without delay”. 

 

“His Majesty observed that, now with this kind of weapon in use, it had become even more impossible than ever to win the war,” Togo later wrote. The Emperor advised, however, that Japan should not “completely discard the possibility of negotiating conditions”. Togo informed Prime Minister Suzuki and Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, of the Emperor’s position. The militarists were kept out of these secret deliberations, as their fanatical junior officers were bound to interpret Togo’s influence as perverting the Imperial Will, which would endanger the lives of the “peace faction”. For this reason, in part, Prime Minister Suzuki tended to say whatever the hardliners wished to hear. The destruction of Hiroshima had not changed Suzuki’s outward refusal to surrender. Regardless of what his “stomach art” advised him, the atomic bomb, for now, had failed to move the stubborn old man, who knew little of what was happening in the country. Togo similarly paid lip service – in public – to continuing the war, while privately urging the Emperor to intervene. Only the Emperor’s word, he knew, could impose surrender and control the army’s malcontents. In the meantime, he would continue to talk, and scheduled a meeting of the Supreme Council next morning, 9 August.

 

Here was the last testament of a delinquent regime beyond the reach of reason. The advent of nuclear war had manifestly not achieved the desired outcome; the atomic bomb had not shocked Tokyo into submission, as Washington intended (and later claimed). The nuclear bludgeon failed to deter the militarists, men like Anami, Toyoda and Umezu, from their disastrous course. To them, another city had died in a country that had hitherto suffered the loss of more than 60. 

 

A more ominous threat, in the regime’s eyes, emanated from the gathering storm on the Manchurian border. The Russians had massively underlined their deadly intent on 28 July – two days after the Potsdam Declaration – when Tokyo received news of a further 381 eastbound Soviet military trains, carrying 170,000 troops, hundreds of guns and tanks, and – vital for an invasion – 300 barges, 83 pontoon bridges and 2900 horses. The Japanese had in fact grossly underestimated Russia’s resolve: by night over the past four months, rail carriages had shifted more than a million men and materiel 10,000 kilometres to the Pacific theatre in one of the greatest redeployments in the history of warfare.

Early on 9 August Tokyo time, Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu received a call from the Domei News Agency, informing him of the Soviet declaration of war. It came as a profound shock. 

 

Prime Minister Suzuki went to see the Emperor at 7am and returned “an hour or two later” with an answer: “His Majesty had agreed to accept the terms issued at Potsdam. Togo and his senior staff had reached the same conclusion that morning, with the condition that “the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation shall not have any influence on the position of the Imperial House”. The Prime Minister scheduled immediate meetings of the Supreme Council and the full cabinet: the Big Six would meet at 10am, an hour before the B-29 Bockscar – bearing the plutonium bomb – would reach the vicinity of Nagasaki. 

 

It is palpably clear from these events that the Soviet declaration of war made a deeper impression on Tokyo than the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. When Suzuki heard the news that the Russians had overrun the Imperial Army, he responded: “Is the Kwantung Army that weak? Then the game is up.” The Japanese leaders had anticipated – many desired – an American land invasion, which would, they believed, ennoble the last sacrifice of the Japanese people. To their shock, it had come from Russia.

 

A tedious debate about how to surrender in light of the Russian invasion proceeded in the hot little room; the leaders sank deep in their chairs and the usual hopeless divisions emerged. “We can’t get anywhere by keeping silent forever,” noted the unusually outspoken Navy Minister Yonai. The “peace” and “war” factions were split equally over whether: (1) to surrender in line with the terms of Potsdam on condition that the Emperor be preserved; or (2) to surrender with four conditions attached: that the Imperial House remain intact; that Japanese forces be allowed voluntarily to withdraw; that alleged war criminals be tried by the Japanese government; and that Japan’s mainland territory remain free of foreign occupation. In short, fantasy vied with delusion for a claim on their minds.

 

Moderates Suzuki, Togo and Yonai supported the first path; hardliners Anami, Umezu and Toyoda the second. The latter controlled the armed forces, whose officer class continued ferociously to resist any talk of surrender. Nothing of great moment had occurred in Hiroshima tpersuade them of the futility of further defiance; the militarists scorned the weapon as a cowardly attack on defenceless civilians. Towards the end of the interminable discussion – now into its third hour – a messenger arrived with news of the destruction of Nagasaki – by another "special bomb". The Big Six paused, registered the news, and resumed their earlier conversation. The messenger, bowing apologetically, was sent on his way. "No record … treated the effect [of the Nagasaki bomb] seriously," noted the official history of the Imperial General Headquarters.

 

In an effort to break the impasse, Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu proposed a full cabinet conference later that day. It began at 2.30pm. For hours, the 16 members (including the Big Six) examined the situation – chiefly the Russian threat – from every perspective, hammered out their arguments, and honed their ancient references and sophistries – as Nagasaki burned. After seven hours the impasse remained and Suzuki declared an intermission. 

 

 

A long interrogative refrain by the President of the Privy Council revealed the low priority the meeting attached to the atomic bombs. Near the end of a great list of questions about the Soviet invasion and the state of Japan’s food supply, between his concerns about air raids in general and the paralysis of public transportation in particular, Baron Hiranuma asked: "And are you confident in our defense against atomic bombs?"

Poker-faced Umezu, a stranger to understatement, replied, in all sincerity: "Though we haven’t made sufficient progress so far in dealing with air raids, we should expect better results soon since we have revised our tactics. But there is no reason to surrender to our enemies as a result of air raids."

 

Hirohito sat silent throughout. A little after 2am, Prime Minister Suzuki rose, bowed to His Highness and made a statement that changed the course of Japanese history: “The situation is urgent … I am therefore proposing to ask the Emperor his own wish [goseidan – sacred judgment]. His wish should settle the issue, and the government should follow it.”

Hirohito leaned forward and said: “I have the same opinion as the Foreign Minister.” That is, Japan should surrender “unconditionally” – with the single proviso that the Imperial House be allowed to persist.

“I have been told that we have confidence in our victory but the reality doesn’t match our projections,’ the Emperor continued. ‘For example, the War Minister told me that the defense positions along the coast of Kujukuri Hama would be ready by mid-August but it is not yet ready. Also I have heard that we have no more weapons left for a new division. In this situation, there is no prospect of victory over the American and British forces … It is very unbearable for me to take away arms from my loyal military men … But the time has come to bear the unbearable, in order to save the people from disaster …”

 

At 7 AM Domei News dispatched Tokyo’s formal surrender to Washington via the Swiss Chargé d’Affaires in Berne. 

 

In a last desperate bid to buy time, Minister Anami tried to stall the process: he urged Suzuki to delay the next Imperial conference by two days; he needed time to consult with the armed forces. The Prime Minister refused: "Now is the time to act … there is no more time to waste," Suzuki warned. Anami abruptly left the room.

Suzuki’s doctor, who happened to be present, asked the Prime Minister why he could not wait a few days.

"I can’t do that," Suzuki said. "If we miss today, the Soviet Union will take not only Manchuria, Korea, Karafuto, but also Hokkaido. This would destroy the foundation of Japan. We must end the war while we can deal with the United States."

 

 

 

Even the targets were not really justified. The way they were chosen was based on four criteria. The target should:

 

a) Possess sentimental value to the Japanese so its destruction would "adversely affect" the will of the people to continue the war;

b) Have some military significance – munitions factories, troop concentrations etc;

c) Be mostly intact, to demonstrate the awesome destructive power of an atomic bomb;

d) Be big enough for a weapon of the atomic bomb’s magnitude. 

 

Dr Joyce C. Stearns, a scientist representing the air force, named the four shortlisted targets in order of preference: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama and Kokura. They were all "large urban areas of more than three miles in diameter"; "capable of being effectively damaged by the blast"; and "likely to be unattacked by next August."

 

The meeting barely touched on the two cities’ military attributes, if any. Kyoto, Japan’s ancient capital, had no significant military installations; however, its beautiful wooden shrines and temples recommended it, Groves had earlier said (he was not at the 10 May meeting), as both sentimental and highly combustible. Hiroshima’s port, main industrial and military districts were located outside the urban regions, to the southeast of the city.

Kokura, too, made the reserved list. Kokura, on Kyushu, west of the Kanmon tunnel, was the most obvious military target. It possessed one of Japan’s biggest arsenals, replete with military vehicles, ordnance, heavy naval guns and, as had been reported, poison gas. There were coal and ore docks, steelworks, extensive railway yards and an electric power plant, covering almost 3 kilometres along the shore and 2.4 kilometres inland. A less appealing target, Niigata, had "fire resistive" industrial plants and houses made of ‘heavier plaster’ to protect against harsh winters, hence less combustible.

 

As for Hiroshima ...

 Since 1888, Hiroshima Castle, a moated white tower set in gardens just north of the town centre, had been home to the 5th  Division of the Imperial Army and its locally famous 11th  Regiment. The Meiji Emperor had made the castle his headquarters during the first war with China, in 1894. In the 1940s, it served as a focal point for local recruits to the Imperial Army whose presence breathed through life in the town; at any time, 20,000 to 40,000 reserve troops would parade on the castle’s drill grounds prior to their departure for the Gaisenkan, the Hall of Triumphal Return, at the mouth of the Ota. This was the last point on the mainland from which millions of Japanese troops would depart for the killing fields of China, Russia and the Pacific – at least until late 1944, when the US naval blockade terminated Hiroshima’s military function. By early 1945, with defeat looming, Hiroshima had lost its critical role as the army’s embarkation point.

 

Nagasaki was not a crucial target at all, since some time. In late July, 32 B-29s attacked the Mitsubishi shipbuilding plant, putting the shipyard out of action. Even that was not necessary as  in early 1945,  the Mitsubishi shipyard produced virtually nothing; it had few resources, largely due to the US naval blockade, and served as a workhouse for Korean slaves and about 500 British, Dutch, American and Australian prisoners of war.

There were some secondary targets, as minor factories though, like in  Ohashi, where Mitubishi operated an underground torpedo plant. 

 

 

 

All quotes and data taken from the mentioned above book, along with gathered elsewhere conference scripts and protocols. 

[Cybermat47]

No, they were not. I wanted to stay away from the discussion as I figured there is no way that I can at least provoke someone to a rethinking his view, not to mention of changing it. It's also interesting that anyone who dares to oppose the view is called revisionist, I should say - thanks God for revisionists. My entire life I was taught a critical thinking and not to accept the common view but seek the details myself to create my own opinion. It must certainly not be a part of modern education.

Hey, if you have something to say, you should say it. The more opinions, the better. Different opinions can often make us think more. Plus, life would be extremely boring if we all agreed with each other.

 

BTW, I couldn't agree more with you about critical thinking

[=362nd_FS=Hiromachi]

But thanks God they didnt - neither nazis nor japanese military. It's unfortunate though that another totalitarianism did, I mean Soviet Union. 

 

I also find this interesting, especially because they overall try to be politically correct as much as possible and we have this awkward situation when they create artificial scenes or characters to present diversity. 

 

Spaniards are not easy to deal with, there is a huge variety of actions taken - Monarchy was deeply concerned about the natives and their treatment, local administration was either negative towards them or ambivalent, and conquistadors exploited them with no limits on their sugarcane plantations. 

For a detailed research I highly recommend obtaining those two books :

http://www.amazon.com/1491-Revelations-Americas-Before-Columbus/dp/1400032059

http://www.amazon.com/1493-Uncovering-World-Columbus-Created/dp/0307278247

 

They dont focus on Spanish only, more on the reasons and consequences of great geographical discoveries.  It was one of those books I read in a day or two, as it was so fascinating. 

[unreasonable]

I agree. The bombings were strategically justified, not morally. Strategy and morals don't often mix.

 

 

This is a questionable position, philosophically. One could equally say, if the US leadership believed that the bombings were strategically necessary, then it would have been be morally unjustifiable for them not to have given the order to proceed: even if they were wrong on the point of fact as to the strategic necessity.

 

The fact is that there was - and is now - no agreement on what constitutes moral action in a time of war - or for that matter in times of peace. At the time there was not even agreement on what laws should be applied to acts of war. And note that even now it is generally accepted that while, other things being equal, it is a good thing to obey laws, it is also accepted that breaking them occasionally is not just expedient, but also morally justifiable.

 

So I would say they do indeed mix, but in a complex way.

[unreasonable]

 

No, they were not. [ edit - strategically justified]

 

My edit to Hiromachi's post - you believe, based on the books you have read, that the bombings were not the main point that forced surrender. You conclude that, therefore, the bombings were not strategically necessary.

 

Even if you are right about the first point (and I tend to agree), it does not follow the bombings were strategically unnecessary looking at the bigger picture.

 

Demonstrating to the Soviets that the US had this weapon and were prepared to use it was extremely useful strategically, given that the division of Europe between the blocs was still in play. Preventing a new war from breaking out by a show of force was, it seems to me, a perfectly good strategic goal. The Japanese victims got to be killed with an A bomb rather than incendiaries, and a point was made to the Soviets.