LUFTWAFFE EXPERTEN, Fact or Fiction?

[MiloMorai]

http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlesww2luftwaffe.htm

[Brano]

The inability of the German Fighter force to support its ground forces effectively, contrasted sharply with the evolution of the RAF's tactics and operational procedures as the Desert War progressed.
The tactical use of Medium Bombers, and the highly effective Kittyhawks which were able to offer direct support to the troops with their bombing and strafing was never matched by the Luftwaffe. The fact that many of the fighter pilots ran up big personal scores was irrelevant to the prosecution of the war and the undue emphasis placed on such achievements was an indication of the failure by German Commanders at all levels to understand the principles of Air Power.

 

Very well written

[novicebutdeadly]

Whilst a good read, the article doesn't mention when historians have deliberately tried to fabricate findings to try to prove that Luftwaffe pilots didn't achieved the kills that they did.

One notable was a Russian historian that tried to prove that Hartmann fabricated his kills, however this Historian clearly thought that German records were all lost after the war, and so tried to claim that Hartmann couldn't have possibly shot down planes at a certain location because no planes were shot down there on those dates (I can't remember the exact examples).

Yet as the records showed, Hartmann not only didn't claim any kills in that area, he wasn't even in that area....

Hartmann was thoroughly investigated to the point that one of the people assigned to check on his claims (also a pilot) was assigned as his wing man.


At the end of the article it mentions the book "Aces of the Reich" and I def have to agree it's a great read.

In short the German fighter pilots desire for kills (and the awards and fame that followed) resulted in a mentality that the most important thing was kills.

 

Whereas other countries deliberately chose to not engage enemy aircraft (that were not a threat to them) and stay on mission, protecting the bombers, or covering the ground forces.

 

 

Some may criticize this mentality (of the Luftwaffe fighter pilots), but the majority of people who have played il2, il2 bos and pretty much any other flying game, are equally as guilty.

 

How many times have people flying bombers requested an escort, and either no-one responds, or they escort for a while but are quickly lured away by the chance off kills (even if the enemy planes are not a threat to the bomber)???

 

 

The reason is sadly simple, we all desire glory, to see the highest score/ kills next to our name, and escorting bombers is tedious and boring.

When we fly over the area that the enemy has to attack it is only because we know it will bring prey, we rarely think of the "people" on the ground.

We tell ourselves that its "just a game" yet when we tell our friends about our "hunting" experiences (online etc), how real we make it out to be.

~S~

Edited September 17, 2014 by 907-novicebutdeadly

[mudpuppy]

An interesting read and similar to thoughts I've been having while reading a book by Christer Bergstrom on Stalingrad and the air war just prior and during that section of the war.  There are numerous cases when he lists claims made (by both sides) and how they do not match with loss records from the enemy.  In the end I think it is true that the Luftwaffe Experten did rack up large numbers of planes shot down....but where they exactly the same as the numbers claimed?  Probably not, and then it becomes a matter of whether the over-claims were errors of commission or ones of omission. Did they intentionally inflate their 'kills' or believe a plane had been shot down when it may have managed to limp home after getting lost in the chaos of battle.

 

Still, interesting discussion as long as it can stay civil and academic.  

Regards,

Derek

[novicebutdeadly]

An interesting read and similar to thoughts I've been having while reading a book by Christer Bergstrom on Stalingrad and the air war just prior and during that section of the war.  There are numerous cases when he lists claims made (by both sides) and how they do not match with loss records from the enemy.  In the end I think it is true that the Luftwaffe Experten did rack up large numbers of planes shot down....but where they exactly the same as the numbers claimed?  Probably not, and then it becomes a matter of whether the over-claims were errors of commission or ones of omission. Did they intentionally inflate their 'kills' or believe a plane had been shot down when it may have managed to limp home after getting lost in the chaos of battle.

 

Still, interesting discussion as long as it can stay civil and academic.  

Regards,

Derek

 

 

Given Hartmann's style (he learned off his mentors) ,anything he hit wasn't limping home, unless you count the pilot hitchhiking as limping back to base

 

In a fur ball everything is rather fluid, and Hartmann whilst in Romania (for a short period of time) in at least one engagement claimed 2 with a possible third, but was only awarded 1 (which is a funny at first but ultimately sad story), but the majority of the time, Hartmann used the tactic of "sticking your nose in the enemy cockpit and you can't miss", to the point that on several occasions his aircraft received damage (to various degrees) from the debris of the enemy aircraft.

 

Then there was the ransom that was placed on his head by the Russians...

 

I hope I don't get miss-understood, I don't "hero worship", and have no problems with claims that some people over claimed (deliberately or not), BUT just because some did it, doesn't mean that all did it.

 

 

Hartmann due to the nature of the fighting on the Eastern front was able to do what would have been impossible on the Western front.

 

He was able to stalk his prey and choose if and how to engage (to the point that he believed that the majority of his victims had no idea he was there until it was too late), and even developed a great philosophy of "See, decide, attack, break, coffee break.

 

That is; locate your enemy, decide when is the most opportunistic position/time to attack, attack the enemy, then break off and re-evaluate the situation, and if need be go back to base.

 

He hated fur balls and avoided them when possible.

 

 

[=LD=Hethwill]

Compare kills per sortie and you don't have much of difference between air forces.

 

On top of that allies did rotation back home. Axis forces had to keep on flying until they were wounded or worse or when they ran out of machines, so yeah the very long run gives incredible results.

[mudpuppy]

Thanks for that perpsective, 907.  From my(non-aviator) perpsective, I am amazed at these pilots who could engage in such deadly confrontations and not only manage to make it back to base but shoot down an enemy who was hell-bent on doing the same to you.  Tactics, quality of the aircraft and esprit-de-corps most certainly played a large role along with the natural abilities of the pilots. 

I wonder if there were some occasions when a pilot would choose NOT to be credited with a 'kill' if there was an absence of secondary confirmation? 

Regards,

Derek

[SCG_Neun]

Compare kills per sortie and you don't have much of difference between air forces.

 

On top of that allies did rotation back home. Axis forces had to keep on flying until they were wounded or worse or when they ran out of machines, so yeah the very long run gives incredible results.

+1

[SCG_Space_Ghost]

The inability of the German Fighter force to support its ground forces effectively, contrasted sharply with the evolution of the RAF's tactics and operational procedures as the Desert War progressed.

The tactical use of Medium Bombers, and the highly effective Kittyhawks which were able to offer direct support to the troops with their bombing and strafing was never matched by the Luftwaffe. The fact that many of the fighter pilots ran up big personal scores was irrelevant to the prosecution of the war and the undue emphasis placed on such achievements was an indication of the failure by German Commanders at all levels to understand the principles of Air Power.

 

Overly broad. Where is the evidence to support that claim?

 

The author is trying to compare P's and Q's - politics/propaganda vs. military doctrine, the first being the ultimate point of emphasizing such achievements.

 

Might as well throw away the Medal of Honor (US Armed Forces), or any personal achievement merit, since personal achievement is such an undue emphasis and has no quantifiable effect on armed forces morale, especially when the failure of their commanders forced them to pay the ultimate price in many cases.

 

An interesting read and similar to thoughts I've been having while reading a book by Christer Bergstrom on Stalingrad and the air war just prior and during that section of the war.  There are numerous cases when he lists claims made (by both sides) and how they do not match with loss records from the enemy.  In the end I think it is true that the Luftwaffe Experten did rack up large numbers of planes shot down....but where they exactly the same as the numbers claimed?  Probably not, and then it becomes a matter of whether the over-claims were errors of commission or ones of omission. Did they intentionally inflate their 'kills' or believe a plane had been shot down when it may have managed to limp home after getting lost in the chaos of battle.

 

Still, interesting discussion as long as it can stay civil and academic.  

Regards,

Derek

 

A lot of VVS documentation and attrition reports support some of the top scoring Experten's claims - Hartmann, Rall, Barkhorn, etc.

-snip-  Tactics, quality of the aircraft and esprit-de-corps most certainly played a large role along with the natural abilities of the pilots. 

-snip-

 

Yep.

-long so snip-

 

And everything this guy said - the LW investigated its top scoring pilots, Hartmann especially.

Edited September 17, 2014 by FalkeEins

[LLv34_Flanker]

S!

 

 Reading the book of Hans Joachim Marseille. Even mostly focused on him and his achievements it also gives some nice info on the general mood and mentality of the Luftwaffe pilots serving in Africa. They did not underestimate their opponent RAF/SAAF in any way, it would have been costly to them. Luftwaffe lost the war of attrition to Allies, they simply did not have the resources to keep the fight up. But they did put up a remarkable fight and give RAF/SAAF a run for their money so to speak. Marseille was the most successfull of them, after he "grew up" and honed his skills to perfection in shooting and handling his Bf109F-4. And his tally of 158 planes shot down is a feature of it's own against a skilled and motivated opponent.

[VRPilot]

read Adolf Gallands book ("the first and the last"), you possibly get the best inside view of the german fighter pilots (and how claims worked / kills were credited)

[Brano]

Overly broad. Where is the evidence to support that claim?

 

Axis forces surrender in Tunisia by 12th May 1943.

[Finkeren]

The seemingly endless discussion about kills and overclaiming aside. The general point made in article is true: The Luftwaffe as a whole proved largely unable to fulfill its purpose as either a tactical or a strategic force for the greater part of the war. Despite their tremendeous individual successes the LW "experten" failed to inflict sufficient losses on the enemy and minimize their own to have a significant impact on the war.

 

The question is, whether or not things could have been any different, given how hopelessly outnumbered the Luftwaffe forces were in most of their operations. The Luftwaffe was just never a very big force, and even at the apex of the Jagdwaffe never numbered more than 1500 serviceable single seat fighters and never more than 5000 aircraft for the entire air force, while just its 3 major opponents could easily field ten times that number. When you are outnumbered 10 to 1 in war, it really doesn't matter how well you are equipped or how valiantly you fight. The best you can hope for is a Thermopylae.

[SCG_Neun]

In coarse basic terms...Germany as a whole "suckered punched" Europe from the start and tactically had a superior advantage as the Allied powers geared up for the conflict.  After the Allies shook off the first couple of years momentum suffered from a Nazi regime that had betrayed every promise for a non-aggressive agenda, the Nazi's got what was coming to them. WWII in the initial stages was comparable to the Washington Redskins playing James Wood High School....The question of Luftwaffe Experten....is a mute point, as every nationality in the conflict had it's own experts.    A couple quotes referenced below....

 

"The German Aces Speak: World War II through the Eyes of Four of the Luftwaffe's Most Important Commanders" and I quote from Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF (RET):

 

"What I did experience firsthand was the caliber of these pilots. You had to be sharp, and on your game, or you would be killed. Colin Heaton’s expert interviewing methods have brought these stories and these men back to life. The hardships thy endured as pilots I can readily comprehend as those are universal. However what is beyond my experience, thank God, was their struggle against their own leadership at the same time they were fighting a war of national survival."

 

"This book is truly a testament to good men doing a tough job. Even though they were my enemies, I can still call them my brothers. I hold no ill will against the Germans I fought, just the opposite. I admired their skill, and feared their effectiveness, and after the war I enjoyed their company. I hope that the rest of the world can also allow these pilots, these men, to be accepted as national heroes in their own country. They should be proud of their dedication to Germany. I am proud to have fought against such worthy adversaries, who were good men.”"

Edited September 19, 2014 by JagdNeun

[SCG_Space_Ghost]

Axis forces surrender in Tunisia by 12th May 1943.

 

Not convinced you read the context of my post.

 

Not surprised, either.

[Wulf]

In coarse basic terms...Germany as a whole "suckered punched" Europe from the start and tactically had a superior advantage as the Allied powers geared up for the conflict.  After the Allies shook off the first couple of years momentum suffered from a Nazi regime that had betrayed every promise for a non-aggressive agenda, the Nazi's got what was coming to them. 

 

 

 

What do you mean Germany "sucker punched Europe"?  And what tactical advantage are you suggesting the Germans had - "as the Allied powers geared up for conflict"?

[SCG_Neun]

What do you mean Germany "sucker punched Europe"?  And what tactical advantage are you suggesting the Germans had - "as the Allied powers geared up for conflict"?

It's just a slang term meaning they planned all along to grab land for their "living space" doctrine but hid behind bogus non-aggression treaties which they had no intention of honoring.  If it's about "honor" from the Nazi regime it didn't exist.  Sucker punch is when someone just comes up to you and knocks the crap out of you, and you never saw it coming....  Tactical advantage is when you build up your war machine knowing full well what your plans are and the Allies have no idea what's coming.   Tanks, men, bombers, fighters. Logistically moving men and equipment into place....Thats a big tactical advantage.....as the Allies had to gear up for a war waged by a regime whose ruthlessness and quest for European domination they could not foresee.....

 

All this is pertinent to the OP topic because many of the claims made by the Luftwaffe were early war years when the Allies were flying some obsolete aircraft with limited training and tactics against a seasoned Luftwaffe.  All this especially on the Eastern Front.  As the war progressed and the VVS gained better equipment and better training and tactics....the tide would turn and and the air victories would not be so easy for the Luftwaffe pilots....

Edited September 20, 2014 by JagdNeun

[SCG_Neun]

A sucker punch, also known as a one hit punch or coward-punch, is a punch made without warning, allowing no time for preparation or defense on the part of the recipient. The term is generally reserved for situations where the way in which the punch has been delivered is considered unfair or unethical.

[LukeFF]

The tactical use of Medium Bombers, and the highly effective Kittyhawks which were able to offer direct support to the troops with their bombing and strafing was never matched by the Luftwaffe. The fact that many of the fighter pilots ran up big personal scores was irrelevant to the prosecution of the war and the undue emphasis placed on such achievements was an indication of the failure by German Commanders at all levels to understand the principles of Air Power.

 

This is a point I think people are overlooking. German fighter pilots were known to loathe ground attack missions and much preferred the "thrill of the hunt," i.e., free-roaming missions looking for enemy aircraft without much concern for directly supporting their ground forces. This was in contrast to not only the Kittyhawks in North Africa but also Soviet fighters, which were sent all the time on low-level ground attack missions, in addition to more "traditional" air-to-air sorties.

 

Christer Bergström, Luftwaffe Aircraft in Profile, page 3:

 

In terms of aerial victories, the German fighter aces of World War II are truly unequalled. The highest class of fighter pilots consists only of Luftwaffe men - Marseille, Graf, Galland, Hartmann, Nowotny, Oseau and others.

 

One of the main reasons for this is the extreme weight placed upon individual aerial victories within the Luftwaffe fighter force. This one-sided aim, derived from the romantic outlook of one man - von Richthofen - gave the German fighter force a relatively unique draft. While the pilots of the Spitfires, Mustangs and Yakovlevs attacked the enemy wherever they found him - in the air or on the ground - realizing that they fought a merciless war - the Jagdflieger of the Luftwaffe were encouraged to look upon their mission more or less as a trophy hunt in the air. Subsequently, Marseille and his comrades were engaged plucking one British fighter after another in the skies over the Northern Desert in 1941-42, while the RAF fighter squadrons smashed up Rommel's supply lines, thus hastening the Allied victory in this war theater. Together, the six most successful German fighter pilots in the Western Desert shot down more than 400 Allied aircraft; on the Allied side only one pilot - "Killer" Caldwell - succeeded in achieving more than 20 aerial victories during the whole campaign. In the narrow sight of the German fighter pilots in Libya, they were the great victors. To the German and Italian ground troops, who continuously were strafed and bombed by low-flying Curtiss and Hurricane fighters while the Messerschmitt 109s made some pirouettes above, things looked different. 

 

This is also one of the main explanations to the magnificent results produced by the German fighters on the Eastern Front. Even in 1944, when the Red Air Force had overcome its initial weakness, introducing better trained pilots, using better tactics and being equipped with excellent aircraft such as the Yak-3, Experten such as Hartmann, Batz and Kittel achieved the same amount of successes as the aces of 1941-1942 had done.

 

The German fighter pilots developed such a snobbish attitude towards ground-attacks, that when they during the autumn of 1940 for the first time were forced to undertake such missions, they regarded it as an unjust punishment - which, in fact, was also the intention of Hermann Göring, who had given the order! - that severely hampered their morale. One of the most faithful disciples of Manfred von Richthofen, Adolf Galland, never overcame the bitterness this order created, which he proved many times after the war.

Edited September 20, 2014 by LukeFF

[Wulf]

OK, well I won't get into the politics of this because I suspect that won't end well but, I will just make a couple of comments of the subject of Germany's supposed 'tactical advantage' at the beginning of the War.  

 

Despite what some people may tell you, the Germans didn't have any really significant 'qualitative' advantages, in terms of equipment, going into WW 2 and in fact, the German Army was the least mechanized of all the western armies at the time (and so it remained throughout the War).  If you have a close look at the Polish campaign, for example, where Germans were supposed to have steamrolled the Polish military out of existence in very short order (6 weeks), you will find that the Germans actually suffered very significant casualties in both men and equipment.  In fact, during the course of the six week campaign, the Poles inflicted over 40,000 casualties on the Germans and in the process destroyed approximately 900 armoured fighting vehicles, over 500 aircraft were put out of action or destroyed (close to 40% of the attacking force), and some 6,000 trucks were destroyed.  This damage was inflicted by the same army, we are led to believe, that was so ill prepared and vulnerable, that they were forced to use cavalry against tanks.  The Poles did use cavalry during the campaign of course (but never intentionally against tanks) but then so did the Germans.  It should also be noted that the Poles actually had about 700 tanks of their own, most of which were at least as good if not better than the bulk of the German armour; made up as it was largely of obsolete Mk 1s and 2s.  The Poles also had good numbers of Swedish build 37mm anti-tank guns which were more than capable of defeating any German tank used during the campaign. It should also be noted that the Polish armour typically mounted heavier and far more effective guns (usually 37mm-or 47mm) than did their German counterparts.  The German Mk 1 and 2s, which, as mentioned, made up the bulk of the German tank force during the campaign (as they did in the subsequent attack on France) mounted either 2  machine guns or in the case of the Mk 2, an MG and a 20mm.  The German Mk 3s and 4s were of course more capable (although not by much) but they only made up a very small proportion of the German tank force.

 

If the Soviets hadn't attacked the Poles from the East (now there's a sucker punch if ever I've heard one) then in all probability the Poles may well have been in a position to hold out significantly longer than they did, but of course, that wasn't to be.  Either way, of course, (in the absence of effective Allied support) the Poles would ultimately have been defeated by the sheer size of the force the Germans ranged against them, but it would be a mistake to assume that the Poles were helpless in the face of what the defeated western allies would subsequently describe as the German 'Blitzkrieg'.  Far better it would seem,  in times of crisis, to invent some scary sounding bogey man than actually acknowledge your own failings and incompetence.

[Finkeren]

This is a great discussion. I just hope that people can keep the politics out of it.

 

Lukes quote from Bergström is interesting and pretty much right on the money. However, it's doubtful if a different and more "conventional" approach to fighter tactics would really have made that much difference given how few numbers the Luftwaffe actually had. I actually think that the individualist approach propably made the most of limited resources.

 

As with everything else concerning the Nazi-German war effort, the surprising thing is not that it failed in the end but that it went as well as it did for as long as it did.

[SCG_Neun]

Wulf, thanks for pointing that out...It's always good to have a different angle on something and after reading a bit more on the Polish Air Force of 1939 it clarified things for me a bit as well.  I didn't know much about the Poles military capabilities at that time......and now I do.  Once again....Cheers

[Finkeren]

The thing that baffled me as an adult digging deeper into the WW2 litterature was just how close most of the early battles were fought, how stretched to the limit especially the German forces were, how many casualties they sustained and how many close calls the Wehrmacht had, where they had to gamble everything. It's such a contrast to the simplified "for kids" story that tells of the initially invincible Germans who just steamrolled over much weaker enemies.

[Rama]

It should also be noted that the Poles actually had about 700 tanks of their own, most of which were at least as good if not better than the bulk of the German armour; made up as it was largely of obsolete Mk 1s and 2s.

Sorry, but this isn't what the Polish Tank OB analyze shows:

- 50 R35 (French single-man turreted Tank, equiped with a WWI 47mm short-barelled gun)

- 139 7TP (Polish Tank, slower, lesser armored and lesser equiped than the german counterpart)

- 38 Vickers (light)

So a grand total of 227 "modern" tank, opposed to:

- 202 Pz35t

- 78 Pz38t

- 98 PzIII

- 211 PzIV

So 589 modern tank, all superiors in many aspects to the polish tanks.

 

The other Polish "tanks" were composed of obsolete WWI Renault FT-17 and of light tracked recon vehicle, that can hardly be qualified "tanks".

 

So the Germans had more thant double numbers of modern tanks, maybe it isn't "overhelming", but it is vaslty superior

The 2668 PzI and PzII were not used for Tank battle, but with the intantry to clean the battlefield after the tank clash (and quite usefull in this role)

 

It should also be noted that the Polish armour typically mounted heavier and far more effective guns (usually 37mm-or 47mm) than did their German counterparts.  The German Mk 1 and 2s, which, as mentioned, made up the bulk of the German tank force during the campaign (as they did in the subsequent attack on France) mounted either 2  machine guns or in the case of the Mk 2, an MG and a 20mm.  The German Mk 3s and 4s were of course more capable (although not by much) but they only made up a very small proportion of the German tank force.

You forgot the very good 37mm skoda gun of the Pz35t and Pz38t.... and you also forgot that the French 47mm gun of the R35 was a WWI design, and inferior to the 37mm guns of the German armor. Only the 37mm Bofor of the 7TP could be really compared.

 

And I'm not even talking about the use of these materials. The Polish had no unit comparable to a german armored division. The armored vehicles were mostly attached to infantry units for support.

[MiloMorai]

The thing that baffled me as an adult digging deeper into the WW2 litterature was just how close most of the early battles were fought, how stretched to the limit especially the German forces were, how many casualties they sustained and how many close calls the Wehrmacht had, where they had to gamble everything.

 

So true. The Battle of France comes to mind.

[Wulf]

Sorry, but this isn't what the Polish Tank OB analyze shows:

- 50 R35 (French single-man turreted Tank, equiped with a WWI 47mm short-barelled gun)

- 139 7TP (Polish Tank, slower, lesser armored and lesser equiped than the german counterpart)

- 38 Vickers (light)

So a grand total of 227 "modern" tank, opposed to:

- 202 Pz35t

- 78 Pz38t

- 98 PzIII

- 211 PzIV

So 589 modern tank, all superiors in many aspects to the polish tanks.

 

The other Polish "tanks" were composed of obsolete WWI Renault FT-17 and of light tracked recon vehicle, that can hardly be qualified "tanks".

 

So the Germans had more thant double numbers of modern tanks, maybe it isn't "overhelming", but it is vaslty superior

The 2668 PzI and PzII were not used for Tank battle, but with the intantry to clean the battlefield after the tank clash (and quite usefull in this role)

 

You forgot the very good 37mm skoda gun of the Pz35t and Pz38t.... and you also forgot that the French 47mm gun of the R35 was a WWI design, and inferior to the 37mm guns of the German armor. Only the 37mm Bofor of the 7TP could be really compared.

 

And I'm not even talking about the use of these materials. The Polish had no unit comparable to a german armored division. The armored vehicles were mostly attached to infantry units for support.

 

 

I'm not trying to make the point that the Poles had better equipment than the Germans.  They absolutely didn't, at least in most respects they didn't.  However qualitative differences between German and Polish weaponry and its tactical deployment weren't decisive features of the campaign.  Poland's armour was hardly cutting edge even by the standards of the late 1930's but that same criticism could just as easily be leveled at the Germans.  As previously noted, most of the German tank force (Mk 1s and Mk 2s) in 1939/40 was essentially obsolete.  Even the limited number of Mk 3s and 4s available to the Germans during the campaign were by no means state of the art.  In 1939 the Mk 3 was armed with a 37mm Pak 36 while the Mk 4 was armed with a low velocity 75mm .  The Mk 3 was expected to defeat enemy tanks while the Mk 4 was nothing more than an infantry support vehicle.  Both tanks were out-gunned and out performed by the latest generation of French tanks encountered the following year.  In fact, the Mk 3s and 4 proved quite incapable of destroying some of the more advanced French tanks, like the Char B.  It was therefore somewhat fortuitous for the Germans that they were in a position to press their 88mm Flak guns into service as improvised anti-tank weapons.  If they hadn't been able to do this their campaign may well have stalled at critical moments.

 

The point I'm trying to make is that Poland could have been defeated by any of the major European powers in 1939.  Poland was by no means a push-over but it was relatively small.  Furthermore, there was nothing special about the weapons or  tactics employed by the Germans.  What really doomed the Poles was the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the failure of the Western Allies to mobilize quickly and decisively in Poland's support.  The situation in France in the following year was different again, but the Germans didn't bring anything particularly new to the campaign apart from a risky plan and a determination to win.  The Germans fought extremely well during the campaign, there's no doubt about that, but there was nothing magical or new about their methods.  The French had equipment that was as good (and in some respects better) than the Germans and certainly more of it.   But unfortunately for the French, the initial deployment of their forces, the failure of their military organisation to adapt to the escalating crisis in the French rear and a critical failure of 'will' on the part of the French Government doomed them to defeat.     

Edited September 20, 2014 by Wulf

[Rama]

We can have long talk about the reasons of the French defeat, one short post ins't enough for a good synthesis... but I wasn't trying to make a point.

I was just showing the innacuracy of one of your affirmations, no more.

[J2_Trupobaw]

Remember that Germany's war was always to be with Soviets (and Poland, if only because they were along the way), both for "living space" and to defeat the communism which was or was not threat to all European countries ^*. That's the war Wehrmacht (Luftwaffe included) was being built and designed for.  Germany made numerous peace proposals to Western Allies starting in fall 1939, after fall of Poland, offering peace if Allies accept German territorial gains in the east. Only when Britain and France famously refused, time and time again, Germans reculantly went to war with them - yes, they did win on the continent, but Britain continued war in the  West, forcing Germans to occupy Low Countries, Norway and France to be able to continue (armistice with France outright stated that Germans are going to occupy northern France only as long as they need it for war against Britain - after expected British-German ceasefire, occupation would end and a  proper peace treaty with French was to be signed. Both French and Germans expected war - and occupation - to last few months). With British refusing to pull out from war,  Hitler made one attempt to defeat them with Luftwaffe that was not built to fight a war across the Channel, bleeding it for no gain. Then, Mussolini stumbled into north Africa, Greece and Yugoslavia and Germany had to divert more forces to get him out of trouble. When Germany finally invaded Soviets, it was not because their army was ready as planned (instead, it was stretched occupying half of Europe, with air force that already suffered a depleting defeat, with Soviet having ally waiting to happen in the West). Germans attacked because they knew situation in the West won't improve and they won't be more ready than they are now.

My point? That Germany didn't "sucker punch" anyone - they were lucky to more or less contain the western enemies they'd rather avoid, at cost of tied down occupying force and many lost airplanes. And that Luftwaffe (and rest of the Wehrmacht) was never fighting in "it's element" after Polish campaign - not in the west where it wasn't supposed to fight, not over the channel where it wasn;t equipped to fight and not in the East where it was supposed to be stronger and more numerous. Regardless of quality of planes and pilots, regardless of tactics, whatever strategies were designed for Luftwaffe in 1930s did not apply  to wars it was fighting. It was always right tool for wrong job.

 

[DD_Arthur]

Golly Trupobaw; those poor,  poor Germans.  It must have been pretty awful for them - what with being forced to invade all those countries. 

 

At least the French were thoughtful enough to provide all those lovely tree-lined avenues so German soldiers could march down them in the shade.

[J2_Trupobaw]

Well, after French and Brits refused to stand aside and let Germans have their way with Poland and in perspective Soviets, German choices  were either to end war and go back home (which they believed would be inviting Soviets to invade *them* in few years), or to take war to French and Britons. Frankly, Germans made every effort to negotiate peace with the west without giving Poland back, and other countries they invaded either were in the way or were originally invaded by Mussolini (who, unlike Hitler, was trying to randomly grab land for sake of randomly grabbing land).

The fact that they could not ignore or make peace with France and had to invade did send their plans FUBAR, however impressive might their conquests look like, they were pointless and expansive. Call them poor if you empathise, 

No mistakes, I believe British and French made right decision by declaring war on Germans and by refusing to walk away, even if it caused devastation of France, Britain and neutral countries that got caught in the middle. The German - Soviet war would erupt anyway, and if West stayed aside in 1939 / 1940 it would not intervene in war of two aggresive  totalitarisms. It would be the war Germans wanted and planned for, with no lend-lease help for Soviets and no German troops killed in 1940-1941 or tied up occupying conquered countries, with no naval blockade of war materials or British bombers over Germany. Whomever won that war would be in position to dominate  lands that ultimately became Warsaw Pact, and even if victors were Soviets, they would have no sentiment, gratitude or even sense of shared victory with the West. They wouldn't be obliged to let their new vassals in central Europe continue as independent-ish states in Soviet "block", either; that part came from agreement with the west. By tying themselves to Soviet side in west made foundation of international community, United Nations included, which along with nukes led to long periond of mostly peace.

Edited September 21, 2014 by Trupobaw

[III/JG52_Otto_-I-]

Every year we find a post like this, trying to disprove this Hartmman victories, something that is historically quantified and demonstrated dozens of times.

 

I recommend you read this article, which I think is pretty fair .... also I recommend the rest of the magazine, if you want to know what the importance of the Bf-109 in the history of world aviation.

http://issuu.com/joete6/docs/aviation_classics_018._messerschmit/61?e=0

 

The large number of victories gained by the Luftwaffe aces is due to three reasons, and easy to understand.
1/- Experience; They fought restlessly, day after day, until they were injured or killed, so they were experts in aerial combat (this is why they were called "Experten").
2/-Numerical inferiority; If there are more enemies, more possibility of shoot down any of them.
3/- The best tool for the job; The Messerschmitt Bf-109 was the best fighter of the world from 1935 to 1941, and It continued to be one of the best, until the end of the war.

It is no coincidence that the greatest aces of WWII Germans and Finns ( the firsts 114 in list) flew with this plane.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_World_War_II_flying_aces

Edited September 21, 2014 by III/JG52_Otto_Mas

[Crump]

 

The inability of the German Fighter force to support its ground forces effectively, contrasted sharply with the evolution of the RAF's tactics and operational procedures as the Desert War progressed.

 

 

Fighters do not have a direct ground support mission. 

 

I would say that just because the Allies were finally learning the lessons of combined arms warfare is not the reason the Germans were unable to pursue a doctrine they had been using for years already.

[MiloMorai]

It is no coincidence that the greatest aces of WWII Germans and Finns ( the firsts 114 in list) flew with this plane.  

 

 

When there is basically only one type of fighter a/c it is not hard to rack up high number of claims.

Fighters do not have a direct ground support mission. 

 

I would say that just because the Allies were finally learning the lessons of combined arms warfare is not the reason the Germans were unable to pursue a doctrine they had been using for years already.

 

So what is the reason the Germans were not able to pursue their doctrine?

[Anw.StG2_Tyke]

When there is basically only one type of fighter a/c it is not hard to rack up high number of claims.

 

So what is the reason the Germans were not able to pursue their doctrine?

The reason is pretty simple, there weren't simply enough Fighter to provide aerial superiority for their ground attacker.

If the Germans had the same amount of Planes and Pilots like the Allies, they still could prevent enough cover for their Ground-Attackers.

 

The German doctrin simply was for the fighters to fly "Freie Jagd" missions, I think fighter sweep is the best translation. The LW didn't wanted to have Fighters for Ground attacking. Atleast If you ask the Luftwaffe-Fighter-Pilots. That the Allied used their Fighter for Ground-attacks was simply based on the fact that they achieved such a aerial superiority they didn't needed to fear the germans anymore. The P-47's could simply attack with rockets or bombs because they didn't had to fear anything...

[LukeFF]

 

 

That the Allied used their Fighter for Ground-attacks was simply based on the fact that they achieved such a aerial superiority they didn't needed to fear the germans anymore.

 

But that doesn't explain how or why the Soviets constantly sent their fighter planes on ground attack missions practically from the start of Barbarossa, when air superiority for them was but a dream.

 

 

Fighters do not have a direct ground support mission. 

 

Of course they do, if that's what higher command wants them to undertake. That sort of thing goes all the way back to WWI with planes such as the Camel, which were employed heavily in the ground attack role.

[Matt]

The tactical use of Medium Bombers, and the highly effective Kittyhawks which were able to offer direct support to the troops with their bombing and strafing was never matched by the Luftwaffe. The fact that many of the fighter pilots ran up big personal scores was irrelevant to the prosecution of the war and the undue emphasis placed on such achievements was an indication of the failure by German Commanders at all levels to understand the principles of Air Power.

If those Kittyhawks were really that highly effective, the idea of the "Experten" to hunt those planes and shoot them down and leaving ground-attack for Stuka pilots might not have been the worst idea and might've easily caused as much damage as 109s doing ground attack and leaving the Kittyhawks alone.

 

I'm also not sure if the situations of both ground forces was that comparable.

[III/JG52_Otto_-I-]

When there is basically only one type of fighter a/c it is not hard to rack up high number of claims.

That was before the hen or the egg? ...Germans mass produced the bf-109 because it was a good fighter?, ..or was it a good fighter because they mass produced it ? ..i think the first.  

 

If you did not know, .Erich Hartmann was a prisoner of the Russians after the war, over ten years accused of destroying more than 300 Soviet aircraft, this fact implies that the Russians agreed that the number of Hartmann´s claims was true.

 

As all world always demonstrated, Luftwaffe´s "experten" pilots were a historic fact, not a fiction. 

This may like to you or not, but it is a historical reality.  

Edited September 22, 2014 by III/JG52_Otto_Mas

[III/JG52_Otto_-I-]

http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlesww2luftwaffe.htm

 

Addition to the above, That article you cite is a hoax, cut and pasted in forums for over 10 years. The book and the author does not exist.

Exactly the same post, was posted on another forum on 04/01/2004, which is prior to your cited article.    

http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php/138508-LUFTWAFFE-EXPERTEN-Fact-or-Fiction-Forums?s=646a8c402463d51ee0f255be8b72352b

Edited September 22, 2014 by III/JG52_Otto_Mas

[MiloMorai]

What book does not exist?

 

The article was updated.

 

Jeff Kenneday does exist, http://www.pacificairfields.com/af_show_airfield.php?id=5438

[MiloMorai]

That was before the hen or the egg? ...Germans mass produced the bf-109 because it was a good fighter?, ..or was it a good fighter because they mass produced it ? ..i think the first.

 

It was mass produced because the Germans couldn't, not that they didn't try, develop a better fighter.