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Me 110 front line fighter ?

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The Me 110 suffered at the hands of the RAF during the Battle of Britain and did not live up to expectation as a front line fighter, so how did it perform as a front line fighter on the Russian front

I should imagine that it would have been confined to escort duties and ground attack as the war progressed

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Posted (edited)

I have read many books about 110's.

In 1941 Zerstörer pilots claimed lot of russian planes down.

 

Units that operated them were mostly veteran pilots and they did not have great issues to fight against soviet fighters.

Naturally when war progressed it became more dangerous not only because plane started to shown age but also because Luftwaffe started to crumble.

 

Ground troops appreciated their ability to destroy targets with great accuracy and pilots operating the aircraft liked the plane because it could fight back in case of enemy air activity.

 

In my own analysis Bf 110 was used in wrong way in Battle of Britain because Luftwaffe had to do something about 109's fuel issue.

If 109's issues would have been solved earlier Bf 110 would have got better reputation.

 

Edited by Godspeed
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Posted (edited)
2 hours ago, taffy2jeffmorgan said:

The Me 110 suffered at the hands of the RAF during the Battle of Britain and did not live up to expectation as a front line fighter, so how did it perform as a front line fighter on the Russian front

I should imagine that it would have been confined to escort duties and ground attack as the war progressed

 

BOB was the first time the germans flew against planes of similar ability, in any great numbers. the BF110 was really untested against at the time "modern fighters".

 

The germans expected to walk all over the brits they had the planes and the numbers of experienced battle hardened pilots and had never fought a battle like this one before. Many factors involved , and you have to look at the big picture.

So yes the bf110 was used in the wrong way , they had never really tested it against modern fighters in any great numbers.

 

And 

The Luftwaffe did very well at the start of the eastern front campaign, because at the start the Russians were out matched and unprepared. and the BF110 was not flying under the same conditions as in the BOB. The soviets did not have any decent planes at the start of this conflict. Stalingrad was the turning point for the germans. So many factors outside battle hardware have a huge impact.

 

And here is yet another reason,... quote: http://www.aviation-history.com/messerschmitt/bf110.html

 

"When compared to other twin-engine aircraft such as the Bristol Beaufighter, de Havilland Mosquito, Petlyakov Pe-2 and Lockheed P-38, the biggest mistake was that the Bf 110 was built to fulfill too many roles. The Beaufighter, Mosquito and Pe-2 were never intended to be fighters and the P-38’s main role was as a fighter. Hitler’s obsession with offensive capabilities required the Germans to produce aircraft with multiple roles that compromised performance as opposed to the Allies who produced aircraft that were more specialized."

 

Its not all about a capability of a plane vs plane or tank vs tank. Numbers, supply lines, pilot quality and quantity, strategy, build quality etc etc have a huge impact. You can't look at battle hardware alone in isolation of other factors and make comparisons.

Edited by =RS=Stix_09
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While every publication on the Messerschmitt Bf 110 boasts about its mauling during the Battle of Britain, the fact that the "escorts needed to be escorted" is just not true according to British author John Vasco. He has authored eight books on the Messerschmitt Bf 110 and has conducted dozens of interviews with German pilots during the 1980s and 90s. According to German pilots who were there, the Bf 109 was no more successful than the Bf 110. The misstatement seems to have arisen by Hermann Göring's rants about the losses of 110s at one point during the Battle, who was seeking to point blame at others in order to divert attention from his own ill-conceived strategy. Gunther Rall, third most successful fighter ace in history said of Göring, "To be fair, he (Goring) was a great organizer before the war. He ran several political economic programs, but he was certainly not a strategist. About air warfare, he was mistaken."1

   

Vasco gives many examples in his books. “In the early days of July, III./ZG 76 suffered losses on an escort mission for Stukas against shipping in the Channel. The 110 units also escorted He 111, Ju 88 & Do 17 units during the Battle. The majority of their missions were flying as pure escort units more often than not. Flying at around 200 mph or less, with the slow, lumbering, bombers, they were bounced often by RAF fighters flying considerably faster, up towards 300 mph and above, they were often at a great disadvantage, hence the level of their losses." The 110 units flew in far greater roles than the 109 units, and Bf 109 units arrived at the Channel front much later than the Bf 110 units, which no doubt reduced Bf 109 losses than they otherwise would have been.

 

It's not about the plane, it's about tactics. If you are forced to fly with the same speed as bombers on the same altitude then you will have bad time. I remember someone posting some statistics here, 109 had worse K:D ratio than 110 in battle of Britain. 110 was not a bad plane.

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yes posting stats of 109 vs 110 in a battle is meaningless if conditions of use are not considered.

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As stated before - the 110 can do many things quite well, close escort is not among them. 

 

If they try to win manoeuvre combat against single engined fighter they fight at a serious disadvantage. Some cocky Zerstörer pilots even tried to turnfight polish biplanes and were shot down. 

 

However in the surprise bounce the Zerstörer were successful - even over Britain. And this form of combat was that in which most a2a kills were achieved in both world wars and Korea by any fighter airplane anyway...

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I would think that the 110 could be very successful if used as part of a team.  It was tough and had great concentrated firepower.  Drag and bag would seem to be a good option.  What it was not going to do is win a 1:1 dogfight against a properly flown Spitfire or Hurricane.  Minimal to no speed advantage, outclassed in terms of roll and turn, etc.  However, if it was given free reign to attack British planes as they attacked bomber formations it would have done much better.

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I recently Read First Light by Geoffrey Wellum and one thing he recounted was that they'd come across flights of 110's and they'd form a defensive circle, i.e. they'd fly around in a big ring, the idea being if a plane latched on to the tail of one, the 110 behind could shoot that plane down.

it didn't really work and it usually devolved into a furball where the 110 did not do so well against the rather nimble spit.

 

I think the idea that the 110 was mis-used during the battle of britain is accurate, they are a fast attack plane, zoom in, drop your bombs and get out, in a fight they're great at the german favourite boom n zoom but in a turn fight will suffer.  Being stuck with the slower heavier mediums or using defensive tactics like circling the wagons will get you shot down no matter the plane Imo.

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Posted (edited)
4 hours ago, =RS=Stix_09 said:

the biggest mistake was that the Bf 110 was built to fulfill too many roles

I would not call it a mistake tho. Germany could not make one plane for every role. It was not mighty USA that could produce whatever they wanted to. Pretty much everything they had was build for many roles. Ju88 could be a level bomber, dive bomber, night fighter, torpedo bomber. Bf110 was fighter, nightfighter, ground attacker with bombs or 37mm AT gun or something like bomber hunter. Even ju87 a dive bomber was later upgraded as tank killer with guns. Fw190 was a fighter bomber. They were forced to make and use versatile planes simply because they had no choice.


So in my opinion it was not a mistake but a necessity. They tried to make ground attacker only (hs129) but as you can see they just could not really put much resources into it.

Edited by InProgress
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Whatever shortcomings that the Me110 had it certainly made up for it as a night fighter against the RAF night bombing raids

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Yup using an airplane for the role it was born to do is the issue here. The black widow never had to dogfight anyone and hence it is remembered as a successful plane.

 

Now, returning to the OP.... IIRC the bf110 was used mainly as ground attack plane in the estern front, right? It could defend itself as a fighter if the oppositon showed up but even in the first year of hostilities it was not intentionally thrown in as a fighter on typical fighter roles.

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The First Term Used by Germans for the BF110 was Zerstörer

"DESTROYER" 

They Started the entire Twin engine Attacker or Destroyer Craze. 

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10 hours ago, taffy2jeffmorgan said:

The Me 110 suffered at the hands of the RAF during the Battle of Britain and did not live up to expectation as a front line fighter, so how did it perform as a front line fighter on the Russian front

I should imagine that it would have been confined to escort duties and ground attack as the war progressed

 

Er. 210 under Rubensdorffer showed just how good an aircraft it was for fast, precision strikes while a few of the ZG units claimed a fair few RAF fighters. SKG 210 carried on the fast strike role in 1941 and the other 110 units were - I think - generally ground-attack with a mixture of long-range intruder and interdiction duties

 

Given the E and F models were pretty fast and the crews well-trained and experienced, it soldiered on pretty well until around '43 when the majority had been diverted to the NJG units.

 

I always liked the 110.

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The 110 was always my childhood favorite. Only recently being replaced by the 109 at the top of my list of favorite war birds. I've really enjoyed reading this thread about the old girl.

 

Thanks

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The 110 was suppose to be the tip of the spear. Just like P-51s that flew in front of the bomber stream to help clear the air of attacking fighters.

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Added to the Statistic during BOB was the loss of almost two squadron flying from Denmark and  Norway. These had plywood non droppable bellytanks. 

They escorted HE 111 and where a pyrotechnical and aerodynamic disaster waiting to happen by the time they entered the eastcoast of England. With their bellytanks empty but full of petrol-fumes a single hit caused the to blow to smithereens. And the bellytanks affected the aerodynamic in a degree that the HE 111 they escorted could out turn them. 

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Posted (edited)

Something I recently learned was that during the BoB, German fighter escorts were ordered to be in close formation with the bombers.  They could not use energy saving/building tactics by flying faster  above the formations and adjusting course as necessary to stay in position.  109 pilots reported excessive work load just trying to keep their kites flying with stability at the reduced speed.  I'm sure a 110 in-form with 111s became a rather poor flying gun turret and not much more.  

 

It's quite possible that when the 110 was allowed to act in the hunter/killer role free of such constraints it was more survivable, but it wasn't great.  

We will never really know what the bulk of 110's were doing when they were shot down, but I suspect that the order to "close escort" was a big factor.  

 

Still, I highly doubt they were able to turn as extremely as they do in-game. 

Edited by =AVG77=Mobile_BBQ

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IIRC, the 110 personnel and aircraft losses over Britain were statistically the highest of any major type. But it caused significant damage when used properly.

 

It was a very good aircraft for its class and extremely useful.

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2 minutes ago, =AVG77=Mobile_BBQ said:

Something I recently learned was that during the BoB, German fighter escorts were ordered to be in close formation with the bombers.

That was in the 2cd half of the Bob when bomber pilots complained about the lack of escort, which wasn't true..

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4 minutes ago, =AVG77=Mobile_BBQ said:

Something I recently learned was that during the BoB, German fighter escorts were ordered to be in close formation with the bombers.  

 

That is an old myth. Theres was an ongoing friction about escort (there always is), but actually the balance of forward, general and close support was left to commanders.

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40 minutes ago, =AVG77=Mobile_BBQ said:

Still, I highly doubt they were able to turn as extremely as they do in-game. 

 

Actually I read that it's turn radius was very similar to the 109. Havin worse acceleration it should have slower turn rate - but probably very good for a twin engined aircraft. I guess the slow rate of roll was the bigger concern in manoeuvre combat. 

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43 minutes ago, EAF19_Marsh said:

That is an old myth. Theres was an ongoing friction about escort (there always is), but actually the balance of forward, general and close support was left to commanders.

 

What makes you think it is a myth? At least Galland's, Lützow's and Mölders' biographies all mention this order of close escort and the heated debate about it. It has come up from so many sources that I don't think it could be a myth.

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54 minutes ago, II./JG77_Kemp said:

 

What makes you think it is a myth? At least Galland's, Lützow's and Mölders' biographies all mention this order of close escort and the heated debate about it. It has come up from so many sources that I don't think it could be a myth.

Yes and all documentaries from early to lates mention it too. 

Knowing Gallands proudness and sensitive attributes I can imagine he blamed some losses on high command. But sources come from all over on this

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1 hour ago, II./JG77_Kemp said:

What makes you think it is a myth? At least Galland's, Lützow's and Mölders' biographies all mention this order of close escort and the heated debate about it. It has come up from so many sources that I don't think it could be a myth.

 

Well, the actual documents from the Karinhall meetings and operations undertaken by the force at the time. Try Price, Bungay, Bergstrom etc for the actual details on this. It was debated - this question was debated on the Allied side from 1942 - but that there outcome was a dogmatic tying down of fighters is a myth.

 

Galland blamed everything on Goering and many histories have taken this at face value. Actually, the only direct order was a strengthening of Stuka escorts after early August. Otherwise, if you look at the documents and the fighter dispositions, you will see that close escort was only a part: many Gruppe flew sweeps or top cover.

 

The ‘109s tied to bombers’ myth is one of many oft repeated, but that does not make it true. The Luftwaffe in 1940 made quite a few errors, but this was not one of them.

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6 hours ago, EAF19_Marsh said:

Well, the actual documents from the Karinhall meetings and operations undertaken by the force at the time. Try Price, Bungay, Bergstrom etc for the actual details on this.

 

I recall reading Bergstrom's mythbusting somewhere online, but as far as I recall, his claim there was that Göring did not give that order, but did not dispute that the order existed. The order could have come from Kesselring or Sperrle or someone else, even though I also recall other sources specifically mentioning Göring related to that. Another thing, if an actual document about it was found from Karinhall, it would of course prove that the order existed, but not finding the document does not prove that the order did not exist. From my recollection of Lützow's or Mölders' biographies (both written by Kurt Braatz), this order was given somewhere in France, where Luftwaffe commanders had been summoned to a meeting, not in Karinhall.

If there are several "eye witness" accounts of this order existing - from Luftwaffe commanders that actually received that order - then even if some historians, that were not there at the time, could not locate a document about that specific order, it does not prove that the order did not exist and these "eye witnesses" have conspired to lie about it in their memoirs, for no apparent reason.

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23 hours ago, =RS=Stix_09 said:

"When compared to other twin-engine aircraft such as the Bristol Beaufighterde Havilland Mosquito, Petlyakov Pe-2 and Lockheed P-38, the biggest mistake was that the Bf 110 was built to fulfill too many roles. The Beaufighter, Mosquito and Pe-2 were never intended to be fighters and the P-38’s main role was as a fighter. 

Pe-2 was originally projected as high altitude heavy fighter ВИ-100 with task to escort long range TБ-7 bombers. It evolved into ПБ-100 prototype = fast/dive bomber that became serial Pe-2.

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After online search, in the book "Albert Kesselring" (by Pier Paolo Battistelli) a specific date of this order is also mentioned to be on August 19, indeed in Karinhall, by Göring specifically. Another book, "Axis Victories to the Turn of the Tide: World War II, 1939-1943" (by Alan Levine) also mentions the same date, August 19, for that order.  Other major orders from that same date, mentioned by both books, were withdrawing Stukas from Battle of Britain and moving most of the Bf-109 units from Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 to Kesselring's Luftflotte 2. It is the same meeting where "109's escorting 110's" was discussed. 

In that sense it is interesting that Bergstrom and some other historians could not find documents that some other historians were apparently able to find. Alan Levine does say, though: "This interpretation of his [Göring's] orders may have been overly narrow, but he failed to correct this misconception." Anyway, that is the way that the order was forwarded to actual Luftwaffe units. The meeting in France, that I mentioned in my previous post, was probably where the Luftwaffe unit commanders received that order, as they were not physically present in Karinhall.

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Posted (edited)
3 hours ago, Brano said:

Pe-2 was originally projected as high altitude heavy fighter ВИ-100 with task to escort long range TБ-7 bombers. It evolved into ПБ-100 prototype = fast/dive bomber that became serial Pe-2.

 

Well it did become heavy fighter too known as Pe-3

I really would like to get it into Sturmovik because i love heavy fighters.

Edited by Godspeed

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Also something i found:

 

Beginning in early September 1940, some German air units equipped with the twin-engined fighter plane Messerschmitt Bf 110 were withdrawn from the English Channel to be used as night fighters. Sometimes this has been regarded as a ‘degradation’ of the Bf 110.

In fact, under heavy pressure from Hitler and the German population to put an end to the night raids against Berlin and other German cities, Göring chose to use his very best fighter plane, the Bf 110.

This should come as a surprise to many, because a fairly common notion is that the Bf 110 didn’t suffice as a day fighter; that it performed poorly in combat; and because of this had to be assigned with fighter escorts of single-engined Bf 109s. However, none of this stands up to closer scrutiny.

The twin-engined, long-range fighter Bf 110 was the result of the war games conducted under Göring’s supervision in the winter of 1933/34. These showed that the prevailing view by then that “the bombers will always get through” – the notion that regardless of intercepting fighters and air defence a sufficient number of bombers always would get through to their assigned targets, where they were expected to cause enormous damage – was incorrect.

 

In the summer of 1934, the leadership of the still secret Luftwaffe presented a study that suggested what at that time was quite revolutionary: a twin-engined fighter, heavily armed with automatic cannons as well as machine guns, to protect the bombers against enemy fighter interception. The idea was to dispatch these twin-engined fighter aircraft in advance, at a high altitude over the intended bombing target area, to clear the air of enemy fighters before the bombers arrived.

In fact, when used in that way, the Messerschmitt Bf 110 was quite successful. Actually, the Bf 110 appears to have had a better ratio of shot down enemy aircraft to own combat losses than any other fighter type during the Battle of Britain. Yet in most accounts of the Battle of Britain, the accomplishments of the Bf 110 have been nearly totally neglected (although admittedly this is largely a result of the inaccessibility of sources on this aircraft). Investigations of the available material have enabled a completely different picture to be drawn of the Bf 110 during the Battle of Britain.

 

Bf 110 fighter units sustained some very heavy losses on various occasions. In most cases, however, this was when the Bf 110 fighters were ordered to fly slow, close-escort missions to German bombers. In those cases, there was no difference between what the Bf 110 suffered and what the Bf 109 suffered. There are numerous cases where Bf 109 units were absolutely thrashed by RAF fighters because they had to fly on foolishly slow close-escort missions. In this way, Bf 110-equipped I./ZG 26 lost six aircraft over the North Sea on 15 August 1940, just as Bf 109-equipped I./JG 77 lost five aircraft on 31 August 1940, to pick just two examples.

 

Christer Bergström

14 hours ago, EAF19_Marsh said:

That is an old myth. Theres was an ongoing friction about escort (there always is), but actually the balance of forward, general and close support was left to commanders.

No it's not. This is from war diary of JG 26:

image.png.9fea5d9113f66f58534ffd7af3ade04e.png

 

Cleary mentions need of even CLOSER escrot. It's mentioned everywhere, by veterans, historians, even in war diary of fighter units.

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4 hours ago, II./JG77_Kemp said:

recall reading Bergstrom's mythbusting somewhere online, but as far as I recall, his claim there was that Göring did not give that order, but did not dispute that the order existed. The order could have come from Kesselring or Sperrle or someone else, even though I also recall other sources specifically mentioning Göring related to that. Another thing, if an actual document about it was found from Karinhall, it would of course prove that the order existed, but not finding the document does not prove that the order did not exist. 

 

Most of the pilot memoirs are pretty apologetic. There was no direct order - if for no other reasons than the Luftwaffe command structure was too dispersed / inefficient. The documents from the meetings which are quoted in several of the above texts acknowledge the bomber leaders’ demand but leave the escort implementation to the fighter unit commanders. Galland, for instance, split escort between his Gruppen and he acknowledges this. You can also check this through the 3rd party histories. Thus, if there were a single and direct order - of which there was not - it sounds like the commander of JG26 ignored it.

 

Post-war, the pilots were the apolitical heroes, Goering was the baddie (and dead), so this became the standard account. You might as well say the Barbarossa failed because Russian weather is bad: there is an element of truth, but it misses the wider points and ignores the facts / assessment that show otherwise. 

29 minutes ago, InProgress said:

it's not. This is from war diary of JG 26:

 image.png.9fea5d9113f66f58534ffd7af3ade04e.png

So your proof of a close escort direct order - which you fail to cite - is that Galland flew a ‘Geschwader-strength frei jagd and escort’? Does that not rather undermine your claim that close escort was ordered from on high?

 

Again, pressure from bomber leaders was for closer escort and this sis indeed occur. That this is taken as an all-encompassinf ‘order’ by many histories does not make it true: there are many myths about German operations which were widely believed but shown to be false once the actual records rather than post-hoc memories were used.

 

JG26 and others split their forces. Galland’s own memoirs talk of bouncing RAF fighter formations as they climbed, during the September battles, which sounds tricky from a position of close escort. He complained about Goering both during and after the war with good reason, but in this case he is playing a bit fast with the truth.

 

Again, the same debate dogged the RAF 1941-42 and USAAF 1943-44, with much mid-slinging then and since from memoirs and histories.

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On 8/15/2019 at 10:38 AM, InProgress said:

It's not about the plane, it's about tactics. If you are forced to fly with the same speed as bombers on the same altitude then you will have bad time. I remember someone posting some statistics here, 109 had worse K:D ratio than 110 in battle of Britain. 110 was not a bad plane.

 

That was probably me - it was quoted right out of Christer Bergström's "Battle of Britain" book.

 

The 110 units claimed 27.8% of all the Luftwaffe BoB kills, but consisted of only 20% of the fighter-force (order of battle on 13th August).

If claims vs. losses are counted, the 110 units had a ratio of about 3.4, while 109 units had a ratio of about 3.28. Again favoring the 110.

 

Taken claims and actual combat losses of the opposition into account, the following ratios are established by Bergström:

 

Spitfire 1.4

Hurricane 1.2

 

Bf 109 1.4

Bf 110 1.5 (!)

 

Thus, the 110 had the best exchange-ratio of the four fighters, with the Spitfire and 109 being on par and the Hurricane coming in last.

 

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On 8/15/2019 at 10:17 AM, =RS=Stix_09 said:

 

And here is yet another reason,... quote: http://www.aviation-history.com/messerschmitt/bf110.html


"When compared to other twin-engine aircraft such as the Bristol Beaufighter, de Havilland Mosquito, Petlyakov Pe-2 and Lockheed P-38, the biggest mistake was that the Bf 110 was built to fulfill too many roles. The Beaufighter, Mosquito and Pe-2 were never intended to be fighters and the P-38’s main role was as a fighter.  

 

Actually, Pe-2 was designed as a high altitude, escort twin engined fighter (VI-100), similar to Bf 110. However, lack of dive bombers at the dawn of WW2 in VVS prompted a hasty modification into dive bomber with minimal changes.

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On 8/16/2019 at 4:51 PM, Bremspropeller said:

Thus, the 110 had the best exchange-ratio of the four fighters, with the Spitfire and 109 being on par and the Hurricane coming in last.

 

CLAIMS - that they actually achieved this ratio is is very unlikely when you stop to consider the issue. Some pilots in some units may have done extremely well some of the time. but it is very unlikely that the force as a whole (aircraft performance, sortie type, involvement in major air battles) could have managed this.

 

They performed far better than some histories have suggested, but the idea that over 5 months it achieved the best victory / loss ratio is a little absurd.

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33 minutes ago, EAF19_Marsh said:

CLAIMS - that they actually achieved this ratio is is very unlikely when you stop to consider the issue. Some pilots in some units may have done extremely well some of the time. but it is very unlikely that the force as a whole (aircraft performance, sortie type, involvement in major air battles) could have managed this.

 

They performed far better than some histories have suggested, but the idea that over 5 months it achieved the best victory / loss ratio is a little absurd.

 

Again, it's the claims that were matched to actual losses on the other side.

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Posted (edited)
1 hour ago, EAF19_Marsh said:

 

CLAIMS - that they actually achieved this ratio is is very unlikely when you stop to consider the issue. Some pilots in some units may have done extremely well some of the time. but it is very unlikely that the force as a whole (aircraft performance, sortie type, involvement in major air battles) could have managed this.

 

They performed far better than some histories have suggested, but the idea that over 5 months it achieved the best victory / loss ratio is a little absurd.

 

On 8/16/2019 at 4:51 PM, Bremspropeller said:

Taken claims and actual combat losses of the opposition into account, the following ratios are established by Bergström:

 

Someone spends a lot of time doing research and getting accutare view on kills and losses by comparing claims with actuall losses of enemy, just so some random guy can come up with "Thats absurt" based on absolutely nothing. :rofl: Good job dude.

 

Edited by InProgress
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Posted (edited)
48 minutes ago, InProgress said:

 

 

Someone spends a lot of time doing research and getting accutare view on kills and losses by comparing claims with actuall losses of enemy, just so some random guy can come up with "Thats absurt" based on absolutely nothing. :rofl: Good job dude.

 

 

OK, look at 110 losses (known), look at Fighter Command losses (known), examine the documents and the tireless efforts by multiple historians and then show me any evidence that actual air victories of 110 units achieved anything close to a 4:1 or even 3:1 exchange ratio. Unlikely in the extreme, given 109 units rarely achieved that.

 

You support this assertion, I questioned on based on the factual basis that 109s flew far more direct air-to-air sorties and had a far more effectual aircraft. It is on you to support your belief in the 110 success ratio.

 

 

Edited by EAF19_Marsh
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On 8/16/2019 at 4:51 PM, Bremspropeller said:

Taken claims and actual combat losses of the opposition into account, the following ratios are established by Bergström:

 

Spitfire 1.4

Hurricane 1.2

 

Bf 109 1.4

Bf 110 1.5 (!)

 

Thus, the 110 had the best exchange-ratio of the four fighters, with the Spitfire and 109 being on par and the Hurricane coming in last.

 

 

7 minutes ago, EAF19_Marsh said:

 

OK, look at 110 losses (known), look at Fighter Command losses (known), examine the documents and the tireless efforts by multiple historians and then show me any evidence that actual air victories of 110 units achieved anything close to a 4:1 or even 3:1 exchange ratio. Unlikely in the extreme, given 109 units rarely achieved that.

 

You support this assertion, I questioned on based on the factual basis that 109s flew far more direct air-to-air sorties and had a far more effectual aircraft. It is on you to support your belief in the 110 success ratio.

 

 

 

He said 1.5:1...

 

4:1 would be unlikely - but he never said that...

 

1.5:1 sounds believable to me 

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Posted (edited)

Again I point out combat loss ratios are not relevant unless conditions under which combat took place are specified other wise its just a bunch of BS statistical propaganda like a politician  would use.. The problem is other factors apart from plane ability have more impact and can drastically impact results of combat. As for example  it s the reason for the high kill rates of German aces VS allied aces as explained in this short  video(when criteria are specified results make sense). Statics are only relevant  when criteria and operating conditions of combat are defined. Only then can meaningful comparisons be made.

 

And this  quote pretty much summarises the use and effectiveness  of Bf110's   in the Battle of Britain. It was effective when used under specific criteria )

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_110_operational_history#Battle_of_Britain
(related quote enclosed)

Spoiler
Quote

The Battle of Britain revealed the Bf 110's fatal weaknesses as a daylight fighter against single-engine aircraft. A relatively large aircraft, it lacked the agility of the Hurricane and Spitfire and was easily seen. The World War I-era Bristol Fighter had done well with a rear gunner firing a rifle-caliber machine gun, but by World War II, this was insufficient to deter the eight-gun fighters facing the Bf 110. Its size and weight meant that it had high wing loading, which limited its maneuverability. Furthermore, although it had a higher top speed than contemporary RAF Hurricanes, it had poor acceleration. However, it was better suited as a long-range bomber escort than most other aircraft of the time, and did not have the problems of restricted range that hampered the Bf 109E. The design excelled at "high escort" where Bf-110 squadrons were sent well ahead of the bombers to clear the skies of enemy aircraft, using their speed and firepower advantages in diving attacks to counter the enemy's maneuverability, then breaking contact and climbing away,[28] what the Americans would later call "Boom-and-Zoom." But the Bf-110 suffered greatly in "close escort," where they were forced lumber alongside the slow bombers, taking away their tactical edge and forcing them to always respond to the attacking fighters, which were never taken by surprise and could easily avoid the attacks of the Zerstorer, and even turn the tables. This limitation of tactical flexibility greatly hampered the ability of the Bf 110 to counter enemy single-engine fighters on a level of parity.[26][2]


Bf 110C under refueling, October 1940

One of the engines from Hess's Bf 110 on display at the National Museum of Flight in East Lothian, Scotland.
Hermann Göring's nephew, Hans-Joachim Göring, was a pilot with III./Zerstörergeschwader 76, flying the Messerschmitt Bf 110. He was killed in action on 11 July 1940, when his Bf 110 was shot down by Hurricanes of No. 87 Squadron RAF. His aircraft crashed into Portland Harbour.[29]

The worst day of the battle for the Bf 110 was 15 August 1940, when nearly 30 Bf 110s were shot down, the equivalent of an entire Gruppe. Between 16–17 August, 23 more were lost.[30]

After the 18 August there was a marked reduction in the number of Zerstörer operations. Their seeming absence has often been equated with the simultaneous disappearance from the Battle of the Ju 87. But wereas the Ju 87 had to be withdrawn because it simply could not survive in the hostile environment over southern England in the late summer of 1940, the reason for the decrease in Bf 110 activity was much more mundane. Replacements were not keeping pace with losses. There were just not enough Zerstörer available.

— Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstörer Aces, World War Two[31]
The last day of August proved to be a rare success for the Messerschmitt Bf 110. ZG 26 claimed 13 RAF fighters shot down, which "was not far off the mark", for three losses and five damaged. However, on 4 and 27 September, 15 Bf 110s were lost on each day.[32] The Luftwaffe had embarked on the battle with 237 serviceable Bf 110s. 223 were lost in the course of it.[33]

On 10 May 1941, in a strange episode in the aftermath of the Battle of Britain, Rudolf Hess, the deputy leader of the Nazi party, flew in a Bf 110 from Augsburg, north of Munich, to Scotland, apparently in an attempt to broker a peace deal between Germany and Great Britain.

 

Important bits

 

Quote

"A relatively large aircraft, it lacked the agility of the Hurricane and Spitfire and was easily seen"

 

Quote

Furthermore, although it had a higher top speed than contemporary RAF Hurricanes, it had poor acceleration. However, it was better suited as a long-range bomber escort than most other aircraft of the time, and did not have the problems of restricted range that hampered the Bf 109E.

 

Quote

The design excelled at "high escort" where Bf-110 squadrons were sent well ahead of the bombers to clear the skies of enemy aircraft, using their speed and firepower advantages in diving attacks to counter the enemy's manoeuvrability, then breaking contact and climbing away

 

Quote

But the Bf-110 suffered greatly in "close escort," where they were forced lumber alongside the slow bombers, taking away their tactical edge and forcing them to always respond to the attacking fighters, which were never taken by surprise and could easily avoid the attacks of the Zerstorer, and even turn the tables

 

(BTW: this last one seems to point out it did get used in close bomber combat at some point , which they then stopped doing as it was not effective)

(if its a myth provide documented evidence it did not happen, I think it did occur , but whether high command ordered it I don't know (I bet it did as that is the sort of dumb arsery that occurred in war), and for how long they did it I also don't know, but i'm confident it did occur at least in some cases)

 

Quote

But wereas the Ju 87 had to be withdrawn because it simply could not survive in the hostile environment over southern England in the late summer of 1940, the reason for the decrease in Bf 110 activity was much more mundane. Replacements were not keeping pace with losses. There were just not enough Zerstörer available.

 

Edited by =RS=Stix_09
Typo

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Posted (edited)
10 hours ago, =RS=Stix_09 said:

Again I point out

You can point out as much as you want but what does that have to do with the price of tea in China?

 

No one here compares planes and trying to find the best one. I don't care if allies had more planes to shoot at so they could have ace with 10 000 kills. They did not so it's pointless to talk about what if. Battle of Britain happened and these were its statistics. You also seem to have problems with reading since stats @Bremspropeller posted were not claims buy researched and fixed statistics by recorded losses on both sides. If these claims said 110 has ratio of 3,4 then Bergstrom researched it to be 1.5 in reality. So how is that a political propaganda? Another weird claim that has nothing to do with topic here. Battle of Britain were bloody on both sides and losses on both sides were similar, which stats presented earlier seem to confirm. 1.2, 1.4, 1.4, 1.5 and additional losses of bombers.

 

So tell me where do you see these HIGH claims? Because i see that they are all almost identical.

10 hours ago, =RS=Stix_09 said:

Statics are only relevant  when criteria and operating conditions of combat are defined.

No they are not. Maybe if you want to have fun comparing them to find the best plane in the world. Point in this topic was to kill the myth of 110 that was worthless, got destroyed and did not do anything which is false. 1.5 ratio while being used in wrong way proves it was not just a punch bag. And your pointing out that statistics are not relevant make no sense.

 

1. Ok and? This is a plane that escorts waves of bombers and British have radars anyway. This is not a stealth fighter. Hurricane and spitfire lack firepower of 110, what's your point? Again you are comparing them for some reason which was never point in this topic.

 

2. It's because you can't have everything, point was to make long range escort fighter, of course it would sacrafice other things by improving other ones. Zero sacraficed all the armor for speed and maneuverability. There is no 10/10 plane.

 

3. So something it did not do in BoB and something that was a cause of high losses, so if you want to play with relevant ststs, then WHAT IF they flew the way they were designed to do? 10:1 ratio confirmed :fool:

 

Just because 110 took heavy losses that could not get replaced does not mean it did not do anything and failed. It has nothing to do with topic here.  Original point was that 110 was bad and got anihilated. RAF could replace their losses while germany could not. 110 took heavy losses but did not turn useless crap as people keep believing it was. Providing stats was the point here, proving that even tho they lost a lot of 110, they still got more kills than they lost. Weather you think stats are relevant or not, fact is that 110 did not do such a poor job as many people think.

Edited by InProgress
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