Jump to content
Sign in to follow this  
I./ZG1_Panzerbar

Pilot training of Luftwaffe - interested facts.

Recommended Posts

Cant agree.

 

In 1941, pilots were VERY high trained in general. They lost most of aircrafts, but VVS could stay alive in winter 41/42, making new aircrafts.

But Heavy losses in winter 41/42 and spring 1942 wiped out most of best trained VVS pilots, and summer 1942 show most if VVS pilots ill-trained novices.

 

Use translator:

http://warspot.ru/4661-esli-by-v-boy-shli-odni-stariki


Cant agree.

 

In 1941, pilots were VERY high trained in general. They lost most of aircrafts, but VVS could stay alive in winter 41/42, making new aircrafts.

But Heavy losses in winter 41/42 and spring 1942 wiped out most of best trained VVS pilots, and summer 1942 show most if VVS pilots ill-trained novices.

 

Use translator:

http://warspot.ru/4661-esli-by-v-boy-shli-odni-stariki

 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Don't know how you got to your conclusions.That article speaks about 170.IAP and its fights over Bobryusk and Mogilev in June 1941.

As part of inner military Orlovsk district it was not a front line unit. As such it was under equipped with machines.Priority was given to VVS units of OVO (special military districts which formed the fronts when war begun).

In early 1941 it had 18 cadre pilots and 60 novices.They didn't manage to train these guys more then 20-30h in ishaks till 22.6.1941.Many of those hours were even flown in UTI-4,not ishaks themselves.Only few pilots ever shot a bullet at target sleave.

After war broke out,there were only 11 (13 resp) ishaks in the regiment. Out of 60! Therefore only cadre pilots and the most potential young pilots were sent to front.The rest stayed at their winter quarter.

Nevertheless the regiment did fare quite well untill it was withdrawn on 14th July to rear to be reequipped with LaGG-3.

I would say a typical story of ordinary VVS IAP and the level of the experience within.Same I posted earlier in this thread.Mobilisation of 1940-41,core cadre pilots and flood of unmanagable novices.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Sorry to dig up this old thread, but a google-search actually brought me here :bag:

 

I think it is safe to assume the basic soviet training wasn't half bad.

Otherwise the german idea to re-live it's Luftwaffe by secretly training it's initial cadre of new pilots in the Soviet Union wouldn't have materialized.

 

The defeat in 1941 was due to a lot of issues stacked against the soviets. Chiefly german tactical knowledge, technological superiority in several key-areas OTHER than bare aircraft performance (e.g. radio-equipment) and a general higher percentage of modern equipment - much of that thanks to modern replacement-airplanes after losses suffered in earlier campaigns.

Edited by Bremspropeller

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
11 minutes ago, Bremspropeller said:

I think it is safe to assume the basic soviet training wasn't half bad.

Otherwise the german idea to re-live it's Luftwaffe by secretly training it's initial cadre of new pilots in the Soviet Union wouldn't have materialized.

 

Luftwaffe training in Soviet Union had nothing to do with Soviet training. German pilots were trained by German instructors, just the venue was in Soviet Union, because air force was forbidden for Germany after WWI. Of course Soviet Union used the opportunity to observe it.

 

16 minutes ago, Bremspropeller said:

The defeat in 1941 was due to a lot of issues stacked against the soviets.

 

I think one of the biggest issue was related to the Great Purge and general old guard -mentality that prevailed in Soviet Union. While Germany used Spanish Civil War experience to develop and improve Luftwaffe tactics and put top pilots like Lützow and Mölders behind desks to develop their fighter doctrine, Soviet Union did the opposite and enforced obsolete tactics in VVS.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

It should be noted that it was a heck of a lot easier for the Luftwaffe to implement new tactics into an emerging independent air-arm (still heavily interconnected with th Heer and shamelessly ignorant of large-scale naval operations), than it was for an already existing air arm to throw all previous knowledge, experience and percieved truths over board.

 

In that way, Germany had a unique advantage over all the already existing air arms.

Convincing old farts who have Great War credentials (Goering, anyone?*) of how the air war is going to be pulled off in the future is not an easy task.

 

The purge was bad in short term in 1941, but it somewhat payed off for Stalin in two ways during the the later war-years:

1) He got rid of political enemies. True and percieved ones. Duh.

2) He cleared the way for younger and talent-selected commanders, rather than relying on a large corps of quasi-senile leaders who were fighting the last war still.

Of course he also lost thousands of valuable people and the net-effect was most probably negative. But still, this cleared the way for very talented and highly successful lower-tier leaders to rise through the ranks more quickly, whithout bumping into older mid-level commanders who were looking after their own career-paths rather than for the common goal**.

 

It would actually be interesting WHY Lützow and Mölders were put behind desks. I haven't read either of Braatz' books (I certainly should), but I'm fairly sure that both were pulled out of harm's way*** rather than for developing fighter tactics - the Luftwaffe high command was far too little interested in field-unit commanders' opinions (whenever they clashed with the ideas of Goering, Udet or other high-command personnel flying handcrafted mahogany desks).

 

____

* Not only Goering: Udet was a big factor in the Luftwaffe's eventual demise. It was the old Nazi-buddy system, that ultimately let the Luftwaffe down. The Luftwaffe would have needed more capable managers and open-minded leaders (somewhat akin to Speer) who were less interested in enlarging their arts-collection, than in dealing with strategic and operational challenges.

In fact, this is one decisive element of why the Luftwaffe had it's pants rolled down in 1944: The old farts of WW1 had no idea how a fast-paced, strategical air war was going to come home and haunt them at night (figuratively speaking) and taking their production-capabilities away.

 

** In totalitarian regiemes, this is a factor that can not be overestimated. Lots of talent gets shut-down and hused away for fear of being outpaced and jealousy.

This still is a factor in democratic systems, but generally those are more talent- and capability-oriented and there's less (not none!) of a buddy-system in place. The more buddies are in charge, the lower performing the system gets overal.

 

*** For propaganda-reasons. Lützow probably was much better high-command material than Mölders, but again, I'd have to red Braatz' books on both of them to get a better idea about either person's character.

Edited by Bremspropeller

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
Sign in to follow this  

×