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About VO101Kurfurst

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  1. Thing is that both the 13 mm and the .50 more than enough ballistic performance to punch clean through any aircraft structure. The energy required for that purpose is roughly a the same, given the similar diameter of the rounds. Beyond the energy that is necessary to achieve this purpose any excess energy remaining is wasted on ‘useless work’ - i.e. the projectile may keep flying for miles further after it passed through. That was the point about introducing the HMG / 13mm, as the rifle caliber rounds penetrative power was marginal and insufficient once aircraft armor came into general use. RCMG rounds could even ‘lost’ or rendered ineffective even after penetrating the fuselage, given their very small size and energy.Unlike rifle caliber rounds, he 13/.50 rounds had no such issues, unless when meeting with armor, and, given their excessive energy, they simply overpenetrate the target (pass though). The US quite simply used the .50 M2 because it had nothing else available working reliably, not because it would offer any advantage in destructiveness. They tried copying and/or developing a large number of alternatives (including a .60 copy of the MG 151), but all attempts failed to produce useful and reliable weapons. So they simply took off the shelves what they already had, an old WW1 heavy machine-gun originally intended for ground use, and introduced a lightened variant for aircraft. The round, originally designed to ‘reach out’ to 800 - 1200 against armoured targets and field fortifications, remained the same.
  2. I did not know that Newtonian physics are obsolete now. Its a quite simple fact that bullets cannot transfer more energy to their target than it is required to pass through the said material. That energy in case of aluminium skin, radios, fuel tanks, cast aluminium engine blocks is quite marginal. Find yourself a shooting range and try it out yourself. Even tiny .22 LR penetrates thin metal objects absolutely easily, and that is a 100-150 Joule round, not a 19 000 Joule monster originally designed for anti-tank work. Unless its armor grade steel, there is absolutely nothing within an aircraft structure that can reliable stop a heavy machinegun ammunition, and having a more powerful round doesn't give you anything apart from flatter ballistics and a cleaner exit hole.
  3. It agrees with real life test results by the British, see below. To get to the pilot on the 109F/G with dural bulkheads behind the petrol tank, you have to go through the highly angled dural skin, 30layers of sandwhiched dural plate behind the tank (this was primarly designed to render ineffective incendinaries from functioning, but was also estimated to be equivalent to 7.3 mm of steel armor), the tank and the fuel inside it, and finally defeat the 8mm angled steel armor. Reliably defeating so many layers was simply too much for anything under 20 mm. Even early US .50 incendinary rounds were rendered ineffective by the dural plate, however the Soviet .50 API was still effective, and the US subsequently copied it's design (that's basically M8 API iirc). It is the dural plate that boost the protection from direct astern that makes it so hard to defeat - it was not present on the 109E (however the Emil had a similarly position steel armor in the same position, but without the pilot's own plate behind his seat), and also removed on late MW boost equipped 109s (those however had a large MW tank filled with water, bets are off how that helped the protection system).
  4. At the muzzle. The thing that is commonly forgotten is that only fraction of this energy is actually transferred to the target as the bullets will simply pass through the extremely thin aluminium skin (easily doable with 150 Joule .22 round as well) and unless they hit something in between (and again, both equally capable of wrecking just about any subsystem) they will continue their way in the air harmlessly until they fall back to the ground several kilometers away. High round energy round is an advantage if you have to pass through substantial armour or fire at very long ranges. Or if you are hunting an elephant that actually has thick enough hide and meat behind it to make penetration capacity an issue. However, If you are shooting at something that is basically air sandwhiched between two layers of wet tissue paper...
  5. Rüstsaetze is for external stores such as bombs and gondolas. The manual is L. Dv. T. 2109/Fl Bf 109K-4 Bedienungsvorschrift-FL, Teil 2: Wartung, (Operating Instructions, Part : Servicing, Stand Oktober 1944, Ausgabe Januar 1945, page 11. Two dive limitations table is given, one for the speed compensating speedometer (shows roughly ~TAS, as in Me 262), and one for the usualIAS speedometer; the limitations show the IAS limits. An interesting thing about DB 605D in the K-4 is that the engine, unlike previous 60x series it had a supercharger bleed valve so throttling back 'to the white' mark was no longer neccesary in dives for the K-4/G-10.
  6. At high altitude you get high true air speed but from the aerodynamic standpoint you are fighting at LOW IAS speed so its basically the same as a low-speed turn fight at low altitude, except that you don't have the engine power. The Mach/true air speed relation of course decreases with altitude but you will never, ever get into high Mach power the region in a manoeuvring fight with propeller fighters, not so often even with modern jets. Turning and high mach numbers simply do not add up. Now unfortunately 605D also has more power output than the V-1650-7 at all altitudes and all boosts historically used by the USAAF. This is also true for higher altitudes although the difference is not breath taking to be relied on. Now, given that the P-51 is still pretty fast up there on account of its low drag design, and that everyone turns like a lame duck up there, what the 51 should do is teamwork and keeping the speed up, negating most of the 109s advantages in rooted in its higher power loading .
  7. Found a rather comprehensive overview of Luftwaffe operations over Normandy, by Oberst Walter Gaul. Includes details of sorties flown by day, night and by bomber, recon operations, types of missions and weapons loadout used. cc. 14 000 sorties were flown in June and 15 500 in July. Appearantly bombers used large amount of aerial sea mines (BM 1000, LMB - In July 1,644 L.M.B. and 993 BM 1000 were laid) for mining operations, torpedoes, circling torpedoes (LT 350) and guided glide bombs (Hs 293, "PX" - Fritz X?) and heavy anti shipping AP bombs (PC 1400, PC 1800). Contains also various useful appendixes on sorties flown by type of aircraft, aircraft bases, heavy artillery positions. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/g/gaf-invasion-normandy.html
  8. If I read correctly the datasets kindly provided by @JV69badatflyski, which records the history of each and every XIV's fate from their data card records, there were only 44 Mk XIVe built in total (.50 variant) , with 15 lost to Enemy Action and 6 more to misc. reasons by the end of the war. I hope he does not mind if I post his table summary. The dates would indicate that the 'date of commencement of production' in April 1944 is a highly optimistic statement (and as is the general case with Spitfires), in this case it really means that they built a single prototype, followed by a very low rate of production, so this date its not to be taken as a face value for serial production. The first (and in that month, the only) Mk XIVe is issued to 91 Sqn. is RM 726 in mid July (between 11-20), then its transferred to 402. Squadron in early September 1944. Two more (RM 796 and 799) are issued to 41 Sqn in September, one (RM 806) in October to No 83 Sqn and so on - 19 Mk XIVe appears to have been issued in 1944 in all. The remaining 25 seem to start to be issued mostly in the 1945 period, including 5 issued to India in April 1945, and the maximum number in Squadron usage is cc 20, from late November 1944 till the end of the war, and are scattered amongst all Squadrons, with about half of them with 430 Sqn. Issues of Mk XIVe to Squadrons, via JV69badatflyski (note that the single issue of RM 726 to 91 Sqn in July 1944 is not included in the table for some reason, but included with No 402 listings). jún.44 júl.44 aug.44 szept.44 okt.44 nov.44 dec.44 jan.45 febr.45 Mars-45 ápr.45 máj.45 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 11--20 21--31 1--10 SQ-130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 0 0 0 SQ-130 SQ-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 1 SQ-2 SQ-350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 SQ-350 SQ-401 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 SQ-401 SQ-402 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 1 1 3 3 3 0 0 0 SQ-402 SQ-41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SQ-41 SQ-412 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SQ-412 SQ-430 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 5 8 10 10 10 9 9 9 10 9 9 9 8 6 SQ-430 SQ-610 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 SQ-610
  9. Except that they did not. To put it into perspective, Fighter Command flew 20 495 offensive day fighter sorties and lost 416 fighters (in addition to 108 daylight Bomber Command losses) in the process between July and December 1941. On the opposing side of the Channel, Luftflotte 3 day fighters (chiefly equipped with 109Fs) lost only 98 fighters in the same period, an very favourable exchange ratio of 4–5 to 1. In the course of the entire year of 1942 (January - December), when the Fw 190 was deployed in large numbers in the fast, the figures were as follows. During 1942, RAF fighter command flew 43 339 daylight offensive fighter sorties, and lost 587 fighters (Bomber command lost 62 bombers in the daylight). In addition the then fledling USAAF 8th AAF lost 30 heavy, 2 Light/Medium bombers, and just 10 Fighters on offensive missions. I am looking for LW losses in the West but it’s quite clear that they did not do better in 1942, when the 190 was introduced, than in the 2nd half of 1941, when the 109F was the mainstay fighter. In the 2nd half of 1941, the RAF was losing, on avarage, 87 fighters and bombers on avarage per month on daylight offensive operations; in the course 1942, the RAF and the USAAF lost cc. 57 fighters and bombers on avarage in every month on offensive daylight operations. Allied losses, in fact, went down and not up when the Fw 190 was introduced, but there were probably a lot more reasons to that than the introduction of a new fighter plane. The appearance of the 190 did not change the success rate of Western Luftwaffe fighter units in any meaningful way, however, it gave the RAF FC top brass a convinient excuse to stop and rethink operations that were never really working or achieving anything else at any time than to give the Germans easy pickings.
  10. Whatever the case is with individual planes, the video of the downed 109K certainly shows that the current cocpit model is not wrong per se, and at the very least it corresponds to (some? all?) historical examples.
  11. As I understand the 109s with the tall vertical stabilizer and rudder (besides it presumably being lighter at high speed due to the Flettner) were also cleared for higher diving speeds, i.e. qual to that of the 109K (Vne=850 kph as opposed to Vne=750 kph). So that may be a noticable difference.
  12. In the 109K Flight Handbook, Part 9A there is a picture of the cocpit instruments, but there is only two ammo counters - I suppose that ammo counters were for the MG 131 only on the 109K.
  13. True for the ASM, but for Late /AS (cc 1945) appears to have been equipped with ASB/ASC series engines with the same output as the DB/DC. The ASB/ASC appears to be some kind of A/D series hybrid (upgraded A series engine blocks with D series parts?) as shown by the K-4 like oil system bulges on the lower cowling chin of late G14/AS. note - DB and DC is simply a marking coming into use in the end of 1944 for different boost used for the SAME 605 D series engine. In other words there is only DB 605D which received different subdesignations (mainly for the groundcrew’s information) during its development as max boost went from 1,75, 1,8, and 1,98. You could simply ‘convert’ one into the other (i.e. DB into a DC and vica versa) by a few tenths of mm adjustment in the fuel flow valve, and of course increase the manifold pressure settings (plus of course use the correct spark plugs and fuel). This itself probably takes an hour or two for the crew in the field because you need to remove the supercharger assembly to access the said fuel flow screw, as I have been told by an actual 109 mechanic. So it you consider that in the winter months many Ks had their wheel well covers removed and operated with fixed tailwheels, natural performance variance in between serial production place, there was a marginal difference in performance between late G-14/AS, G-10 and K-4. They all had the same supercharger, same ratings and roughly the same aerodynamics. Thats also logical as the /AS was just a step in until the improved 605D could be produced, and the G-10 was brought alive by the desire that factories would not have to retool for K airframe production, as the K different in many small details from the G airframe.
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