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Thad

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Everything posted by Thad

  1. I've mentioned it before... but as a mission builder, I'd like to see a Russian player T-70 and the German Pz38 t. I know they are light tanks but one could put together some interesting battles using the lighter player tanks. 😁
  2. Thad

    THE BRAND NEW ME-262

    Why are some so unfair to others? 😧
  3. Thanks for all the suggestions. After a LOT of adjusting and testing.... I finally just did a clean new install of my Windows 10. What a pain. I lost all of my files but I was able to download game installer just now. Whatever my computer shop did with Windows I obviously removed and things seem to be working fine right now. I will have to reconstitute as much of my lost game files as I can. Once again, thanks for all of your suggestions.
  4. I've tried several of the suggestions above and am still unable to figure out why I can't access the game installer with my main computer. I have the installer and it loads but everything stops when it attempts to load the game client. I have been able to download two other games from another site. I'm currently at a loss. ☹️
  5. Ok... I was able to download the installer with my Thinkpad, so nothing wrong on the IL2 site. The problem obviously lies in my main computer setup somewhere. The installer loaded but it is stuck and Downloading Game Client. Again.... something is amiss on my main computer. ☹️
  6. The direct link didn't work. I've turned off my firewall. Still no success. I'll try my slow as hell Thinkpad. 😐
  7. Salutations, I unfortunately had a serious system crash recently. As a result, I was forced to take my computer to a shop. Long story short, I lost all of my files after Windows was updated and reinstalled. Afterwards, I have been unsuccessful in my efforts to DOWNLOAD the game installer. At supports suggestion.... I attempted with two other browsers. None of the three browsers used were able to download the installer. I get "Waiting for cdn.ILwsturovik.net", then nothing. Obviously, I am able to access the forums, my profile and the download page. Has anybody else experienced this and if so, what was your solution. Currently, I can't do anything with IL2. Thanks. 🌝
  8. What does Bert and Erney have to say about it? 🌝
  9. I detest any and all enemy planes I have to fly against. Which ever side I'm currently flying on. 😀
  10. Possible? Yes, all things are possible to those that want to do the work but I have primarily created single player missions. I have no expertise in creating any such career series.
  11. Salutations, There are many tank missions available. I have a series of mission. My HTL (Hold The Line) series of Allied missions and the BTL (Breach The Line) Axis series of missions. Search the forums. I've started feeling better now and have returned to working on my HTL Our Last Bastion allied tank mission using the M4A2 Sherman. The mission is going to be most challenging for me to put together. I will be striving to present the player with changing variable that will include two different main objectives each time the mission is played. (50% chance). There will also be variable chance for the type of enemy encountered. My brain starts to freeze up when I consider the amount of play testing I will need to do. The player M4 seems to be working fine under AI control. I will be fielding between 30-40 AFV on the player side! That may prove problematic. Let's hope not.
  12. Every time I look in a mirror, I know God has a sense of humor. 🌝
  13. Not recently. I've had a cold for the last few days. ☹️
  14. Oh, is the same anomaly experienced on a server other than TAW?
  15. This situation will not be allowed to continue indefinitely and will be sorted out I'm sure. It is obviously frustrating.
  16. Salutations, Has the 'bug' been observed during any or your single player missions? If not, I suspect it has something to do with the internet server connections. 😐
  17. Final Part: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk Another aspect of the Battle of Kursk which is rarely considered is its indecisiveness. Neither side achieved what it hoped to accomplish in this inordinate expenditure of resources. On the Soviet side, the Red Army wanted the German armour to literally ‘impale’ itself on mines and anti-tank gun barriers, but was risk-averse to allowing the Germans to achieve any kind of breakthrough. Every time German armour threatened to break through a Soviet defensive line, the Soviet commander committed most of his available armour to counter-attack it, resulting in head-in engagements with German assault groups. However, in order for the Red Army to achieve any kind of decisive success at Kursk, Soviet tactical commanders needed to allow German spearheads to advance into the depth of the defence, creating vulnerable flanks. Given the forces available for Zitadelle, there was no way that the German pincers could have reached Kursk and held a viable front with the limited number of divisions available. Von Manstein would have required a dozen extra divisions to hold the flanks of a penetration stretching to Kursk. Yet lacking these divisions, deeper German penetrations meant longer, weaker flanks. If Stalin had granted Rokossovsky and Vatutin the flexibility to allow some loss of ground, Soviet armored counter-attacks against the extended German salient would have increased the possibility of surrounding and destroying some of the attacking Panzer-Divisions. On the German side, lack of operational flexibility robbed Zitadelle of any chance of achieving decisive results even before it started. The Germans knew very well that the Soviets had identified their likely attack sectors and were deploying strong forces to block them. Without surprise or a favourable correlation of forces, Zitadelle was limited to being a frontal assault. However, the Germans could have used the obvious tactic of a double pincer attack as a deception to fix large Soviet forces in place, while shifting the actual axis of attack to the face of the Kursk salient. If both Model and von Manstein had shifted part of their armour against the relatively weak 38th and 60th Armies, while mounting strong feints against the expected attack sectors, they likely would have achieved operational surprise and an overwhelming local superiority. Soviet operational reserves were poorly deployed to respond quickly to a threat to the face of the salient, which would have delayed any response. Furthermore, the face of the Kursk salient was defended by far fewer mines and anti-tank guns, which would have increased the chance of a rapid breakthrough. By smashing in the face of the Kursk salient – which likely would have been far less costly than trying to reach Kursk through three lines of defence, von Manstein might have reduced the size of the Kursk salient and thereby shortened his front line. By ‘hitting them where they weren’t’ – a tactic favored by the Panzerwaffe in 1941–42 – the Germans might have achieved one or more nice tactical victories in the summer of 1943, as they had in the past. However, inflexibility was the downfall of Zitadelle, since rather than using manoeuvre, the German commanders opted for brute force. Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.
  18. Salutations, I think Tank Crew will be a full blown game module. There will 'probably' be a campaign(s), either presented by the developer or by the communities mission builders. There are no firm dates for anything but future development looks very promising.
  19. No... we need to 'defend' the bridge at Remagen. 😀
  20. Part 4: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk Operation Zitadelle was not the ‘death ride’ of the Panzerwaffe, as Soviet historians tried to depict for years. Far from it. Yet neither was Zitadelle a ‘lost victory’ as von Manstein claimed, since the Soviets were already at the point where they could replace losses far more rapidly than the Germans. Rather, Zitadelle was the end of the road for the traditional German combined arms team, built upon the integration of mechanized manoeuvre forces and close air support. After Kursk, the Germans still had plenty of tanks and assault guns, but fewer and fewer supporting arms, air support or veteran leaders. It was the German infantry divisions that were disintegrating, which made it increasingly difficult for the panzers to hold or retake ground. Furthermore, the Germans learned the wrong lessons about tank warfare at Kursk – that it was a tank gunnery contest and that the side that outgunned the other won. The Tigers had done very well during Zitadelle, inflicting greatly disproportionate losses on the enemy and absorbing enormous punishment. Only 11 of 117 Tigers were destroyed during Zitadelle, although their operational readiness rate was very low so it was rare for more than a few Tigers to be involved in any given action. Increasingly, the Germans placed their faith in long 7.5cm and 8.8cm guns, at the expense of manoeuvreability. The Pz III had generally been kept in the background during Zitadelle and the Pz IV was now regarded as second-rate. Despite its shabby performance, Hitler and the OKH believed that the Panther would eventually counter-balance the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks. New heavy tanks, like the 68-ton King Tiger under development, were regarded as the answer to Soviet numbers, not trying to build a better medium tank. Effectively, after Kursk the Wehrmacht abandoned its interest in building more or better 30-ton tanks and settled on the fantasy that smaller numbers of super-heavy tanks would alter the trajectory of a lost war. Soviet losses at Kursk are more difficult to pin down, but the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts suffered approximately 148,000 casualties in stopping von Manstein’s offensive and lost between 600–900 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, the Steppe Front continued to pour fresh reserves into the battle even as Hitler called off the offensive and Vatutin’s armoured formations still had between 500-900 operational tanks and self-propelled guns. Painful losses suffered against Panther and Tiger tanks finally encouraged the GABTU to press for an upgraded main armament for the T-34 and a new heavy tank; these two initiatives would lead to the introduction of the T-34-85 and the IS-2 within six months. However, the Red Army still regarded the medium tank as its primary mobile combat system and heavy tanks were intended only to level the playing field when enemy heavy tanks appeared. In contrast to the Wehrmacht, the Battle of Kursk helped the Red Army to recognize that armoured warfare was not just about tanks and they learned to use their anti-tank and artillery capabilities to balance the tactical shortcomings of their tanks. Failures at Kursk taught the Red Army that launching hasty, ill-planned operations was counter-productive and as a result, the Red Army tried to fight in more methodical fashion. In time, Soviet improvements in combined arms warfare proved more decisive than German skill in tank gunnery. Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.
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