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Everything posted by Thad

  1. Thanks for all the suggestions. After a LOT of adjusting and testing.... I finally just did a clean new install of my Windows 10. What a pain. I lost all of my files but I was able to download game installer just now. Whatever my computer shop did with Windows I obviously removed and things seem to be working fine right now. I will have to reconstitute as much of my lost game files as I can. Once again, thanks for all of your suggestions.
  2. I've tried several of the suggestions above and am still unable to figure out why I can't access the game installer with my main computer. I have the installer and it loads but everything stops when it attempts to load the game client. I have been able to download two other games from another site. I'm currently at a loss. ☹️
  3. Ok... I was able to download the installer with my Thinkpad, so nothing wrong on the IL2 site. The problem obviously lies in my main computer setup somewhere. The installer loaded but it is stuck and Downloading Game Client. Again.... something is amiss on my main computer. ☹️
  4. The direct link didn't work. I've turned off my firewall. Still no success. I'll try my slow as hell Thinkpad. 😐
  5. Salutations, I unfortunately had a serious system crash recently. As a result, I was forced to take my computer to a shop. Long story short, I lost all of my files after Windows was updated and reinstalled. Afterwards, I have been unsuccessful in my efforts to DOWNLOAD the game installer. At supports suggestion.... I attempted with two other browsers. None of the three browsers used were able to download the installer. I get "Waiting for cdn.ILwsturovik.net", then nothing. Obviously, I am able to access the forums, my profile and the download page. Has anybody else experienced this and if so, what was your solution. Currently, I can't do anything with IL2. Thanks. 🌝
  6. What does Bert and Erney have to say about it? 🌝
  7. I detest any and all enemy planes I have to fly against. Which ever side I'm currently flying on. 😀
  8. Possible? Yes, all things are possible to those that want to do the work but I have primarily created single player missions. I have no expertise in creating any such career series.
  9. Salutations, There are many tank missions available. I have a series of mission. My HTL (Hold The Line) series of Allied missions and the BTL (Breach The Line) Axis series of missions. Search the forums. I've started feeling better now and have returned to working on my HTL Our Last Bastion allied tank mission using the M4A2 Sherman. The mission is going to be most challenging for me to put together. I will be striving to present the player with changing variable that will include two different main objectives each time the mission is played. (50% chance). There will also be variable chance for the type of enemy encountered. My brain starts to freeze up when I consider the amount of play testing I will need to do. The player M4 seems to be working fine under AI control. I will be fielding between 30-40 AFV on the player side! That may prove problematic. Let's hope not.
  10. Every time I look in a mirror, I know God has a sense of humor. 🌝
  11. Not recently. I've had a cold for the last few days. ☹️
  12. Oh, is the same anomaly experienced on a server other than TAW?
  13. This situation will not be allowed to continue indefinitely and will be sorted out I'm sure. It is obviously frustrating.
  14. Salutations, Has the 'bug' been observed during any or your single player missions? If not, I suspect it has something to do with the internet server connections. 😐
  15. Final Part: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk Another aspect of the Battle of Kursk which is rarely considered is its indecisiveness. Neither side achieved what it hoped to accomplish in this inordinate expenditure of resources. On the Soviet side, the Red Army wanted the German armour to literally ‘impale’ itself on mines and anti-tank gun barriers, but was risk-averse to allowing the Germans to achieve any kind of breakthrough. Every time German armour threatened to break through a Soviet defensive line, the Soviet commander committed most of his available armour to counter-attack it, resulting in head-in engagements with German assault groups. However, in order for the Red Army to achieve any kind of decisive success at Kursk, Soviet tactical commanders needed to allow German spearheads to advance into the depth of the defence, creating vulnerable flanks. Given the forces available for Zitadelle, there was no way that the German pincers could have reached Kursk and held a viable front with the limited number of divisions available. Von Manstein would have required a dozen extra divisions to hold the flanks of a penetration stretching to Kursk. Yet lacking these divisions, deeper German penetrations meant longer, weaker flanks. If Stalin had granted Rokossovsky and Vatutin the flexibility to allow some loss of ground, Soviet armored counter-attacks against the extended German salient would have increased the possibility of surrounding and destroying some of the attacking Panzer-Divisions. On the German side, lack of operational flexibility robbed Zitadelle of any chance of achieving decisive results even before it started. The Germans knew very well that the Soviets had identified their likely attack sectors and were deploying strong forces to block them. Without surprise or a favourable correlation of forces, Zitadelle was limited to being a frontal assault. However, the Germans could have used the obvious tactic of a double pincer attack as a deception to fix large Soviet forces in place, while shifting the actual axis of attack to the face of the Kursk salient. If both Model and von Manstein had shifted part of their armour against the relatively weak 38th and 60th Armies, while mounting strong feints against the expected attack sectors, they likely would have achieved operational surprise and an overwhelming local superiority. Soviet operational reserves were poorly deployed to respond quickly to a threat to the face of the salient, which would have delayed any response. Furthermore, the face of the Kursk salient was defended by far fewer mines and anti-tank guns, which would have increased the chance of a rapid breakthrough. By smashing in the face of the Kursk salient – which likely would have been far less costly than trying to reach Kursk through three lines of defence, von Manstein might have reduced the size of the Kursk salient and thereby shortened his front line. By ‘hitting them where they weren’t’ – a tactic favored by the Panzerwaffe in 1941–42 – the Germans might have achieved one or more nice tactical victories in the summer of 1943, as they had in the past. However, inflexibility was the downfall of Zitadelle, since rather than using manoeuvre, the German commanders opted for brute force. Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.
  16. Salutations, I think Tank Crew will be a full blown game module. There will 'probably' be a campaign(s), either presented by the developer or by the communities mission builders. There are no firm dates for anything but future development looks very promising.
  17. No... we need to 'defend' the bridge at Remagen. 😀
  18. Part 4: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk Operation Zitadelle was not the ‘death ride’ of the Panzerwaffe, as Soviet historians tried to depict for years. Far from it. Yet neither was Zitadelle a ‘lost victory’ as von Manstein claimed, since the Soviets were already at the point where they could replace losses far more rapidly than the Germans. Rather, Zitadelle was the end of the road for the traditional German combined arms team, built upon the integration of mechanized manoeuvre forces and close air support. After Kursk, the Germans still had plenty of tanks and assault guns, but fewer and fewer supporting arms, air support or veteran leaders. It was the German infantry divisions that were disintegrating, which made it increasingly difficult for the panzers to hold or retake ground. Furthermore, the Germans learned the wrong lessons about tank warfare at Kursk – that it was a tank gunnery contest and that the side that outgunned the other won. The Tigers had done very well during Zitadelle, inflicting greatly disproportionate losses on the enemy and absorbing enormous punishment. Only 11 of 117 Tigers were destroyed during Zitadelle, although their operational readiness rate was very low so it was rare for more than a few Tigers to be involved in any given action. Increasingly, the Germans placed their faith in long 7.5cm and 8.8cm guns, at the expense of manoeuvreability. The Pz III had generally been kept in the background during Zitadelle and the Pz IV was now regarded as second-rate. Despite its shabby performance, Hitler and the OKH believed that the Panther would eventually counter-balance the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks. New heavy tanks, like the 68-ton King Tiger under development, were regarded as the answer to Soviet numbers, not trying to build a better medium tank. Effectively, after Kursk the Wehrmacht abandoned its interest in building more or better 30-ton tanks and settled on the fantasy that smaller numbers of super-heavy tanks would alter the trajectory of a lost war. Soviet losses at Kursk are more difficult to pin down, but the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts suffered approximately 148,000 casualties in stopping von Manstein’s offensive and lost between 600–900 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, the Steppe Front continued to pour fresh reserves into the battle even as Hitler called off the offensive and Vatutin’s armoured formations still had between 500-900 operational tanks and self-propelled guns. Painful losses suffered against Panther and Tiger tanks finally encouraged the GABTU to press for an upgraded main armament for the T-34 and a new heavy tank; these two initiatives would lead to the introduction of the T-34-85 and the IS-2 within six months. However, the Red Army still regarded the medium tank as its primary mobile combat system and heavy tanks were intended only to level the playing field when enemy heavy tanks appeared. In contrast to the Wehrmacht, the Battle of Kursk helped the Red Army to recognize that armoured warfare was not just about tanks and they learned to use their anti-tank and artillery capabilities to balance the tactical shortcomings of their tanks. Failures at Kursk taught the Red Army that launching hasty, ill-planned operations was counter-productive and as a result, the Red Army tried to fight in more methodical fashion. In time, Soviet improvements in combined arms warfare proved more decisive than German skill in tank gunnery. Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.
  19. Part 3: The Meaning of The Battle Of Kursk In 1999, David. M. Glantz wrote the best available single-volume history of the Battle of Kursk, based upon a good mix of Soviet and German records. However, Glantz failed to offer much insight into why major Soviet armoured counter-attacks on 8 and 12 July failed so badly, or why the II.SS-Panzerkorps was able to penetrate Vatutin’s defensive lines so quickly. Nipe returned to the fray in 2011 with Blood, Steel and Myth, which focused even more narrowly on II.SS-Panzerkorps. Although he does not use Soviet records, Nipe added great detail on the operations of the Waffen-SS and concluded that the number of tanks involved in Prokhorovka was far fewer than previously stated, particularly on the German side. Indeed, it is now clear that no more than 210 German and 642 Soviet tanks participated in the fighting on 12 July 1943, which is quantitatively smaller than some of the tank battles around Smolensk in 1941 and Voronezh in 1942. Distancing himself from earlier claims, Nipe also concluded that the capture of Prokhorovka would not have made any difference and the commitment of XXIV Panzerkorps would not have been decisive. Finally, Valeriy Zamulin’s ground-breaking Demolishing the Myth (2011) has revealed a treasure-trove of Soviet records about the battle that provide a much more realistic interpretation. While Hoth’s 4. Panzerarmee had inflicted grievous armour losses on Rotmistrov’s ill-timed 5 GTA counter-attack, the combination of mines, anti-tank guns, artillery and air attacks had in fact worn down the German combined arms team – just as the Stavka had intended. Hoth could still cobble together an armoured spearhead with his remaining tanks, but it was the loss of Panzergrenadiers and pioniers that made further advance problematic. By 15 July, von Manstein’s forces had suffered over 28,000 casualties, including 5,600 dead or missing. Altogether, the three Panzerkorps committed to Zitadelle by Heeresgruppe Süd still had 340 tanks (including 134 Pz IV and 33 Tigers) and 156 assault guns operational (about one-third of starting strength). According to Zetterling, Heeresgruppe Sud lost only 119 tanks and 10 assault guns during Zitadelle, but this means that over 800 AFVs were under repair. Although Kursk was not a ‘death ride’ for the Panzerwaffe, a number of German Panzer units, such as all three Panzer-Divisionen in Breith’s III. Panzerkorps and the Panther brigade, were rendered combat-ineffective due to losses. Indeed, half of von Manstein’s remaining armoured combat power was concentrated in Hausser’s II.SS-Panzerkorps, with the other two Panzerkorps were no longer capable of attacking. The suggestion that the II./SS-Panzerkorps could have made any significant advance northward after the action at Prokhorovka on 12 July is absurd on a number of levels, beginning with the reality that the factors that were still slowing the German armour – the mines, anti-tank guns and artillery, as well as the lack of infantry to cover the flanks – were still intact. Soviet airpower was also intact and causing frequent damage to Panzer units in the open. Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword.
  20. Part 1: The Meaning of the Battle of Kursk. Kursk is a highly controversial battle. Right after the battle, Marshal Vasilevsky wrote an after-action report that attempted to conceal the truth about 5 GTA’s losses, but Stalin soon found out and was enraged. Initially, Stalin wanted to have Rotmistrov tried and executed, but eventually Vasilevsky softened his response. Instead, Stalin put Politburo member Georgy M. Malenkov in charge of a commission to determine the reasons why the 5 GTA’s counter-attack had failed; Malenkov’s report was sealed, but it concluded that the 5 GTA’s attack was a model of an unsuccessful operation. Rotmistrov was allowed to remain in command of 5 GTA until mid-1944 but afterwards he was kicked upstairs into various high-level desk jobs. In the 1960s, Kursk was not well known in the West. Initially, popular memoirs by Guderian and Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin depicted Zitadelle as a decisive defeat, but this view was challenged by von Manstein’s memoirs that complained about Hitler ‘throwing away a victory’ in his decision to cancel Zitadelle. Paul Carell echoed von Manstein’s claims in his well-known books written in 1964–70 and he helped to shape the early historiography of Kursk with his contention that von Manstein had indeed been on the cusp of a great victory when Hitler pulled the rug out from under his feet. Carell’s histories also helped to create a heroic mythology around the Waffen-SS troops involved in Zitadelle, which retains great credibility even today. The Soviet version of Kursk began appearing with the multi-volume History of the Great Patriotic War in 1958 and Rotmistrov’s inaccurate memoirs in the 1960s. This white-washed version of Kursk was designed to conceal the Red Army’s disproportionate losses in the battle and Nikita Khrushchev’s (by then First Secretary of the CPSU) role in the disastrous commitment of Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA. Kursk excerpts from, Forczyk, Robert. Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller . Pen and Sword. Part 2: The Meaning of the Battle Of Kursk Soviet accounts created a highly mythic account of Prokhorovka as ‘the greatest tank battle in history’ and Grigoryi A. Koltunov claimed that, ‘in one day the Germans lost more than 350 tanks and over 10,000 officers and men.’ Soviet historians regarded Kursk as determining the outcome of the war in the East, stating that, ‘the Germans had been bled white’ and had permanently lost the initiative. This version of the battle was melded with Carell’s and influenced popular as well as academic histories written about Kursk until the mid-1990s. Even seasoned authors such as Albert Seaton, John Erickson and David Glantz accepted embellished accounts of Kursk as historical fact. In 1995, Glantz’s landmark one-volume account of the Eastern Front, When Titans Clashed, still claimed that the Germans lost 320 tanks and assault guns at Prokhorovka. At that point, two things happened which reduced most previous historiography on Kursk to pulp: the records of II.SS-Panzerkorps became available, and the Soviet-era archives were partly opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Books written based upon this new information by Zetterling, Nipe, Glantz and Zamulin have given a much more realistic interpretation of Kursk, but still suffer from biases. Zetterling took a materialistic approach and provided a great statistical analysis of the battle based upon better – but not perfect – numbers. He used Totalausfalle numbers of tanks to show that the German armour was not crippled at Kursk and still retained the ability to advance, particularly if Hitler had allowed Nehring’s XXIV Panzerkorps to reinforce Hoth. However, Zetterling’s numbers are somewhat disingenuous, in that he suggests that tanks that were not completely destroyed were still useful to the Germans since they could be repaired, but in fact tanks which had been repeatedly hit by anti-tank fire and mines were increasingly ‘degraded’ to the point that they had only marginal combat value. He also fails to put the heavy German personnel losses in perspective: by 13 July von Manstein’s Panzer-Divisionen had lost a large number of tactical leaders, including three Panzer-Regiment commanders and multiple battalion and company commanders; the loss of these leaders negatively impacted unit morale and motivation. The Tiger tank units were particularly hard hit; for example, the s. Pz.Abt. had suffered about 40 per cent personnel casualties and the Waffen-SS separate Tiger tank companies had lost multiple commanders. Personnel losses tend to hit armoured units particularly hard, since experienced leaders, gunners and drivers cannot be easily replaced by rear-echelon personnel or partly-trained replacements. What Zetterling missed was that while the Germans were able keep their Totalausfalle numbers low in relation to Soviet losses, the repaired tanks and remaining crews did not have anything near the same efficiency as the tanks and crews at the start of the offensive. In 1996, amateur historian Georg Nipe wrote Decision in the Ukraine, which used some of the new numbers from German records, but fell into the trap of endorsing von Manstein’s claims about Zitadelle as a ‘lost victory.’ Without reference to any Soviet records, Nipe claimed that Rotmistrov lost 600–650 tanks at Prokhorovka on 12 July and that the Germans had actually gained numerical superiority in tanks in this sector and that the commitment of Nehring’s XXIV Panzerkorps may have been decisive.
  21. Salutations, The games future looks better and better for all of us.
  22. Salutations, This map is an important step in the developers map technologies because the polygonal net of the landscape is 16 times more detailed than on previous maps. In addition, the detailed zone for ground warfare (20 km to the South and the West of Prokhorovka) contains new high detailed buildings with new damage visualization. It should be noted that this more detailed environment, of course, demands more from the graphics subsystem, but reasonable graphics settings can give you good performance even on middle range video cards. You may ask "Why don't you make all the new maps at this level of detail?", but the answer is that increasing the level of detail reduces the overall size of the map. A good map for the joint tank and air battles (100 x 100 km in case of Prokhorovka) would be not enough for a full-blown, 'air campaign' map that should be 200 x 250 km minimum. Therefore, Prokhorovka map is a fine balance of several things. It allows making interesting tank campaigns, having interesting joint tank and aircraft multiplayer, keeping the performance impact 30% or less at reasonable graphics settings, and having improved visual quality at the ground level required for the ground battles.
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