1
Excerpt from the raw and unedited manuscript of the new Black Cross Red Star Vol 3
by Christer Bergström
Dealing with Operation “Wilhelm” in June 1942.
Read the background to Operation “Wilhelm” here (pages 312-315):
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Decision/USA-EF-Decision-15.html
On April 5, 1942, Hitler presented the plan for the great 1942 Summer Offensive in his Führer
Directive No. 41, Operation “Blue.” He had given up on the prospect of annihilating the
Soviet Union, but the new aim was to “wipe out the entire defensive potential remaining to
the Soviets, and to cut them off, as far as possible, from their most important centers of war
industry.” For this purpose, “all available forces will be concentrated on the main operations
in the southern sector, with the aim of destroying the enemy before the Don River, in order to
secure the Caucasian oil fields and the passes through the Caucasus mountains themselves.”
Objectively speaking, this was the most rational thing to do, at least from
Hitler’s own perspective. Indeed, oil was the Achilles heel of Soviet war industry, which
otherwise outproduced Germany. The USSR was a major oil producer, but 86% of its oil
came from the Caucasian oil fields at Baku, Groznyy, and Maykop. Hitler figured that if his
armed forces could occupy these oil fields, the Soviet industry would be strangled.
To achieve such a goal—which implied an advance across thousands of
kilometers of mainly uninhibited steppe with very few roads, across high mountains, and with
a tremendously extended flank towards the east—several preconditions were required. The
capture of Sevastopol was one, and obtaining better jump-off positions at River Donets after
the ending of the encirclement battle south of Kharkov in May 1942 was another. The purpose
of the latter was to secure an area which would protect the Sixth Army’s upcoming offensive
towards the northeast from Belgorod, according to Operation “Blue I.”
Two plans, one following after the other, were prepared for this objective: First,
Operation “Wilhelm” was to be launched across River Donets as a pincer operation against
the Twenty-eighth Army of Soviet Southwestern Front east of Kharkov. The objective was to
annihilate this army and overcome three water barriers that cross this sector from north to
south: The Donets River and its two tributaries Velikiy Burluk and Oskol.
Next, Operation “Fridericus II” would be carried out in order to envelop and
annihilate the army to the south of the Twenty-eighth, General-Mayor Kirill Moskalenko’s
Thirty-eighth Army, and elements of the Ninth Army on the Southern Front’s northern flank,
between Izyum and Kupyansk, on the eastern bank of River Donets.
The role of air support for the offensive was given to General Kurt Pflugbeil’s
Fliegerkorps IV, the air corps that Generaloberst Alexander Löhr’s Luftflotte 4 had in
Ukraine. This mustered an impressive force of over one thousand aircraft (transport and
liaison aircraft not included) on June 1:
145 tactical reconnaissance aircraft (109 Fw 189s, 19 Hs 126s, and 17 Bf 110s).
80 strategic reconnaissance aircraft (45 Ju 88s, 33 Do 17s, and one each Bf 110
and Fw 189.
214 fighters in Stab and three Gruppen of JG 3 “Udet” (Bf 109 F-4); Stab and
three Gruppen of JG 52 (Bf 109 F-4); 15.(Kroat.)/JG 52 with 19 Bf 109 E; and I./JG 53 “Pik
As” (Bf 109 F-4).
226 bombers in Stab, II. and III./KG 51 (74 Ju 88s); Stab and three Gruppen of
KG 27 “Boelcke” (77 He 111s); and Stab and three Gruppen of KG 55 “Greif” (75 He 111s).
54 Ju 87 Stukas of II./StG 1.
2
300 ground-attack aircraft in Stab and I./SchG 1 (34 Bf 109 E-7/U1); II./SchG 1
(34 Hs 129s); 7./SchG 1 (17 Hs 123s); Stab, I. and II./ZG 1 “Wespe” (92 Bf 110s); Stab, I.
and II./ZG 2 (87 Bf 110s); and III./ZG 2 (36 Bf 109 E-7/U1).
[. . .]
General-Mayor Timofey Khryukin arrived on June 7 to replace Falaleyev, who
was deprived of his command. Khryukin had previously led the VVS of the Karelian Front,
and he was a worthy successor of Falaleyev, being hand-picked by the commander of VVS
KA, General-Leytenant Aleksandr Novikov.
Khryukin’s first task was to organize the transformation of VVS Southwestern
Front into the new Eighth Air Army, 8 VA. The order for this arrived on June 9. This meant
that the previous air forces of the individual armies were re-organized into air Diviziya under
8 VA’s centralized control—a major improvement. At its formation on June 10, 8 VA
consisted of the following units:
206 IAD:
31 IAP with LaGG-3s, and 515 IAP and 876 IAP with Yak-1s.
220 IAD:
2 IAP with LaGG-3s, and 248 IAP, 296 IAP and 875 IAP with Yak1s.
268 IAD:
273 IAP with Yak-1s and 512 IAP with LaGG-3s.
269 IAD:
254 IAP with LaGG-3s
226 ShAD:
504 ShAP and 800 ShAP with Il-2s.
228 ShAD:
211 ShAP, 285 ShAP, 431 ShAP and 505 ShAP with Il-2s, 792 IAP with LaGG3s, and 94 BAP with Pe-2s.*
271 NBAD:
623 NBAP with U-2s and 10 GBAP with SBs, Il-4s, and Pe-2s.
272 NBAD:
596 NBAP, 709 NBAP, and 714 NBAP with U-2s, and 13 GBAP with Su-2s.
4 RAG (reorganized into 270 BAD on June 18, 1942):
148 IAP with Yak-1s, 52 BBAP, 135 BBAP and 826 BBAP with Su-2s, and 99
BAP with Pe-2s.
* 94 BAP was shifted to 4 RAG on June 12.
As can be seen, all obsolete Polikarpov fighters (I-16, I-153 and I-15bis) had been phased out
and replaced with modern fighter planes, mainly Yak-1s. On the other hand, only two day
bomber regiments were available to 8 VA, which was a major weakness.
In addition to these units, 8 VA had four composite air regiments (SAP) for
close support of the ground troops, seven separate auxiliary Eskadrilyas (reconnaissance,
ambulance, liaison), a transport aviation detachment, and the Kiev Special Air Group of the
Civil Air Fleet (Kiyevskaya osobaya aviagruppa GVF). The latter operated PS-84s, U-2s, R5s, UT-1s, TB-3s to deliver cargo and troops to the front units, and flew deep behind the
German lines at night, dropping sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and delivering supplies
3
to the partisans. All in all, 8 VA had 596 combat aircraft, 116 auxiliary aircraft, and 124
transport planes.
1
In the midst of the organization of Soviet air army 8 VA, the Germans struck. At
dawn on June 10, in clear weather, the calm was broken as hundreds of German artillery
pieces opened up against General-Leytenant Dmitriy Ryabyshev’s Soviet Twenty-eighth
Army, while the skies were darkened by masses of attacking Luftwaffe planes. Soviet 169th
Rifle Division’s C.O., Polkovnik Samuil Rogachevskiy, called Twenty-eighth Army’s
headquarters and reported from the northern flank: “Everything is covered by a thick veil of
smoke and dust from all the explosions. You can't see anything, it's like night everywhere.
There seems to be no place where shells and bombs are not falling. In the defense sector of
the 680th Infantry Regiment, it is absolute hell. The men cower in trenches and holes. The
regimental commander and battalion commanders cannot see anything from their observation
posts because of the smoke and dust.”
2
After a 45-minute artillery and air preparation, the German ground attack was
launched at 0400 hrs on June 10. The first units were repelled by the 169th Rifle Division, but
then, wrote General-Leytenant Ryabyshev, “up to 70 dive-bombers appeared. They subjected
the entire depth of the regimental sector to violent bombing. Under the pressure of the
superior enemy forces, our troops began to retreat.”3
VIII Army Corps of General Friedrich Paulus’s Sixth Army attacked towards
the southeast from the area northeast of Kharkov, and III Motorized Army Corps, temporarily
assigned to Paulus, struck northwards from the area southeast of Kharkov. Very effective
Luftwaffe air strikes enabled the Germans to break through on both flanks. In the north, the
three infantry divisions of VIII Army Corps captured three bridges across the Donets, and
already by the afternoon of June 10, they captured the city of Volchansk and continued
towards the southeast, advancing in the rear of the Soviet forces. To the south, III Motorized
Army Corps was even more successful. Having taken two undamaged bridges across River
Burluk between Chuguyev and Kupyansk in the morning, its three panzer divisions and one
motorized division pushed Soviet Thirty-eighth Army aside and made a lightning advance
across the flatland to the north, reaching the town of Bolshoy Burluk, nearly 40 kilometers
from their starting point, on the evening of June 10.
The attack was supported by the most concentrated air effort ever seen in the
war. Fliegerkorps IV carried out 2,072 combat sorties, of which 627 were by the Bf 110
ground-attack planes of ZG 1 and ZG 2, and 625 by other ground-attack planes and Stukas.4
It
was nearly the same number of sorties that had been flown by Luftflotte 2 on June 22, 1941,
the opening onslaught on the Soviet Union (2,272), only that this time it was directed against
an area only half as large. Only nine of these aircraft were shot down, mostly by ground fire.
As a measurement of the intensity with which the Luftwaffe fliers were
engaged, the war diary of III./KG 51 “Edelweiss” shows that this unit carried out its first
attack of June 10 when it attacked Soviet troop quarters in the village of Krynki between 0330
and 0345 hours with 24 Ju 88s in the largest formation in a long time. After landing at 0400
hours, the Junkers bombers took off again at 0509 hours, fully loaded with bombs and
ammunition and refueled, to attack the next target. By 0820 hours, III./KG 51 had already
flown eighty-three sorties in four missions against Soviet troop quarters. At the end of the
day, the unit had conducted no less than 159 sorties, divided between nine missions. Not once
had they encountered any fighter opposition.5 This was quite indicative of the first two days
of Operation “Wilhelm.” Not even on June 11 was III./KG 51 intercepted by Soviet fighters,
and the war diary of another Kampfgruppe, III./KG 55 “Greif,” also shows no encounters with
Soviet fighters on June 10 or June 11.6
There were several reasons to this, of which the most important one was the
completely overwhelming number of German aircraft in the air, against which the Soviets had
4
little chance. But the German ground troops also reported quite weak interference from the
VVS, which probably was because 8 VA was in the midst of its reorganization.
Air fighting actually was on quite a limited scale on June 10, despite the
thousands of sorties flown by the Luftwaffe. The German fighter pilots claimed eight Il-2s,
seven fighters (of which one was by I./JG 53 against 2 VA), and two Su-2s. One of the latter
ended up as No. 95 on the scoreboard of 9./JG 52’s Oberfeldwebel Leopold Steinbatz, and
Fighter General Adolf Galland’s older brother, Oberleutnant Fritz Galland of 2./JG 3,
achieved his second victory against what was reported as a “MiG-1,” but probably was a
LaGG-3.* Actual losses sustained by 8 VA were five Il-2s, four fighters, and two Su-2s.
However, among 8 VA’s operations on June 10 was an attempt to strike back by
attacking one of the bases near Belgorod where ZG 1 “Wespengeschwader” (“Wasp
Geschwader”) was stationed, as war correspondent Günther Dach described in a report: “Led
by Knight's Cross holder Hauptmann Schenck, a Gruppe of the 'Wasp Geschwader' carries out
relentless mission against Russian positions. Howling and whistling, the light and heavy
bombs of the 'Wasps' create large gaps in the Russian positions. The bombs rain down on
artillery batteries, machine gun positions and trenches, on tanks, cannon and vehicles. Then
the sleek Messerschmitt Zerstörer follow up with strafing attacks against the Russian lines,
their cannon and machine guns blasting.
While the German planes bring death and destruction to the Russian infantry, a
formation of Russian aircraft sneak up to attack the Zerstörergruppe's airfield. The attackers
are six of the so-called Shturmoviks.
The Gruppenkommandeur is about to enter his airplane on the neighboring
airfield when he sees the tracers of the Flak. Within seconds, his Me 110 roars across the
airfield, he climbs in a steep turn and takes up the chase. Four other aircraft follow him. Five
Zerstörer are in hot pursuit of the enemy. As they catch up and come within firing range, they
cling onto the Russians, close behind. The landing gear drops on one of them, another emits
smoke. But won't any of these heavily armored planes go down?
The commander is in position behind the last aircraft, that has not yet been
attacked. The vicious eyes of the wasp that is painted in the nose of the '110 is closing in on
the enemy. With short, precisely aimed bursts of fire, our pilot, who has been successful in
almost two hundred combat missions, keeps his sights on the Russian's most vulnerable spot.
Three, four, a few more bursts of fire, then a flame shoots out from the Russian's cabin, he
staggers and plummets to the ground like a burning torch. The four other Russians struggle to
get over their lines. They too are badly shot up.”7
Thus, Hauptmann Wolfgang Schenck scored his 16th victory. Hauptmann Kurt
Brändle, the Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 3 “Udet,” described the shooting down of another
Soviet aircraft that day, recorded as his 45th victory,** on a mission with his wingman,
Leutnant Gustav Frielinghaus:
“I flew to provide a bridge with air cover. In the course of the mission, I flew
with my wingman over our own panzer spearhead. Coming from the east, I saw 6 R-10s
[apparently Su-2s] with 8 fighter planes as escort flying towards the west at an altitude of
about 1,200 meters. I approached the higher flying fighter escort from behind and below, and
* This is according to Tagesmeldung Nr. 320 by Fliegerkorps IV, issued at 2400 hours on June 10, 1940, in
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RH 20-6/183. Prien et al has missed Galland’s and two other claims by I./JG 3 in
their Die Jagdverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe, Teil 9/II.
* No. 45, at 1732 hours, according to Tagesmeldung Nr. 320 by Fliegerkorps IV, issued at 2400 hours on June
10, 1940, in Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RH 20-6/183, and Brändle’s own victory report in
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RL 10/431; not No. 46, as per Prien et al, ibid.
5
catching them by surprise, I opened fire at close range against the enemy aircraft that flew
farthest to the right in the formation. While I still was shooting, parts were torn off the
fuselage and tail unit. The enemy aircraft pushed away in a left turn and subsequent dive. It
flew close to the ground for a few moments and then attempted an emergency landing but
crashed and burned out completely. Point of impact 3 km north of Buganyovka, 1732 hours."8
The massive onslaught from the air and on the ground compelled the Soviets to
commence a rapid withdrawal to get the Twenty-eighth Army out of the “sack.” They only
had a 30-km narrow passage between the two German pincers, but next day, June 11,
Khryukov dispatched all his Il-2s with strong fighter escort, mainly against VIII Army Corps,
which attacked from the north. Meanwhile, Soviet Thirty-eighth Army mounted a
counterattack against III Motorized Army Corps in the south, where the 44th Infantry
Division took the full brunt of the strike. This compelled General Pflugbeil to concentrate his
air units to this sector. German Sixth Army reported: “Fliegerkorps IV supported the 16th
Panzer Division with the bulk of its units, and effective Stuka attacks relieved the 44th
Infantry Division. The enemy’s air activity was of little effect.”9
The fighters of Fliegerkorps IV were in relentless action to relieve their ground
troops. They reported eighteen Soviet aircraft shot down, including eleven Il-2s.
The Luftwaffe’s own losses were eleven shot down aircraft. None of these were in air combat,
although Khryukov’s fighters made a larger appearance in the skies on this day. Both III./KG
51 and III./KG 55 reported their first cases of enemy fighter interceptions on June 10, but with
no German losses as a result—which might indicate the inadequate gunnery training of many
of the hastily trained young pilots that had recently been sent to the air units.10 Next day
brought deteriorated weather which caused the air activity on both sides to decrease.
Fliegerkorps IV recorded only five aircraft losses on June 12. With one of these, however,
III./JG 52 lost 37-victory ace Stabsfeldwebel Alfred Emberger when his Bf 109 received a
direct AAA hit.
Nevertheless, the Stukas continued to take a heavy toll of the counterattacking
Thirty-eighth Army, as that army’s commander, General-Mayor Kirill Moskalenko, observed:
“The main complicating factor was the enemy aviation, which enjoyed an unquestionable air
superiority. The German aerial reconnaissance observed the movements of the Soviet forces,
which allowed the German command to foresee our intentions. In close cooperation with their
tanks, the enemy aircraft dealt continuous blows against our artillery positions and troop
concentrations. Nearly 1,200 aircraft sorties were made against the armored forces that
participated in Thirty-eighth Army’s counterattack.”11
However, even in that way, the counterattack enabled the Twenty-eighth Army
to slip out of the trap. When the German pincers met early on June 13, the bulk of the
Twenty-eighth Army had escaped. Pflugbeil now directed the bulk of his air sorties against
those Red Army units that after all had been enveloped. With Luftwaffe planes and artillery
wiping out all Soviet ammunition and fuel dumps in the area, the surrounded elements quickly
lost their fighting capacity. Meanwhile, the bulk of Fliegerkorps IV supported the continued
advance by III Motorized Army Corps.12 A report to the Headquarters of the Southwestern
Front that day illustrates the massive Luftwaffe operations: “From 1600 hours, the following
areas were heavily affected by bombers: Olkhovatka, Maly Burluchek, Khatne, intersections
in the Kupyansk, Urazovo section and the heights west of Kupyansk. A large group of
bombers with fighters bombed Valuyki, the station area.”
13
The German ground forces had attacked with a numerical superiority, but the
swift advance clearly was also much due to the massive support by Fliegerkorps IV, which
had completely overwhelmed 8 VA. The intensity of the Luftwaffe operations is obvious from
the following excerpt from the logbook of III./KG 51’s Hauptmann Klaus Häberlen, which
shows the following combat missions during the four first days of Operation “Wilhelm”:14
6
June 10, 1942:
0335-0355 hours
0500-0535
0640-0725
0800-0855
1030-1135
1335-1435
1505-1645
June 11, 1942:
0700-0745
0855-0940
1035-1125
June 12, 1942:
0930-1025
1330-1440
1555-1705
1640-1935
June 13, 1942
0830-09-30
1030-1125
1455-1625
In these four days alone, Häberlen carried out seventeen bombings, knowing all the time that
each of these combat flight could be his last flight; every bombing mission was a challenge of
death. One of the combat missions on June 11, 1942, was Häberlen's 100th in total. But this,
of course, did not last. On July 1, 1942, he is so exhausted that he is transferred to the training
unit IV./KG 51 in the rear area.15
In a discussion over the telephone late in the evening of June 13, Stalin informed
Marshal Timoshenko that General-Leytenant Aleksandr Golovanov would dispatch forces
from his ADD bomber force against the German airfields. He also demanded that 8 VA
“bomb crossings over the Donets to prevent the enemy from supplying everything needed for
their tank groups,” and that the fighter planes should be employed “in massive
counterattacks.”
This resulted in a somewhat heated discussion where Timoshenko retorted, “Our
problem now is the lack of bombers for daytime operations, so we are not only unable to
bomb the river crossings, but it also affects ground targets directly at the front. As far as our
capabilities allow, we will concentrate our aviation against the enemy crossings day and night,
but we kindly ask you to reinforce us with daytime bombers as soon as possible.”
Displaying a conspicuous ignorance of some of the realities in the air war, Stalin
snapped, “You are wrong about daytime bombers. Our Il-2 Shturmoviks are considered the
best daytime bombers for close-support. They have a better effect than the Junkers against
tanks, enemy manpower, and bridges. Our Shturmoviks can take 400 kg of bombs. According
to my information, you have Shturmoviks. Maybe they are not used properly?”
16
With only two Shturmovik regiments and without any day bomber regiments,
there was not much Khryukin could do to comply with Stalin’s orders. The lack of bombers
7
was a general problem throughout the VVS. Indeed, 8 VA received substantial reinforcements
between June 12 and 14. However, these consisted only of fighter units: 206 IAD was
bolstered with Yak-1-equipped 427 IAP; 268 IAD received 9 GIAP with Yak-1s, and the
entire 235 IAD with four regiments equipped with Lend-Lease Hawker Hurricanes (46 IAP,
180 IAP, 191 IAP, and 436 IAP) arrived. Also, 659 IAP with Yak-1s arrived at 268 IAD.
Perhaps most important of all was the arrival of the élite 434 IAP, commanded by one of the
most legendary Soviet fighter pilots of the war, Hero of the Soviet Union, Mayor Ivan
Kleshchyov, who at that time had been credited with eleven air victories.
The Shturmovik units were quite worn down after the severe losses during the
past days, so 8 VA operated mainly with fighters. For understandable reasons, Khryukin was
hesitant to employ his fighters in the role of fighter-bombers; his predecessor, Falaleyev, had
done so during the Battle of Kharkov in May. Since the rocket-projectiles made the fighters
slow and cumbersome in air combat, this had led to bitter losses, which was one of the main
reasons why Falaleyev was sacked from his command.
Several deficiencies also plagued the newly formed 8 VA, as pointed out in the
chronicle of this air army: “The effectiveness of combat sorties was often reduced because of
an insufficient cohesion of the newly formed units and poor interaction between them. These
shortcomings were particularly prominent in the fighter units, whose pilots often huddled
together in air combat, without any camouflage, and not echeloned at altitude. When they
spotted enemy aircraft, everyone attacked immediately, without any division into strike and
reserve groups.”
17
The bolstering of the Soviet fighter force was felt by many German bomber
fliers on that day, when, for instance, III./KG 55 was intercepted by fighters on two occasions,
but no losses were inflicted on the bomber unit.18 All in all, only six of Fliegerkorps IV’s
aircraft were shot down on June 13. In spite of reinforcements, 605 combat sorties was all that
8 VA could accomplish on the two days June 13-14, resulting in claims for no more than nine
shot down German aircraft.
19
The level of the Luftwaffe’s numerical superiority in the air is evident from the
logbooks of some of the fighter pilots for June 13: In JG 52, Hauptmann Johannes Steinhoff
flew four missions without encountering enemy aircraft on more than one occasion (when he
shot down a LaGG-3), Oberleutnant Gerhard Barkhorn flew four missions without ever
spotting any enemy in the air, Feldwebel Edmund Rossmann also flew four missions and
came across the enemy just once, when he blew a LaGG-3 out of the sky, and Feldwebel
Alfred Grislawski was airborne three times without any hostile encounter.20
Whenever these highly experienced fighter pilots came across any Soviet
formation in the sky, they often inflicted terrible losses. A formation of LaGG-3s and Yak-1s
ran into Bf 109s of JG 52 at noon on June 13, whereby the Germans claimed five shot down
for no own losses: These were the 30th victory of Oberfeldwebel Heinz Ahnert, the 32nd and
33rd victories of Leutnant Waldemar Semelka, and the 8th and 9th victories of future “100-
plus-victory” ace Leutnant Rudolf Miethig.
On the Soviet side, 296 IAP was badly hit that day, losing three pilots in combat
and another two who collided in mid-air. One of the missing fliers was Starshiy Leytenant
Vasiliy Skotnoy, with five individual and eleven kills on his tally.21 One of his unit mates,
Kapitan Boris Yeryomin, said, “We lost Skotnoy north of Kupyansk, in a heavy combat
against 50 enemy aircraft. No one saw what happened. They searched for him, but in vain. He
was a courageous and highly respected pilot, a master of his craft. Before his last fight he told
us: ‘I will probably get shot down.’ We just said, ‘Stop bitching! We all fly under the sky,
anything can happen to anyone.’ But he had a premonition of his death."
8
June 13 marked the climax of the air battle. In violent fighter combat that raged
throughout that day, the Luftwaffe fighters claimed to have shot down twenty-three enemy
fighters and just four Il-2s against a single loss of their own.
However, that it could be dangerous to underestimate their enemy was proven to
II./JG 52 on the next day—when Operation “Wilhelm” came to an end. A combat with LaGG3s cost the Jagdgruppe two Bf 109s. One of these was probably shot down by 248 IAP’s
Leytenant Konstantin Saprykin, who thus achieved his fifth kill. Nevertheless, the greater
experience among the Luftwaffe pilots, their superior tactics and better airplanes decided the
outcome of most engagements. On June 14, one of the fighter units that had arrived to bolster
VVS Southwestern Front a fortnight previously, 206 IAD, lost eight aircraft, including four
Yak-1s from 427 IAP alone.22 All of these seem to have been victims of II./JG 52, where the
Gruppenkommandeur, Hauptmann Johannes Steinhoff, scored his 64th kill against a LaGG-3.
The Germans now had reached the line Kupino (30 km southeast of Belgorod) –
Olkhovatka (30 km southeast of Volchansk) – Burluk River 20 km north of Balakleya, but the
numerical results of Operation “Wilhelm” was meager. Most of the Twenty-eighth Army
managed to slip out of the trap, and no more than 22,000 POWs were brought in by the
Germans, who also counted 232 destroyed Soviet tanks, and 153 destroyed or captured
artillery pieces and anti-tank guns.23 However, the intended territorial gains had been
achieved, and all of this was at a quite low cost for the German ground units, no more than
718 men killed in action.24 This was much due to the massive air support. All in all,
Fliegerkorps IV dropped 3,034.5 tons of bombs during Operation "Wilhelm."25
The 37 aircraft lost by Fliegerkorps IV in combat during “Wilhelm” represented
a quite low loss ratio, but it was higher than Pflugbeil had expected. The 78 Soviet aircraft
that had been claimed shot down in the same period—of which approximately 70 % can be
matched with actual Soviet losses—showed a ratio between Luftwaffe and VVS losses that
had deteriorated significantly since the Battle of Kharkov.
Notes
1 Gubin, B.A. & V.D. Kiselyov. Vosmaya vozdushnaya. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1980. , p. 7.
2 Ryabyshev, Dmitriy Ivanovich. Pervyy god voyny. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1990. , p. 223.
3 Ryabyshev, p. 224.
4 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RH 20-6/183. AOK 6, Führungsabteilung. Anlagenband zum Kriegstagebuch No.
12. Anlage 422: Tagemeldung Nr. 320 by Fliegerkorps IV.
5 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RL 10/661. Anlage 2 zum 7. Kriegstagebuch der III./KG 51.
6 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RL 10/132. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 6 der III./Kampfgeschwader 55.
7 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RL 15/34. Wortberichte Lw. Kriegsberichterkomp. (mot.) 2.
8 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RL 10/431. Abschussbericht Hptm. Brändle am 10.6.1942.
9 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RH 20-6/176. AOK 6. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12 vom 23. Mai - 19. Juli 1942.
10 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RL 10/132. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 6 der III./Kampfgeschwader 55; RL 10/661.
Anlage 2 zum 7. Kriegstagebuch der III./KG 51.
11 Moskalenko, Kirill Semyonovich. Na Yugo-Zapadnom napravlenii. Kniga 1. Moscow: Nauka, 1969. p. 228.
12 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RH 20-6/183. AOK 6, Führungsabteilung. Anlagenband zum Kriegstagebuch No.
12. Anlage 457.
13 TsAMO, f. 96a, op. 2011, d. 26. l. 81.
14 Klaus Häberlen, logbook.
15 Interview with Klaus Häberlen.
16 TsAMO, f. 96a, op. 2011, d. 26. ll. 87ff.
17 Gubin & Kiselyov, Vosmaya vozdushnaya, p. 10.
18 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RL 10/132. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 6 der III./Kampfgeschwader 55.
19 TsАМО, f. 346, оp. 5760, d. l. 70.
20 Logbooks of Johannes Seinhoff, Gerhard Barkhorn, Edmund Rossmann, and Feldwebel Alfred Grislawski.
21 TsAMO, f. 58, op. 818883, d. 1082, l. 65.
9
22 TsAMO, f. 346, op. 0005755, d. 0023, l. 482ff.
23 NARA. AOK 6, Fuehrungsabteilung Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12, 12-15 June 42, AOK 6 22855/1 file.
24 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RH 20-6/176. AOK 6. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12 vom 23. mai - 19. Juli 1942.
25 Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv. RH 20-6/176. AOK 6. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12 vom 23. Mai - 19. Juli 1942.